The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) activates its Crisis Action Team (CAT) at the Pentagon to respond to the terrorist attacks, although the time this occurs at is unclear. [US Congress, 9/13/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 
; US Air Force, 9/9/2003] General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the JCS, will later tell a congressional hearing that in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center: “We stood up our Crisis Action Team.… And we started talking to the federal agencies.” [US Congress, 9/13/2001] The JCS’s CAT apparently assembles in the National Military Command Center (NMCC), which is located in the JCS area of the Pentagon and is responsible for monitoring worldwide events for the JCS. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ; GlobalSecurity (.org), 7/24/2011; Effingham Daily News, 9/12/2011] Myers will state that the CAT is activated just after 8:46 a.m., when the first hijacked plane crashed into the WTC (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). He will say it is activated “[a]t the time of the first impact on the World Trade Center.” “That was done immediately,” he will add. [US Congress, 9/13/2001] However, other accounts will indicate that the CAT is activated after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon attack occurs (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Lieutenant Colonel Lyndon Willms is an Air Force officer currently assigned to the Pentagon, working as a joint strategic planner for the JCS. After he and his colleagues in the Joint Vision and Transformation Division of the JCS learn from television reports of the second hijacked plane hitting the WTC, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), they “knew a decision would be made to either send us to augment one of the crisis action teams forming in the National Military Command Center across the hall or be evacuated to another site,” Willms will recall. It appears from Willms’s account, however, that the CAT is only activated later on. By around 9:51 a.m., Willms will state, the CAT is forming in the NMCC, but he and his colleagues are “a bit confused because we thought we would be going in to augment” it. Instead, they are evacuated from the Pentagon. [Effingham Daily News, 9/12/2011] Lieutenant Colonel James Foley, the NMCC operations officer, will also indicate that the CAT is only activated after the Pentagon is hit. He will state that “a Joint Staff Crisis Action Team assembled… within the first two hours, while the situation was entirely uncertain and the Pentagon was burning.” [US Air Force, 9/9/2003] And when they visit the NMCC in 2003, members of the 9/11 Commission staff will be told that a CAT “was stood up” in the NMCC “sometime in the afternoon on 9/11.” [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] It is apparently standard procedure for the JCS to activate its CAT during a terrorist attack. A Department of Defense memorandum sent in March 2001, about how the US military responds to terrorism, will state that in a crisis, the operations directorate of the JCS “establishes a Crisis Action Team (CAT) to prepare and coordinate deployment, and execute orders.” [US Department of Defense, 3/15/2001]
Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Learns of the First Crash at the WTC from Television
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, learns of the first crash at the World Trade Center when he sees it reported on television while he is about to go into a meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001] Myers has been nominated as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is scheduled to hold a series of meetings today with senators on Capitol Hill in preparation for his Senate confirmation hearing. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] He is scheduled to meet Cleland at 9 o’clock in Cleland’s Capitol Hill office. [CNN, 11/20/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The two men are going to discuss the future of American defenses, particularly against global terrorism, Cleland will later recall. [Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003]
Myers Sees the Burning North Tower on Television – While Myers is waiting in Cleland’s outer office, he notices the television there showing a live shot of the New York skyline with black smoke coming out of one of the Twin Towers of the WTC. Text across the bottom of the screen reports that a plane hit the North Tower. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-8] Myers hears the commentator on television saying something like: “We think it was an airplane. We don’t know if it’s a big one or a little one.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] He thinks the plane that crashed “[m]ust have been a light aircraft… [m]aybe on a sightseeing flight.”
