According to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 9/11 Commission testimony in 2004, about one minute before the first WTC tower falls, he is able to reach the White House by phone. Speaking to Chris Henick, deputy political director to President Bush, Giuliani learns the Pentagon has been hit and he asks about fighter cover over New York City. Henick replies, “The jets were dispatched 12 minutes ago and they should be there very shortly, and they should be able to defend you against further attack.” [9/11 Commission, 5/19/2004] If this is true, it means fighters scramble from the Otis base around 9:46 a.m., not at 8:52 a.m., as most other accounts have claimed. While Giuliani’s account may seem wildly off, it is consistent with reports shortly after 9/11. In the first few days, acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, and a NORAD spokesman, Marine Corps Major Mike Snyder, claimed no fighters were scrambled anywhere until after the Pentagon was hit. [US Congress, 9/13/2001; Boston Globe, 9/15/2001] This story only changed on the evening of September 14, 2001, when CBS reported, “contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks were under way.” [CBS News, 9/14/2001]
9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Goes to Search for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leaves the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon shortly after arriving there to look for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but is unable to find him. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Myers recently arrived at the Pentagon following a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Shortly Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] Once there, he headed to the NMCC and reached it at around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 
; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Leaves the Command Center – A conference call is being conducted from the NMCC linking the command center to NORAD and the White House, among others (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Myers is content that Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations in the NMCC, who convened the conference call, is “doing a good job of managing the information flow and keeping the chain of command plugged in,” he will later recall. He therefore decides to leave the command center to look for Rumsfeld. He will recall seeing the collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Center on television as he is heading out. This means he leaves the NMCC at around 9:59 a.m., when the collapse occurs (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001)—possibly as little as a minute after he arrived there.
Myers Learns that Rumsfeld Is Outside – Myers heads toward Rumsfeld’s office, on the third floor of the E Ring—the outer ring of the Pentagon. He finds thickening smoke in the E Ring corridor and conditions almost as bad in Rumsfeld’s office suite. He talks to one of Rumsfeld’s aides who tells him the secretary of defense is outside, helping the wounded. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152] Although Rumsfeld was in his office earlier on, he headed outside immediately after the Pentagon was attacked (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001) and went to the crash site, where he helped carry an injured victim on a stretcher (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 1-2; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130] Since the secretary of defense is not around, Myers leaves word that he is returning to the NMCC and then makes his way back to the command center. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152-153]
Myers Will Rejoin the Conference Call – The length of time he spends away from the NMCC is unclear. However, he will be back there by 10:17 a.m. At that time, Leidig will state over the conference call that the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “would like to know who’s controlling the aircraft over Washington, DC.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ] Rumsfeld will arrive at the NMCC and start participating in the conference call at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131] After then, he and the vice chairman “stayed joined the rest of the day together,” Myers will recall. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Wants Confirmation that the Airborne Operations Center Has Taken Off
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asks Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, to check that the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) has been launched in response to the terrorist attacks. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153-154] Myers arrived at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon with Klimow at around 9:58 a.m. and then joined the air threat conference (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] At 9:59 a.m., an Air Force officer at the White House stated over the air threat conference that Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley had requested the implementation of “Continuity of Government” (COG) measures (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). These measures are meant to be taken “only in the gravest of emergencies,” Myers will later note, “and most recently had been expected to meet the Cold War threat of nuclear attack.”
