General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, learns of the first crash at the World Trade Center when he sees it reported on television while he is about to go into a meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001] Myers has been nominated as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is scheduled to hold a series of meetings today with senators on Capitol Hill in preparation for his Senate confirmation hearing. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] He is scheduled to meet Cleland at 9 o’clock in Cleland’s Capitol Hill office. [CNN, 11/20/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The two men are going to discuss the future of American defenses, particularly against global terrorism, Cleland will later recall. [Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003]
Myers Sees the Burning North Tower on Television – While Myers is waiting in Cleland’s outer office, he notices the television there showing a live shot of the New York skyline with black smoke coming out of one of the Twin Towers of the WTC. Text across the bottom of the screen reports that a plane hit the North Tower. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-8] Myers hears the commentator on television saying something like: “We think it was an airplane. We don’t know if it’s a big one or a little one.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] He thinks the plane that crashed “[m]ust have been a light aircraft… [m]aybe on a sightseeing flight.”
Myers Doesn’t Realize the Crash Was Terrorism – After he enters Cleland’s office, he and Cleland chat for a short while about the incident in New York. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8] Being a pilot himself and noting that it is a beautiful, clear day, Myers says, “How could an airplane get off course and hit a building?” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] “How could a pilot be that stupid, to hit a tower?” he asks. However, he then thinks, “Well, whatever” and proceeds with the meeting. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] Myers and Cleland will learn about the second crash at the WTC, which occurs at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), when a staffer comes in and tells them about it, according to most accounts. Only then will the two men realize that this is a terrorist attack (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “Maybe we should have known after the first one [that this was terrorism],” Myers will reflect. However, he will explain: “After the first [tower] was attacked, early on… people still couldn’t agree on what had actually happened. We didn’t have a good account at that point.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8-9]
Myers Is Currently the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs – General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently out of the country, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so, by law, Myers is the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his place. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-432; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] In this role he is the nation’s highest-ranking military officer and the principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense, and the National Security Council. [Office of the Federal Register, 6/1/1999, pp. 178-179 
; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11/7/2019] “Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be [Myers’s] to make, in conjunction with Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and the president,” Shelton will comment. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432] With Shelton away, it is “critical for Myers to get back to the Pentagon” to respond to the crashes, the American Forces Press Service will note. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001] However, he will only start his journey back there sometime after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Learns of the Second Crash While Meeting Senator Cleland
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, learns that a second plane has crashed into the World Trade Center and realizes this is a terrorist attack while he is meeting Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) on Capitol Hill. Myers learned of the first crash at the WTC when he saw it reported on television as he was about to go into the meeting with Cleland, but didn’t realize it was a terrorist attack (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). He therefore proceeded with the meeting, which began at around 9:00 a.m. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9]
Myers and Cleland Have Been Talking about Terrorism – After briefly discussing the incident in New York, Myers and Cleland had a “little conversation about national security,” Myers will later describe. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8] Ironically, one of the subjects they talked about was terrorism. [Washington Post, 7/3/2003] They have been “discussing the need to boost our conventional forces, to look at the question of terrorism and attacks on the United States,” Cleland will recall. [US Congress, 9/13/2001] They were “discussing the future of American defenses, particularly against worldwide terrorism,” he will say on another occasion. [Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003]
