A later review by the CIA’s inspector general will find that the CIA’s counterterrorism resources are not properly administered during this period. The review will comment that “during the same period [CIA counterterrorism managers] were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not effectively managing the Agency’s counterterrorism funds.”
In particular: 
Although counterterrorism funding increases from 1998, funds are moved from the base budget of the Counterterrorist Center to other CIA units. Some of the funds moved are “used to cover nonspecific corporate ‘taxes’ and for a variety of purposes that… were unrelated to terrorism”; No funds are moved from other programs to support counterterrorism, even after CIA Director George Tenet issues a “declaration of war” against al-Qaeda in December 1998 and says he wants no resources spared in the fight against terrorism (see December 4, 1998); Little use of reserve CIA funds is made to fight terrorism; Counterterrorism managers do not spend all the money they have, even after their funding has been reduced by diversions to other programs. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. x-xi 
]
The CIA’s inspector general will recommend that accountability boards be convened to review the performance of the following officials for these failings: The executive director (David Carey from July 1997, A.B. “Buzzy” Krongard from March 2001); The deputy director for operations (Jack Downing from 1997, James Pavitt from 1999); and The chief of the Counterterrorist Center (Jeff O’Connell from 1997, Cofer Black from summer 1999). [Central Intelligence Agency, 3/16/2001; Coll, 2004, pp. xiv, 456; Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. x-xi ]
March 2000: US Team Plans to Capture Al-Qaeda Leader in Afghanistan, but Mission Is Aborted
CIA official Gary Berntsen and a US Army Special Forces major known as Brock (an apparent reference to Maj. Brock Gaston) lead a six-person team with the mission to enter Afghanistan and capture one of bin Laden’s top aides. The exact target is not specified; the team is expected to take advantage of whatever opportunities present themselves. The team passes through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, then meets up with Northern Alliance forces in the part of Afghanistan still under their control. But from the very beginning they encounter resistance from a CIA superior officer who is based in a nearby country and is in charge of CIA relations with the Northern Alliance. Known publicly only by his first name Lawrence, he apparently had a minor role in the Iran-Contra affair and has a personal dispute with Gaston. The team stays at Ahmad Shad Massoud’s Northern Alliance headquarters high in the Afghan mountains for about two weeks. However, they never have a chance to cross into Taliban territory for their mission because Lawrence is sending back a stream of negative messages to CIA headquarters about the risks of their mission. A debate ensues back at headquarters. Cofer Black, head of the CIA’s Counter Terrorist Center, and his assistant Hank Crumpton support continuing the mission. But CIA Director George Tenet and his assistant Jim Pavitt cancel the mission on March 25. Upon returning to the US, Berntsen, Gaston, Black, and Crumpton formally call for Lawrence’s dismissal, but to no effect. Berntsen will later comment that Black and Crumpton “had shown a willingness to plan and execute risky missions. But neither CIA Director George Tenet nor President Bill Clinton had the will to wage a real fight against terrorists who were killing US citizens.” [CNN, 12/15/2001; Berntsen and Pezzullo, 2005, pp. 43-64]
December 2000: Incoming Bush Administration Briefed on Terrorism Threat; Apparently Ignores Recommendations
CIA Director Tenet and other top CIA officials brief President-elect Bush, Vice President-elect Cheney, future National Security Adviser Rice, and other incoming national security officials on al-Qaeda and covert action programs in Afghanistan. Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt recalls conveying that bin Laden is one of the gravest threats to the country. Bush asks whether killing bin Laden would end the problem. Pavitt says he answers that killing bin Laden would have an impact but not stop the threat. The CIA recommends the most important action to combat al-Qaeda is to arm the Predator drone and use it over Afghanistan. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; Reuters, 3/24/2004] However, while the drone is soon armed, Bush never gives the order to use it in Afghanistan until after 9/11 (see September 4, 2001).
July 2001: Head of the CIA’s bin Laden Unit Compares the Current Situation to the Period before World War II and Bin Laden to Hitler
During a meeting with other CIA officials, Richard Blee, head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, compares al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler before World War II and emphasizes that the terrorist threat would be significantly reduced if he was killed. The officials have just attended a briefing for representatives from various agencies during which A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, executive director of the CIA, played a video recently taken by a drone aircraft that showed a man who appeared to be bin Laden. Krongard asked audience members if they thought the US should try to assassinate the man based on this evidence (see (July 2001)). After the briefing ends, James Pavitt, the CIA’s deputy director for operations, gathers together the CIA operations officers who attended it to further discuss the issues that were covered. Those at Pavitt’s meeting include Blee; Hugh Turner, the associate deputy director for operations; and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, deputy associate director of central intelligence for military support.
