The US military’s defense readiness condition is raised from Defcon 5, the lowest possible level, to Defcon 3, an intermediate level that requires a heightened alert status for US armed forces worldwide, and which is the highest the defense readiness condition has been for 28 years. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/18/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
Rumsfeld Recommends Raising the Defcon – The decision to go to Defcon 3 is reportedly made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Rumsfeld will later recall that after he arrives at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he talks with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and “[w]e discussed and I recommended raising the defense condition level from five to three.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004]
Teleconference Participants Are Told to ‘Hold Off’ on Defcon 3 – Rumsfeld directs that the US military go to Defcon 3. At 10:43 a.m., it is announced on the air threat conference call that the secretary of defense “has directed that we go to Defcon 3 and be prepared to go to [Defcon] 2.” However, a minute later, Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney on the conference call, and Cheney says he will have to run the decision to go to Defcon 3 by the president, “and let him make the call.” Therefore, at 10:45 a.m., those on the conference call are told to “hold off on Defcon 3.”
Order to Raise the Defcon Is Reinstated – But Rumsfeld believes raising the defense readiness condition is urgent. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554] There is therefore a “historical discussion about how the move to Defcon 3 went during previous crises, Cuba specifically [i.e. the Cuban missile crisis in 1962],” Captain Charles Leidig, who is also in the NMCC, will later recall. With their reference being “a book on the shelf,” according to Leidig, Myers is shown that he has “approval authority to go to Defcon 3.” [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004
] After consulting Defense Department directives, Rumsfeld concludes that he has the authority to issue the order to raise the defense readiness condition. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] Therefore, at 10:46 a.m., those on the air threat conference call are told: “Override last instructions. The vice chairman [i.e. Myers] is directing we go to Defcon 3.” A few minutes later, an announcement is made on the conference call, “Emergency action message released at 14:52 [Zulu time, i.e. 10:52 a.m. Eastern time], re: Defcon 3.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
Raising the Defcon Is a ‘Huge Move’ – Rumsfeld will later agree with an interviewer that raising the defense readiness condition is “a very serious step for the nation.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] It was last raised to Defcon 3 during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when Rumsfeld had been the United States ambassador to NATO. Regarding the decision to raise it, Myers tells Rumsfeld, “It’s a huge move, but it’s appropriate.” [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002; Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
President Is Later Told of the Decision – The decision to go to Defcon 3 will soon be communicated within NORAD (see 11:03 a.m.-11:12 a.m. September11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; 9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004 ] Rumsfeld will brief President Bush on the decision (see (11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Bush, 2010, pp. 133] Apparently around the time the defense readiness condition is raised, Rumsfeld and/or Myers also decide to raise the force protection condition of US military installations (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004
; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153]
Defcon 3 Was Intended for the Cold War – Some individuals will later be critical of the decision to raise the defense readiness condition at this time. John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will write that Defcon 3 is in fact “a Cold War-era designation, devised to respond to a nuclear threat.” [Farmer, 2009, pp. 235] According to Farmer and other 9/11 Commission staffers, it is “suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al-Qaeda’s attack.” [Rutgers Law Review, 9/7/2011 ] General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, will similarly say that Defcon 3 is “not intended for [events like] the attacks of 9/11 and thus could have complicated the response to the attacks.” He will say he does not think that raising the condition would have “done anything for us” within the continental United States. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
]
Defcons Are Phased Increases in Combat Readiness – The defense readiness condition is a “uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands, and for use by the [armed] services,” according to the Department of Defense. [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2010 ] Defcons are phased increases in combat readiness and are graduated to match situations of varying military severity. They are numbered, from Defcon 5, which means “normal peacetime readiness,” down to Defcon 1, which means “maximum force readiness.” The current level, Defcon 3, represents an “increase in force readiness above normal readiness.” [Federation of American Scientists, 4/29/1998] The defense readiness condition will remain at Defcon 3 until three days later, when it will be reduced one notch, to Defcon 4 (see September 14, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/30/2002]
11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Officials Participate in a Teleconference with Other Government Agencies and Discuss Rules of Engagement for Fighters
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several more senior officials at the Pentagon participate in a secure video teleconference with other government agencies in which the rules of engagement for fighter jets responding to the terrorist attacks are discussed. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers has been in the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and Rumsfeld has been with him there since around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, announced earlier on that a secure video teleconference with the White House was going to take place at 11:00 a.m. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003
] Rumsfeld, Myers, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, now leave the DDO’s office to participate in this. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] The teleconference takes place in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room, which is more commonly known as “the tank.” [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003