Cleland and Myers Possibly See the Crash on TV – At some point, they learn of the second crash, which takes place at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), although accounts will conflict over exactly when and how this happens. According to Cleland, they learn of the crash when they see it on television. He will recall that while they are talking, his secretary, Elaine Iler, bursts into the room in an agitated state and says, “You’ve gotta see the TV.” Myers and Cleland follow her out to where the television is. “Almost as soon as we got into the room, we saw the second plane hit the tower at the World Trade Center,” Cleland will describe. “For a moment, I thought it was a replay of the first plane hitting the tower, but it quickly became apparent there were two planes involved and neither of them was little,” he will add. [Cleland and Raines, 2009, pp. 170]
Staffer Alerts Cleland and Myers to the Crash – Myers, though, will recall that, rather than seeing it on television, he and Cleland learn of the crash after it occurs, and, on most occasions, he will say they do so when someone tells them about it. On some occasions he will state that they learn of the crash shortly after their meeting began. “A couple of minutes into the meeting, one of the aides came in and said the second building had been hit,” he will say in an interview in 2011. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] He will give a similar account in his 2009 memoir, writing: “[Cleland] had started preparing a pot of tea, but we hadn’t taken a sip when a staff person came in from the outer office and informed us that the second tower had been hit. We both knew the interview was over and started out to the TV to see the South Tower erupting with smoke and flame.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8]
Notification of the Crash Possibly Occurs Later On – In an interview in 2002, he will indicate that he and Cleland are alerted to the crash later on during their meeting. “Somewhere in the middle of that meeting, [someone] came in and said the second tower has been hit,” he will tell NBC News. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] On another occasion, he will be less specific, mentioning only that after the second crash occurred, “The meeting was over very quickly.” [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
No One Alerts Cleland and Myers to the Crash, according to One Account – However, in an interview five weeks after 9/11, Myers will claim that no one interrupts the meeting to tell them about the crash and they only learn of it after the meeting ends. “Sometime during that office call the second tower was hit. Nobody informed us of that, but when we came out, that was obvious,” he will say. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001]
Cleland and Myers Realize This Is Terrorism – Myers and Cleland realize immediately that the US is under attack when they learn of the second crash. “It was pretty clear from the time that second tower was hit that we were under attack,” Myers will comment. “That’s when we figured out something: that America, or at least the World Trade Center, is under attack,” he will say. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The second crash was “no light aircraft accident, but certainly an act of unthinkable terrorist savagery,” he will write. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9]
Myers Takes No Action in response to the Crash – However, Myers does nothing in response to the attacks at this time. He will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “did not recall making any decisions or taking any actions between the time the second tower was hit and the time the Pentagon was struck,” which is 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Furthermore, despite noting that the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon is “essentially my battle station when things are happening,” he will only head back to the Pentagon sometime after the Pentagon attack occurs (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Congress, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently out of the country, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so Myers is the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his place. [American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Until Shelton returns to the US, therefore, he is the nation’s highest-ranking military officer. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11/7/2019]
9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Acting Joint Chiefs Chairman Myers Updates Clarke Videoconference on Fighter Response
