In the middle of the 9/11 attacks, General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, drives from his NORAD headquarters office at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, about a dozen miles away. The journey reportedly takes him 45 minutes and en route he loses a cell phone call with Vice President Cheney. The reason he makes this journey is unknown, though it is reported that there are superior communications capabilities available at Cheyenne Mountain. [Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006; Washington Post, 7/29/2006] The exact times when Eberhart departs Peterson AFB and arrives at Cheyenne Mountain are unclear. General Richard Myers says that Eberhart phones him from Peterson either just before or just after the Pentagon is hit, which suggests that Eberhart heads out some time between 9:35 a.m. and 9:40 a.m. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Eberhart tells the 9/11 Commission that when he arrives at the NORAD operations center, the order to shoot down hijacked aircraft has already been passed down NORAD’s chain of command. According to the commission’s timeline, this would indicate he arrives after 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42] Yet other reports state that the massive blast doors to Cheyenne Mountain are shut at around 10:15 a.m. (see (10:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which suggests that Eberhart arrives earlier.
9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Reports that Its Commander Has Not Yet Declared Crisis an Emergency
The NORAD representative on the air threat conference call reports that NORAD has yet to give an assessment for the crisis that is taking place and adds that General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, has not yet declared the situation an air defense emergency. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ] The National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon has just started an air threat conference call in response to the terrorist attacks (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] A NORAD representative, in their first communication over the conference call, states: “No assessment has been given for this event at this point. No assessment for the overall air situation has been given at this point.” The representative adds that “CINC NORAD”—meaning Eberhart, the commander in chief of NORAD—“is not declaring [an] air defense emergency at this point.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
] An “air defense emergency” is defined by the US government as an “emergency condition which exists when attack upon the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, or US installations in Greenland by hostile aircraft or missiles is considered probable, is imminent, or is taking place.” [US Government, 7/1/2003] British online publication The Register will later comment that this definition “sums up the tragic events of [September 11] fairly well.” The declaration of an air defense emergency, according to The Register, “invokes a regulatory scheme known as Security Control of Air Traffic and Air Navigation Aids (SCATANA).” [Register, 9/17/2001] SCATANA is a procedure, developed in the 1960s, that was originally intended to clear the airspace above the US in the event of a confirmed warning of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. [Schwartz, 1998; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001] Eberhart will order a limited version of it later in the day, apparently around 11:00 a.m. (see (11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Eberhart was at NORAD headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, when the attacks began, but at some point headed out to the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
; Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006]
9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Sovereignty Fighters Directed to ‘Battle Stations’ Nationwide
As the 9/11 Commission will later describe, the commander of NORAD, General Ralph Eberhart, now directs “all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] Being at “battle stations” means the pilots have to suit up into their flight gear and get into their planes, ready to start the engines and taxi out if a scramble order follows. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 27] Senior NORAD officials will subsequently give the order to launch available fighter jets across the nation (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 178, 180]
Clarke Requested Combat Air Patrols – A few minutes earlier, according to his own account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, learned of an aircraft hitting the Pentagon and instructed his deputy: “Find out where the fighter planes are. I want combat air patrol over every major city in this country” (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Whether Clarke’s actions influenced Eberhart to issue his order is unknown. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 7-8]
Fighter Units Possibly Offered Help Much Earlier – The Toledo Blade will state that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) only begins calling bases across the US to request help “[b]y 10:01 a.m.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] But an article in Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine will indicate that NORAD and NEADS began receiving calls from various fighter units, asking, “What can we do to help?” right after the second World Trade Center tower was hit at 9:03, when it had become obvious the US was under attack (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002] It is therefore unclear why the instruction to put available fighters on battle stations—or to scramble them—was not issued significantly earlier.
10:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Commander Eberhart Declares ‘Concern’ over the Crisis
The NORAD representative on the Pentagon’s air threat conference call reports that General Ralph Eberhart, the commander in chief of NORAD, has declared “concern” for the crisis that is taking place. At around 9:39 a.m., the NORAD representative said over the conference call that “[n]o assessment for the overall air situation” had been given by NORAD at that point (see (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But now he says an assessment has been issued. He reports over the conference call: “At this time, CINC [commander in chief] NORAD”—meaning Eberhart—“has declared an assessment of concern for the air events does hold. I say again, an assessment of concern does hold for the air events.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
] Eberhart will tell the 9/11 Commission that at NORAD, he alone would be responsible for making an assessment of concern. He will say that at around 9:40 a.m. to 9:45 a.m., he received a lot of pressure from personnel at NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center to say that “yes,” he did assess concern. If he makes an assessment of concern, Eberhart will comment, it triggers a “Defcon surge.” What he means by a “Defcon surge” is unclear. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] (The military’s defense readiness condition (Defcon) will in fact be raised to Defcon 3, on the orders of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, at 10:52 a.m. (see (10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131] ) Eberhart will also say that an assessment of concern is “tied basically to a foreign attack” and making it triggers a number of consequences that, among other things, would impact Russia. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004]
After 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Fails to Tell NORAD about Vice President Cheney’s Shootdown Authorization
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently fails to tell NORAD about Vice President Dick Cheney’s authorization for the military to shoot down suspicious aircraft. Myers has been in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon since around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004
] At some unspecified time after reaching the NMCC, he begins a phone call with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who is at NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) in Colorado, in which the two men discuss “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Cheney, meanwhile, gave the military authorization to shoot down a suspicious aircraft that was approaching Washington, DC, shortly after 10:10 a.m. (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and personnel in the NMCC are told about this over the air threat conference at 10:14 a.m. and again at 10:19 a.m. (see 10:14 a.m.-10:19 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41-42]
Myers Will Be Unable to Recall Discussing Cheney’s Authorization – However, Myers apparently fails to tell Eberhart about it. When asked by the 9/11 Commission in 2004 whether he communicated with NORAD “to inform them of the vice president’s authorization and ensure that they understood their instructions,” he will give a confused and inexplicit answer. “To the best I can recall, I’m not sure I didn’t have that conversation with Eberhart on this,” he will reply. “I don’t remember… that being a simple issue we worked our way through,” he will add. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Eberhart will imply that Myers fails to tell him about Cheney’s shootdown authorization when he is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission. He will recall being told about Cheney’s authorization not by Myers but by Major General Rick Findley, NORAD’s director of operations, sometime after around 10:15 a.m., when he arrives at the CMOC. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004]
Myers Does Not Hear of Cheney’s Authorization on the Conference Call – Furthermore, Myers will be unable to recall whether he is even monitoring the air threat conference when Cheney’s shootdown authorization is reported over it. He will be under the mistaken impression that Cheney only gives the authorization after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld joins him in the NMCC, at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). “My recollection is that before we got the vice president’s authorization, the secretary [of defense] and I had this conversation and I made him aware of the authorization we were going to need if we had [a hijacked] aircraft coming in,” he will tell the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And yet in his 2009 memoir, Myers will contradict what he told the 9/11 Commission and describe hearing Cheney’s shootdown authorization being reported over the air threat conference. “Vice President Cheney has forwarded the president’s authorization to go weapons free if that plane [that is approaching Washington] is confirmed hijacked and threatens the White House or the Capitol,” he will recall hearing a military aide at the White House saying. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Discusses Rules of Engagement for Fighters with NORAD Commander Eberhart
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, but the two men will subsequently take no action to ensure these rules are communicated to fighter pilots. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Eberhart was in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, earlier on but left the base at around 9:30 a.m. to head to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Myers is at the Pentagon, where he went following a meeting on Capitol Hill. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] After arriving at the Pentagon, he went to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) with Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, reaching it at around 9:58 a.m. and going to the office of the deputy director for operations (DDO) there (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Issue of Shootdown Authority Needs to Be Resolved – Sometime after reaching the DDO’s office, Myers talks to Eberhart on the phone. The call is made by Myers, according to Klimow. Myers “picked up the Red Switch [secure phone] and began a painful conversation with NORAD,” Klimow will later say. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] However, Myers will recall Eberhart making the call, stating, “I was the one that took the phone call from General Eberhart.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Myers and Eberhart have two immediate issues to resolve in the call. These are determining when a fighter pilot should “pull the trigger for the shootdown of an airliner” and clarifying “who would have the ultimate authority to give that command to shoot,” according to Klimow. It is important to resolve these issues, Klimow will note, since the two men “didn’t want to put the burden of killing innocent passengers on the shoulders of a single fighter pilot.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Rules Are Decided by 10:30 a.m. – Myers and Eberhart have agreed upon the rules of engagement by around 10:30 a.m., when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). These are, “We were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down,” Klimow will say. