Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, receives a call from General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who urgently wants to talk to Myers. Klimow is at the Pentagon, in an office in the building’s outer ring, and has seen the news of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Eberhart, meanwhile, is in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. After seeing the second crash at the WTC on television, he realized that a coordinated terrorist attack was underway (see (9:03 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] He tried contacting General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but was unable to reach him since Shelton is currently airborne, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so he now wants to talk to Myers instead. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 
; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-432] The Red Switch phone on Klimow’s desk, therefore, starts to ring. The Red Switch, Klimow will later describe, “is the global secure telephone and conferencing system that provides rapid top-secret communication links between the White House, the Pentagon, and all of our major commands around the world.” Klimow picks up the phone and hears Eberhart’s voice on the line. Knowing that Eberhart is the commander of NORAD, he will recall, “My heart sank because NORAD is responsible for defending North America from air attack.” Eberhart asks to speak to Myers. Myers, however, is away from the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “Sir, he’s on Capitol Hill,” Klimow explains. “Man, it’s urgent,” Eberhart says. “Get hold of him, get him to a phone,” he instructs Klimow. “I’m on it,” Klimow replies. Klimow then hangs up the Red Switch phone. He will subsequently call Myers and let him know that NORAD wants to talk to him (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Myers will talk to Eberhart (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The exact time when Klimow speaks to Eberhart will be unstated. However, the call apparently takes place sometime before 9:29 a.m., since Klimow will recall that after he talks to Eberhart and then phones Myers, he receives another call on the Red Switch phone, inviting him to join the “significant event conference.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call will be convened by the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37]
Before 9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: Executive Assistant Calls Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers and Says NORAD Wants to Talk to Him
Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls Myers to let him know that NORAD wants to talk to him. Klimow is at the Pentagon and has seen the news of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television. Myers, meanwhile, is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). He is aware of the two crashes at the WTC and realizes that they were terrorist attacks (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Eberhart has just called Klimow on a secure line and said he urgently wanted to speak to Myers (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Executive Assistant Calls Myers’s Military Aide – After hanging up the secure phone, Klimow sets about contacting the vice chairman. He picks up the unsecured phone on his desk and calls the cell phone of Captain Chris Donahue, Myers’s military aide, who is with Myers on Capitol Hill. When Donahue answers, Klimow says, “Chris, get the old man on the phone.” Myers is apparently still meeting with Cleland, since Donahue hesitates and then asks, “Do you really want me to interrupt the senator?” But Klimow exclaims, “It’s urgent!” and orders, “Get in there!”
Myers Is Advised to Return to the Pentagon – Donahue therefore goes and finds Myers. When the vice chairman comes on the line, Klimow asks him if he knows about what happened in New York. Myers says Cleland’s staff has just briefed him on this. Klimow says in a calm and precise voice, “It looks like there’s a major hijacking underway and I recommend that you return to the Pentagon as soon as possible,” Myers will later recall. Myers will also recall that Klimow tells him the White House Situation Room called at 9:16 a.m. and confirmed that American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles hit the North Tower of the WTC. Klimow will recall telling Myers: “NORAD needs to talk. It sounds pretty bad.” He then asks the vice chairman, “Can you get back to the Pentagon?” According to Klimow, Myers replies: “I’ll call NORAD from my sedan. I’ll be there in 15 minutes.” “We’re on our way back to the Pentagon now,” Myers will recall saying. Myers ends the call and Klimow then starts making preparations for his arrival back at the Pentagon.