Pavitt Is Uneasy about the CIA Assassinating Terrorists – Pavitt appears uncomfortable with the implications of authorizing the CIA to deploy armed drones—something that was discussed during the briefing. He tells his colleagues: “We have to think long and hard about getting back into the assassination business. We should think about the impact it will have on our mission, on our organization. It’s dangerous to kill people in secret… even terrorists.” He adds, “We need to have a rock-solid case that conducting assassinations is necessary and justifiable, and also consistent with the broader principles that we serve as agency officers.”
Colleague Suggests Raising Concerns with the White House – Turner responds to Pavitt’s concerns, saying in a sullen manner: “Times are different than they were during the agency’s assassination and covert action days. The world has changed since the l960s and 1970s. We have congressional oversight, lots of oversight.” He advises Pavitt to raise his concerns with the White House. “They need to hear your reservations about repeating the mistakes of the past,” he tells him. He says that if the CIA is to go ahead and use armed Predator drones, it should make sure it has first received specific authorities in writing from the National Security Council. Additionally, he says, “Our lawyers need to square away the CIA’s legal authorities with [the] Department of Justice.”
Pavitt Wonders if Killing Bin Laden Is ‘Worth It’ – Pavitt gives more details of his reservations, saying: “We rejected assassination in our past because it was corrosive to our culture and to democracy. And we weren’t any good at it. It caused more harm than good.” He notes that killing people remotely using an armed drone “is dangerously seductive” since it would leave the CIA with “no blood on our hands.” In light of these concerns, he asks: “Is killing bin Laden worth it? Would it matter? Would his departure from the scene change things so much that it would justify a return to assassination operations?”
Bin Laden’s Death Would Be a ‘Major Blow’ to Al-Qaeda – Pavitt looks at Blee to see his reaction. “Pavitt would listen to Blee, an experienced and highly respected counterterrorist expert,” Mowatt-Larssen will later note. Blee clearly thinks the al-Qaeda leader is a serious enemy who poses a major threat to the United States. “Osama bin Laden is a charismatic leader. He is the heart and soul of al-Qaeda. He created this terrorist organization and declared war on America,” he says. He adds that no one else in al-Qaeda has the same influence and vision. He therefore indicates that he thinks assassinating bin Laden would have significant benefits. “His death would be a major blow to the movement,” he says. “The threat would be greatly diminished if bin Laden was eliminated,” he adds.
Blee Compares Bin Laden to Hitler – Blee explains the severity of the threat he feels bin Laden poses by comparing the al-Qaeda leader to Hitler. “The situation we’re in reminds me of the situation before World War II,” he says. “How would history have been different if we had a chance to take out Adolf Hitler before the war?” he asks. “Without Hitler, World War II war might have been averted,” he states, adding that similarly, “Without bin Laden, al-Qaeda is not the threat it represents with him as their leader.” Blee makes clear that he therefore believes the US should assassinate him, concluding: “We can’t pass up the chance to kill [bin Laden]. No, we have to take our shot if we get the chance.” Pavitt is surprised but also reassured by the firmness of Blee’s conviction. According to Mowatt-Larssen, while the deputy director for operations will continue to have misgivings about using armed drones to kill terrorists, it is now clear he will do nothing to prevent such action being taken. [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020]
After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: CIA’s Deputy Director and New York Station Chief Conclude Bin Laden Behind Attack
At the CIA’s Langley headquarters, Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt has arrived back at his office after attending an 8:30 a.m. meeting in the agency’s conference room (see Shortly After 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). The second WTC tower has already been hit by this time. Pavitt sends a message to all CIA stations, saying, “I expect each station and each officer to redouble efforts of collecting intelligence on this tragedy.” Mary, the CIA’s New York station chief, calls him. In this call, Pavitt and Mary agree that Osama bin Laden is behind the attack. According to journalist and author Ronald Kessler, they believe that “Its scope, temerity, degree of planning, and viciousness fit his way of operating.” [Kessler, 2003, pp. 202-204]
September 12, 2001: Former CIA Bin Laden Unit Chief Returns, But Not Given Much to Do
Michael Scheuer, former head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit (see February 1996), returns to the unit to serve as an adviser, but is not allowed to debrief detainees. Scheuer, who was fired from the unit in 1999 (see June 1999), remains with Alec Station until 2004, when he resigns from the CIA and authors Imperial Hubris, a book critical of the CIA and the US government’s fight against terrorism in general. He had finished his first book, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, before 9/11, and it is released in 2002. He will later complain that he is given a job title but no official duties. Other CIA officers seek out his services, but these requests are blocked, apparently by James Pavitt, the Deputy Director of Operations. Scheuer comments: “The CIA knew that Through Our Enemies’ Eyes was respected by Islamists and that, as the author, I would be an effective debriefer. Mr. Pavitt, however, put burying my career above using me to elicit information to defend America.” [Scheuer, 2005, pp. 264; Scheuer, 2006, pp. xvii]
September 12, 2001: British Intelligence Chiefs Fly to US; Delegation Visits CIA and Advises to Concentrate on Afghanistan, Not Iraq
