Future 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi wires $1,360 from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to someone in Johannesburg, South Africa. The name of the person who receives the Western Union wire is Abdullah Abdulrahman Alghamdi, according to an FBI document of 9/11 hijacker activities made after the attacks. [Investigative Services Division, FBI Headquarters, 4/19/2002] The name may be an alias for alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), who uses very similar aliases and travels very widely in the years before 9/11 (see for instance June 1998). For example, around this same time KSM applies for a US visa using a passport with the name Abdulrahman al Ghamdi and a real photo of himself (see July 23, 2001). Also, a 2006 Guantanamo document will give one of his aliases as Abdul Rahman Abdullah Faqasi al-Ghamdi. [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2006] A later Justice Department indictment will give one of his aliases as Abdulrahman Abdullah al-Ghamdi. [US District Court Southern District of New York, 4/4/2011 
] There is no publicly known al-Qaeda presence in South Africa at this time. However, there is an intriguing mention in another intelligence document that an al-Qaeda operative linked to KSM told another al-Qaeda leader in early 2000 of an address in South Africa where a contact existed who could provide help (see Early January 2000).
May 2001: Five 9/11 Hijackers Take Advantage of New, Anonymous Visa Express Procedure
The US introduces the “Visa Express” program in Saudi Arabia, which allows any Saudi Arabian to obtain a visa through his or her travel agent instead of appearing at a consulate in person. An official later states, “The issuing officer has no idea whether the person applying for the visa is actually the person in the documents and application.” [US News and World Report, 12/12/2001; US Congress, 9/20/2002] At the time, warnings of an attack against the US led by the Saudi Osama bin Laden are higher than they had ever been before—
“off the charts” as one senator later puts it. [Los Angeles Times, 5/18/2002; US Congress, 9/18/2002] A terrorism conference had recently concluded that Saudi Arabia was one of four top nationalities in al-Qaeda. [Star-Tribune (Minneapolis), 5/19/2002]
Suspect Travel Agency – Ten Saudi travel agency companies are allowed to issue US visas as part of the program. One company, Fursan Travel and Tourism, is a subsidiary of Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp., a multibillion Saudi banking conglomerate. Fursan is also the only one out of the ten deputized to handle the collection and initial processing of US visas. After 9/11, the CIA will suggest taking action against Al Rajhi for its suspected support of Islamist militancy, but the Bush Administration will decide not to do anything (see Mid-2003 and Mid-2003). It is believed that al-Qaeda and other militant groups advised their operatives to use Al Rajhi for their banking needs (see Before September 11, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 10/13/2003]
Used by 9/11 Plotters – Five hijackers—Khalid Almihdhar, Abdulaziz Alomari, Salem Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, and Fayez Ahmed Banihammad—use Visa Express over the next month to enter the US. [US Congress, 9/20/2002] Alomari has a bank account with Al Rajhi, but it is unknown if he or any of the other hijackers use Fursan, the Al Rajhi subsidiary, since the names of travel agencies do not appear on copies of the hijackers’ visa applications that are later made public. [Wall Street Journal, 10/13/2003] Even 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will successfully get a US Visa through the “Visa Express” program in July (using a false name but real photograph), despite a posted $2 million reward for his capture. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/2004]
Saudi Visas Almost Never Rejected – Only three percent of Saudi visa applicants are turned down by US consular officers in fiscal 2000 and 2001. In contrast, about 25 percent of US visa seekers worldwide are rejected. Acceptance is even more difficult for applicants from countries alleged to have ties to terrorism such as Iraq or Iran. [Washington Post, 10/31/2001] The widely criticized program is finally canceled in July 2002, after a public outcry. [Wall Street Journal, 10/13/2003]
May 1-July 18, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Open More Florida Bank Accounts
The 9/11 hijackers open nine new SunTrust bank accounts in Florida. One is opened by hijacker pilot Ziad Jarrah, the others by the newly arrived hijackers: 
Satam Al Suqami and Waleed Alshehri open a joint account on May 1 with a $9,000 deposit; [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 136 ] Ziad Jarrah opens an account on May 15; Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, and Mohand Alshehri open accounts on June 1; Wail Alshehri opens an account on June 18; Saeed Alghamdi and Ahmed Alhaznawi open accounts on July 12; Fayez Ahmed Banihammad opens an account on July 18. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 3, 19 ] Many of the hijackers also obtain Florida driver’s licenses and ID cards at the same time (see April 12-September 7, 2001).