According to his own account, during a video conference with top officials that he is directing, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, “I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many? Where?” Myers, who is at the Pentagon, replies, “Not a pretty picture, Dick. We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but… Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now [toward Washington]. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert.” Vigilant Warrior may be a mistaken reference to either the on-going war game Vigilant Guardian, or perhaps another exercise called Amalgam Warrior (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Otis Air National Guard Base is in Massachusetts, 188 miles east of New York City; Langley is in Virginia, 129 miles south of Washington; Tinker Air Force Base is in Oklahoma. Clarke asks, “Okay, how long to CAP [combat air patrol] over DC?” Myers replies, “Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5] The first fighters don’t reach Washington until perhaps more than 30 minutes later (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, this account—or at least the time Clarke alleges the conversation occurs—is contradicted by Myers himself and Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). Myers claims he has been at a meeting on Capitol Hill with Cleland since about 9:00 a.m., and does not arrive back at the Pentagon until after it is hit, which is at 9:37 a.m. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/15/2003; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] Cleland confirms the existence of this meeting, and claims that Myers is with him until around the time of the Pentagon attack. [CNN, 11/20/2001; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003] (There are, though, some inconsistencies in Myers and Cleland’s accounts of this period—see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
December 16, 2002: Members of 9/11 Commission Have Potential Conflicts of Interest
The 10 members of the new 9/11 Commission are appointed by this date, and are: Republicans Thomas Kean (chairman), Slade Gorton, James Thompson, Fred Fielding, and John Lehman, and Democrats Lee Hamilton (vice chairman), Max Cleland, Tim Roemer, Richard Ben-Veniste, and Jamie Gorelick. [Chicago Tribune, 12/12/2002; Associated Press, 12/16/2002; New York Times, 12/17/2002] Senators Richard Shelby (R-AL) and John McCain (R-AZ) had a say in the choice of one of the Republican positions. They and many 9/11 victims’ relatives wanted former Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH), who co-wrote an acclaimed report about terrorism before 9/11 (see January 31, 2001). But, possibly under pressure from the White House, Senate Republican leader Trent Lott (R-MS) blocked Rudman’s appointment and chose John Lehman instead. [St. Petersburg Times, 12/12/2002; Associated Press, 12/13/2002; Reuters, 12/16/2002; Shenon, 2008, pp. 55-56] It will slowly emerge over the next several months that at least six of the 10 commissioners have ties to the airline industry. [CBS News, 3/5/2003] Henry Kissinger (see December 13, 2002) and his replacement Thomas Kean (see December 16, 2002) both caused controversy when they were named. In addition, the other nine members of the Commission are later shown to all have potential conflicts of interest. Republican commissioners: 
Fred Fielding also works for a law firm lobbying for Spirit Airlines and United Airlines. [Associated Press, 2/14/2003; CBS News, 3/5/2003] Slade Gorton has close ties to Boeing, which built all the planes destroyed on 9/11, and his law firm represents several major airlines, including Delta Air Lines. [Associated Press, 12/12/2002; CBS News, 3/5/2003] John Lehman, former secretary of the Navy, has large investments in Ball Corp., which has many US military contracts. [Associated Press, 3/27/2003] James Thompson, former Illinois governor, is the head of a law firm that lobbies for American Airlines and has previously represented United Airlines. [Associated Press, 1/31/2003; CBS News, 3/5/2003] Democratic commissioners: Richard Ben-Veniste represents Boeing and United Airlines. [CBS News, 3/5/2003] He also has other curious connections, according to a 2001 book on CIA ties to drug running written by Daniel Hopsicker, which has an entire chapter called “Who is Richard Ben-Veniste?” Lawyer Ben-Veniste, Hopsicker says, “has made a career of defending political crooks, specializing in cases that involve drugs and politics.” He has been referred to in print as a “Mob lawyer,” and was a long-time lawyer for Barry Seal, one of the most famous drug dealers in US history who is also alleged to have had CIA connections. [Hopsicker, 2001, pp. 325-30] Max Cleland, former US senator, has received $300,000 from the airline industry. [CBS News, 3/5/2003] James Gorelick is a director of United Technologies, one of the Pentagon’s biggest defense contractors and a supplier of engines to airline manufacturers. [Associated Press, 3/27/2003] Lee Hamilton sits on many advisory boards, including those to the CIA, the president’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, and the US Army. [Associated Press, 3/27/2003] Tim Roemer represents Boeing and Lockheed Martin. [CBS News, 3/5/2003]
January-July 2003: Bush Administration Delays Release of 9/11 Congressional Inquiry Report until after Start of Iraq War
