The FBI hires Turkish-American Sibel Edmonds as a contract translator for Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Farsi. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the FBI is desperately seeking qualified individuals to translate backlogged wiretaps and help authorities interview detained suspects. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004] Before 9/11, there was not a single Turkish-language specialist at the bureau. [Vanity Fair, 9/2005] Fluent in both Turkish and Azerbaijani, Edmonds works as a “linguist” in those languages. For Farsi, which Edmonds hasn’t spoken in 25 years, she is only a “monitor.” (An FBI translator is either a “linguist” or a “monitor” for any given language. Linguists are more qualified and consequently have broader roles. For example, while linguists can do verbatim translations, monitors may only produce summaries. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004] ) As a contract translator, Edmonds is given a flexible schedule. On average she will work four evenings a week logging between 10 and 25 hours weekly. Almost 75 percent of her work will relate to pre-9/11 intelligence. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004] The work of FBI translators is very important because the translator is often the bureau’s first filter that incoming intelligence must pass through. It is the responsibility of translators to decide what needs to be translated verbatim, what can simply be summarized, and what can be dismissed as not pertinent. In making these decisions, translators are not required to consult field agents or analysts. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004] In fact, agents can’t even access the translation area unless they are escorted by a translator. [WorldNetDaily, 1/7/2004; United Press International, 3/31/2004] A translator’s decision to mark a wiretap as “not pertinent” is usually final. Though all documents and transcripts are supposed to be reviewed by at least two translators, this never actually happens, according to Edmonds, even after 9/11. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004]
September 20, 2001 and After: FBI Translator Sees Pattern of Deliberate Failure
Immediately after beginning her job as an FBI translator, Sibel Edmonds encounters a pattern of deliberate failure in her department. Her supervisor, Mike Feghali, allegedly says, “Let the documents pile up so we can show it and say that we need more translators and expand the department.” She claims that if she was not slowing down enough, her supervisor would delete her work. Meanwhile, FBI agents working on the 9/11 investigation would call and ask for urgently needed translations. In January 2002, FBI officials will tell government auditors that translator shortages are resulting in “the accumulation of thousands of hours of audio tapes and pages” of material that has not been translated. [Washington Post, 6/19/2002] After she discloses this in an October 2002 interview with CBS’ 60 Minutes, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) says of her charges, “She’s credible and the reason I feel she’s very credible is because people within the FBI have corroborated a lot of her story.” He points out that the speed of such translation might make the difference between an attack succeeding or failing. [CBS News, 10/25/2002; New York Post, 10/26/2002] An investigation by the Justice Department’s Inspector General’s Office (see (July 8, 2004)) will also find Edmonds credible.
After September 14, 2001-October 2001: FBI Translation Supervisor Blocks Agent’s Request to Have Certain 9/11-Related Material Re-Translated
One of Sibel Edmond’s main assignments as a contract FBI translator is to expedite requested translations from field agents. Shortly after she is hired by the FBI, an Arizona field agent requests that certain material be re-translated. He is concerned that the original translation may not have been thorough enough. When she does the re-translation, she discovers that it contains information extremely relevant to the September 11 attacks, including references to “blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas” It also “reveals certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery” (see July-August 2001). [Edmonds, 8/1/2004] After re-translating the documents, she goes to supervisor Mike Feghali and says, “I need to talk to this agent over a secure line because what we came across in this retranslating is gigantic, it has specific information about certain specific activity related to 9/11.” But Feghali refuses to send the retranslation to the same agent, telling her, “How would you like it if another translator did this same thing to you? The original translator is going to be held responsible.” The agent never receives the re-translation he requested from Edmonds. Instead he is told by the Washington field office that the original translation is fine. [Boston Globe, 7/5/2004; Edmonds, 8/1/2004]
November 2001: FBI Translator Fails to Translate Wiretaps of Individuals with Whom She Has Connections
