Chief Edward Plaugher of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) believes the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon should be evacuated but a senior Department of Defense official refuses when Plaugher advises him to evacuate it. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Varley, 2009, pp. 255] Plaugher was in Fairfax, Virginia, when the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon occurred, but he quickly went to the Pentagon when he learned what had happened. He arrived there at around 10:00 a.m. and assumed the role of senior adviser, responsible for coordinating with the various responding local, state, and federal agencies. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A39 
; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 76-77; Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 9/2011 ]
Fire Chief Is Concerned that the NMCC Is Still in Operation – At some point after arriving, he becomes concerned that the NMCC has not been evacuated along with most other areas of the Pentagon. [Varley, 2009, pp. 255] The command center, located in the Joint Staff area of the Pentagon, has over 300 people working in it. [Federation of American Scientists, 4/29/1998] Additionally, senior officials including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, go there this morning to respond to the terrorist attacks (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44] Although it was not damaged in the Pentagon attack, the NMCC is uncomfortably close to the fire, and the ACFD considers it unsafe to keep the facility up and running.
Staffers May Be at Risk of Carbon Monoxide Poisoning – Plaugher therefore meets “a high-ranking official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense” to discuss his concerns. The identity of this person will be unstated. Plaugher says to the official, “Your building is on fire” and tells them to evacuate the NMCC. The official, however, refuses to do so. “We do not want to leave the national command post because our nation is under attack and we’re not sure how complex it is,” they say. Plaugher puts forward several arguments to try to persuade them to evacuate the NMCC. He explains the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning and points out that “the first thing carbon monoxide does is to make you do wacky things.” Surely, he suggests, it is a bad idea to risk having NMCC staffers carrying out their sensitive work in an unreliable state of mind. The Defense Department official, though, refuses to back down and Plaugher, accepting that he is unable to win the argument, gives in. “I’m doing this negotiation with a guy who’s wearing a .45 on his arm and he’s got F-15s flying overhead—what am I supposed to do?” he will later comment.
NMCC Is Provided with Air Monitoring Equipment – Eventually, the ACFD and the Department of Defense come up with a compromise. The fire department provides the NMCC with a carbon monoxide detector and 25 sets of breathing apparatus, along with instructions for their use. Beyond this, Plaugher accepts that NMCC staffers will need to take responsibility for their own safety. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 132; Varley, 2009, pp. 255-256; Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 9/2011 ] All the same, at 12:19 p.m., Rumsfeld, Myers, and several other senior officials will leave the command center due to the poor air quality there and relocate to another area of the Pentagon (see 12:19 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/18/2002 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 156-157]
Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: US Military’s Force Protection Level Is Raised
US military installations are placed on the highest state of alert, known as Force Protection Condition Delta (FPCON Delta), in response to the terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon. The raised threat level applies to every US military installation across the country and around the world, and every member of the US armed forces. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001] Measures that are taken once FPCON Delta has been declared include placing more guards on duty at military installations, having all vehicles on installations identified, and having all personnel positively identified. Additionally, all suitcases, briefcases, and packages brought into an installation must be searched. [Slate, 9/12/2001]
Rumsfeld and Myers Decide to Raise the FPCON – The decision to raise the force protection condition is apparently made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and/or acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers. Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that after he arrives at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he and Myers “discussed, and I recommended… increasing the force protection level.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will later write that after he arrives at the NMCC (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he “recommended that all American military commands and units worldwide go to [FPCON] Delta.” He will add: “Terrorists had staged major attacks in New York and Washington. Although we did not yet have reliable intelligence on when and where they would strike next, it seemed likely that they would.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153] But White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will write that he gave the instruction to raise the force protection condition, at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5-6]
Conflicting Times Are Given for the Raising of the FPCON – The exact time at which the force protection condition is raised is unclear. CNN’s Barbara Starr will report that “all US military forces [are] ordered to Condition Delta” at 10:10 a.m. [CNN, 9/4/2002] However, other evidence indicates the force protection condition is raised at a later time, around 10:35 a.m. Rumsfeld only enters the NMCC at about 10:30 a.m., indicating it is raised after that time. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44] And at 10:38 a.m., after Vice President Dick Cheney asks him on the air threat conference call if US forces are on “heightened alert,” Rumsfeld will reply, “Yes,” and say they are at FPCON Delta. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ]