Myers Doesn’t Realize the Crash Was Terrorism – After he enters Cleland’s office, he and Cleland chat for a short while about the incident in New York. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8] Being a pilot himself and noting that it is a beautiful, clear day, Myers says, “How could an airplane get off course and hit a building?” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] “How could a pilot be that stupid, to hit a tower?” he asks. However, he then thinks, “Well, whatever” and proceeds with the meeting. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] Myers and Cleland will learn about the second crash at the WTC, which occurs at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), when a staffer comes in and tells them about it, according to most accounts. Only then will the two men realize that this is a terrorist attack (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “Maybe we should have known after the first one [that this was terrorism],” Myers will reflect. However, he will explain: “After the first [tower] was attacked, early on… people still couldn’t agree on what had actually happened. We didn’t have a good account at that point.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8-9]
Myers Is Currently the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs – General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently out of the country, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so, by law, Myers is the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his place. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-432; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] In this role he is the nation’s highest-ranking military officer and the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. [Office of the Federal Register, 6/1/1999, pp. 178-179 ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11/7/2019] “Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be [Myers’s] to make, in conjunction with Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and the president,” Shelton will comment. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432] With Shelton away, it is “critical for Myers to get back to the Pentagon” to respond to the crashes, the American Forces Press Service will note. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001] However, he will only start his journey back there sometime after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
9:03 a.m.-9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Commander Eberhart Sees the Second Crash on TV but Does Not Immediately Go to NORAD’s Operations Center
General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, realizes the US is under attack after he sees Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center on television and then considers whether he should go to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC). Eberhart was at his home in Colorado when he learned about the hijacking of Flight 11 and then went to his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs (see (8:45 a.m.-9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). In his office, he sees the second hijacked plane, Flight 175, crashing into the WTC live on television at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). He is unaware that a second aircraft has been hijacked, but realizes immediately that a coordinated terrorist attack is taking place. Right away, he tries to contact General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but is unable to do so, because Shelton is currently airborne, being flown to Hungary for a NATO conference (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001). Eberhart then tries contacting General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is able to reach him on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Eberhart then focuses his attention on determining whether he should stay at NORAD headquarters or go to the CMOC, which is about 30 minutes’ drive away from Peterson Air Force Base. He initially decides to stay in his office. This, he will say, is because the CMOC is already well manned and also because there are “dead spots” in which he would be out of phone coverage for five to 10 minutes at a time during the drive to the operations center. However, Eberhart subsequently decides to go to the CMOC. He will tell the 9/11 Commission that he leaves his office to head there at approximately 9:30 a.m., during a lull in transmissions on a teleconference, which he is presumably listening to. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] He will experience problems receiving phone calls while he is traveling to the CMOC (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006]
After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Learns of the Second Crash While Meeting Senator Cleland
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, learns that a second plane has crashed into the World Trade Center and realizes this is a terrorist attack while he is meeting Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) on Capitol Hill. Myers learned of the first crash at the WTC when he saw it reported on television as he was about to go into the meeting with Cleland, but didn’t realize it was a terrorist attack (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). He therefore proceeded with the meeting, which began at around 9:00 a.m. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9]
Myers and Cleland Have Been Talking about Terrorism – After briefly discussing the incident in New York, Myers and Cleland had a “little conversation about national security,” Myers will later describe. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8] Ironically, one of the subjects they talked about was terrorism. [Washington Post, 7/3/2003] They have been “discussing the need to boost our conventional forces, to look at the question of terrorism and attacks on the United States,” Cleland will recall. [US Congress, 9/13/2001] They were “discussing the future of American defenses, particularly against worldwide terrorism,” he will say on another occasion. [Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003]
Cleland and Myers Possibly See the Crash on TV – At some point, they learn of the second crash, which takes place at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), although accounts will conflict over exactly when and how this happens. According to Cleland, they learn of the crash when they see it on television. He will recall that while they are talking, his secretary, Elaine Iler, bursts into the room in an agitated state and says, “You’ve gotta see the TV.” Myers and Cleland follow her out to where the television is. “Almost as soon as we got into the room, we saw the second plane hit the tower at the World Trade Center,” Cleland will describe. “For a moment, I thought it was a replay of the first plane hitting the tower, but it quickly became apparent there were two planes involved and neither of them was little,” he will add. [Cleland and Raines, 2009, pp. 170]