] This is the “NMCC facility for secure teleconferences” and is “a tiny room with a thick, airtight door” that is “severely cramped,” according to Myers. Klimow will later describe it as “a small soundproof room just big enough for six or seven people.” Along with Myers, Rumsfeld, and Klimow, other officials in the room for the teleconference include Giambastiani; Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld’s closest aide; William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense; and Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz participates in the teleconference after arriving at the alternate military command center inside Raven Rock Mountain on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and can be seen by his colleagues at the Pentagon in a small box in the top right corner of their screen. The identities of the other participants will be unstated. The purpose of the teleconference is to link the Department of Defense’s civilian and military leadership with the rest of the government, and the main issue discussed is the rules of engagement for NORAD to follow should more hijackings occur, according to Myers. Further details of what the participants talk about will be unstated. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] It is unclear how long the teleconference lasts. Joseph Wassel, assistant to the secretary of defense for communications, who waits outside the room while it is taking place, will recall only that it “went on for quite a while.” [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003
] As the teleconference progresses, its participants in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room will start feeling sick due to the deteriorating air quality. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Before 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Asks What the Enemy Could Do Next
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asks officers at the Pentagon what else they think the terrorists might do and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggests they could conduct an attack using weapons of mass destruction. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 302] Myers has been in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and Rumsfeld has been there since around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38, 43-44] Since 11:00 a.m., the two men were with other senior officials in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room within the NMCC, participating in a teleconference with other government agencies (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003
; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155] That meeting has now been adjourned and they start making their way back to the deputy director for operations’ office within the NMCC along with Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant. Suddenly Rumsfeld stops Myers and Klimow in their tracks. Then, in a command voice, he calls out to the dozen or so officers in the room: “What haven’t we thought of yet? What else can the enemy do?” He “was thinking ahead, engaging in [his] well-known outside-the-box speculation,” Myers will later comment. “He was always challenging his staff to think out of the box,” Klimow will say. Immediately, Myers replies, “NBC,” meaning a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. Apparently as a result of this interaction, Myers orders that special response units be positioned outside Washington, DC, and New York, presumably in case a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack should occur in one of these cities. It is unclear exactly when the interaction occurs. However, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will place it before midday, when Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirms to him and his colleagues in the NMCC that today’s attacks have undoubtedly been committed by al-Qaeda (see 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001). Klimow will explain why he considers Rumsfeld’s question about what else the terrorists might do to have been “significant in terms of lessons learned.” Rumsfeld was simply saying words to the effect of: “Wake up! Wake up! What else can happen?” But, Klimow will comment, “Somebody needed to do it and they needed to do it right at that moment.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 302]
12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Intelligence Agency Director Says Al-Qaeda Responsible for Attacks
The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency informs military leaders in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon that al-Qaeda is responsible for the morning’s attacks. General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later describe: “At noon, Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirmed what everybody at the conference table had already surmised: The attacks had undoubtedly come from al-Qaeda.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156] Later in the day, Wilson will inform General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of a single piece of intelligence that had suggested a terrorist attack may have been imminent (see 5:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 159]
After 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Wants CENTCOM Commander Franks to Start Planning a Response to the Attacks
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, instructs Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, to call General Tommy Franks, commander in chief of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), and tell him to promptly return to his headquarters and start considering how to respond to today’s terrorist attacks. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156] Myers and Klimow have been in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004
; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Wants a ‘Fairly Big Response’ to the Attacks – Around midday, Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, confirmed to them and others in the NMCC that today’s attacks were undoubtedly committed by al-Qaeda (see 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156] This prompts Myers and his colleagues to immediately start considering “some sort of response.” The one thing they “knew for certain,” Myers will later recall, considering that al-Qaeda had “attacked us on our soil” and thousands of Americans had been killed, was that “this response had to be proportionate, meaning a fairly big response.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Myers notes that Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership are in Afghanistan. However, he will comment, “If the president and the secretary [of defense] ordered us to go to war in Afghanistan, we were going to have to do it before winter and that didn’t leave us a lot of time in the foothills of the Hindu Kush.”