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Myers and Eberhart decide to delegate the authority to order the shootdown of a civilian airliner to “the regional air defense commander,” according to Klimow. Klimow will presumably be referring to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will similarly state that, regarding the passing on of the shootdown order, Eberhart would have to talk to his “regional commander” who would then talk to “the fighters that are involved in this.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] Eberhart will recall directing CONR to “look for a hostile act” before ordering the shootdown of an aircraft, although he will give no indication of when he issued this instruction. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Myers and Eberhart Do Nothing to Get the Rules to Pilots – However, after establishing the rules of engagement, Myers and Eberhart will make no effort to ensure they are passed on to the fighter pilots who are responding to the crisis. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that in the “initial period” after he reached the NMCC—apparently referring to the first hour after he reached the command center—“he did not do anything to ensure that effective rules of engagement were communicated to pilots.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] And Eberhart will tell the 9/11 Commission only that he “assumed that the [shootdown] order was passed to the level of the fighter pilot.” [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
]
Written Rules Will Only Be Issued Hours Later – Furthermore, the task of establishing rules of engagement is apparently not fully resolved by 10:30 a.m. Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that “[t]hroughout the course of the day,” he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules” (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will only receive the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465]
Phone Call Apparently Occurs after 10:15 a.m. – It is unclear exactly when Eberhart and Myers discuss rules of engagement for fighter pilots. Myers will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “spoke to Eberhart many times” this morning, but add that he “could not remember exact times.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] According to his own recollection, though, he left the NMCC for a short period soon after he arrived there in order to look for Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and so his discussion with Eberhart presumably occurs sometime after he returns to the command center. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Furthermore, in the 45 minutes after 9:30 a.m. in which Eberhart is traveling from Peterson Air Force Base to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, he “couldn’t receive telephone calls,” according to the Denver Post (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
; Colorado Springs Gazette, 6/16/2006; Denver Post, 7/28/2006] This suggests he would only be able to discuss rules of engagement with Myers after around 10:15 a.m. (However, he will recall receiving a call from Arnold during the journey, so he is apparently not completely out of communication while he is on the road. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] )
10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Works on Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots, Too Late to Be of Any Use
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld works on “rules of engagement” for fighter pilots after he arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, but it will be hours before these rules are issued. After going outside to visit the site of the Pentagon attack, Rumsfeld arrives at the NMCC at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43-44, 465; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 5-7; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130-131]
Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Updates Rumsfeld – There, he immediately asks General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, for an update on the rules of engagement for fighter jets that are responding to the terrorist attacks. [Graff, 2019, pp. 236] Since arriving in the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m., Myers has discussed these rules over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD (see (Between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] In response to the inquiry, Myers says the policy he and Eberhart agreed upon is that “we were going to try to persuade a potentially hijacked plane to land, but if it was headed to a large city, take it down.” [Graff, 2019, pp. 236]
Vice President Says He Has Given Shootdown Authorization – Then, at 10:39 a.m., Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney over the air threat conference (see 10:39 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Cheney says he has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft that are approaching Washington, DC (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43] Upon hearing this, Rumsfeld’s “thoughts went to the pilots of the military aircraft who might be called upon to execute such an order,” Rumsfeld will later recall, adding: “It was clear that they needed rules of engagement telling them what they could and could not do. They needed clarity.”
Existing Rules Are Unsuitable for the Current Crisis – There are currently “standing rules of engagement,” Rumsfeld will note. [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004] However, he will comment, “There were no rules of engagement on the books about when and how our pilots should handle a situation in which civilian aircraft had been hijacked and might be used as missiles to attack American targets.” “I’d hate to be a pilot up there and not know exactly what I should do,” he says to Myers. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340] To resolve the issue, Rumsfeld and Myers go to work “to fashion appropriate rules of engagement.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Rumsfeld also discusses these rules with Cheney and President Bush while he is developing them.
Suspicious Aircraft May Have to Be Shot Down – In the process of establishing rules of engagement, Rumsfeld and Myers talk about a fighter pilot making “hand signals and communications, and flying in front [of a suspicious aircraft] and waving at them, and getting them to go in a direction that’s not dangerous.” They determine that if a suspicious aircraft is going “in a direction that’s dangerous,” meaning toward “a high value target on the ground of some sort,” the fighter pilot would “have to shoot them down,” Rumsfeld will state. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] Myers speculates that any plane within 20 miles of the White House that fails to land on command might have to be shot down. [Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 340]
Rules Are Quickly Developed – Rumsfeld and Myers reportedly come up with rules of engagement after a relatively short time. “We rapidly developed some rules of engagement for what our military aircraft might do in the event another aircraft appeared to be heading into a large civilian structure or population,” Rumsfeld will say. The process they come up with is that “the combatant commander would be notified in the event there was a circumstance that was abnormal and potentially dangerous, and he then would notify [Rumsfeld], and [Rumsfeld] then would notify the president.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Once the rules of engagement have been devised, the president approves them and Rumsfeld passes them on to Eberhart.