Assistant Is Told to Verify that the NAOC Is Airborne – One aspect of the government’s COG plan is launching the NAOC. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153] The NAOC is a militarized version of a Boeing 747 that is intended to provide the president, secretary of defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff with an airborne command center that could be used to execute war plans and coordinate government operations during a national emergency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for directing NAOC operations. [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Verton, 2003, pp. 143; United States Air Force, 8/2007] “Some in Washington considered it an expensive, unnecessary relic of the Cold War, but with the capital itself now under imminent threat, it was clear that NAOC was still a useful part of the inventory,” Myers will comment. In response to Hadley’s request, therefore, he asks Klimow to verify that the NAOC is airborne, according to his own recollection. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 154] Klimow, though, will give a slightly different account, recalling that Myers turns to him and says, “Call Strategic Command and have him scramble the NAOC.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
NAOC Planes Were Involved in an Exercise – The US military in fact possesses four NAOC planes and three of them are already airborne. Two of them took off from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, at 9:27 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. (see (9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the third took off from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio minutes after the Pentagon attack, which occurred at 9:37 a.m. (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 ; Dayton Daily News, 9/12/2001; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004] Furthermore, while Myers will imply that the NAOC was launched as part of COG measures, according to the Omaha World-Herald, the three aircraft took off because they were being used in a major training exercise called Global Guardian, which was being conducted by the US Strategic Command this morning (see Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Omaha World-Herald, 2/27/2002] The exact time when Myers talks about the NAOC with Klimow is unclear. However, he apparently does so before 10:28 a.m., since, in his 2009 memoir, he will place the conversation before he sees the North Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing on television, and the collapse occurs at 10:28 a.m. (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 154]
Shortly After 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shelton Talks to Vice Chairman Myers, Updated on Military’s Actions
General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talks over the phone with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is at the Pentagon, and is given information about the Pentagon attack and the military’s response to the terrorist attacks. Shelton took off at 7:15 a.m. to fly to Europe for a NATO conference (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). He learned of the attacks in New York while his plane was over the Atlantic Ocean, and has just been told of a “big explosion at the Pentagon” (see (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
First Report Is of a Hand Grenade Going Off at Pentagon – Shelton heads to the communications console just behind the plane’s cockpit. From there, he talks over a secure, encrypted phone line with Myers, who is in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon. Myers updates Shelton on what is known about the explosion at the Pentagon. He says the first report is that a hand grenade went off in the Pentagon parking lot.
Myers Updates Shelton on Military Response to Attacks – Myers then gives Shelton a complete status report. He says: “We’ve transitioned the SIEC [significant event conference] into an air threat conference call, which is in progress as we speak (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). FAA has requested that NORAD take over control of US airspace. Fighters have scrambled to escort Air Force One (see (After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and we’re sending AWACS up to provide further monitoring (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). We’ve escalated to Threatcon Delta and are about to launch the NAOC [National Airborne Operations Center plane]. Bases around the world are locked tight, [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz has been relocated to Site R (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), plus, [Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen] Hadley has requested we implement full ‘Continuity of Government measures’ (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), and we are proceeding along those lines.”
Myers Says Plane Hit the Pentagon – Myers is then interrupted by some commotion in the background. When he returns to the line, he tells Shelton, “Okay, we just got the word: the prior report was incorrect; it was not a hand grenade that exploded, it was another commercial airline that struck the Pentagon.” He then continues with his status report, saying, “[P]er the president, we’ve gone weapons free in the event of a hijacked aircraft or one that threatens the White House.” [Giesemann, 2008, pp. 20, 22-24; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-433]