CENTCOM Commander Is Away in Europe – Afghanistan is in the area of responsibility of CENTCOM, the military command that controls US operations in the Middle East. However, Franks, the commander of CENTCOM, is currently overseas, on the Greek island of Crete. Myers therefore instructs Klimow to contact him and ask him to return to CENTCOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, as soon as possible. Additionally, Myers says, “I want General Franks to start looking at options for al-Qaeda.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156]
CENTCOM Commander Immediately Starts Preparing a Military Response – Throughout the evening, Franks starts preparing the US military’s response to today’s attacks from his hotel in Crete. CENTCOM has already tried to identify al-Qaeda training camps, barracks, command and control facilities, communications centers, and support complexes in Afghanistan. It has also built target sets for key Taliban installations, air defense sites, and early warning radars in the country. “The time had come when that effort would pay off,” Franks will comment in his 2004 memoir. He talks to Major General Victor Renuart, CENTCOM director of operations, who is at CENTCOM headquarters, and tells him to begin strike targeting for Afghanistan. He also directs his staff to coordinate with Vice Admiral Charles Moore, CENTCOM’s naval component commander, to ensure that American ships in the Afghanistan area cancel all port calls and immediately set out to sea. [Franks and McConnell, 2004, pp. 243] On the morning of September 12, Franks’s flight crew will receive permission from Greek air traffic control to take off from Crete and Franks will then head back to the United States. His plane will land at MacDill Air Force Base at 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. [Franks and McConnell, 2004, pp. 247-248]
After 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Oxygen Level Is Found to Be Dangerously Low in the Pentagon Command Center
Officers in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon are concerned about the air quality in the center and an air quality expert subsequently informs them that the oxygen level there is dangerously low. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 277-278] From around 11:00 a.m., a small number of Pentagon officials, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room within the NMCC, participating in a secure video teleconference with other government agencies (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155]
Officials Start Feeling Unwell – During this teleconference, Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, starts feeling sick and becomes unable to concentrate. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 277] Others in the room also feel unwell. “Our eyes became red and our throats itchy,” Rumsfeld will later recall. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340] Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, is concerned about the conditions in the small conference room. “It started to get really hot and the air got bad,” he will describe. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8/1/2002 ; Graff, 2019, pp. 277-278] Realizing what the problem is, he shakes Klimow and then tells him what is wrong. “I’m a submariner; I know what’s going on,” he says and then explains: “There’s no oxygen in this room. It’s filling up with carbon dioxide.”
Officers Consider Moving to Another Area – “Let’s get everybody out of here,” he says. He suggests they all go to the Navy Command Center. Although Klimow is unaware that the Navy Command Center was destroyed when the Pentagon was hit (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), he rejects the proposal. “I’ve been trying to get hold of the [Navy Command Center]; I can’t raise him,” he says. He suggests they go to the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon basement instead. Giambastiani says he will do a reconnaissance to the Army Operations Center, and advises Klimow to “go find an air monitor and see how bad it is in here.” Klimow therefore calls Captain Chris Donahue, Myers’s military aide, and instructs him to find an air monitor.