The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry is originally expected to release its complete and final report in January 2003, but the panel spends seven months negotiating with the Bush administration about what material can be made public, and the final report is not released until July 2003. In late March 2003, the US launches an attack on Iraq, beginning a long war. [Washington Post, 7/27/2003] The administration originally wanted two thirds of the report to remain classified. [Associated Press, 5/31/2003] The inquiry concluded in July 2002 that Mohamed Atta never met with an Iraqi agent in Prague, as some have claimed, but it is unable to make that conclusion public until now (see Late July 2002). Former Senator Max Cleland (D-GA), a member of the 9/11 Commission, will later claim: “The administration sold the connection [between Iraq and al-Qaeda] to scare the pants off the American people and justify the war. There’s no connection, and that’s been confirmed by some of bin Laden’s terrorist followers.… What you’ve seen here is the manipulation of intelligence for political ends. The reason this report was delayed for so long—deliberately opposed at first, then slow-walked after it was created—is that the administration wanted to get the war in Iraq in and over… before [it] came out. Had this report come out in January [2003] like it should have done, we would have known these things before the war in Iraq, which would not have suited the administration.” [United Press International, 7/25/2003] Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), one of the inquiry’s chairmen, also suspects that the administration deliberately does not hurry the declassification process along. However, he thinks this is because there is a “direct line between the terrorists and the government of Saudi Arabia.” According to author Philip Shenon, Graham thinks the administration wants to keep this material from the public because of its “determination to keep Saudi oil flowing to the United States.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 50-51]
January 26, 2003: Some 9/11 Commission Members Unhappy with Staffing Arrangements, Executive Director Zelikow’s Appointment and Degree of Control
When all ten members of the 9/11 Commission meet for the first time, in an informal setting, some of them are already unhappy about the way the commission is being run. Some of the Democratic members are unhappy about the selection of Republican Philip Zelikow as executive director (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003), a decision made solely by chairman Tom Kean and vice chairman Lee Hamilton. Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste will say Zelikow’s appointment was “presented as a fait accompli.” Ben-Veniste is also alarmed by Zelikow’s links to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see 1995 and January 3, 2001), and he and fellow commissioner Max Cleland are upset about the proposed staff structure (see Around February 2003). There is to be a single staff led by Zelikow, and the commissioners will not have personal staffers, although this is usual on such commissions. Ben-Veniste proposes that each commissioner develop an expertise in a specific field, but this plan is blocked by Kean, Hamilton, and Zelikow. Kean and Hamilton also say that the commissioners can visit the commission’s offices, but cannot have a permanent presence there. Indeed, not even Kean and Hamilton will have an office in the commission’s building. Author Philip Shenon will comment: “To Ben-Veniste, the way the staff was being organized guaranteed that the commissioners’ involvement in the details of the investigation would be limited. It centralized control in Zelikow’s hands.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 69-70]
After January 27, 2003: 9/11 Commissioner Cleland Disappointed with Start of Inquiry
Following the 9/11 Commission’s first formal meeting, Democratic commissioner Max Cleland is unhappy with the state of the inquiry. Specifically, he dislikes the facts that the Commission will not issue subpoenas for the documents it wants (see January 27, 2003) and will have a single non-partisan staff headed by executive director Philip Zelikow, who is close to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see Shortly Before January 27, 2003). In addition, he is disappointed by the resignations of Henry Kissinger (see December 13, 2002) and George Mitchell (see December 11, 2002). Although Kissinger is a Republican, Cleland had believed that “with Kissinger… we were going to get somewhere,” because: “This is Henry Kissinger. He’s the big dog.” Kissinger’s replacement Tom Kean has no experience in Washington and Cleland thinks he is “not going to be the world’s greatest tiger in asking a difficult question.” Cleland respects Mitchell’s replacement Lee Hamilton, but knows that he has a reputation for a non-confrontational style of politics, the reason he was initially passed over for the position of vice chairman of the Commission (see Before November 27, 2002). [Shenon, 2008, pp. 71-72]
March 2, 2003: 9/11 Commission Executive Director Zelikow Tries to Prevent Staff Talking Directly to Commissioners
The 9/11 Commission’s executive director Philip Zelikow issues a five-page memo, entitled “What Do I Do Now?” telling newly hired staff members how to go about their jobs on the Commission. The most controversial part of the memo prevents staffers from returning calls from commissioners, stating: “If you are contacted by a commissioner, please contact [deputy executive director] Chris [Kojm] or me. We will be sure that the appropriate members of the Commission’s staff are responsive.” Author Philip Shenon will write that the staffers are surprised by this: “It occurred to several of the staff members, especially those with experience on other federal commissions, that Zelikow was trying to cut off their contact with the people they really worked for—the commissioners.”