Myers Talks to the NORAD Commander – The time when this call takes place is unclear. However, it apparently takes place sometime before 9:29 a.m., since Klimow will recall that after he makes it, he receives a call inviting him to join the “significant event conference.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call will be convened by the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] Myers talks over the phone with Eberhart, who updates him on what is happening and the actions NORAD is taking in response to the attacks (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, while Klimow’s account will imply that the call between Myers and Eberhart takes place after Klimow’s conversation with the vice chairman, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will describe it taking place before he receives the call from Klimow. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Vice Chairman Myers’s Executive Assistant Talks on the Phone with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shelton’s Plane
Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talks on the phone with either General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Lieutenant Commander Suzanne Giesemann, one of Shelton’s aides, and alerts them to the attack on the Pentagon soon after it occurs. [Giesemann, 2008, pp. 24; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Shelton is currently flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Giesemann is accompanying him. They were both alerted to the crashes at the World Trade Center shortly after the attacks occurred and in response, Shelton gave the order for his plane to turn around and head back to the US (see (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Giesemann, 2008, pp. 21-23; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-431] Klimow is at the Pentagon and has seen the news of the crashes at the WTC on television. He has been participating in the conference call convened by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Executive Assistant Is Alerted to the Call from Shelton’s Plane – After Klimow has been on the conference call for a short time, Mary Turner, his secretary, tries to get his attention. Annoyed at the interruption, though, he tells her: “Mary, no, not now. I’m taking notes.” But Turner is undeterred and starts waving her hands at him. She then says Shelton is calling on the unsecured phone, Klimow will later recall. “He wants to talk, now. He’s calling from his airplane,” she adds. But Giesemann will write that she, not Shelton, makes the call from Shelton’s plane at this time. She will describe calling Shelton’s office at the Pentagon and reaching Klimow there.
Executive Assistant Updates the Caller – While still listening to the conference call on his secure phone, Klimow picks up his unsecured phone to talk to either Shelton or Giesemann. He will recall Shelton snapping at him, “Klimow, what the devil is going on back there?” to which he replies: “Sir, I’m on the Red Switch [secure phone] with the White House and NORAD. I’ll relay information.” But according to Giesemann, Klimow tells her: “Suzanne, this is really bad. The scenes on TV are unbelievable.” He then says, “You guys need to get back here right away” and Giesemann replies, “We’re coming now.”
Secretary Feels the Pentagon Move – Klimow’s secretary notices when the Pentagon is attacked, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Klimow will recall that as he is passing on the information he is hearing over the conference call to Shelton’s plane, Turner, who is sitting next to him, suddenly stands up and exclaims, “My God, the building moved.” He then notices “pandemonium” outside his door, with people running down the corridor, yelling and shouting. However, with his attention focused on two phone calls, he hadn’t noticed the building moving or heard anything unusual when the Pentagon was hit. Annoyed, he therefore instructs his secretary: “Mary, close the door. I can’t hear.” Giesemann will describe noticing the turmoil at the Pentagon, with the sound of shouting in the background coming over her headphones. “What’s all that commotion, Colonel?” she asks and Klimow replies: “I’m not sure. Stand by, Suzanne.” [Giesemann, 2008, pp. 24; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Crash Is Reported over the Conference Call – Klimow learns what happened when, at 9:39 a.m., Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations in the NMCC, states over the conference call, “There’s a report that an aircraft has crashed into the Mall side of the Pentagon.” A couple of minutes later, Klimow checks this information with Leidig, asking him, “Do we confirm that [an] aircraft crashed into the building?” and Leidig replies: “On live TV you can now see smoke emitting from the Pentagon. Yes, sir. It’s confirmed.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ]
Executive Assistant Tells the Caller about the Pentagon Attack – Klimow passes on news of the attack to either Shelton or Giesemann. According to his own recollection, he tells Shelton: “Sir, we’ve been hit. The Pentagon’s been hit by an airplane. Turn your aircraft around. Get back to Washington.” The call then ends. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012; Graff, 2019, pp. 98] But Giesemann will recall him saying: “Something’s happened here at the Pentagon. I think a bomb exploded, but we’re still trying to find out what it was.” He then tells her, “I have to go.” [Giesemann, 2008, pp. 24] Klimow will subsequently tell Leidig over the conference call that he has informed Shelton’s plane about the Pentagon attack. “I’ve passed all the information that you just said to General Shelton’s aircraft,” he will say, adding, “I’ve had comms with him consistently but he just dropped.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ] A short time later, he will receive a call from Myers, who is being driven back to the Pentagon from a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Before 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Talks to His Executive Assistant and Is Updated on the Pentagon Attack
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talks on the phone with Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, as he is being driven back to the Pentagon from a meeting on Capitol Hill and is given an update on what is happening. Klimow, who is at the Pentagon, saw the news of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television and learned that an aircraft had crashed into his building when this was reported over the air threat conference. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9-11; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers was on Capitol Hill for a meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) when he learned of the crashes at the WTC (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He was informed of the Pentagon attack shortly after it occurred, as he was making his way back to the Pentagon (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] In response to this news, he promptly calls Klimow from his car to verify what happened.