Air Quality Expert Warns of Low Oxygen – Giambastiani subsequently returns from his reconnaissance, shaking his head. He tells Klimow they will be unable to go to the Army Operations Center since the passageways in the outer areas of the Pentagon are impassible due to thick smoke. Donahue then comes in with the Arlington County Fire Department’s air quality specialist. The air quality specialist has taken readings and explains to Klimow that he and the others in the conference room are in a precarious situation. “In some of the corridors in the Pentagon, the air is filled with about 88 percent carbon dioxide—that’s lethal,” he says. “In the outer office here in the NMCC you’re at 33 percent oxygen,” he continues. He says that in the conference room, “you’re at 16 percent oxygen.” If the oxygen level gets down to 13 percent, he says, “you cannot survive.” Therefore, he concludes, “You need to leave.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 278] Fortunately, Giambastiani subsequently finds a smoke-free area for the group in the conference room to relocate to: the Executive Support Center (ESC) on the third floor of the Pentagon. Rumsfeld, Myers, and their entourage will therefore move to the ESC (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8/1/2002 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157]
Air Handling Units Have Been Shut Down – The lack of oxygen in the NMCC is apparently the result of a misunderstanding. According to Klimow, the “incident commander”—presumably meaning Assistant Chief James Schwartz of the Arlington County Fire Department—was incorrectly told that the entire Pentagon had been evacuated and, “with the fires raging out of control,” shut down the building’s air handling units. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Rumsfeld, though, will suggest a different explanation. “The air-conditioning [in the Pentagon] was supposed to have been disabled to avoid circulating the hazardous smoke, but apparently it took some time for it to be shut down,” he will write. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340]
12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Relocate to the Executive Support Center
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several other senior Pentagon officials move from the National Military Command Center (NMCC) to the Executive Support Center (ESC) due to the poor air quality in the NMCC. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157] Since around 11:00 a.m., Rumsfeld, Myers, and a small number of their colleagues had been in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room within the NMCC, participating in a secure video teleconference (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155] As the teleconference progressed, they started feeling unwell, and an air quality specialist with the Arlington County Fire Department subsequently came and told them that the oxygen level in the conference room was dangerously low (see (After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 277-278] Fortunately, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, who had been participating in the teleconference, found that the ESC was smoke-free. Those in the conference room consequently relocate there. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157] The ESC, on the third floor of the Pentagon, is a secure communications hub with a video teleconference facility. [Vogel, 2007, pp. 440] It also has its own air-conditioning system. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8/1/2002
] Once he has settled there, Myers passes on Rumsfeld’s authorization for a partial Reserve call-up. Those activated include fighter pilots, air tanker crews, and communications specialists. “With the country suddenly at war, we would need all the help we could muster, and much of that help was in the Reserve and National Guard,” Myers will later comment. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157]
After 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001: Crash Witness Confirms to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that a Commercial Aircraft Hit the Pentagon
Army Captain Lincoln Leibner, who witnessed the attack on the Pentagon, speaks to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his entourage, and is the first person to confirm to them that the building was hit by an American Airlines plane. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 5; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 61-62; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 62] Leibner works in the Executive Support Center (ESC)—a secure communications hub on the third floor of the Pentagon. He was scheduled to come into work at 10:00 p.m. this evening for a night shift and was therefore at home when the crashes at the World Trade Center took place. But after seeing the second crash live on television, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), he called the ESC and said he was going to come in right away to help out, since “any crisis or any development requiring the attention of the secretary [of defense] causes our activity to go up most dramatically,” he will later comment. When he got to the Pentagon, he found his usual parking space was taken and so he had to park in lane one of the south parking lot, which is the lane furthest from the building. After leaving his car, he started jogging toward the building.
Witness Saw ‘the Entire Terminal Descent’ of Flight 77 – While he was approaching one of the entrances, he witnessed Flight 77 crashing into the building, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). He initially heard the very loud sound of jet engines. He turned his head toward where the noise was coming from, expecting to see a fighter jet there, but instead saw a passenger aircraft descending toward the Pentagon. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 3] “I saw the jetliner clear the ridge right by the Navy Annex, coming down Columbia Pike,” he will describe. [Lofgren, 2011, pp. 56] “I watched the entire terminal descent,” he will recall. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 3] The plane was so close to him that he noticed the American Airlines markings on it. “I could see actually through the windows of the airplane as it came past; it was that close,” he will say. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 57] He saw the last three or four seconds of the plane’s flight and then watched “the entire airplane go into the building.”