Some Areas Are Already at FPCON Delta – Although the entire US military is now under the same FPCON level, usually, different locations can have different FPCON levels. [Slate, 9/12/2001] US forces in some parts of the world, particularly the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, are in fact already at FPCON Delta. [New York Times, 9/12/2001] (The force protection condition was raised in those areas in late June, after intelligence reports suggested that terrorists might attack American military or civilian targets in the region (see June 21, 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 6/23/2001; National Public Radio, 5/23/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 257] ) Shortly after the force protection condition is raised, Rumsfeld will order that the defense readiness condition also be raised (see (10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554]
There Are Five Possible Force Protection Conditions – The force protection condition is a “chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved standard for identification of, and recommended responses to, terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities,” according to the Department of Defense. [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2010 ] It was created in June 2001 and replaced the “terrorist threat condition,” or “Threatcon.” [Los Angeles Times, 1/22/2002] There are five possible force protection conditions. The lowest, FPCON Normal, means no threat of terrorist activity is present. The other conditions are Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, up to the highest, FPCON Delta, which means a terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that action against a specific location is likely. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; Slate, 9/12/2001]
10:13 a.m. September 11, 2001: President’s Military Aide Requests Fighter Escort for Air Force One
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gould, a military aide who is accompanying President Bush on his visit to Florida, makes a call requesting a fighter escort and other assets to support Air Force One as it flies away from Sarasota. Gould, who has tactical control of all the military assets that support the president, including presidential aircraft, was with Bush on Air Force One when the plane took off from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). He has talked with Colonel Mark Tillman, Air Force One’s pilot, about the plane’s ability to evade other aircraft. “At this point we don’t know the scope of this attack and what’s in front of us,” Gould will later recall. Gould will say that because he “thought there was a threat,” he makes a phone call and asks for three things: fighter jets to escort Air Force One, a refueling plane, and an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System plane) to provide the ability to “see” around the president’s plane.
Request Relayed over Conference Call – Gould will say, in 2011, that he calls the Pentagon to make this request. [Lompoc Record, 9/11/2011; Santa Barbara News-Press, 9/11/2011] However, other evidence indicates that he contacts the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House with the request, and the request is then passed on to the Pentagon over the air threat conference call. A transcript of the air threat conference call shows that at 10:14 a.m., Colonel Michael Irwin, the director of operations for the White House Military Office, who is in the PEOC, says he has “just talked to [the] mil aide” on Air Force One, and then adds: “We’d like AWACS over Louisiana. We’d like fighter escort.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ]
Fighters and AWACS Later Accompany Air Force One – An AWACS on a training mission off the coast of Florida is directed toward Air Force One and will accompany it all the way to Washington, DC (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Code One Magazine, 1/2002] Fighters will also arrive to escort the president’s plane. However, it will be over an hour before they reach it (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 9/11/2001] It is unclear if and when a refueling plane reaches Air Force One.
10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Readiness Condition Is Raised to the Highest Level in 28 Years
The US military’s defense readiness condition is raised from Defcon 5, the lowest possible level, to Defcon 3, an intermediate level that requires a heightened alert status for US armed forces worldwide, and which is the highest the defense readiness condition has been for 28 years. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/18/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
Rumsfeld Recommends Raising the Defcon – The decision to go to Defcon 3 is reportedly made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Rumsfeld will later recall that after he arrives at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he talks with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and “[w]e discussed and I recommended raising the defense condition level from five to three.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004]
Teleconference Participants Are Told to ‘Hold Off’ on Defcon 3 – Rumsfeld directs that the US military go to Defcon 3. At 10:43 a.m., it is announced on the air threat conference call that the secretary of defense “has directed that we go to Defcon 3 and be prepared to go to [Defcon] 2.” However, a minute later, Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney on the conference call, and Cheney says he will have to run the decision to go to Defcon 3 by the president, “and let him make the call.” Therefore, at 10:45 a.m., those on the conference call are told to “hold off on Defcon 3.”