Shelton Wants to Return to Washington – Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that after he arrives at the NMCC—presumably referring to the time of this phone call—he “recommended General Shelton return to Washington, DC.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] But Shelton will recall that he tells Myers, “I need you to call Ed Eberhart [General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD] at NORAD and let him know that we’re coming back [to Washington] on Speckled Trout [the nickname of the plane he is on], and tell him that I would consider it a personal favor if he would see to it that the chairman and his crew are not shot down on their way back to Andrews.” Myers confirms, “Will do.” According to Shelton, his plane is called back 10 minutes later “with confirmation that we had been officially cleared to fly through the shutdown airspace.” [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 433] But according to Captain Rob Pedersen, the flight navigator on Shelton’s plane, it is several hours before the plane is cleared to enter the US airspace (see (After 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] The plane will therefore only land at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington, at 4:40 p.m. (see 4:40 p.m. September 11, 2001) and Shelton will only arrive at the NMCC an hour after that (see 5:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 159] The exact time of the call between Shelton and Myers is unclear, though it would be at some time after about 10:00 a.m., when Myers arrives at the NMCC (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38]
After 10:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: Counterterrorism’ Tsar’ Clarke Updated on Fighter Situation, Told Flight 93 Still Headed toward Washington
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told by White House Situation Room Deputy Director Ralph Seigler, “Secret Service reports a hostile aircraft ten minutes out.” Two minutes later, he is given an update: “Hostile aircraft eight minutes out.” In actual fact, when Flight 93 crashed at 10:06 a.m., it was still about 15 minutes away from Washington. Clarke is also told that there are 3,900 aircraft still in the air over the continental US (which is roughly accurate); four of those aircraft are believed to be piloted by terrorists (which is inaccurate by this time). Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman Richard Myers then reports: “We have three F-16s from Langley over the Pentagon. Andrews is launching fighters from the DC Air National Guard. We have fighters aloft from the Michigan Air National Guard, moving east toward a potential hostile over Pennsylvania. Six fighters from Tyndall and Ellington are en route to rendezvous with Air Force One over Florida. They will escort it to Barksdale.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; Clarke, 2004, pp. 8-9] However, fighters do not meet up with Air Force One until about an hour later (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Franklin Miller, a senior national security official who is working alongside Clarke on 9/11, and another official who is also in the Situation Room, will later fail to recall hearing any warning that a plane could be only minutes away. [New York Times, 3/30/2004] The time of this incident is unstated, but the Michigan fighters are not diverted until after 10:06 a.m. (see (After 10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). If it takes place after 10:06 a.m., this would parallel similar warnings about Flight 93 after it has already crashed provided to Vice President Dick Cheney elsewhere in the White House (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: US Military’s Force Protection Level Is Raised
US military installations are placed on the highest state of alert, known as Force Protection Condition Delta (FPCON Delta), in response to the terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon. The raised threat level applies to every US military installation across the country and around the world, and every member of the US armed forces. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001] Measures that are taken once FPCON Delta has been declared include placing more guards on duty at military installations, having all vehicles on installations identified, and having all personnel positively identified. Additionally, all suitcases, briefcases, and packages brought into an installation must be searched. [Slate, 9/12/2001]
Rumsfeld and Myers Decide to Raise the FPCON – The decision to raise the force protection condition is apparently made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and/or acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers. Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that after he arrives at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he and Myers “discussed, and I recommended… increasing the force protection level.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will later write that after he arrives at the NMCC (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he “recommended that all American military commands and units worldwide go to [FPCON] Delta.” He will add: “Terrorists had staged major attacks in New York and Washington. Although we did not yet have reliable intelligence on when and where they would strike next, it seemed likely that they would.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153] But White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will write that he gave the instruction to raise the force protection condition, at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5-6]
Conflicting Times Are Given for the Raising of the FPCON – The exact time at which the force protection condition is raised is unclear. CNN’s Barbara Starr will report that “all US military forces [are] ordered to Condition Delta” at 10:10 a.m. [CNN, 9/4/2002] However, other evidence indicates the force protection condition is raised at a later time, around 10:35 a.m. Rumsfeld only enters the NMCC at about 10:30 a.m., indicating it is raised after that time. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44] And at 10:38 a.m., after Vice President Dick Cheney asks him on the air threat conference call if US forces are on “heightened alert,” Rumsfeld will reply, “Yes,” and say they are at FPCON Delta. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ]