June 11-14, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Seen in Hotel before He Apparently Enters US
9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi is seen in a Florida hotel by the manager before he is said to enter the US. Although the 9/11 Commission will say he arrives in America on June 27 (see April 23-June 29, 2001), the manager of the Deluxe Inn in Dania, Florida, will tell the FBI that he stays there for these three nights from June 11-14 together with fellow hijackers Mohamed Atta, Ahmed Alnami, and Marwan Alshehhi, who completed the registration forms. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/2001, pp. 157 ]
June 12, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Obtains US Visa, despite Lying on Application
Future 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi obtains a US visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The application is made through the Visa Express program (see May 2001), using a passport issued two days earlier. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24 ] The visa is issued by Shayna Steinger, a consular official who apparently issues the 9/11 hijackers with 12 visas (see July 1, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 12/30/2002, pp. 2; Office of the Inspector General (US Department of State), 1/30/2003]
Lies on Application – Alghamdi lies on his application form, claiming that he has never before applied for a US visa, when in fact he obtained one the previous year, also from Steinger (see September 4, 2000). Fellow hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Ahmed Alnami make similar false statements on their visa applications around this time (see April 23, 2001 and June 13, 2001), although Alnami corrects his application. The information about his previous visa is available at the consulate, but is not accessed, as consular workers do not usually examine previous visa issunces, only refusals. The 9/11 Commission will speculate that he lied on purpose to conceal the previous application. [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24 ]
Fraudulent Features – The Commission will also suggest that one or more of Alghamdi’s passports may contain fraudulent features, but will claim that this is not certain, as Alghamdi’s passport was not recovered after 9/11. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 563-4; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 42 ] This is an error by the Commission, as Alghamdi’s passport will actually be found after 9/11 and the Commission will be aware of this (see Shortly After September 11, 2001).
KSM’s Travel Agent – The travel agency used for the Visa Express application is Minhal Travel, which will also later be used by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to obtain a US visa (see July 23, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24, 29 ]
Early-Late June, 2001: Plot Facilitator Assists Four 9/11 Hijackers in United Arab Emirates
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi assists four hijackers transiting Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on their way to the US: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Salem Alhazmi, Abdulaziz Alomari, and Saeed Alghamdi. Banihammad stays at al-Hawsawi’s flat in nearby Sharjah for two or three weeks and they open bank accounts together (see June 25, 2001 and Early August-August 22, 2001), and al-Hawsawi recognizes Alghamdi and Alhazmi from Afghanistan. He coordinates their arrival dates in telephone conversations with Mohamed Atta (see Late June-August, 2001) and then purchases tickets for them, paying for Alomari and Alhazmi. Al-Hawsawi provides this information to the US under interrogation, which is considered by some to make it unreliable (see June 16, 2004), and then again before a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay to determine his combat status (see March 9-April 28, 2007). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ; US department of Defense, 3/21/2007 ] It is unclear who assisted the nine muscle hijackers who transited Dubai before this: Waleed Alshehri, Satam Al Suqami, Ahmed Alghamdi, Maqed Moqed, Hamza Alghamdi, Mohand Alshehri, Ahmed Alnami, Ahmed Alhaznawi, and Wail Alshehri (see April 11-June 28, 2001 and April 23-June 29, 2001).
August 16, 2001: Moussaoui’s Belongings Possess Information Sufficient to Roll Up 9/11 Plot
After Zacarias Moussaoui is arrested, the FBI wishes to search his possessions (see August 16, 2001 and August 23-27, 2001). According to a presentation made by FBI agent Aaron Zebley at Moussaoui’s trial, the belongings are sufficient to potentially connect Moussaoui to eleven of the 9/11 hijackers: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Fayez Banihammad, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Hamza Alghamdi, Satam Al Suqami, and Waleed Alshehri. The connections would be made, for example, through Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who spoke with Moussaoui on the telephone and wired him money (see July 29, 2001-August 3, 2001), and who was linked to three of the hijacker pilots from their time in Germany together (see November 1, 1998-February 2001). Bin al-Shibh also received money from Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, who was connected to hijacker Fayez Ahmed Banihammad (see June 25, 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006] Moussaoui’s notebook contained two recognizable control numbers for the Western Union wire transfers from bin al-Shibh and, according to McClatchy newspapers, a check on these numbers “would probably have uncovered other wires in the preceding days” to bin al-Shibh from al-Hawsawi. [McClatchy Newspapers, 9/11/2007] The discovery of the eleven hijackers could potentially have led to the discovery of some or all of the remaining eight plot members, as they were brothers (Wail and Waleed Alshehri, Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi), opened bank accounts together (see May 1-July 18, 2001 and June 27-August 23, 2001), lived together (see March 2001-September 1, 2001), obtained identity documents together (see April 12-September 7, 2001 and August 1-2, 2001), arrived in the US together (see April 23-June 29, 2001), and booked tickets on the same four flights on 9/11 (see August 25-September 5, 2001).
