A lieutenant colonel at the White House repeatedly relays to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon that Vice President Dick Cheney has confirmed that fighter jets are cleared to engage an inbound aircraft if they can verify that the aircraft is hijacked. The lieutenant colonel notifies the NMCC of the authorization over the air threat conference call (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, said at sometime between 10:10 and 10:15 that fighters could engage an aircraft that was reportedly approaching Washington (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, it is only when Cheney calls President Bush at 10:18 a.m. that Bush confirms the shootdown order (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). The shootdown order will be received by NORAD, and then, at 10:31 a.m., sent out to its three air defense sectors in the continental US (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41-42; Spencer, 2008, pp. 240]
After 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Fails to Tell NORAD about Vice President Cheney’s Shootdown Authorization
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently fails to tell NORAD about Vice President Dick Cheney’s authorization for the military to shoot down suspicious aircraft. Myers has been in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 
; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] At some unspecified time after reaching the NMCC, he begins a phone call with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who is at NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) in Colorado, in which the two men discuss “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Cheney, meanwhile, gave the military authorization to shoot down a suspicious aircraft that was approaching Washington, DC, shortly after 10:10 a.m. (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and personnel in the NMCC are told about this over the air threat conference at 10:14 a.m. and again at 10:19 a.m. (see 10:14 a.m.-10:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41-42]
Myers Will Be Unable to Recall Discussing Cheney’s Authorization – However, Myers apparently fails to tell Eberhart about it. When asked by the 9/11 Commission in 2004 whether he communicated with NORAD “to inform them of the vice president’s authorization and ensure that they understood their instructions,” he will give a confused and inexplicit answer. “To the best I can recall, I’m not sure I didn’t have that conversation with Eberhart on this,” he will reply. “I don’t remember… that being a simple issue we worked our way through,” he will add. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Eberhart will imply that Myers fails to tell him about Cheney’s shootdown authorization when he is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. He will recall being told about Cheney’s authorization not by Myers but by Major General Rick Findley, NORAD’s director of operations, sometime after around 10:15 a.m., when he arrives at the CMOC. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004]
Myers Does Not Hear of Cheney’s Authorization on the Conference Call – Furthermore, Myers will be unable to recall whether he is even monitoring the air threat conference when Cheney’s shootdown authorization is reported over it. He will be under the mistaken impression that Cheney only gives the authorization after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld joins him in the NMCC, at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “My recollection is that before we got the vice president’s authorization, the secretary [of defense] and I had this conversation and I made him aware of the authorization we were going to need if we had [a hijacked] aircraft coming in,” he will tell the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And yet in his 2009 memoir, Myers will contradict what he told the 9/11 Commission and describe hearing Cheney’s shootdown authorization being reported over the air threat conference. “Vice President Cheney has forwarded the president’s authorization to go weapons free if that plane [that is approaching Washington] is confirmed hijacked and threatens the White House or the Capitol,” he will recall hearing a military aide at the White House saying. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
10:15 a.m. September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Permitted to Shoot Down Threatening Planes over Washington
Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG), finally receives specific instructions from the Secret Service for his fighter jets to follow when they launch over Washington, and is told they can use “whatever force is necessary” to prevent another aircraft hitting a building. [9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003; Vogel, 2007, pp. 446; Spencer, 2008, pp. 218]
Instructions Received within ‘Half-Hour’ of Request – Wherley phoned the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center after arriving at the headquarters of the DCANG’s 121st Fighter Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The agent he talked to requested that DCANG fighters be sent up over the capital, but Wherley asked for more specific instructions (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Secret Service agents at the White House have been working hard to get these. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 184-185, 218] According to the Washington Post, “within a half-hour,” Wherley receives “oral instructions from the White House giving the pilots extraordinary discretion to shoot down any threatening aircraft.” [Washington Post, 4/8/2002]
Jets May Use ‘Whatever Force Is Necessary’ – Wherley had been talking to Secret Service agent Kenneth Beauchamp, but these instructions are given to him by Becky Ediger, the deputy special agent in charge of the Presidential Protective Division, who now comes on the line. Ediger says the instructions have come directly from Vice President Dick Cheney. She tells Wherley: “We want you to intercept and turn away any airplane that attempts to fly within 20 miles of the Washington area. If you are not able to turn them away, use whatever force is necessary to keep them from hitting any buildings downtown.”