Staffer Alerts Cleland and Myers to the Crash – Myers, though, will recall that, rather than seeing it on television, he and Cleland learn of the crash after it occurs, and, on most occasions, he will say they do so when someone tells them about it. On some occasions he will state that they learn of the crash shortly after their meeting began. “A couple of minutes into the meeting, one of the aides came in and said the second building had been hit,” he will say in an interview in 2011. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] He will give a similar account in his 2009 memoir, writing: “[Cleland] had started preparing a pot of tea, but we hadn’t taken a sip when a staff person came in from the outer office and informed us that the second tower had been hit. We both knew the interview was over and started out to the TV to see the South Tower erupting with smoke and flame.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8]
Notification of the Crash Possibly Occurs Later On – In an interview in 2002, he will indicate that he and Cleland are alerted to the crash later on during their meeting. “Somewhere in the middle of that meeting, [someone] came in and said the second tower has been hit,” he will tell NBC News. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] On another occasion, he will be less specific, mentioning only that after the second crash occurred, “The meeting was over very quickly.” [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
No One Alerts Cleland and Myers to the Crash, according to One Account – However, in an interview five weeks after 9/11, Myers will claim that no one interrupts the meeting to tell them about the crash and they only learn of it after the meeting ends. “Sometime during that office call the second tower was hit. Nobody informed us of that, but when we came out, that was obvious,” he will say. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001]
Cleland and Myers Realize This Is Terrorism – Myers and Cleland realize immediately that the US is under attack when they learn of the second crash. “It was pretty clear from the time that second tower was hit that we were under attack,” Myers will comment. “That’s when we figured out something: that America, or at least the World Trade Center, is under attack,” he will say. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The second crash was “no light aircraft accident, but certainly an act of unthinkable terrorist savagery,” he will write. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9]
Myers Takes No Action in response to the Crash – However, Myers does nothing in response to the attacks at this time. He will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “did not recall making any decisions or taking any actions between the time the second tower was hit and the time the Pentagon was struck,” which is 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Furthermore, despite noting that the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon is “essentially my battle station when things are happening,” he will only head back to the Pentagon sometime after the Pentagon attack occurs (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Congress, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently out of the country, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so Myers is the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his place. [American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Until Shelton returns to the US, therefore, he is the nation’s highest-ranking military officer. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11/7/2019]
9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Directs Crisis Response through Video Conference with Top Officials
Around this time, according to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke reaches the Secure Video Conferencing Center just off the main floor of the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. From there, he directs the response to the 9/11 attacks and stays in contact with other top officials through video links. Clarke claims that on video he can see Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, CIA Director George Tenet, FBI Director Robert Mueller, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (filling in for the traveling Attorney General John Ashcroft), Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (filling in for the traveling Secretary of State Colin Powell), and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers (filling in for the traveling Chairman Henry Shelton). National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is with Clarke, but she lets him run the crisis response, deferring to his longer experience on terrorism matters. Clarke is also told by an aide, “We’re on the line with NORAD, on an air threat conference call.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 2-4; Australian, 3/27/2004] According to the 9/11 Commission, logs indicate that Clarke’s video teleconference only begins at 9:25 a.m. (see 9:25 a.m. September 11, 2001), which is later than Clarke suggests, and CIA and FAA representatives only join it at 9:40 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 36 and 462] Other accounts claim that, rather than being involved in Clarke’s teleconference at this time, Donald Rumsfeld is still in his office waiting for his intelligence briefing (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Richard Myers is in a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; Clarke, 2006, pp. 218-219] The 9/11 Commission claims that, “While important,” Clarke’s conference has “no immediate effect on the emergency defense efforts.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] Yet, as the Washington Post puts it, “everyone seems to agree” Clarke is the chief crisis manager on 9/11. [Washington Post, 3/28/2004] Even Clarke’s later opponent, National Security Adviser Rice, calls him 9/11’s “crisis management guy.” [United Press International, 4/9/2004] The conference is where the government’s emergency defense efforts are concentrated.
9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Mistakenly Tells NEADS Flight 11 Is Still Airborne
According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS is contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center. Colin Scoggins, Boston Center’s military liaison, tells it: “I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.… That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That’s the latest report we have.… I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.” The NEADS official asks: “He—American 11 is a hijack?… And he’s heading into Washington?” Scoggins answers yes both times and adds, “This could be a third aircraft.” Somehow Boston Center has been told by FAA headquarters that Flight 11 is still airborne, but the 9/11 Commission will say it hasn’t been able to find where this mistaken information came from.
