Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Discusses Rules of Engagement for Fighters with NORAD Commander Eberhart

General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, but the two men will subsequently take no action to ensure these rules are communicated to fighter pilots. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Eberhart was in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, earlier on but left the base at around 9:30 a.m. to head to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Myers is at the Pentagon, where he went following a meeting on Capitol Hill. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] After arriving at the Pentagon, he went to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) with Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, reaching it at around 9:58 a.m. and going to the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) there (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Issue of Shootdown Authority Needs to Be Resolved – Sometime after reaching the DDO’s office, Myers talks to Eberhart on the phone. The call is made by Myers, according to Klimow. Myers “picked up the Red Switch [secure phone] and began a painful conversation with NORAD,” Klimow will later say. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] However, Myers will recall Eberhart making the call, stating, “I was the one that took the phone call from General Eberhart.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Myers and Eberhart have two immediate issues to resolve in the call. These are determining when a fighter pilot should “pull the trigger for the shootdown of an airliner” and clarifying “who would have the ultimate authority to give that command to shoot,” according to Klimow. It is important to resolve these issues, Klimow will note, since the two men “didn’t want to put the burden of killing innocent passengers on the shoulders of a single fighter pilot.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Rules Are Decided by 10:30 a.m. – Myers and Eberhart have agreed upon the rules of engagement by around 10:30 a.m., when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). These are, “We were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down,” Klimow will say. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Myers and Eberhart decide to delegate the authority to order the shootdown of a civilian airliner to “the regional air defense commander,” according to Klimow. Klimow will presumably be referring to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will similarly state that, regarding the passing on of the shootdown order, Eberhart would have to talk to his “regional commander” who would then talk to “the fighters that are involved in this.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Eberhart will recall directing CONR to “look for a hostile act” before ordering the shootdown of an aircraft, although he will give no indication of when he issued this instruction. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Myers and Eberhart Do Nothing to Get the Rules to Pilots – However, after establishing the rules of engagement, Myers and Eberhart will make no effort to ensure they are passed on to the fighter pilots who are responding to the crisis. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that in the “initial period” after he reached the NMCC—apparently referring to the first hour after he reached the command center—“he did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And Eberhart will tell the 9/11 Commission only that he “assumed that the [shootdown] order was passed to the level of the fighter pilot.” [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Written Rules Will Only Be Issued Hours Later – Furthermore, the task of establishing rules of engagement is apparently not fully resolved by 10:30 a.m. Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that “[t]hroughout the course of the day,” he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules” (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will only receive the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465]
Phone Call Apparently Occurs after 10:15 a.m. – It is unclear exactly when Eberhart and Myers discuss rules of engagement for fighter pilots. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “spoke to Eberhart many times” this morning, but add that he “could not remember exact times.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] According to his own recollection, though, he left the NMCC for a short period soon after he arrived there in order to look for Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and so his discussion with Eberhart presumably occurs sometime after he returns to the command center. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Furthermore, in the 45 minutes after 9:30 a.m. in which Eberhart is traveling from Peterson Air Force Base to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, he “couldn’t receive telephone calls,” according to the Denver Post (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006] This suggests he would only be able to discuss rules of engagement with Myers after around 10:15 a.m. (However, he will recall receiving a call from Arnold during the journey, so he is apparently not completely out of communication while he is on the road. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] )