Nabih Berri takes over the Amal Militia, a Shi’a Lebanese paramilitary organization, and tries to build it up as a power base for himself. Although not a fundamentalist Muslim, Berri allies himself with the new regime in Iran and Hezbollah, a fundamentalist Lebanese Shi’a party backed by Iran. Berri also manages to convince Syrian authorities that he will represent their interests in Lebanon and comes to a similar arrangement with the Ba’ath party in Iraq. This is a difficult balance for Berri to keep, as journalists Joe and Susan Trento will later point out, “If he displeased the Iranian mullahs who controlled the supply of money to Hezbollah in Lebanon, he would lose his grip on power.” Former intelligence officer Michael Pilgrim will comment, “Berri was targeted for CIA recruitment and so were members of his militia… I think it’s safe to say we financed his early trips to Iran.” He also commences relationships with the Drug Enforcement Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency. Unsurprisingly, some of the consequences of this are bad for the US, and the Trentos will comment: “The relationship would end in a series of deadly disasters for members of our armed services and the CIA. According to US intelligence officials who served in Lebanon at the time, Berri kept the peace with [Iran] and the Shi’a by allowing them to attack Westerners in his Amal-controlled territory. To prove his loyalty to the Shi’a and keep the alliance that was essential to his power base, he failed to pass on intelligence to the United States.” Based on interviews with former intelligence officers and associates of Berri, the Trentos will conclude that he facilitated attacks on the US by Hezbollah by allowing their operatives to pass Amal checkpoints without warning the US, for example before attacks on the US embassy and Marine barracks in 1983 in which hundreds die (see April 18-October 23, 1983). [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 74-77]
Late 1996: ISI Returns Afghanistan Training Camps to Bin Laden and Subsidizes Their Costs
When bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan (see May 18, 1996), he was forced to leave most of his personal fortune behind. Additionally, most of his training camps were in Sudan and those camps had to be left behind as well. But after the Taliban conquers most of Afghanistan and forms an alliance with bin Laden (see After May 18, 1996-September 1996), the Pakistani ISI persuades the Taliban to return to bin Laden the Afghanistan training camps that he controlled in the early 1990s before his move to Sudan. The ISI subsidizes the cost of the camps, allowing bin Laden to profit from the fees paid by those attending them. The ISI also uses the camps to train militants who want to fight against Indian forces in Kashmir. [Wright, 2006, pp. 250] In 2001, a Defense Intelligence Agency agent will write about the al-Badr II camp at Zhawar Kili. “Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistan contractors funded by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and protected under the patronage of a local and influential Jadran tribal leader, Jalalludin [Haqani],” the agent writes. “However, the real host in that facility was the Pakistani ISI. If this was later to be bin Laden’s base, then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan’s ISI.” [Defense Intelligence Agency, 10/2/2001 
]
1997-September 11, 2001: Russian-Born Businessman Provides the US Government with Information about Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
Felix Sater, a Russian-born businessman, works as a spy for American intelligence, and obtains valuable information about Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, including bin Laden’s satellite telephone numbers. [BuzzFeed News, 3/12/2018] Sater was born in Moscow in 1966 but moved with his family to America when he was a child and is now an American citizen. [US Congress. House, 12/2017; ABC News, 8/23/2019] He becomes an informant for the FBI around December 1998 after pleading guilty for his role in a $40 million stock fraud scheme orchestrated by New York mafia members. To avoid a prison sentence, he signs a cooperation agreement with the US government. [BuzzFeed News, 3/12/2018; Politico, 5/16/2019; Hill, 5/16/2019; Daily Mail, 8/23/2019] However, his work for American intelligence begins more than a year before this, he will later claim, when he meets an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency who tells him his country needs him and then recruits him in support of American intelligence efforts. [US Congress. House, 12/2017; ABC News, 8/23/2019] He works as a spy for over 20 years, assisting the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies. [US Department of Justice, 8/27/2009 ; Politico, 3/12/2018]
Sater Faces ‘Tremendous Risks’ in His Intelligence Work – Sater provides what he will describe as “extraordinary assistance” to the US government that involves “serious matters of national security.” His work poses “tremendous risks to my safety and the safety of my family,” he will state, and implicates “some of our nation’s greatest enemies, whose terrorism threatened our way of life.” His activities include: 
Establishing a network of contacts in various countries that includes intelligence officers, military operatives, and personnel at military research facilities. [US Congress. House, 12/2017] Among these contacts are a former senior KGB officer and arms dealer who possesses information regarding “potential threats to the United States emanating from Afghanistan and certain Central Asian republics,” and an intelligence officer working for the Northern Alliance, the resistance group fighting Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban. [US Department of Justice, 8/27/2009 ; BuzzFeed News, 3/12/2018] Providing information about the location of bin Laden and elements of his command structure. [US Congress. House, 12/2017] Providing information about who is selling arms to bin Laden. [US Department of Justice, 8/27/2009 ] Obtaining five of bin Laden’s personal satellite telephone numbers. [US Department of Justice, 8/27/2009 ; US Congress. House, 12/2017; BuzzFeed News, 3/12/2018] Providing information about the locations of hidden al-Qaeda terrorist training camps. Assembling a team of mercenaries in an effort to kill bin Laden in one of his terrorist training camps. Providing information about the location of Stinger missiles that were initially provided to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan, before they are acquired by al-Qaeda. [US Congress. House, 12/2017]