Witness Was Probably the First Person to Reach the Crash Site – He was about 100 yards from the point of impact and immediately ran toward the building. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 3] “I was probably the first person on the scene,” he will comment. [US Medicine, 5/2002] He was able to enter the building through a door that had been blown off its hinges. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 61] He then went in and out several times, helping rescue people from there. [US Medicine, 5/2002] Firefighters told people to get away from the building just before the wall that was impacted collapsed (see 10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). Then, even though he had only minor injuries, he was put in an ambulance and taken to the Virginia Hospital Center in Arlington. [Boston Globe, 9/8/2002; Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 4-5; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 61] He was able to return to the Pentagon early in the afternoon. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 62]
Witness Was Advised to Talk to Rumsfeld – Once there, he went to the ESC, where he told his immediate supervisor what he had experienced. He then talked to Colonel Steven Bucci, military assistant to the secretary of defense, and Bucci recommended that he talk to Rumsfeld. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 5] Rumsfeld moved to the ESC earlier this afternoon after smoke from the crash site started seeping into the National Military Command Center, where he had been located (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340-341]
Rumsfeld Seems to Doubt the Witness’s Account – Leibner goes into the conference room where Rumsfeld and a few of his colleagues, including General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are sitting, and describes to them what he saw when the Pentagon was attacked. “I told them the plane came in full throttle, level, flaps up, wheels up; wasn’t crashed into the building, was flown into the building,” he will recall. He says the aircraft he saw was an American Airlines plane. This is “the first personal account” that Rumsfeld has heard of the attack, Leibner will comment. The secretary of defense, however, appears incredulous. “Even at this point, I don’t believe the secretary was confident that, in fact, a civilian airliner had hit the building,” Leibner will say, adding, “I think they still speculated about a bomb, a cruise missile, a small aircraft.” Rumsfeld asks Leibner if he is positive about what hit the Pentagon. “Was I sure? Was I certain?” Leibner will recall being asked. However, “I was close enough to look into the windows of the airplane as it flew past,” he will comment, and so there is “no doubt in my mind what I had seen.” [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 5-6; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 62]
Rumsfeld Earlier Determined that an American Airlines Plane Hit the Pentagon – Although Rumsfeld now appears dubious of Leibner’s account of what hit the Pentagon, he in fact determined himself that the building was likely hit by a large plane after examining the crash site this morning. He immediately headed to the site after the Pentagon was hit (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001) and had seen “[h]undreds of pieces of metal… scattered across the grass in front of the building.” He had picked up what he will describe as “a small, twisted piece of metal from whatever had hit the Pentagon.” [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 335-336] He “looked at some inscription on it” and then said aloud, “American Airlines,” according to Officer Aubrey Davis, one of his security guards (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/20/2006 ; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 2] When he returned to the building and went to the ESC, he told the people there, “I’m quite sure it was a plane and I’m pretty sure it’s a large plane” (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [WBZ Radio 1030 (Boston), 9/15/2001; Clarke, 2006, pp. 221] After telling Rumsfeld what he witnessed, Leibner is advised to go home, but he decides to stay at the ESC and continues working there for the rest of the day. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 6; Lofgren, 2011, pp. 62-63]
12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Updates Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Informs Him of the Final Rules of Engagement for Fighters
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gives Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld an update on what he knows about the crisis and the military’s response to it, which includes details of the rules of engagement for fighter jets. Since 12:19 p.m., the two men have been in the Executive Support Center on the third floor of the Pentagon (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157]
Myers Says Planes Are Inbound from the Far East – Myers now informs Rumsfeld that the FAA has reported that five airliners inbound to the United States from the Far East have come too far on their journeys to head back due to low fuel. One of these, Korean Airlines Flight 85, is squawking the hijack code on its transponder, although this may be the result of pilot error rather than evidence of another hijacking, Myers will later recall telling Rumsfeld. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] (However, according to USA Today, while the FAA has been alerted to this suspicious flight (see (Shortly Before 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001), the plane will only start squawking the hijack code over 40 minutes later, at 1:24 p.m. (see 1:24 p.m. September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/12/2002] ) Fighters have been scrambled to escort all five airliners, Myers says (see (12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001).