Wherley Wants to Talk to Military – Wherley asks if there is anybody in a uniform—i.e. from the military—with Ediger that he could talk to. Ediger alludes to a Navy captain who is busy with other things, but says no one from the military is available. Although the instructions he has been given are not in military terms, Wherley feels they are understandable enough. [Peabody Gazette-Bulletin, 2/12/2003; 9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003; Spencer, 2008, pp. 218] According to the 9/11 Commission, Wherley translates Ediger’s instructions in military terms to flying “weapons free,” meaning “the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this case in the cockpit of the lead pilot.” He will pass these instructions to the DCANG pilots that take off at 10:42 a.m. and after (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 44]
Instructions Coming from Cheney – Wherley will later say that Ediger is “standing next to the vice president” during their call. [Filson, 2003, pp. 79] However, the 9/11 Commission will apparently state differently, saying a “Secret Service agent” (presumably Ediger) has “a phone in each ear, one connected to Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instructions that the White House agent said he was getting from the vice president.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 44]
White House Denies Cheney Involvement – In 2004, Secret Service officials will confirm that its agents’ actions relating to the DCANG on September 11 are ordered by Cheney. The agency will issue a statement, clarifying, “The Secret Service is not authorized to, nor did it, direct the activation or launch of Department of Defense aviation assets.” But two unnamed White House officials that are involved in the emergency response to the attacks will say the Secret Service acts on its own. An official speaking on behalf of Cheney will say he doesn’t know whether the vice president directed Secret Service agents to call the DCANG, and he would not be able to find out. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ] The 9/11 Commission will state that both Cheney and President Bush “indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside the military chain of command.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 44]
Wherley Wants More Information – Wherley still has questions about the rules of engagement for his fighter jets, which will subsequently be answered by a Secret Service agent at the White House, possibly Ediger (see (Between 10:16 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/28/2003]
10:18 a.m. September 11, 2001: Navy Commander Passes on Vice President Cheney’s Shootdown Authorization to the Pentagon
Navy Captain Anthony Barnes, deputy director of presidential contingency programs for the White House Military Office, lets a general at the Pentagon know that Vice President Dick Cheney has given his authorization for the military to shoot down hostile aircraft. The general, who was concerned about a suspicious aircraft that is presumably hijacked and is heading toward Washington, DC, recently called Barnes and asked for permission to shoot the plane down (see (Shortly Before 10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). In response to the request, Barnes went to the conference room in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center below the White House, told Cheney about the aircraft, and asked for authorization for the military to engage it. Cheney promptly gave his authorization (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Barnes now gets back on the phone with the general at the Pentagon and passes on what he said. “The vice president has authorized you to engage confirmed terrorist aboard commercial aircraft,” he says. “I… made sure that [the general] understood that I had posed the question to the National Authority and the answer was in the affirmative,” he will later comment. “We made sure that we did not stutter or stumble because the emotion at that point was very, very high,” he will add. [Summers and Swan, 2011, pp. 141-142; Graff, 2019, pp. 164-165]
10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cheney Calls Bush; Receives Shootdown Authorization, According to 9/11 Commission
In a phone call with Vice President Dick Cheney, President Bush authorizes the military to shoot down hostile aircraft. Minutes earlier, in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, a military aide had asked Cheney for the authority to engage what appeared to be an inbound aircraft, and Cheney had promptly given it (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). During a subsequent quiet moment, deputy White House chief of staff Josh Bolten, who is also in the PEOC, suggested to Cheney that he contact the president to confirm the engage order. Therefore at 10:18 a.m., according to White House logs, Cheney calls Bush, who is on board Air Force One, and speaks with him for two minutes. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer notes that at 10:20 a.m., Bush informs him that he has authorized the shootdown of aircraft, if necessary. According to the 9/11 Commission, “Fleischer’s 10:20 note is the first mention of shootdown authority.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41 and 465] Bush’s senior adviser Karl Rove, who is also on Air Force One, gives a similar account, later telling NBC News that “at about 10:20,” Bush goes from his office into the private cabin in front of it, “and took a phone call, and came back in and said that he had talked to the vice president and to the secretary of defense and gave the authorization that [the] military could shoot down any planes not under control of their crews that were gearing critical targets.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] But other accounts indicate the president gives the shootdown authorization earlier than this. Bush and Cheney will claim that Bush gives the authorization during a call estimated to occur between about 10:00 and 10:15 (see (Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40] Similarly, according to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, Bush gives it in a call with Cheney soon after 9:56, when Air Force One takes off (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 102; Woodward, 2002, pp. 17-18; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke says it is given even earlier. He states that, at some point between about 9:38 and 9:56, he is instructed to tell the Pentagon it has authorization from the president to shoot down hostile aircraft (see (9:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [ABC News, 11/29/2003; Clarke, 2004, pp. 8]
10:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Staff in White House Bunker Learns of Flight 93 Crash; Vice President Cheney Already Thinks an ‘Act of Heroism’ Occurred
Those inside the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House learn that an aircraft is down in Pennsylvania. (This turns out to be Flight 93.) Many of the people in the PEOC wonder whether military fighters shot it down. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41] National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice later claims that, like her, Vice President Dick Cheney initially thinks, “it must have been shot down by the fighters.” [Hayes, 2007, pp. 339] However, Eric Edelman—Cheney’s national security adviser, who is also in the PEOC—will later recall: “The vice president was a little bit ahead of us.… He said, sort of softly, and to nobody in particular, ‘I think an act of heroism just took place on that plane.’” [CNN, 9/11/2002; CNN, 9/14/2002] Yet the Pentagon does not confirm that Flight 93 was not shot down until after midday (see (Shortly After 12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/31/2001] And the phone calls from Flight 93 that indicated a passenger revolt took place are only reported later on. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002]
10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Works on Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots, Too Late to Be of Any Use
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld works on “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots after he arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, but it will be hours before these rules are issued. After going outside to visit the site of the Pentagon attack, Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44, 465; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 5-7; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130-131]
Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Updates Rumsfeld – There, he immediately asks General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, for an update on the rules of engagement for fighter jets that are responding to the terrorist attacks. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Since arriving in the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m., Myers has discussed these rules over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] In response to the inquiry, Myers says the policy he and Eberhart agreed upon is that “we were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down.” [Graff, 2019, pp. 236]
Vice President Says He Has Given Shootdown Authorization – Then, at 10:39 a.m., Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney over the air threat conference (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Cheney says he has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft that are approaching Washington, DC (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43] Upon hearing this, Rumsfeld’s “thoughts went to the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order,” Rumsfeld will later recall, adding: “It was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not do. They needed clarity.”
Existing Rules Are Unsuitable for the Current Crisis – There are currently “standing rules of engagement,” Rumsfeld will note. [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] However, he will comment, “There were no rules of engagement on the books about when and how our pilots should handle a situation in which civilian aircraft had been hijacked and might be used as missiles to attack American targets.” “I’d hate to be a pilot up there and not know exactly what I should do,” he says to Myers. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340] To resolve the issue, Rumsfeld and Myers go to work “to fashion appropriate rules of engagement.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Rumsfeld also discusses these rules with Cheney and President Bush while he is developing them.
Suspicious Aircraft May Have to Be Shot Down – In the process of establishing rules of engagement, Rumsfeld and Myers talk about a fighter pilot making “hand signals and communications, and flying in front [of a suspicious aircraft] and waving at them, and getting them to go in a direction that’s not dangerous.” They determine that if a suspicious aircraft is going “in a direction that’s dangerous,” meaning toward “a high value target on the ground of some sort,” the fighter pilot would “have to shoot them down,” Rumsfeld will state. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] Myers speculates that any plane within 20 miles of the White House that fails to land on command might have to be shot down. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340]
Rules Are Quickly Developed – Rumsfeld and Myers reportedly come up with rules of engagement after a relatively short time. “We rapidly developed some rules of engagement for what our military aircraft might do in the event another aircraft appeared to be heading into a large civilian structure or population,” Rumsfeld will say. The process they come up with is that “the combatant commander would be notified in the event there was a circumstance that was abnormal and potentially dangerous, and he then would notify [Rumsfeld], and [Rumsfeld] then would notify the president.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Once the rules of engagement have been devised, the president approves them and Rumsfeld passes them on to Eberhart.