Sater Goes ‘above and beyond’ What Is Expected – Sater is apparently dedicated and effective in his work for the US government, and will receive significant praise for it. Agents who supervise him will all say he is “an exemplary cooperator who worked diligently to further the aims of the missions to which he was assigned.” [US Department of Justice, 8/27/2009 ] A senior intelligence official who works directly on terrorism cases before and after 9/11 will comment, “Felix likely does not realize how important his work has been in saving American lives” and “deserves a commendation” for his efforts. [BuzzFeed News, 3/12/2018] He went “above and beyond what is expected of most cooperators, and placed himself in great jeopardy in so doing,” federal prosecutors involved with his stock fraud case will write. [US Department of Justice, 8/27/2009 ; Daily Mail, 8/23/2019]
Sater Is Happy to Assist the US Government – Sater is apparently happy to work with US intelligence agencies. He will state that he “enthusiastically embraced” the opportunity to serve and protect his country. He will continue working for US intelligence after 9/11, and provide information about the names and passports of al-Qaeda operatives, and information about the locations of al-Qaeda weapons caches, among other things (see After September 11, 2001). [US Congress. House, 12/2017] He will become known after the 2016 US presidential election for his business ties to then President Donald Trump. [CBS News, 11/29/2018; Hill, 5/16/2019; ABC News, 8/23/2019]
October 1998: Military Analyst Finds Sensitive Information on Terrorism in Afghanistan, but US Authorities Confiscate Data
Julie Sirrs, a military analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), travels to Afghanistan. Fluent in local languages and knowledgeable about the culture, she made a previous undercover trip there in October 1997. She is surprised that the CIA was not interested in sending in agents after the failed missile attack on Osama bin Laden in August 1998, so she returns at this time. Traveling undercover, she meets with Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud. She sees a terrorist training center in Taliban-controlled territory. Sirrs will later claim: “The Taliban’s brutal regime was being kept in power significantly by bin Laden’s money, plus the narcotics trade, while [Massoud’s] resistance was surviving on a shoestring. With even a little aid to the Afghan resistance, we could have pushed the Taliban out of power. But there was great reluctance by the State Department and the CIA to undertake that.” She partly blames the interest of the US government and the oil company Unocal to see the Taliban achieve political stability to enable a trans-Afghanistan pipeline (see May 1996 and September 27, 1996). She claims, “Massoud told me he had proof that Unocal had provided money that helped the Taliban take Kabul.” She also states, “The State Department didn’t want to have anything to do with Afghan resistance, or even, politically, to reveal that there was any viable option to the Taliban.” After two weeks, Sirrs returns with a treasure trove of maps, photographs, and interviews. [ABC News, 2/18/2002; ABC News, 2/18/2002; New York Observer, 3/11/2004] By interviewing captured al-Qaeda operatives, she learns that the official Afghanistan airline, Ariana Airlines, is being used to ferry weapons and drugs, and learns that bin Laden goes hunting with “rich Saudis and top Taliban officials” (see Mid-1996-October 2001 and 1995-2001). [Los Angeles Times, 11/18/2001] When Sirrs returns from Afghanistan, her material is confiscated and she is accused of being a spy. Says one senior colleague, “She had gotten the proper clearances to go, and she came back with valuable information,” but high level officials “were so intent on getting rid of her, the last thing they wanted to pay attention to was any information she had.” Sirrs is cleared of wrongdoing, but her security clearance is pulled. She eventually quits the DIA in frustration in 1999. [ABC News, 2/18/2002; New York Observer, 3/11/2004] Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) will claim that the main DIA official behind the punishment of Sirrs is Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, who later becomes “one of the top officials running the Department of Homeland Security.” [Dana Rohrabacher, 6/21/2004]
October 16, 1998: DIA Report Details Bin Laden’s Chechen Connections
The Defense Intelligence Agency acquires a report on the connections between Osama bin Laden and Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab. The report states that Ibn Khattab fought with bin Laden in Afghanistan and established training camps in Chechnya at bin Laden’s request. It also says that bin Laden has met with Chechen leaders and agreed to help them with “financial supplies”, and that the Chechen camps will be used to train European militants to conduct kidnappings and terrorist acts against French, Israeli, US, and British citizens. A direct route from Afghanistan to Chechnya has been established through Turkey and Azerbaijan, and is being used for “volunteers”, as well as drug smuggling. [Defense Intelligence Agency, 10/16/1998 ] What US intelligence knows about the relationship between Ibn Khattab and bin Laden will play an important role in the handling of the Zacarias Moussaoui case just before 9/11 (see August 22, 2001 and August 24, 2001).