Executive Assistant Describes the Commotion at the Pentagon – Klimow answers the phone immediately. He tells Myers that people are running around and shouting in the E Ring—the outermost corridor of the Pentagon—and all the fire alarms are going off. Myers asks him if he is okay. “Yes, sir,” Klimow replies. The aircraft that hit the Pentagon “must have hit on the west side of the building, near the helo pad,” he explains. He says the White House has mentioned that the combatant commanders will probably want to increase the terrorist threat condition—the “Threatcon”—as they see fit. “If terrorists were executing a complex and massive attack today, our isolated naval, air, and ground bases overseas might be especially vulnerable, so raising the Threatcon was essential,” Myers will later comment.
Myers Says He Is ‘Coming in’ to the Pentagon – Klimow says the FBI has been designated the lead civilian agency in the crisis, with the military standing by as required if the terrorist attacks should involve weapons of mass destruction, meaning chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. Realizing he needs to be where the military has the appropriate command and control apparatus to respond to the attacks, Myers asks Klimow if the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon is up and running. Klimow says it is. “We’re coming in,” Myers tells Klimow. “I’ll be there in three minutes,” he says and adds, “Meet me at the River Entrance.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9-11; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers’s car then heads across the 14th Street Bridge over the Potomac River. As it does, Myers notices black smoke rising up from the Pentagon in the distance. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 11] After putting down the phone, Klimow will head to the Pentagon’s River Entrance and wait there until Myers arrives (see (Shortly Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Shortly Before 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Reaches the Pentagon and Heads to the Command Center
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives at the Pentagon and then heads to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) there. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers learned of the crashes at the World Trade Center while he was on Capitol Hill for a meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and he learned of the Pentagon attack as he was making his way back to the Pentagon (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] He talked over the phone with Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, as he was being driven to the Pentagon and Klimow then went to the Pentagon’s River Entrance to wait for him to arrive (see (Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9-11; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Talks to the Deputy Defense Secretary – Myers’s car now pulls up outside the Pentagon and Myers jumps from it. The steps of the River Entrance are crowded with men and women who have evacuated the building, and Klimow is waiting calmly near the door. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151] Before entering the Pentagon, Myers stops briefly to speak to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was evacuated from the building after it was attacked (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [PBS Frontline, 4/22/2002; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] He then grabs Klimow by the arm and the two men make their way through the many Pentagon employees streaming out of the building as they head for the NMCC. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151; American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Wants to Quickly Get to the Command Center – In the event of an attack, procedures require the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go to Site R, an alternate military command center outside Washington, DC, while the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintains command at the NMCC. However, since General Henry Shelton, the chairman, is currently out of the country, flying to Europe for a NATO meeting (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Myers is designated acting chairman until he has returned to the United States. Consequently, “my command post had to be in the burning Pentagon,” Myers will later note. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 10] “I wanted to get [to] the National Military Command Center as soon as I could,” he will recall. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] He and Klimow head up some stairs, and at the top are confronted by two security officers who try to stop them. “I’m sorry, General, we have orders to keep everybody out; the building’s not safe,” one of them says. However, Myers and Klimow ignore them. They push past the two security officers, and continue on their way to the inner rings of the Pentagon and the NMCC. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] They will reach the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38]
9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Enters the NMCC and Joins the Air Threat Conference
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon and starts participating in the conference call being conducted from there. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Myers recently arrived at the Pentagon following a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Shortly Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] He joined Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, at the River Entrance and the two men then headed to the NMCC. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] The NMCC is the US military’s “worldwide monitoring, crisis response center,” according to Myers. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] It is “a communications hub, a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders,” he will later write. Klimow will call it “the nerve center of the Pentagon.” It includes the large Current Actions Center (CAC), which is filled with computer cubicles.