Scoggins Makes Error – Vanity Fair magazine will later add, “In Boston, it is Colin Scoggins who has made the mistaken call.” Scoggins will explain why he believes he made this error: “With American Airlines, we could never confirm if [Flight 11] was down or not, so that left doubt in our minds.” He says he was monitoring a conference call between FAA centers (see 8:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), “when the word came across—from whom or where isn’t clear—that American 11 was thought to be headed for Washington.” However, Boston Center was never tracking Flight 11 on radar after losing sight of it near Manhattan: “The plane’s course, had it continued south past New York in the direction it was flying before it dipped below radar coverage, would have had it headed on a straight course toward DC. This was all controllers were going on.” Scoggins says, “After talking to a supervisor, I made the call and said [American 11] is still in the air.” [Northeast Air Defense Sector, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
Myers Refers to Mistaken Report – In the hours following the attacks, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers will apparently refer to this erroneous report that Flight 11 is still airborne and heading toward Washington, telling the Associated Press that “prior to the crash into the Pentagon, military officials had been notified that another hijacked plane had been heading from the New York area to Washington.” Myers will say “he assumed that hijacked plane was the one that hit the Pentagon, though he couldn’t be sure.” [Associated Press, 9/11/2001]
Before 9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Commander Eberhart Talks to Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers’s Executive Assistant
Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, receives a call from General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who urgently wants to talk to Myers. Klimow is at the Pentagon, in an office in the building’s outer ring, and has seen the news of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Eberhart, meanwhile, is in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. After seeing the second crash at the WTC on television, he realized that a coordinated terrorist attack was underway (see (9:03 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] He tried contacting General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was unable to reach him since Shelton is currently airborne, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so he now wants to talk to Myers instead. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-432] The Red Switch phone on Klimow’s desk, therefore, starts to ring. The Red Switch, Klimow will later describe, “is the global secure telephone and conferencing system that provides rapid top-secret communication links between the White House, the Pentagon, and all of our major commands around the world.” Klimow picks up the phone and hears Eberhart’s voice on the line. Knowing that Eberhart is the commander of NORAD, he will recall, “My heart sank because NORAD is responsible for defending North America from air attack.” Eberhart asks to speak to Myers. Myers, however, is away from the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “Sir, he’s on Capitol Hill,” Klimow explains. “Man, it’s urgent,” Eberhart says. “Get hold of him, get him to a phone,” he instructs Klimow. “I’m on it,” Klimow replies. Klimow then hangs up the Red Switch phone. He will subsequently call Myers and let him know that NORAD wants to talk to him (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Myers will talk to Eberhart (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The exact time when Klimow speaks to Eberhart will be unstated. However, the call apparently takes place sometime before 9:29 a.m., since Klimow will recall that after he talks to Eberhart and then phones Myers, he receives another call on the Red Switch phone, inviting him to join the “significant event conference.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call will be convened by the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37]
9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Possibly Holding ‘Live-Fly’ Training Exercise
According to former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, around this time the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers speaks to him via video link (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). During their conversation, Myers mentions, “We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5] However, no other references have been found to this exercise, “Vigilant Warrior.” Considering that exercise terms are “normally an unclassified nickname,” [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4/23/1998 ] this is perhaps a little odd. Could Richard Clarke have mistakenly been referring to the Vigilant Guardian exercise (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which is taking place on 9/11? According to a later news report though, NORAD confirms that “it was running two mock drills on Sept. 11 at various radar sites and Command Centers in the United States and Canada,” one of these being Vigilant Guardian. [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 12/5/2003] If this is correct then there must be another NORAD exercise on 9/11. If not “Vigilant Warrior,” a possibility is that the exercise referred to by Richard Clarke is in fact “Amalgam Warrior,” which is a NORAD-sponsored, large-scale, live-fly air defense and air intercept field training exercise. Amalgam Warrior usually involves two or more NORAD regions and is held twice yearly, in the spring for the West Coast and in the autumn for the East Coast. [US Congress, n.d.; Airman, 1/1996; Arkin, 2005, pp. 254; GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/27/2005] Is it possible that in 2001 the East Coast Amalgam Warrior is being held earlier than usual (like Global Guardian (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001)) and is taking place on 9/11? In support of this possibility is a 1997 Defense Department report that describes the Stratcom exercise Global Guardian, saying it “links with other exercise activities sponsored by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands.” The exercises it links with are Crown Vigilance (an Air Combat Command exercise), Apollo Guardian (a US Space Command exercise), and—significantly—the NORAD exercises Vigilant Guardian and Amalgam Warrior. [US Department of Defense, 5/1997; GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/27/2005] Since in 2001, Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) is occurring the same time as Global Guardian, might Amalgam Warrior be as well? In his book Code Names, William Arkin says that Amalgam Warrior is “sometimes combined with Global Guardian.” [Arkin, 2005, pp. 254] Amalgam Warrior tests such activities as tracking, surveillance, air interception, employing rules of engagement, attack assessment, electronic warfare, and counter-cruise-missile operations. A previous Amalgam Warrior in 1996 involved such situations as tracking unknown aircraft that had incorrectly filed their flight plans or wandered off course, in-flight emergencies, terrorist aircraft attacks, and large-scale bomber strike missions. Amalgam Warrior 98-1 was NORAD’s largest ever exercise and involved six B-1B bombers being deployed to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, to act as an enemy threat by infiltrating the aerial borders of North America. [Airman, 1/1996; Arkin, 2005, pp. 254; GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/27/2005] Another Amalgam Warrior in fall 2000 similarly involved four B-1 bombers acting as enemy forces trying to invade Alaska, with NORAD going from tracking the unknown aircraft to sending up “alert” F-15s in response. [Eielson News Service, 10/27/2000; Associated Press, 10/29/2000] If either one (or both) of these exercises ending with the name “Warrior” is taking place on 9/11, this could be very significant, because the word “Warrior” indicates that the exercise is a Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved, Commander in Chief, NORAD-sponsored field training exercise. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 8/25/1989] Real planes would be pretending to be threats to the US and real fighters would be deployed to defend against them.