Final Rules Are Only Issued in the Afternoon – The process of coming up with these rules takes place in the hour before 11:15 a.m., Rumsfeld will tell the Washington Post. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] However, “Throughout the course of the day,” he will note, he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will recall that he in fact only receives the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Rumsfeld’s work on rules of engagement is therefore “an irrelevant exercise,” according to journalist and author Andrew Cockburn, since Rumsfeld “did not complete and issue them until… hours after the last hijacker had died.” [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7]
10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: White House Receives Phone Call in Which Caller Threatens Air Force One
An anonymous phone call is received at the White House in which the caller says Air Force One, the president’s plane, will be the next terrorist target and uses code words indicating they have inside information about government procedures. [Cheney, 9/11/2001; New York Times, 9/13/2001; Woodward, 2002, pp. 18] Air Force One is currently flying toward Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, with President Bush on board (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 325] The White House receives a call from an anonymous individual, warning that the next target of the terrorist attacks will be Air Force One. The caller refers to the plane as “Angel.” [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106-107; Woodward, 2002, pp. 18; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Darling, 2010, pp. 60-61] “Angel” is the Secret Service’s code name for Air Force One. [Williams, 2004, pp. 81; CBS News, 11/25/2009] An unnamed “high White House official” will later say the use of “American code words” shows the caller has “knowledge of procedures that made the threat credible.” [New York Times, 9/13/2001]
Government Officials Told about Threat – News of the threatening call is promptly passed on to government officials in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC)—a bunker below the White House—and reported on the Pentagon’s air threat conference call. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; Newsweek, 12/30/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Darling, 2010, pp. 60-61] Vice President Dick Cheney, who is in the PEOC, will comment that the news “reinforced the notion here… that the government has been targeted and that we need to be extra careful about making certain we protected the continuity of government, secured the president, secured the presidency.” [White House, 11/19/2001] According to Major Robert Darling of the White House Military Office, who is also in the PEOC, “The talk among the principals in the room quickly determined that the use of a code word implied that the threat to Air Force One and the president could well be from someone with access to [the president’s] inner circle—possibly someone who was near the president at that very moment.” [Darling, 2010, pp. 61]
Accounts Conflict over Who Receives Call – It is unclear who at the White House answers the call in which the threat against Air Force One is made. The call is received by the White House switchboard, according to some accounts. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106; Fleischer, 2005, pp. 141-142] Other accounts will indicate it is received by the White House Situation Room. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Darling, 2010, pp. 60-61] Eric Edelman, a member of Cheney’s staff who is in the PEOC, will say the call is received by the Secret Service. [White House, 10/25/2001] But two Secret Service agents who are on duty today will deny “that their agency played any role in receiving or passing on a threat to the presidential jet,” according to the Wall Street Journal. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ] However, a Secret Service pager message will be sent at 10:32 a.m., which states that the “JOC”—the Secret Service Joint Operations Center at the White House—has received an “anonymous call” reporting that “Angel is [a] target.” [CBS News, 11/25/2009]
Military Officer Passes on Details of Threat – Officials in the PEOC reportedly learn about the threat to Air Force One from a military officer working in the center. Although Cheney will say the threat “came through the Secret Service,” he will say later this year that he is unsure who passed the details of it to those in the PEOC. [Meet the Press, 9/16/2001; White House, 11/19/2001] An official in Cheney’s office will say in 2004 that Cheney was informed of the threat by “a uniformed military person” manning the PEOC, although Cheney and his staff are unaware who that individual was. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ] National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will say that those in the PEOC are told about the threat by a “communicator,” meaning one of the military officers who works in the PEOC, and is responsible for “establishing phone lines and video lines, and staying in touch with the National Military Command Center” at the Pentagon. [White House, 11/1/2001] The military officer Rice is referring to may be Darling. Darling will recall that he answers a call from the White House Situation Room about the threat to Air Force One and then passes on the information he receives to Rice, telling her, “Ma’am, the [Situation Room] reports that they have a credible source in the Sarasota, Florida, area that claims Angel is the next target.” Rice immediately passes on the news to Cheney, according to Darling. [Darling, 2010, pp. 60-61] Cheney will subsequently call Bush and tell him about the threat (see (10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106-107; CBS News, 9/11/2002]