Myers Goes to the Deputy Director’s Office – When Myers and Klimow arrive at the NMCC, they find “soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines” sitting at “their consoles, their telephones, and their computers, manning communication links around the world.” They head to the deputy director for operations’ office, located at one end of the CAC. This small, windowless room, also known as the “DDO shack,” has several desks, a conference table, and lots of telephones. It is where the 24-hour watch takes place and is “the heart of the NMCC,” according to Klimow. In it, Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations, is participating in a conference call. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call commenced at 9:29 a.m. as a “significant event conference” (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) but was upgraded to an “air threat conference” at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] It links the NMCC to NORAD, the White House, and other agencies. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
Myers Is Concerned about What Could Happen Next – After arriving in the NMCC, Myers wants to gain “situational awareness.” His first thought is, “What’s next?” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] One of his priorities is “looking ahead and giving strategic guidance to make sure we were prepared to handle whatever came next,” he will recall. “We didn’t know at that time if we were in the middle of a several-day long attack, what kind of attacks could come next, or who and what might be targeted,” he will add. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ]
Myers Discusses Evacuating the Sears Tower – The exact time when Myers reaches the NMCC is unclear. He will estimate that he arrives there between 10:00 a.m. and 10:10 a.m. when he is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] However, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that he joins the air threat conference being run from there shortly before 10:00 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] And evidence will indicate that he in fact reaches the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m. or shortly before then. Leidig will tell the 9/11 Commission that he is “certain that the vice chairman was in the room” when the “Sears Tower issue” was discussed over the air threat conference. He will say he recalls telling Myers there is a recommendation to evacuate the Sears Tower, and Myers saying in response that this is a good idea and the military supports it. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] The discussion Leidig will be referring to is apparently one that occurs at 9:58 a.m. At that time, he is recorded saying over the air threat conference, “The vice chairman recommends evacuating [the] Chicago Tower [i.e. the Sears Tower in Chicago] based on the flight plan of one of the possible hijacked aircraft.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ] However, after spending only a short time in the NMCC, Myers will leave there in order to search for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Wants Confirmation that the Airborne Operations Center Has Taken Off
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asks Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, to check that the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) has been launched in response to the terrorist attacks. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153-154] Myers arrived at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon with Klimow at around 9:58 a.m. and then joined the air threat conference (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] At 9:59 a.m., an Air Force officer at the White House stated over the air threat conference that Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley had requested the implementation of “Continuity of Government” (COG) measures (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). These measures are meant to be taken “only in the gravest of emergencies,” Myers will later note, “and most recently had been expected to meet the Cold War threat of nuclear attack.”
Assistant Is Told to Verify that the NAOC Is Airborne – One aspect of the government’s COG plan is launching the NAOC. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153] The NAOC is a militarized version of a Boeing 747 that is intended to provide the president, secretary of defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff with an airborne command center that could be used to execute war plans and coordinate government operations during a national emergency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for directing NAOC operations. [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Verton, 2003, pp. 143; United States Air Force, 8/2007] “Some in Washington considered it an expensive, unnecessary relic of the Cold War, but with the capital itself now under imminent threat, it was clear that NAOC was still a useful part of the inventory,” Myers will comment. In response to Hadley’s request, therefore, he asks Klimow to verify that the NAOC is airborne, according to his own recollection. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 154] Klimow, though, will give a slightly different account, recalling that Myers turns to him and says, “Call Strategic Command and have him scramble the NAOC.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
NAOC Planes Were Involved in an Exercise – The US military in fact possesses four NAOC planes and three of them are already airborne. Two of them took off from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, at 9:27 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. (see (9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the third took off from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio minutes after the Pentagon attack, which occurred at 9:37 a.m. (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 ; Dayton Daily News, 9/12/2001; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004] Furthermore, while Myers will imply that the NAOC was launched as part of COG measures, according to the Omaha World-Herald, the three aircraft took off because they were being used in a major training exercise called Global Guardian, which was being conducted by the US Strategic Command this morning (see Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Omaha World-Herald, 2/27/2002] The exact time when Myers talks about the NAOC with Klimow is unclear. However, he apparently does so before 10:28 a.m., since, in his 2009 memoir, he will place the conversation before he sees the North Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing on television, and the collapse occurs at 10:28 a.m. (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 154]
Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Discusses Rules of Engagement for Fighters with NORAD Commander Eberhart