Early April 2001: CIA Meets Northern Alliance Leader in Paris, Receives Warning of Major Al-Qaeda Attack
CIA managers Gary Schroen, of the Near East division, and Richard Blee, responsible for Alec Station, the agency’s bin Laden unit, meet Northern Alliance commander Ahmed Shah Massoud in Paris, France. [Coll, 2004, pp. 560] Massoud, who is in Europe to address the European Parliament (see April 6, 2001), tells Schroen and Blee “that his own intelligence had learned of al-Qaeda’s intention to perform a terrorist act against the United States that would be vastly greater than the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa.” [Wright, 2006, pp. 337] Declassified Defense Intelligence Agency documents from November 2001 will say that Massoud has gained “limited knowledge… regarding the intentions of [al-Qaeda] to perform a terrorist act against the US on a scale larger than the 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.” They will further point out he may have been assassinated two days before 9/11 (see September 9, 2001) because he “began to warn the West.” [PakTribune (Islamabad), 9/13/2003; Agence France-Presse, 9/14/2003] Blee hands Massoud a briefcase full of cash. [Vanity Fair, 11/2004] Schroen and Blee assure Massoud that, although he has been visited less by the CIA recently, they are still interested in working with him, and they will continue to make regular payments of several hundred thousand dollars each month. Commenting on the military situation in Afghanistan, Massoud says his defenses will hold for now, but the Northern Alliance is doing badly and no longer has the strength to counterattack. [Coll, 2004, pp. 561-2]
June 2001: Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz Asks CIA and DIA to Look into Theory that Iraq Masterminded 1993 Bombing of WTC
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz asks the CIA to look over the 2000 book, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America by Laurie Mylroie, which argued that Iraq was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (see October 2000). Wolfowitz will mention shortly after 9/11 how he asked the CIA to do this, but it is unknown what their response is. Presumably it is not one Wolfowitz liked. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 559] Wolfowitz also asks Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to have his analysts look at the book. The DIA is unable to find any evidence that support the theory. [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 76] Around late July, the US reopens the files on WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef, presumably in response to these requests (see Late July or Early August 2001). But no evidence will be found to support Mylroie’s theory that Yousef was an Iraqi agent. The 9/11 Commission will conclude in 2004, “We have found no credible evidence to support theories of Iraqi government involvement in the 1993 WTC bombing.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 559]
8:47 a.m.-9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: DIA Personnel at the Pentagon Respond to the Attacks in New York but Do Not Evacuate
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) employees at the Pentagon take action in response to the terrorist attacks in New York, but they stay in their offices rather than evacuating and so a number of them will be killed when the Pentagon is hit. Sometime after the first hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center, at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), DIA analysts who are “[t]rained for this kind of emergency,” according to journalists Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, promptly respond to the incident. One group of them starts assessing what has happened; another group starts looking through classified intelligence reports in search of clues about how the attack was planned and conducted; and another group contacts colleagues at the CIA and other intelligence agencies to share information. [Schmitt and Shanker, 2011, pp. 18-19; Defense Intelligence Agency, 9/11/2015] After the second hijacked plane hits the WTC, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), DIA personnel at the Pentagon “swung into crisis management,” Randall Blake, the DIA’s current intelligence terrorism chief, will later recall. Blake is called by his office chief at DIA headquarters at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC. The two men discuss the situation and Blake’s office chief dispatches five or six people to the Pentagon. After reports start coming in stating that the first plane to hit the WTC was hijacked, Blake is summoned to a meeting with Rear Admiral Lowell Jacoby, the director of intelligence for the Joint Staff. At the meeting, Jacoby issues a set of concise instructions on how the unfolding crisis will be dealt with. [Blake, 2012, pp. 2 ] Apparently, no attempt is made to evacuate DIA employees from the Pentagon before the building is attacked. When Flight 77 hits it at 9:37 a.m., the plane will crash through the DIA’s Office of the Comptroller on the first floor of the building’s C Ring, killing seven employees there (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 3/11/2002; Defense Intelligence Agency, 9/11/2015]
Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: DIA Supervisor Thinks Pentagon Is Safest Building in the World
In the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) comptroller’s office, on the first floor of the Pentagon’s C-ring, workers are reportedly uneasy at the news of the plane crashes in New York. However, Paul Gonzales, a retired Navy commander who is now a supervisor there, confidently declares that the Pentagon is probably the safest building in the world. So by 9:30 a.m., most of the workers in his section will be settling back to their usual business. The DIA comptroller’s office is one of the areas impacted when the Pentagon is hit at 9:37 (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Of the 18 workers there, seven will die and five others will be hospitalized. [Washington Post, 3/11/2002; Vogel, 2007, pp. 429; Tennessean, 9/11/2007]
Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Activates Its Operations Center to Respond to the Attacks
Dale Watson, assistant director of the FBI’s counterterrorism division, activates the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI headquarters in Washington, DC, from where the bureau will coordinate its response to the terrorist attacks. Watson learned about the first hijacked plane crashing into the World Trade Center during a briefing in the SIOC attended by the FBI’s assistant directors and Robert Mueller, the bureau’s director (see Shortly After 8:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). Mueller and some of the other officials at the briefing, presumably including Watson, subsequently headed to the office of FBI Deputy Director Thomas Pickard. There, Mueller, Pickard, and the other officials saw the second hijacked plane crashing into the WTC on television (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). It then became clear to them that this was a terrorist attack.