August 25-September 5, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Spend Over $30,000 on 9/11 Tickets
All the 9/11 hijackers book their flights for September 11, 2001, using their apparent real names. The total cost of the tickets is in excess of $30,000: August 25: Khalid Almihdhar, who was watchlisted two days previously (see August 23, 2001), and Majed Moqed book tickets for American Airlines flight 77 using the AA.com website. They are collected from the American Airlines ticket counter at Baltimore Washington International Airport on September 5. The tickets were not mailed, because the shipping address did not match the credit card address. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 72, 74 ] August 26: Wail Alshehri buys a ticket for American Airlines flight 11 over the phone with his debit card. His brother Waleed buys a ticket for the same flight at the AA.com website using his debit card. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 72 ] August 27: Nawaf Alhazmi, who was watchlisted four days before (see August 23, 2001), buys tickets for himself and his brother Salem for American Airlines flight 77 through Travelocity from a Kinkos computer in Laurel, Maryland, using his debit card (see August 25-27, 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 72 ] August 27: Saeed Alghamdi uses his debit card to purchase tickets for United Airlines flight 93 for himself and Ahmed Alnami from the UA.com website. The tickets are not paid for until September 5, 2001, due to a problem with the debit card. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 72 ] August 27: Fayez Ahmed Banihammad uses his visa card to purchase tickets for himself and Mohamed Alshehri for United Airlines flight 175 over the telephone. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 72-73 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] August 28: Mohamed Atta uses his debit card to buy tickets for American Airlines flight 11 for himself and Abdulaziz Alomari from the AA.com website. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] August 28: Waleed Alshehri purchases a ticket for Satam Al Suqami for American Airlines flight 11 in person from the company’s counter at Fort Lauderdale Airport. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 73 ] August 28: Marwan Alshehhi purchases a ticket for United Airlines flight 175 from the company’s counter at Miami International Airport. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 73 ] August 29: Hamza Alghamdi books tickets for himself and Ahmed Alghamdi for United Airlines flight 175 from the UA.com website. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] August 29: Ahmed Alhaznawi creates a new e-mail account and Travelocity.com account and uses them to book a ticket for himself on United Airlines flight 93. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 74 ] August 30: Ziad Jarrah purchases a ticket for himself for United Airlines flight 93 from the UA website. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] August 31: Hani Hanjour purchases a ticket for American Airlines flight 77 from ATS Advanced Travel Services in Totowa, New Jersey, paying in cash. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ]
At least five tickets are one way only. [Los Angeles Times, 9/18/2001] There are numerous connections between the hijackers booked on the four flights by this point: Hijackers on different 9/11 flights arrived in the US on the same plane. For example, Salem Alhazmi (Flight 77) arrived with Abdulaziz Alomari (Flight 11), and Fayez Ahmed Banihammad (Flight 175) arrived with Saeed Alghamdi (Flight 93) (see April 23-June 29, 2001); Two of the pilots, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, train and live together, and have a joint bank account (see (Mid-July 2000 – Early January 2001), July 6-December 19, 2000, and June 28-July 7, 2000); Hijackers from different planes open bank accounts together (see May 1-July 18, 2001 and June 27-August 23, 2001); and The hijackers obtain identity documents together (see April 12-September 7, 2001 and August 1-2, 2001).
Six hijackers also provide the same phone number and three use the same address. [Miami Herald, 9/22/2001]
September 5, 2001: Hijacker Associate Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in Germany Calls 9/11 Hijacker in US; His Calls May Be Monitored
Would-be hijacker Ramzi bin al-Shibh makes three phone calls on this day, and one is to 9/11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi in the US. Bin al-Shibh makes the three calls from the airport in Dusseldorf, Germany, as he is about to take a flight to Spain on his way to Pakistan (see September 5, 2001). Nothing more is known about the call to Alghamdi. However, the call may be an opportunity to discover the 9/11 plot, because at least some of bin al-Shibh’s phone calls are monitored around this time. Details are murky, but a call between bin al-Shibh and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is monitored in late July 2001, although it is not clear if it is monitored by US or German intelligence, or both (see July 20, 2001).