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, but the two men will subsequently take no action to ensure these rules are communicated to fighter pilots. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Eberhart was in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, earlier on but left the base at around 9:30 a.m. to head to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Myers is at the Pentagon, where he went following a meeting on Capitol Hill. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] After arriving at the Pentagon, he went to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) with Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, reaching it at around 9:58 a.m. and going to the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) there (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Issue of Shootdown Authority Needs to Be Resolved – Sometime after reaching the DDO’s office, Myers talks to Eberhart on the phone. The call is made by Myers, according to Klimow. Myers “picked up the Red Switch [secure phone] and began a painful conversation with NORAD,” Klimow will later say. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] However, Myers will recall Eberhart making the call, stating, “I was the one that took the phone call from General Eberhart.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Myers and Eberhart have two immediate issues to resolve in the call. These are determining when a fighter pilot should “pull the trigger for the shootdown of an airliner” and clarifying “who would have the ultimate authority to give that command to shoot,” according to Klimow. It is important to resolve these issues, Klimow will note, since the two men “didn’t want to put the burden of killing innocent passengers on the shoulders of a single fighter pilot.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Rules Are Decided by 10:30 a.m. – Myers and Eberhart have agreed upon the rules of engagement by around 10:30 a.m., when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). These are, “We were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down,” Klimow will say. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Myers and Eberhart decide to delegate the authority to order the shootdown of a civilian airliner to “the regional air defense commander,” according to Klimow. Klimow will presumably be referring to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will similarly state that, regarding the passing on of the shootdown order, Eberhart would have to talk to his “regional commander” who would then talk to “the fighters that are involved in this.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Eberhart will recall directing CONR to “look for a hostile act” before ordering the shootdown of an aircraft, although he will give no indication of when he issued this instruction. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Myers and Eberhart Do Nothing to Get the Rules to Pilots – However, after establishing the rules of engagement, Myers and Eberhart will make no effort to ensure they are passed on to the fighter pilots who are responding to the crisis. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that in the “initial period” after he reached the NMCC—apparently referring to the first hour after he reached the command center—“he did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And Eberhart will tell the 9/11 Commission only that he “assumed that the [shootdown] order was passed to the level of the fighter pilot.” [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Written Rules Will Only Be Issued Hours Later – Furthermore, the task of establishing rules of engagement is apparently not fully resolved by 10:30 a.m. Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that “[t]hroughout the course of the day,” he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules” (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will only receive the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465]
Phone Call Apparently Occurs after 10:15 a.m. – It is unclear exactly when Eberhart and Myers discuss rules of engagement for fighter pilots. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “spoke to Eberhart many times” this morning, but add that he “could not remember exact times.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] According to his own recollection, though, he left the NMCC for a short period soon after he arrived there in order to look for Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and so his discussion with Eberhart presumably occurs sometime after he returns to the command center. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Furthermore, in the 45 minutes after 9:30 a.m. in which Eberhart is traveling from Peterson Air Force Base to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, he “couldn’t receive telephone calls,” according to the Denver Post (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006] This suggests he would only be able to discuss rules of engagement with Myers after around 10:15 a.m. (However, he will recall receiving a call from Arnold during the journey, so he is apparently not completely out of communication while he is on the road. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] )
10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Works on Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots, Too Late to Be of Any Use
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld works on “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots after he arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, but it will be hours before these rules are issued. After going outside to visit the site of the Pentagon attack, Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44, 465; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 5-7; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130-131]
Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Updates Rumsfeld – There, he immediately asks General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, for an update on the rules of engagement for fighter jets that are responding to the terrorist attacks. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Since arriving in the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m., Myers has discussed these rules over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] In response to the inquiry, Myers says the policy he and Eberhart agreed upon is that “we were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down.” [Graff, 2019, pp. 236]
Vice President Says He Has Given Shootdown Authorization – Then, at 10:39 a.m., Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney over the air threat conference (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Cheney says he has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft that are approaching Washington, DC (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43] Upon hearing this, Rumsfeld’s “thoughts went to the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order,” Rumsfeld will later recall, adding: “It was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not do. They needed clarity.”