Before 9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: Executive Assistant Calls Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers and Says NORAD Wants to Talk to Him
Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls Myers to let him know that NORAD wants to talk to him. Klimow is at the Pentagon and has seen the news of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television. Myers, meanwhile, is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). He is aware of the two crashes at the WTC and realizes that they were terrorist attacks (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Eberhart has just called Klimow on a secure line and said he urgently wanted to speak to Myers (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Executive Assistant Calls Myers’s Military Aide – After hanging up the secure phone, Klimow sets about contacting the vice chairman. He picks up the unsecured phone on his desk and calls the cell phone of Captain Chris Donahue, Myers’s military aide, who is with Myers on Capitol Hill. When Donahue answers, Klimow says, “Chris, get the old man on the phone.” Myers is apparently still meeting with Cleland, since Donahue hesitates and then asks, “Do you really want me to interrupt the senator?” But Klimow exclaims, “It’s urgent!” and orders, “Get in there!”
Myers Is Advised to Return to the Pentagon – Donahue therefore goes and finds Myers. When the vice chairman comes on the line, Klimow asks him if he knows about what happened in New York. Myers says Cleland’s staff has just briefed him on this. Klimow says in a calm and precise voice, “It looks like there’s a major hijacking underway and I recommend that you return to the Pentagon as soon as possible,” Myers will later recall. Myers will also recall that Klimow tells him the White House Situation Room called at 9:16 a.m. and confirmed that American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles hit the North Tower of the WTC. Klimow will recall telling Myers: “NORAD needs to talk. It sounds pretty bad.” He then asks the vice chairman, “Can you get back to the Pentagon?” According to Klimow, Myers replies: “I’ll call NORAD from my sedan. I’ll be there in 15 minutes.” “We’re on our way back to the Pentagon now,” Myers will recall saying. Myers ends the call and Klimow then starts making preparations for his arrival back at the Pentagon.
Myers Talks to the NORAD Commander – The time when this call takes place is unclear. However, it apparently takes place sometime before 9:29 a.m., since Klimow will recall that after he makes it, he receives a call inviting him to join the “significant event conference.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call will be convened by the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] Myers talks over the phone with Eberhart, who updates him on what is happening and the actions NORAD is taking in response to the attacks (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, while Klimow’s account will imply that the call between Myers and Eberhart takes place after Klimow’s conversation with the vice chairman, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will describe it taking place before he receives the call from Klimow. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Acting Joint Chiefs Chairman Myers Updates Clarke Videoconference on Fighter Response
According to his own account, during a video conference with top officials that he is directing, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, “I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many? Where?” Myers, who is at the Pentagon, replies, “Not a pretty picture, Dick. We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but… Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now [toward Washington]. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert.” Vigilant Warrior may be a mistaken reference to either the on-going war game Vigilant Guardian, or perhaps another exercise called Amalgam Warrior (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Otis Air National Guard Base is in Massachusetts, 188 miles east of New York City; Langley is in Virginia, 129 miles south of Washington; Tinker Air Force Base is in Oklahoma. Clarke asks, “Okay, how long to CAP [combat air patrol] over DC?” Myers replies, “Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5] The first fighters don’t reach Washington until perhaps more than 30 minutes later (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, this account—or at least the time Clarke alleges the conversation occurs—is contradicted by Myers himself and Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). Myers claims he has been at a meeting on Capitol Hill with Cleland since about 9:00 a.m., and does not arrive back at the Pentagon until after it is hit, which is at 9:37 a.m. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/15/2003; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] Cleland confirms the existence of this meeting, and claims that Myers is with him until around the time of the Pentagon attack. [CNN, 11/20/2001; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003] (There are, though, some inconsistencies in Myers and Cleland’s accounts of this period—see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