Second Call to Jordanian – At the airport, bin al-Shibh also calls an unnamed Jordanian who is said to be a close friend of 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah from a time both of them were studying in Griefswald, Germany, in the mid-1990s. This person lived in the same Hamburg apartment as hijacker Mohamed Atta, was said to have become an Islamist radical, and shared bank accounts and cell phone numbers with some of the hijackers living in Hamburg. [Chicago Tribune, 2/25/2003] This almost certainly is Bashir Musleh, because Musleh is a Jordanian who is a close friend of Jarrah’s from when they both studied in Griefswald. Author Terry McDermott identifies him as one of the Hamburg group. [McDermott, 2005, pp. xi, 53]
Third Call to Cell Member Meziche – The third and final call is to Naamen Meziche, a French citizen of Algerian descent, and a longtime resident of Hamburg, Germany. The call to Meziche’s house lasts 34 seconds. Meziche appears to be a member of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell, but German investigators will never be able to develop enough evidence to charge him with a crime. He will be killed in a drone strike in Pakistan in 2010 (see October 5, 2010). [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/2010]
10:00 a.m.-10:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Hijackers Respond to the Passenger Revolt
Hijackers in the cockpit of Flight 93 react to the passengers who are apparently trying to retake control of the aircraft and one of them appears to ask if they should fly the plane into the ground. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 45-46] Passengers on the flight have apparently been trying to force their way into the cockpit, using a food cart as a shield (see 9:57 a.m.-9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Observer, 12/2/2001; Longman, 2002, pp. 270-271]
Hijacker Asks if He Should ‘Finish It Off’ – The cockpit voice recording from the plane will later reveal that, in response to this, a hijacker in the cockpit apparently suggests crashing the plane into the ground. Speaking in Arabic, he asks: “Is that it? Shall we finish it off?” Another hijacker in the cockpit replies: “No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off!”
Passengers Try to Get into the Cockpit – Seconds later, a male passenger shouts: “Ah! I’m injured.” A hijacker then exclaims: “Oh Allah! Oh Allah! Oh gracious!” A male passenger apparently instructs those with him to continue trying to force their way into the cockpit. “In the cockpit,” he shouts, adding, “If we don’t, we’ll die!” A hijacker then makes some unusual statements. He says: “Up, down. Up, down, in the cockpit. The cockpit. Up, down.” He adds, “Saeed, up, down!” [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 12/4/2003; McMillan, 2014, pp. 103-104] “Saeed” is presumably Saeed Alghamdi, one of the alleged hijackers of Flight 93. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 35]
Hijacker Again Suggests Crashing the Plane – The cockpit voice recorder then picks up the sound of a male passenger, in the distance, giving the instruction, “Roll it!” He is possibly talking about rolling the food cart forward, journalist and author Tom McMillan will suggest. This is followed by the sound of glasses and plates breaking. A hijacker then apparently starts praying, saying: “Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!” He then appears to suggest crashing the plane into the ground again. “Is that it? I mean, shall we pull it down?” he asks. “Yes, put it in it and pull it down,” another hijacker replies.
Hijacker Says to Shut Off the Oxygen Supply – One of the hijackers then suggests that they turn off the oxygen supply to the cabin, saying: “Cut off the oxygen! Cut off the oxygen! Cut off the oxygen! Cut off the oxygen!” [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 12/4/2003; McMillan, 2014, pp. 104] (However, cutting off the oxygen below an altitude of 10,000 feet would have little or no effect on the passengers, aviation officials will comment. [Longman, 2002, pp. 271] ) About 20 seconds later, he makes more unusual statements, saying: “Up, down. Up, down. Up, down.”
Passengers Continue Their Assault – Within the next 20 seconds, the cockpit voice recorder picks up the sounds of loud crashes, snaps, loud grunts, and a male passenger shouting, “Ah!” A passenger then issues some commands. “Go! Go!” they say. “Move! Move!” they shout. A male passenger—perhaps the same person—then yells loudly, “Turn it up!” What they mean by this is unclear. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 12/4/2003; McMillan, 2014, pp. 104] The passengers will apparently continue to struggle against the hijackers until the plane crashes, at 10:03 a.m. (see 10:02 a.m.-10:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 46]