NORAD Wants More Air Defense Units – He tells Rumsfeld that NORAD has contacted the Pentagon requesting an additional Reserve call-up of air defense units and this request will be routed through the secretary of defense’s office to the president. To avoid any confusion, he reminds Rumsfeld that air defense and air sovereignty are primarily Air National Guard missions. He also says the US Coast Guard is completing its own Reserve call-up and Admiral James Loy, commandant of the Coast Guard, has given his commanders authority to challenge any inbound vessels. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157]
Rumsfeld Wants to Settle the Issue of Rules of Engagement – Rumsfeld brings up the subject of “rules of engagement” for fighters defending US airspace. [Clarke, 2006, pp. 225] Since they arrived at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center, at around 9:58 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. respectively, Myers and Rumsfeld have worked on these rules, which include guidelines for when fighter pilots should shoot down a suspicious aircraft (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] “I want to tie up the rules of engagement,” Rumsfeld says. He adds: “We need granularity here. This is not simple for a pilot, especially if he knows he’s shooting down a plane over a civilian area like Washington.” [Clarke, 2006, pp. 225]
Rumsfeld Approves NORAD’s Rules of Engagement – “I’ve got the final recommended [rules of engagement] from General [Ralph] Eberhart at NORAD,” Myers tells Rumsfeld. He describes what these are. “If our fighters intercept an aircraft obviously heading for a runway, they will let it land, but if a plane is on a glide path toward a possible government target or civilian installation, they will shoot it down,” he says. “Clearly, shooting down a civilian airliner with innocent men, women, and children on board was not a good option, but given the circumstances, it was really the only course of action to minimize the death and destruction planned by the hijackers,” he will reflect. “Our pilots will have to exercise great discipline and judgment,” he tells Rumsfeld, since, “If that aircraft veers off, it will be too late.” Rumsfeld approves these rules. “This was not a time to be indecisive,” Myers will comment, since rules of engagement are “a deadly serious matter.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157-158] However, the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m., according to the 9/11 Commission Report (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465]
Between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Visit the Pentagon Crash Site
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visit the site of the Pentagon attack. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Since 12:19 p.m., the two men have been in the Executive Support Center, on the third floor of the Pentagon (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157] Rumsfeld visited the crash site this morning, immediately after the Pentagon was attacked (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 1-3; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130] But this is the first time Myers has been there. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, accompanies them. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Notices Plane Parts – When they arrive at the crash site, the men inspect it. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158] Klimow will later describe what he sees. “The first thing I saw was a huge debris field—bits and pieces of Flight 77”—the plane that hit the Pentagon (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001)—“scattered on the ground, glittering in the sun like confetti,” he will say. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will recall that some of the heavier parts of the airliner—the landing gear and the engines—are recognizable. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] Klimow also notices the “huge V-shaped gash in the building” and “smoke still billowing up.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] “The walls and roof on a wide section of this western Pentagon sector had collapsed into a heap of still-smoldering rubble,” Myers will describe. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158] However, he will comment, he is “impressed that more of the building hadn’t collapsed.” [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] Myers also notices the many workers, including firefighters, medical personnel, and police officers, who are trying to help in any way they can. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002]
Rumsfeld and Myers Talk to Rumsfeld’s Flight Surgeon – While Rumsfeld and Myers are at the crash site, Colonel John Baxter comes over and talks to them. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Baxter is the commander of the Pentagon’s Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic and also Rumsfeld’s flight surgeon, who accompanies the secretary of defense on trips. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 58; Condon-Rall, 2011, pp. 15] He describes to Rumsfeld, Myers, and Klimow the triage and treatment of patients he has conducted. It is unclear when Rumsfeld and Myers visit the crash site. They go there at 4:00 p.m., according to Klimow. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] But Myers will recall that they go there “[j]ust before 5:00 p.m.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 158] Rumsfeld will visit the site again later this afternoon with a larger group (see (Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2006, pp. 228]