Some Areas Are Already at FPCON Delta – Although the entire US military is now under the same FPCON level, usually, different locations can have different FPCON levels. [Slate, 9/12/2001] US forces in some parts of the world, particularly the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, are in fact already at FPCON Delta. [New York Times, 9/12/2001] (The force protection condition was raised in those areas in late June, after intelligence reports suggested that terrorists might attack American military or civilian targets in the region (see June 21, 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 6/23/2001; National Public Radio, 5/23/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 257] ) Shortly after the force protection condition is raised, Rumsfeld will order that the defense readiness condition also be raised (see (10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554]
There Are Five Possible Force Protection Conditions – The force protection condition is a “chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved standard for identification of, and recommended responses to, terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities,” according to the Department of Defense. [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2010 ] It was created in June 2001 and replaced the “terrorist threat condition,” or “Threatcon.” [Los Angeles Times, 1/22/2002] There are five possible force protection conditions. The lowest, FPCON Normal, means no threat of terrorist activity is present. The other conditions are Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, up to the highest, FPCON Delta, which means a terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that action against a specific location is likely. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Slate, 9/12/2001]
After 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Fails to Tell NORAD about Vice President Cheney’s Shootdown Authorization
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently fails to tell NORAD about Vice President Dick Cheney’s authorization for the military to shoot down suspicious aircraft. Myers has been in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] At some unspecified time after reaching the NMCC, he begins a phone call with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who is at NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) in Colorado, in which the two men discuss “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Cheney, meanwhile, gave the military authorization to shoot down a suspicious aircraft that was approaching Washington, DC, shortly after 10:10 a.m. (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and personnel in the NMCC are told about this over the air threat conference at 10:14 a.m. and again at 10:19 a.m. (see 10:14 a.m.-10:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41-42]
Myers Will Be Unable to Recall Discussing Cheney’s Authorization – However, Myers apparently fails to tell Eberhart about it. When asked by the 9/11 Commission in 2004 whether he communicated with NORAD “to inform them of the vice president’s authorization and ensure that they understood their instructions,” he will give a confused and inexplicit answer. “To the best I can recall, I’m not sure I didn’t have that conversation with Eberhart on this,” he will reply. “I don’t remember… that being a simple issue we worked our way through,” he will add. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Eberhart will imply that Myers fails to tell him about Cheney’s shootdown authorization when he is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. He will recall being told about Cheney’s authorization not by Myers but by Major General Rick Findley, NORAD’s director of operations, sometime after around 10:15 a.m., when he arrives at the CMOC. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004]
Myers Does Not Hear of Cheney’s Authorization on the Conference Call – Furthermore, Myers will be unable to recall whether he is even monitoring the air threat conference when Cheney’s shootdown authorization is reported over it. He will be under the mistaken impression that Cheney only gives the authorization after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld joins him in the NMCC, at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “My recollection is that before we got the vice president’s authorization, the secretary [of defense] and I had this conversation and I made him aware of the authorization we were going to need if we had [a hijacked] aircraft coming in,” he will tell the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And yet in his 2009 memoir, Myers will contradict what he told the 9/11 Commission and describe hearing Cheney’s shootdown authorization being reported over the air threat conference. “Vice President Cheney has forwarded the president’s authorization to go weapons free if that plane [that is approaching Washington] is confirmed hijacked and threatens the White House or the Capitol,” he will recall hearing a military aide at the White House saying. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Discusses Rules of Engagement for Fighters with NORAD Commander Eberhart
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, but the two men will subsequently take no action to ensure these rules are communicated to fighter pilots. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Eberhart was in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, earlier on but left the base at around 9:30 a.m. to head to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Myers is at the Pentagon, where he went following a meeting on Capitol Hill. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] After arriving at the Pentagon, he went to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) with Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, reaching it at around 9:58 a.m. and going to the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) there (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Issue of Shootdown Authority Needs to Be Resolved – Sometime after reaching the DDO’s office, Myers talks to Eberhart on the phone. The call is made by Myers, according to Klimow. Myers “picked up the Red Switch [secure phone] and began a painful conversation with NORAD,” Klimow will later say. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] However, Myers will recall Eberhart making the call, stating, “I was the one that took the phone call from General Eberhart.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Myers and Eberhart have two immediate issues to resolve in the call. These are determining when a fighter pilot should “pull the trigger for the shootdown of an airliner” and clarifying “who would have the ultimate authority to give that command to shoot,” according to Klimow. It is important to resolve these issues, Klimow will note, since the two men “didn’t want to put the burden of killing innocent passengers on the shoulders of a single fighter pilot.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Rules Are Decided by 10:30 a.m. – Myers and Eberhart have agreed upon the rules of engagement by around 10:30 a.m., when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). These are, “We were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down,” Klimow will say. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Myers and Eberhart decide to delegate the authority to order the shootdown of a civilian airliner to “the regional air defense commander,” according to Klimow. Klimow will presumably be referring to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will similarly state that, regarding the passing on of the shootdown order, Eberhart would have to talk to his “regional commander” who would then talk to “the fighters that are involved in this.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Eberhart will recall directing CONR to “look for a hostile act” before ordering the shootdown of an aircraft, although he will give no indication of when he issued this instruction. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Myers and Eberhart Do Nothing to Get the Rules to Pilots – However, after establishing the rules of engagement, Myers and Eberhart will make no effort to ensure they are passed on to the fighter pilots who are responding to the crisis. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that in the “initial period” after he reached the NMCC—apparently referring to the first hour after he reached the command center—“he did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And Eberhart will tell the 9/11 Commission only that he “assumed that the [shootdown] order was passed to the level of the fighter pilot.” [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Written Rules Will Only Be Issued Hours Later – Furthermore, the task of establishing rules of engagement is apparently not fully resolved by 10:30 a.m. Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that “[t]hroughout the course of the day,” he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules” (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will only receive the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465]
Phone Call Apparently Occurs after 10:15 a.m. – It is unclear exactly when Eberhart and Myers discuss rules of engagement for fighter pilots. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “spoke to Eberhart many times” this morning, but add that he “could not remember exact times.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] According to his own recollection, though, he left the NMCC for a short period soon after he arrived there in order to look for Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and so his discussion with Eberhart presumably occurs sometime after he returns to the command center. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Furthermore, in the 45 minutes after 9:30 a.m. in which Eberhart is traveling from Peterson Air Force Base to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, he “couldn’t receive telephone calls,” according to the Denver Post (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006] This suggests he would only be able to discuss rules of engagement with Myers after around 10:15 a.m. (However, he will recall receiving a call from Arnold during the journey, so he is apparently not completely out of communication while he is on the road. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] )
10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Representative Finally Joins NMCC Teleconference after Long Delay
A representative of the FAA finally joins an emergency teleconference being conducted by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, after NMCC personnel have repeatedly been unable to connect the FAA to the conference. In response to the terrorist attacks, the NMCC began a “significant event conference” at 9:29 a.m., to gather and disseminate information from government agencies (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), and eight minutes later upgraded this to an “air threat conference” (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, because of “equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers,” operators at the NMCC have been unable to connect the FAA to the conference (see (9:29 a.m.-12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37]
FAA Representative Has ‘No Situational Awareness’ – The air threat conference is now joined by FAA employee Rayford Brooks. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 463] Brooks is on duty in the Central Altitude Reservation Function (CARF) at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. This office is responsible for processing and separating altitude reservations, and coordinates military requests for priority airspace activity with FAA facilities and international agencies. [9/11 Commission, 4/5/2004; 9/11 Commission, 4/15/2004] However, Brooks has “no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials,” according to the 9/11 Commission Report. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] Brooks will later recall having had “no situational awareness” of the current crisis. He only arrived at the Command Center at around 9:30 a.m. and had not been listening to the radio while driving to work. Those on the Command Center floor have not given him any instructions regarding the NMCC conference or other operational matters.