Order to Raise the Defcon Is Reinstated – But Rumsfeld believes raising the defense readiness condition is urgent. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554] There is therefore a “historical discussion about how the move to Defcon 3 went during previous crises, Cuba specifically [i.e. the Cuban missile crisis in 1962],” Captain Charles Leidig, who is also in the NMCC, will later recall. With their reference being “a book on the shelf,” according to Leidig, Myers is shown that he has “approval authority to go to Defcon 3.” [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] After consulting Defense Department directives, Rumsfeld concludes that he has the authority to issue the order to raise the defense readiness condition. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] Therefore, at 10:46 a.m., those on the air threat conference call are told: “Override last instructions. The vice chairman [i.e. Myers] is directing we go to Defcon 3.” A few minutes later, an announcement is made on the conference call, “Emergency action message released at 14:52 [Zulu time, i.e. 10:52 a.m. Eastern time], re: Defcon 3.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
Raising the Defcon Is a ‘Huge Move’ – Rumsfeld will later agree with an interviewer that raising the defense readiness condition is “a very serious step for the nation.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] It was last raised to Defcon 3 during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when Rumsfeld had been the United States ambassador to NATO. Regarding the decision to raise it, Myers tells Rumsfeld, “It’s a huge move, but it’s appropriate.” [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002; Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
President Is Later Told of the Decision – The decision to go to Defcon 3 will soon be communicated within NORAD (see 11:03 a.m.-11:12 a.m. September11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; 9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004 ] Rumsfeld will brief President Bush on the decision (see (11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Bush, 2010, pp. 133] Apparently around the time the defense readiness condition is raised, Rumsfeld and/or Myers also decide to raise the force protection condition of US military installations (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153]
Defcon 3 Was Intended for the Cold War – Some individuals will later be critical of the decision to raise the defense readiness condition at this time. John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will write that Defcon 3 is in fact “a Cold War-era designation, devised to respond to a nuclear threat.” [Farmer, 2009, pp. 235] According to Farmer and other 9/11 Commission staffers, it is “suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al-Qaeda’s attack.” [Rutgers Law Review, 9/7/2011 ] General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, will similarly say that Defcon 3 is “not intended for [events like] the attacks of 9/11 and thus could have complicated the response to the attacks.” He will say he does not think that raising the condition would have “done anything for us” within the continental United States. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Defcons Are Phased Increases in Combat Readiness – The defense readiness condition is a “uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands, and for use by the [armed] services,” according to the Department of Defense. [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2010 ] Defcons are phased increases in combat readiness and are graduated to match situations of varying military severity. They are numbered, from Defcon 5, which means “normal peacetime readiness,” down to Defcon 1, which means “maximum force readiness.” The current level, Defcon 3, represents an “increase in force readiness above normal readiness.” [Federation of American Scientists, 4/29/1998] The defense readiness condition will remain at Defcon 3 until three days later, when it will be reduced one notch, to Defcon 4 (see September 14, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/30/2002]
11:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Updates President on Rules of Engagement for Fighters and Increased Defense Readiness Condition
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld speaks with President Bush, and they discuss the rules of engagement for fighter pilots and Rumsfeld’s decision to raise the defense readiness condition to Defcon 3. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465, 554] Rumsfeld is in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon and Bush is on board Air Force One, flying toward Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] After Rumsfeld entered the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he had been concerned with ensuring that fighter pilots defending US airspace have a clear understanding of their rules of engagement, so they know “what they could and could not do” (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44] He also directed that the nation’s armed forces go to Defcon 3, an increased state of military readiness (see (10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131]
President Approves Decision to Raise Defcon – Rumsfeld now speaks with Bush and, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, tells him that the Department of Defense is “working on refining the rules of engagement, so pilots would have a better understanding of the circumstances under which an aircraft could be shot down.” Also at this time, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Rumsfeld briefs Bush on his decision to raise the defense readiness condition to Defcon 3. When Rumsfeld ordered that the condition be raised, Vice President Dick Cheney told him to run the issue by the president; Rumsfeld replied that he would “call him shortly.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465, 554] Bush gives Rumsfeld his approval for having raised the defense readiness condition. [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; Bush, 2010, pp. 133]