Part of Memo Rescinded – When commissioner Jamie Gorelick learns of the restriction, she calls the Commission’s chairman and vice chairman, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, and tells them this is unacceptable. Fellow commissioner Max Cleland also thinks the order is a bad idea, and will later say, “It violates the spirit of an open look at what the hell happened on 9/11.” Zelikow is forced to rescind this portion of the memo, allowing commissioners free access to the staff.
Other Restrictions – Other rules in the memo include: Commission staff should not disclose the exact location of the Commission’s offices for security reasons; Staffers should never talk to reporters about the Commission’s work, because “there are no innocent conversations with reporters.” Zelikow or his deputy should be notified of such calls. A breach of this rule can get a staffer fired; and All staffers have to prepare a confidential memo describing potential conflicts of interest. Shenon will comment, “Staff members who knew some of Zelikow’s own conflicts of interest found it amusing that he was so worried about theirs.” [9/11 Commission, 3/2/2003; Shenon, 2008, pp. 83-85]
May 2003 and Before: 9/11 Commissioner Argues Panel Should Investigate False Claims of Iraq Link to 9/11, but Other Commissioners Not Interested
At early meetings of the 9/11 commission, Commissioner Max Cleland tries to persuade the other commissioners that they should investigate the Bush administration’s reasons for invading Iraq. Cleland wants to know whether the president used 9/11 as an excuse to launch an attack he had been planning from the beginning of his presidency. Cleland also thinks that the administration’s obsession with Iraq was the reason it paid so little attention to the problem of terrorism in the spring and summer of 2001, and tells the other commissioners, “They were focused on Iraq, they were planning a war on Iraq, they were not paying attention to the business at hand.” However, the commission’s chairman and vice chairman, Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton, as well as Executive Director Philip Zelikow, are against this, as are some of the Republican commissioners, perhaps because of the popularity of the Iraq war at this point. Author Philip Shenon will say: “Even some of the Democrats [on the commission] were distancing themselves from him. Cleland knew he was quickly becoming a pariah.” Cleland will comment, “It was painfully obvious to me that there was this blanket over the commission, adding, “Anybody who spoke out or dissented, whether against George Bush, the White House, or the war against Iraq, was going to be marginalized.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 129-130]
June 2003: 9/11 Commission Begins Moves to Get Rid of Troublesome Member
The 9/11 Commission begins to look for ways to get rid of one of its members, Democrat Max Cleland, who the other commissioners have come to dislike.
Accusations of Partisanship – According to author Philip Shenon, some of the Commission’s members feel that Cleland has been “so combative and harshly partisan in the Commission’s early private meetings—so angry at the mention of the names of [George W.] Bush or [Karl] Rove, so obsessed with what was happening in Iraq—that it threatened any hope of a unanimous final report.” Cleland’s stance is apparently influenced by his recent election defeat, which he blames on what he regards as a smear campaign led by Rove and Bush (see October 11, 2002 and After). Fellow commissioner Slade Gorton will say, “Max Cleland is an extremely embittered individual, and all he wanted to do was ‘get’ the president.”
Appointment to Federal Agency – Therefore, Tom Kean, the Commission’s chairman, and other commissioners begin to look for a way to remove Cleland from the investigation. However, these moves have to be conducted in secret, as Cleland is known to the victims’ family members as a harsh critic of the White House. If news of plans to remove him leaked, it would lead to a firestorm of criticism. Kean therefore calls Democratic Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, who arranged Cleland’s position on the Commission. In July, Daschle will put Cleland forward as a Democratic member of the board of the Export-Import Bank, a federal agency that helps US exports. The lucrative position would be markedly advantageous to Cleland, a severely injured war veteran with no stable source of income. Although the White House does not like Cleland, it will agree to appoint him to the board so that he can be removed from the Commission. However, this will not occur until December (see December 9, 2003). [Shenon, 2008, pp. 160-162]