Brooks on Conference instead of Military Cell Officer – Brooks will tell the 9/11 Commission that the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC)—a small office located next to the CARF at the Command Center, manned by military reservists (see (Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001)—has asked the CARF to monitor the NMCC’s air threat conference on its behalf for three or four hours, because the ATSC does not have a working STU-III secure phone. [9/11 Commission, 4/15/2004] (A chronology of the ATSC’s actions on this day will state that the keys for the ATSC’s secure phones are recalibrated at some point, and these phones then “worked fine.” [US Air Force, 9/11/2001] )
NORAD and FAA Leaders out of Contact – Three times before 10:03 a.m., when the last hijacked plane reportedly crashed (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001), NORAD asked for confirmation of the FAA’s presence on the NMCC’s conference, so the FAA could provide an update on the hijackings, but the FAA had not been connected at those times. As a result of the FAA’s absence from the conference, the leaders of NORAD and the FAA have effectively been out of contact with each other. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37-38]
FAA’s Absence Caused Confusion over Identities of Hijacked Planes – General Richard Myers, the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later write that the lack of communication between the NMCC and the FAA has contributed to confusion at the NMCC over the flight numbers of the aircraft that were hijacked. However, according to Myers, the NMCC could not contact the FAA over ordinary phone lines because “[t]errorists who could hijack aircraft so readily could probably also eavesdrop on unsecured phone lines.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153]
10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Works on Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots, Too Late to Be of Any Use
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld works on “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots after he arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, but it will be hours before these rules are issued. After going outside to visit the site of the Pentagon attack, Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44, 465; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 5-7; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130-131]
Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Updates Rumsfeld – There, he immediately asks General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, for an update on the rules of engagement for fighter jets that are responding to the terrorist attacks. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Since arriving in the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m., Myers has discussed these rules over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] In response to the inquiry, Myers says the policy he and Eberhart agreed upon is that “we were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down.” [Graff, 2019, pp. 236]
Vice President Says He Has Given Shootdown Authorization – Then, at 10:39 a.m., Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney over the air threat conference (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Cheney says he has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft that are approaching Washington, DC (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43] Upon hearing this, Rumsfeld’s “thoughts went to the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order,” Rumsfeld will later recall, adding: “It was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not do. They needed clarity.”
Existing Rules Are Unsuitable for the Current Crisis – There are currently “standing rules of engagement,” Rumsfeld will note. [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] However, he will comment, “There were no rules of engagement on the books about when and how our pilots should handle a situation in which civilian aircraft had been hijacked and might be used as missiles to attack American targets.” “I’d hate to be a pilot up there and not know exactly what I should do,” he says to Myers. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340] To resolve the issue, Rumsfeld and Myers go to work “to fashion appropriate rules of engagement.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Rumsfeld also discusses these rules with Cheney and President Bush while he is developing them.
Suspicious Aircraft May Have to Be Shot Down – In the process of establishing rules of engagement, Rumsfeld and Myers talk about a fighter pilot making “hand signals and communications, and flying in front [of a suspicious aircraft] and waving at them, and getting them to go in a direction that’s not dangerous.” They determine that if a suspicious aircraft is going “in a direction that’s dangerous,” meaning toward “a high value target on the ground of some sort,” the fighter pilot would “have to shoot them down,” Rumsfeld will state. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] Myers speculates that any plane within 20 miles of the White House that fails to land on command might have to be shot down. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340]
Rules Are Quickly Developed – Rumsfeld and Myers reportedly come up with rules of engagement after a relatively short time. “We rapidly developed some rules of engagement for what our military aircraft might do in the event another aircraft appeared to be heading into a large civilian structure or population,” Rumsfeld will say. The process they come up with is that “the combatant commander would be notified in the event there was a circumstance that was abnormal and potentially dangerous, and he then would notify [Rumsfeld], and [Rumsfeld] then would notify the president.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Once the rules of engagement have been devised, the president approves them and Rumsfeld passes them on to Eberhart.
Final Rules Are Only Issued in the Afternoon – The process of coming up with these rules takes place in the hour before 11:15 a.m., Rumsfeld will tell the Washington Post. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] However, “Throughout the course of the day,” he will note, he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will recall that he in fact only receives the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Rumsfeld’s work on rules of engagement is therefore “an irrelevant exercise,” according to journalist and author Andrew Cockburn, since Rumsfeld “did not complete and issue them until… hours after the last hijacker had died.” [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7]