Defense Readiness Condition Possibly Discussed at Later Time – Although the 9/11 Commission Report will say Rumsfeld and Bush’s discussion of the defense readiness condition occurs at 11:15 a.m., in his 2010 book Decision Points, Bush will write that he approves Rumsfeld’s decision when he speaks to Rumsfeld from the office of Lieutenant General Thomas Keck at Barksdale Air Force Base. [Bush, 2010, pp. 133] If correct, this would mean the relevant phone call takes place sometime after 12:11 p.m., when Bush goes to Keck’s office (see (12:11 p.m.-1:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 112-113; American History, 10/2006 ]
11:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron Begins Reconstructing Radar Data
Within two hours of the attacks the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron (RADES) based at Hill Air Force Base, Utah begins reviewing the radar trails of the four earlier hijacked aircraft, after Pentagon officials have turned to them to find out exactly what happened. Using their own software, the unit has the unique ability to create a “track of interest analysis,” singling out and zooming in on each of the planes. The unit has captured most of the flights of the four planes, but lost sight of Flight 93 at some point. [Airman, 12/2003] The FBI also contacts RADES within hours of the attacks, requesting detailed information on the hijacked planes. [Hilltop Times, 4/15/2004] NORAD official Colonel Alan Scott later will tell the 9/11 Commission that much of his radar data for the “primary targets” on 9/11 was not seen that day. He will say, “It was reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron, and other agencies like it who are professionals at going back and looking at radar tapes and then given that they are loaded with knowledge after the fact, they can go and find things that perhaps were not visible during the event itself.” [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Data reconstructed by RADES will be used as a source several times in the account of the hijackings and military response to them in the 9/11 Commission’s final report. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 457-459]
Shortly After 12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Finally Informs White House that Flight 93 Was Not Shot Down
The Pentagon finally informs those inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House that Flight 93 was not shot down by the US military. When they’d first learned of a plane going down in Pennsylvania, many of the people in the PEOC thought the military might have shot it down (see (10:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/31/2001; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] However, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice later recalls, “We couldn’t get an answer from the Pentagon” as to what had happened. In one call to the Pentagon, she’d insisted, “You must know. I mean, you must know!” [Hayes, 2007, pp. 339] It takes until about two hours after Flight 93 crashed for the Pentagon to confirm there was no shoot down. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Several early news reports suggested that military fighter jets might have shot down an aircraft, perhaps Flight 93 (see 11:28 a.m.-11:50 a.m. September 11, 2001). And when F-15 pilot Daniel Nash returns to his base later in the afternoon after flying a combat air patrol over New York, he will be told that a military F-16 had shot down an airliner in Pennsylvania (see (Shortly After 2:15 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/2002]
1:44 p.m. September 11, 2001: US Military Deployed at Sea, in Skies
The Pentagon announces that aircraft carriers and guided missile destroyers have been dispatched toward New York and Washington. Around the country, more fighters, airborne radar (AWACs), and refueling planes are scrambling. NORAD is on its highest alert. [CNN, 9/12/2001; MSNBC, 9/22/2001]
1:45 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Department Finally Distributes Written Rules of Engagement for Fighters
The Department of Defense finally circulates written rules of engagement, which will give fighter pilots an understanding of the circumstances under which a hostile aircraft can be shot down. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Since arriving at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC), at around 9:58 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. respectively, General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have worked on establishing these rules (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] However, Myers will later admit that in the “initial period”—apparently meaning the first hour—after he entered the NMCC, “he did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] In fact, Rumsfeld only approved the final recommended rules of engagement, which Myers had received from General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157-158] And the Department of Defense only circulates written rules of engagement “sometime after 1:00 p.m.,” according to the 9/11 Commission Report. It apparently does so at 1:45 p.m. At this time, it faxes a memo that includes the rules to Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Journalist and author Andrew Cockburn will comment that Rumsfeld and Myers’s work on rules of engagement was therefore “an irrelevant exercise,” since the times at which the rules are completed and issued are “hours after the last hijacker had died.” [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7]
September 12, 2001: Virginia Chief Medical Examiner in ‘Tug of War’ Over Who Should do Autopsies of Pentagon Victims
Virginia Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Marcella Fierro, believing that state forensic pathologists have jurisdiction over the Pentagon’s land, reassigns staff from three other regional offices to the Northern Virginia office in order to conduct postmortem examinations on victims of the Pentagon attack. However, following what the Washington Post calls a “behind-the-scenes tug of war,” after FBI and Defense Department officials meet with her they instead opt to conduct forensic and mortuary activities at Defense Department facilities. Fierro requests and later receives a letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft relieving her department of its responsibilities. [Washington Post, 9/13/2001; US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A-47 ]