Reason for ‘Bogus’ Threat Unclear – The threat will be determined to be “almost surely bogus,” according to Newsweek. [Newsweek, 12/30/2001] The Secret Service’s intelligence division tracked down the origin of this threat,” the 9/11 Commission Report will state, “and, during the day, determined that it had originated in a misunderstanding by a watch officer in the White House Situation Room.” Although the 9/11 Commission will say it found the intelligence division’s “witnesses on this point to be credible,” Deborah Loewer, the director of the White House Situation Room, will dispute this account. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] By the end of 2001, White House officials will say they still do not know where the threat came from. [Newsweek, 12/30/2001] Darling will write in 2010, “To this day, it has never been determined why either the ‘credible source’ or Situation Room personnel used that code word [i.e. ‘Angel’] in their report to the PEOC.” [Darling, 2010, pp. 62] “The best we can tell,” Rice will say, is that “there was a call that talked about events—something happening to the president on the ground in Florida. And that somehow got interpreted as Air Force One.” She will say that the fact the caller knew the code name for Air Force One is “why we still continue to suspect it wasn’t a crank call.” [White House, 11/1/2001] However, former Secret Service officials will say the code name wasn’t an official secret, but instead “a radio shorthand designation that had been made public well before 2001.” [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ]
10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Medevac Helicopter Provides Scare for Bunkered Vice President Cheney and Others
Vice President Cheney and others in the White House bunker are given a report of another airplane heading toward Washington. Cheney’s Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, later states, “We learn that a plane is five miles out and has dropped below 500 feet and can’t be found; it’s missing.” Believing they only have a minute or two before the plane crashes into Washington, Cheney orders fighters to engage the plane, saying, “Take it out.” However, reports that this is another hijacking are mistaken. It is learned later that day that a Medevac helicopter five miles away was mistaken for a hijacked plane. [Newsweek, 12/30/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Warns President Bush about the Threat to Air Force One
Vice President Dick Cheney phones President Bush and tells him the White House has received a credible threat against Air Force One. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106-107; Woodward, 2002, pp. 18; CBS News, 9/11/2002] The White House has just received an anonymous phone call in which the caller said the president’s plane would be the next terrorist target (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Woodward, 2002, pp. 18; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] The caller referred to the plane as “Angel,” which is the Secret Service’s code name for Air Force One. [Fleischer, 2005, pp. 141-142] Details of the call were passed on to government officials, including Cheney, in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House. [White House, 11/19/2001; Newsweek, 12/30/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554]
Cheney Tells Bush about a ‘Credible’ Threat – Cheney now tells Bush: “We’re getting reports of a threat against you. It appears credible,” Major Robert Darling of the White House Military Office, who is with Cheney in the PEOC, will later recall. Cheney says, “We’re scrambling fighter escorts and the Secret Service is taking internal precautions on board Air Force One.” [Darling, 2010, pp. 61] Bush turns to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gould, his military aide, and passes on the news, saying, “A call came into the White House switchboard saying, ‘Angel is next.’” Bush then continues talking with Cheney and says, “We’re at war, Dick, and we’re going to find out who did this and we’re going to kick their ass.” [Sammon, 2002, pp. 107; Fleischer, 2005, pp. 141-142]
Pilot Is Told of the Threat and Asks for a Guard at the Cockpit Door – Colonel Mark Tillman, the pilot of Air Force One, is told about the threat. [CBS News, 9/11/2002] Noting that “Angel” is “a classified call sign of Air Force One,” Tillman will comment that “the only people that knew that call sign was us, [the] Secret Service, and the staff.” Therefore, he will say, “for somebody [to] call into the White House and say that Angel was next, that was just incredible.” [US Air Force, 2/29/2012 ] “It was serious before that, but now… no longer is it a time to get the president home,” Tillman will comment. “We actually have to consider everything we say. Everything we do could be intercepted and we have to make sure that no one knows what our position is.” Tillman asks to have an armed guard at his cockpit door. Will Chandler, the chief of security, is therefore summoned to the front of the plane and stands watch at the base of the stairs leading to the cockpit. No one is then allowed up these stairs. Secret Service agents double-check the identity of everyone on the plane, while the crew reviews the emergency evacuation plan. [CBS News, 9/11/2002; Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016]
Threat Influences the Decision to Fly to Nebraska – White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, who is on Air Force One with Bush, will say the threat against the president’s plane is what leads to the decision to take Bush to Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska (see 2:50 p.m. September 11, 2001) and is also one of the reasons why Bush does not head back to Washington, DC, right away. [White House, 9/12/2001] However, during the afternoon, the Secret Service will determine that the reported threat was unfounded. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] Shortly after Bush learns about the threat, Tillman will be informed that an aircraft that may have been hijacked is heading toward Air Force One (see (10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CBS News, 9/11/2002; CBS News, 1/17/2009] White House chief of staff Andrew Card will say he in fact learned a threat had been made against Air Force One almost an hour earlier, while he was being driven with Bush to Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [White House, 8/12/2002; White House, 8/16/2002; White House, 8/16/2002]