Existing Rules Are Unsuitable for the Current Crisis – There are currently “standing rules of engagement,” Rumsfeld will note. [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] However, he will comment, “There were no rules of engagement on the books about when and how our pilots should handle a situation in which civilian aircraft had been hijacked and might be used as missiles to attack American targets.” “I’d hate to be a pilot up there and not know exactly what I should do,” he says to Myers. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340] To resolve the issue, Rumsfeld and Myers go to work “to fashion appropriate rules of engagement.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Rumsfeld also discusses these rules with Cheney and President Bush while he is developing them.
Suspicious Aircraft May Have to Be Shot Down – In the process of establishing rules of engagement, Rumsfeld and Myers talk about a fighter pilot making “hand signals and communications, and flying in front [of a suspicious aircraft] and waving at them, and getting them to go in a direction that’s not dangerous.” They determine that if a suspicious aircraft is going “in a direction that’s dangerous,” meaning toward “a high value target on the ground of some sort,” the fighter pilot would “have to shoot them down,” Rumsfeld will state. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] Myers speculates that any plane within 20 miles of the White House that fails to land on command might have to be shot down. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340]
Rules Are Quickly Developed – Rumsfeld and Myers reportedly come up with rules of engagement after a relatively short time. “We rapidly developed some rules of engagement for what our military aircraft might do in the event another aircraft appeared to be heading into a large civilian structure or population,” Rumsfeld will say. The process they come up with is that “the combatant commander would be notified in the event there was a circumstance that was abnormal and potentially dangerous, and he then would notify [Rumsfeld], and [Rumsfeld] then would notify the president.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Once the rules of engagement have been devised, the president approves them and Rumsfeld passes them on to Eberhart.
Final Rules Are Only Issued in the Afternoon – The process of coming up with these rules takes place in the hour before 11:15 a.m., Rumsfeld will tell the Washington Post. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] However, “Throughout the course of the day,” he will note, he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will recall that he in fact only receives the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Rumsfeld’s work on rules of engagement is therefore “an irrelevant exercise,” according to journalist and author Andrew Cockburn, since Rumsfeld “did not complete and issue them until… hours after the last hijacker had died.” [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7]
11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Officials Participate in a Teleconference with Other Government Agencies and Discuss Rules of Engagement for Fighters
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and several more senior officials at the Pentagon participate in a secure video teleconference with other government agencies in which the rules of engagement for fighter jets responding to the terrorist attacks are discussed. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers has been in the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) within the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and Rumsfeld has been with him there since around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani Jr., Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant, announced earlier on that a secure video teleconference with the White House was going to take place at 11:00 a.m. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 ] Rumsfeld, Myers, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, now leave the DDO’s office to participate in this. [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] The teleconference takes place in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room, which is more commonly known as “the tank.” [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 ] This is the “NMCC facility for secure teleconferences” and is “a tiny room with a thick, airtight door” that is “severely cramped,” according to Myers. Klimow will later describe it as “a small soundproof room just big enough for six or seven people.” Along with Myers, Rumsfeld, and Klimow, other officials in the room for the teleconference include Giambastiani; Stephen Cambone, Rumsfeld’s closest aide; William Haynes, the general counsel of the Department of Defense; and Victoria Clarke, the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz participates in the teleconference after arriving at the alternate military command center inside Raven Rock Mountain on the Pennsylvania-Maryland border (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and can be seen by his colleagues at the Pentagon in a small box in the top right corner of their screen. The identities of the other participants will be unstated. The purpose of the teleconference is to link the Department of Defense’s civilian and military leadership with the rest of the government, and the main issue discussed is the rules of engagement for NORAD to follow should more hijackings occur, according to Myers. Further details of what the participants talk about will be unstated. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] It is unclear how long the teleconference lasts. Joseph Wassel, assistant to the secretary of defense for communications, who waits outside the room while it is taking place, will recall only that it “went on for quite a while.” [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4/9/2003 ] As the teleconference progresses, its participants in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room will start feeling sick due to the deteriorating air quality. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 155; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