Despite the restrictions on air travel following the previous day’s attacks, one private plane is allowed to fly from Britain to the United States. On it are Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of the British secret intelligence service (MI6), and Eliza Manningham-Buller, the deputy chief of Britain’s domestic intelligence service, MI5. In his 2007 book At the Center of the Storm, CIA Director George Tenet will admit, “I still don’t know how they got flight clearance into the country.” Manningham-Buller and Dearlove dine for an hour-and-a-half with a group of American intelligence officials at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 173-174; BBC, 12/4/2007] In addition to Tenet, the US officials at the dinner include James Pavitt and his deputy from the CIA’s Directorate for Operations; A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, the CIA’s executive director; Cofer Black, the director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center; Tyler Drumheller, the chief of the CIA’s European Division; the chief of the CIA’s Near East Division; and Thomas Pickard, the acting director of the FBI. Also part of the British delegation is David Manning, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser, who was already in the US before 9/11. [Salon, 7/2/2007] The British offer condolences and their full support. The Americans say they are already certain that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks, having recognized names on passenger lists of the hijacked flights. They also say they believe the attacks are not yet over. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 174; BBC, 12/4/2007] According to Drumheller, Manning says, “I hope we can all agree that we should concentrate on Afghanistan and not be tempted to launch any attacks on Iraq.” Tenet replies: “Absolutely, we all agree on that. Some might want to link the issues, but none of us wants to go that route.” [Newsweek, 10/30/2006; Salon, 7/2/2007; Guardian, 8/4/2007]
2002: CIA Officals Ask Tenet to Warn White House Invasion of Iraq Will Undermine Counterterrorism Efforts
Senior CIA officials, including James Pavitt, the deputy director of operations of the CIA, ask CIA Director George Tenet to relay concerns to the White House that invading Iraq will undermine US counterterrorism efforts. They warn that it will divert attention and resources away from the ongoing fight against al-Qaeda, at a time when the United States’ counterterrorism efforts seem to be having a decisive impact. One former aide to Tenet tells author James Risen, “A lot of people went to George to tell him that Iraq would hurt the war on terrorism, but I never heard him express an opinion about war in Iraq. He would just come back from the White House and say they are going to do it.” [Risen, 2006, pp. 183-184]
April 2002: CIA Promotes False Hijacker ‘Superman’ Theory
CIA Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt says of the hijackers: “The terror cells that we’re going up against are typically small and all terrorist personnel… were carefully screened. The number of personnel who know vital information, targets, timing, the exact methods to be used had to be smaller still.… Against that degree of control, that kind of compartmentalization, that depth of discipline and fanaticism, I personally doubt—and I draw again upon my thirty years of experience in this business—that anything short of one of the knowledgeable inner-circle personnel or hijackers turning himself in to us would have given us sufficient foreknowledge to have prevented [9/11].” An FBI official calls this “the superman scenario.”
[New Yorker, 5/27/2002] The media repeats this notion. For instance, later in the year, the Chicago Tribune will comment, “The operational discipline surrounding Sept. 11 was so professional, and impenetrable, that intercepted telephone conversations, or even well-placed spies, might not have made a difference.”
[Chicago Tribune, 9/5/2002] But even in the same article that quotes Pavitt, a senior FBI official states that serious and potentially fatal errors were made by the hijackers. The article also notes that the hijackers did not maintain tight compartmentalization and discipline. [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] Eventually, more and more details will come out proving the “superman” notion false. The hijackers even told vital details of their plot to complete strangers (see April-May 2000; Late April-Mid-May 2000).
2003: CIA Produces Video Containing Fake Osama bin Laden
The CIA makes a fake video of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, although the video is apparently never used. The video shows bin Laden and some associates of his sitting around a campfire, swigging bottles of liquor and talking about having had sex with boys, according to a former CIA official. The actors are drawn from “some of us darker-skinned employees,” the official will say. The timing of this effort is unclear, although it is apparently linked to discussions about making similar videos, including one of a fake Saddam Hussein having sex with a boy, prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion (see Before March 20, 2003). According to another former officer, the projects grind to a halt as nobody can come to an agreement on them. In particular, they are opposed by Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt and his deputy, Hugh Turner, who keeps “throwing darts at it.” The officer will say that the ideas are ridiculous and, “They came from people whose careers were spent in Latin America or East Asia,” and do not understand the cultural nuances of the region. “Saddam playing with boys would have no resonance in the Middle East—nobody cares,” a third former official will say. “Trying to mount such a campaign would show a total misunderstanding of the target. We always mistake our own taboos as universal when, in fact, they are just our taboos.” After the CIA abandons the projects, they are apparently revived by the military. “The military took them over,” one former official will say. “They had assets in psy-war down at Ft. Bragg,” at the Army’s Special Warfare Center. The projects will be revealed in the Washington Post in 2010. [Washington Post, 5/25/2010]