Deputy Director Says the FBI Needs to Open Its Operations Center – Mueller asks Pickard what they should do in response to the incident and Pickard says they need to open the SIOC. [New Yorker, 9/24/2001; 9/11 Commission, 1/21/2004 ] According to the US government’s Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, “Upon determination of a credible threat,” FBI headquarters is required to activate the SIOC, “to coordinate and manage the national level support to a terrorism incident.” [US Government, 1/2001] Following this protocol, Watson goes to his office and activates the SIOC for crisis mode. [New Yorker, 9/24/2001]
Director Goes to the Operations Center to Manage the Crisis – Mueller and Pickard go to the SIOC to manage the FBI’s response to the attacks. Pickard isolates Mueller in a conference room, restricting access to him so he is better able to stay focused on the decisions ahead. Mueller only took over as FBI director a week ago (see September 4, 2001) and Pickard will later comment, “I was worried that there was going to be this string of people running into the room with news or questions and [Mueller] would be standing there asking them who they were.” [Kessler, 2002, pp. 420; Graff, 2011, pp. 314-316] Meanwhile, a live communications link is established that allows them to listen in as Pentagon and FAA air traffic controllers track suspicious aircraft. [Wall Street Journal, 10/5/2001]
Many Other Officials Go to the Operations Center – Other senior officials and FBI agents also begin pouring into the center, along with representatives from numerous other government agencies, including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FAA, the NSA, and the Secret Service. Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff will head to the center, as will Attorney General John Ashcroft, who arrives there early in the afternoon (see (Between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). The SIOC will become “the place to be to get information and so everyone wanted to be there,” Ashcroft will comment. [Kessler, 2002, pp. 5, 421; 9/11 Commission, 12/17/2003 ]
Center Is Designed for Dealing with Crises – The SIOC, which opened in 1998 and cost $20 million to build, covers 40,000 square feet on the fifth floor of the FBI headquarters building. [CNN, 11/20/1998] It is “a heavily fortified cluster of offices surrounded by video screens and banks of computer terminals,” according to the New York Times. [New York Times, 11/2/2001] It can function as a 24-hour watch post, a crisis management center, and an information processing center. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1/18/2004] It operates around the clock, with at least eight staffers on duty at any one time. It is capable of managing up to five crises at a time and is designed to accommodate up to 450 members of staff during major emergencies. [CNN, 11/20/1998; New Yorker, 9/24/2001]
Center Is Built to Survive Attacks – The center is fortified so those in it can survive a bombing or other kind of attack. [New York Times, 11/2/2001] It has no windows to the street outside and is shielded to prevent electronic signals from entering or leaving it. [CNN, 11/20/1998; Kessler, 2002, pp. 421] Its 225 computer terminals have access to three types of local area networks: the regular FBI network that can connect to the networks of outside agencies; a classified network that operates at the top-secret level; and an even more highly classified Special Compartmented Information network. [Washington Post, 10/14/2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1/18/2004] The many computers and video screens in the center can display broadcasts from US television channels and also TV channels from other countries. [CNN, 11/20/1998]
Center Will Become the ‘Nerve Center’ of the FBI’s Investigation – By the end of the week, the SIOC will be “the headquarters of the government’s response” to today’s attacks, according to journalist and author Garrett Graff. As many as 500 people from 56 different agencies will be working in it. [Kessler, 2002, pp. 421; Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 7/1/2002; Graff, 2011, pp. 317] It will become “the nerve center” of the FBI’s investigation of the attacks, according to the Wall Street Journal. [Wall Street Journal, 10/5/2001]