Recently hired FBI translator Melek Can Dickerson (see (Late October 2001)) begins marking as “not pertinent” wiretapped conversations that concern certain high-value surveillance targets working at the American-Turkish Council (ATC). As it later emerges, Dickerson previously worked as an intern for the ATC and maintains ongoing relationships with at least two individuals under investigation. [Washington Post, 6/19/2002; New York Observer, 1/22/2004; Vanity Fair, 9/2005] She also manages to obtain, and prevent from being translated, assignments designated for co-worker Sibel Edmonds. These wiretaps, which she marks as being completed by Edmonds, concern the same targeted persons. [New York Observer, 1/22/2004]
Early December 2001: FBI Wiretaps Reveal that Turkish Groups Attempted to Bribe Congress Persons in Late 1990s
Chicago FBI special agent Joel Robertz contacts FBI contract linguist Sibel Edmonds and asks her to review more than 40 wiretaps, some of which are several years old. The wiretaps include what Sibel believes are references to large scale drug shipments and other crimes. The targets of these recordings are individuals at Chicago’s Turkish Consulate and the American-Turkish Consulate, as well as members of the American-Turkish Council and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. She also finds evidence of attempts to bribe members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat, during the late 1990s (see Late 1990s-Early 2001). [Anti-War (.com), 8/15/2005; Vanity Fair, 9/2005]
December 2, 2001: FBI Translator Sibel Edmonds Invited by Co-Worker to Become Member of Group that Is Under Federal Investigation
FBI translator Sibel Edmonds receives a call from co-worker Melek Can Dickerson, whom she barely knows. Dickerson says she and her husband Major Douglas Dickerson are in the area and would like to stop by for a visit. [Vanity Fair, 9/2005] Douglas is a US Air Force major who procures weapons from the US for various Central Asian and Middle Eastern governments. [Anti-War (.com), 8/15/2005] “I’m in the area with my husband and I’d love you to meet him. Is it OK if we come by?” Edmonds recalls Dickerson saying. When the couple arrives, Douglas Dickerson encourages Edmonds and her husband Matthew Edmonds to join the American-Turkish Council (ATC) and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA). Joining the organizations would get them tied in with a network of high-level people, including officials at the Turkish Embassy. When Sibel’s husband Michael suggests that there are probably strict eligibility requirements for becoming a member of this organization, Douglas says to Sibel, “All you have to do is tell them who you work for and what you do and you will get in very quickly.” Sibel attempts to steer the conversation toward another topic. As part of her job at the FBI, some of the wiretapped conversations she translates involve the very same people the Dickersons are describing as “high-level friends.” She is concerned that the ultimate goal of the Dickersons’ offer is to get Sibel involved in espionage and to help shield those groups from FBI surveillance. [Washington Post, 6/19/2002; CBS News, 10/25/2002; New York Observer, 1/22/2004; Vanity Fair, 9/2005] Major Dickerson brings up the name of a wealthy Turkish man living in nearby McLean, Virginia, who is involved with the ATC and has access to US military information. Sibel Edmonds is surprised because she recognizes his name from an investigation she is working on and knows that he is the target of an FBI counterintelligence operation. The Dickersons intimate that they are so close to this man that they shop for him and his wife. [Sperry, 2005, pp. 163] “They wanted to sell me for the information I could provide,” she later explains in an interview. They promised her she would receive enough to “live a very comfortable life wherever we wanted. We would never have to work again.” [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004]
December 4, 2001: FBI Translator Informs Supervisor that Co-Worker Is Shielding Targets of Investigation from Surveillance
FBI contract linguist Sibel Edmonds informs supervisor Mike Feghali—first orally and later in writing—about her recent encounter with the Dickersons on December 2 (see December 2, 2001) and describes their self-acknowledged links to the American-Turkish Council (ATC), the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), and certain high-level Turkish Embassy officials, all of which are targets of FBI wiretaps. Edmonds also alleges, either on this day or some time afterwards, that Dickerson has also leaked information to people under investigation and that she has even tried to stop Edmonds and another translator from listening to their wiretapped conversations. [Petition for a writ of certiorari. Sibel Edmonds v. Department of Justice, et all., 8/4/2005, pp. 2 ; Government Executive, 8/8/2005; Vanity Fair, 9/2005] Feghali tells her not to worry and says he will immediately file a report with the security department. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004; Vanity Fair, 9/2005] (The security department will later tell Edmonds it received no such report [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004; Boston Globe, 7/5/2004] .) He then changes the subject. “Now, Sibel, I understand you’ve been taking on a lot of coursework at your university. Why not take advantage of our workplace opportunities?” he asks. When Edmonds asks Feghali what he means, he explains that she could come to the office on Saturday and Sunday to do her school work on the clock, adding another $700 or so to her weekly earnings. On another occasion, one of her supervisors (possibly Feghali) offers to make her next trip to Turkey “TDY” (paid travel). All she would have to do is “stop off in some liaison office in Ankara a couple times, make my little appearance, and suddenly all my flights, hotels, and expenses would be paid for by the FBI,” she will recall in a 2004 interview. Edmonds will add, “I couldn’t believe what I was hearing.” [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004]
Between January 14, 2002 and February 1, 2002: FBI Translator Re-Translates Wiretaps Assigned to Colleague; Discovers Colleague Buried Critical Information
FBI contract linguist Sibel Edmonds re-translates 17 of the “hundreds” of wiretapped conversations that had been originally translated or reviewed by co-worker Melek Can Dickerson. [Anti-War (.com), 8/15/2005] She discovers that Dickerson marked as “not pertinent” every single file that included a reference to surveillance targets connected to the Turkish organizations with whom she had ties (see (November 2001)). One of those targets is a Turkish intelligence officer, who is a personal friend of Dickerson. Edmonds learns from the wiretaps that the officer had spies inside the US State Department and Pentagon seeking access to US military and intelligence secrets. [CBS, 10/27/2002] The wiretaps also reveal that the group is involved in arms and drug smuggling and is tied into a complex network of governmental and private figures in several countries. [United Press International, 11/15/2005] Additionally, Edmonds identifies hundreds of other instances where Dickerson’s work obstructed investigations. For example, she learns from one conversation that a US State Department staffer agreed to accept $7,000 in cash from certain individuals in the American-Turkish Council (ATC) in exchange for information. One wiretapped call discussed a payment to a Pentagon official, who seemed to be involved in weapons-procurement negotiations, while another suggested that Turkish doctoral students had been placed at US research institutions in order to obtain information about black market nuclear weapons. Edmonds also hears discussions about the laundering of drug smuggling profits, the selling of classified military technologies, and a scheme to secretly give Republican Congressman Dennis Hastert tens of thousands of dollars in exchange for political favors and information. She becomes convinced that the American-Turkish Council (ATC) is being used as a front for criminal activity. [Anti-War (.com), 7/1/2004; Anti-War (.com), 8/15/2005; Vanity Fair, 9/2005]
January 14, 2002: FBI Special Agent Concerned That Translator Is Protecting Surveillance Targets and Involved in Espionage
Dennis Saccher, the FBI’s special agent in charge of Turkish counter-intelligence, invites FBI translator Sibel Edmonds into his office and shares with her his concern that Edmonds’ co-worker, Melek Can Dickerson, is protecting surveillance targets at the American-Turkish Council (ATC). He shows her several translations of wiretapped conversations that Dickerson either marked as “not pertinent,” or for which she provided only a brief summary indicating that the conversations were not important. When Edmonds tells Saccher that her department, at the request of Dickerson, no longer assigns translation tasks randomly and that certain targets, including the ATC, have been permanently attached to Dickerson, Saccher is shocked. “It sounds like espionage to me,” he suggests. At Saccher’s request, Edmonds and Kevin Taskasen, another translator, re-translate some of the conversations Dickerson had marked as “not pertinent.” They agree to schedule a meeting with supervisor Mike Feghali on February 1 (see February 1, 2002). [Washington Post, 6/19/2002; Vanity Fair, 9/2005]
Early 2002: FBI Whistleblower Threatened with Investigation
At some point during Sibel Edmonds’ effort to report her concerns about potentially major security breaches in the FBI’s translation department (see, e.g., December 2, 2001), she is told by a superior in the counterintelligence squad: “I’ll bet you’ve never worked in government before. We do things differently. We don’t name names, and we usually sweep the dirt under the carpet.” [New York Observer, 1/22/2004] On another occasion, an assistant special agent allegedly tells her: “Do you realize what you are saying here in your allegations? Are you telling me that our security people are not doing their jobs? Is that what you’re telling me? If you insist on this investigation, I’ll make sure in no time it will turn around and become an investigation about you.” [CBS News, 10/25/2002]