Final Rules Are Only Issued in the Afternoon – The process of coming up with these rules takes place in the hour before 11:15 a.m., Rumsfeld will tell the Washington Post. [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002] However, “Throughout the course of the day,” he will note, he and Myers “returned to further refine those rules.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ] Myers will recall that he in fact only receives the final recommended rules of engagement from Eberhart at around 12:40 p.m. (see 12:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 157] And the Department of Defense will only circulate written rules of engagement sometime after 1:00 p.m. (see (1:45 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] Rumsfeld’s work on rules of engagement is therefore “an irrelevant exercise,” according to journalist and author Andrew Cockburn, since Rumsfeld “did not complete and issue them until… hours after the last hijacker had died.” [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 7]
10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Readiness Condition Is Raised to the Highest Level in 28 Years
The US military’s defense readiness condition is raised from Defcon 5, the lowest possible level, to Defcon 3, an intermediate level that requires a heightened alert status for US armed forces worldwide, and which is the highest the defense readiness condition has been for 28 years. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/18/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
Rumsfeld Recommends Raising the Defcon – The decision to go to Defcon 3 is reportedly made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Rumsfeld will later recall that after he arrives at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he talks with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and “[w]e discussed and I recommended raising the defense condition level from five to three.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004]
Teleconference Participants Are Told to ‘Hold Off’ on Defcon 3 – Rumsfeld directs that the US military go to Defcon 3. At 10:43 a.m., it is announced on the air threat conference call that the secretary of defense “has directed that we go to Defcon 3 and be prepared to go to [Defcon] 2.” However, a minute later, Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney on the conference call, and Cheney says he will have to run the decision to go to Defcon 3 by the president, “and let him make the call.” Therefore, at 10:45 a.m., those on the conference call are told to “hold off on Defcon 3.”
Order to Raise the Defcon Is Reinstated – But Rumsfeld believes raising the defense readiness condition is urgent. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554] There is therefore a “historical discussion about how the move to Defcon 3 went during previous crises, Cuba specifically [i.e. the Cuban missile crisis in 1962],” Captain Charles Leidig, who is also in the NMCC, will later recall. With their reference being “a book on the shelf,” according to Leidig, Myers is shown that he has “approval authority to go to Defcon 3.” [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004
] After consulting Defense Department directives, Rumsfeld concludes that he has the authority to issue the order to raise the defense readiness condition. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] Therefore, at 10:46 a.m., those on the air threat conference call are told: “Override last instructions. The vice chairman [i.e. Myers] is directing we go to Defcon 3.” A few minutes later, an announcement is made on the conference call, “Emergency action message released at 14:52 [Zulu time, i.e. 10:52 a.m. Eastern time], re: Defcon 3.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
Raising the Defcon Is a ‘Huge Move’ – Rumsfeld will later agree with an interviewer that raising the defense readiness condition is “a very serious step for the nation.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] It was last raised to Defcon 3 during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when Rumsfeld had been the United States ambassador to NATO. Regarding the decision to raise it, Myers tells Rumsfeld, “It’s a huge move, but it’s appropriate.” [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002; Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
President Is Later Told of the Decision – The decision to go to Defcon 3 will soon be communicated within NORAD (see 11:03 a.m.-11:12 a.m. September11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; 9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004 ] Rumsfeld will brief President Bush on the decision (see (11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Bush, 2010, pp. 133] Apparently around the time the defense readiness condition is raised, Rumsfeld and/or Myers also decide to raise the force protection condition of US military installations (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004
; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153]
Defcon 3 Was Intended for the Cold War – Some individuals will later be critical of the decision to raise the defense readiness condition at this time. John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will write that Defcon 3 is in fact “a Cold War-era designation, devised to respond to a nuclear threat.” [Farmer, 2009, pp. 235] According to Farmer and other 9/11 Commission staffers, it is “suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al-Qaeda’s attack.” [Rutgers Law Review, 9/7/2011 ] General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, will similarly say that Defcon 3 is “not intended for [events like] the attacks of 9/11 and thus could have complicated the response to the attacks.” He will say he does not think that raising the condition would have “done anything for us” within the continental United States. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004
]
Defcons Are Phased Increases in Combat Readiness – The defense readiness condition is a “uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands, and for use by the [armed] services,” according to the Department of Defense. [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2010 ] Defcons are phased increases in combat readiness and are graduated to match situations of varying military severity. They are numbered, from Defcon 5, which means “normal peacetime readiness,” down to Defcon 1, which means “maximum force readiness.” The current level, Defcon 3, represents an “increase in force readiness above normal readiness.” [Federation of American Scientists, 4/29/1998] The defense readiness condition will remain at Defcon 3 until three days later, when it will be reduced one notch, to Defcon 4 (see September 14, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/30/2002]
11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Implements Cold War Era Plan to Clear Skies
At the NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, NORAD commander in chief, General Ralph Eberhart, orders a limited version of a little known plan to clear the skies and give the military control over US airspace. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The plan, Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigation Aids (SCATANA), was developed in the 1960s as a way to clear airspace above the US and off the US coast in the event of a confirmed warning of a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Once it is activated a wartime air traffic priority list is established, allowing essential aircraft and personnel to use the airspace. Among others, this list includes the US president, essential national security staff, aircraft involved in continental defense missions, and airborne command posts. [Schwartz, 1998]
Eberhart Suggests Limited Version of Plan – Eberhart and his staff suggest implementing the limited version of SCATANA over the air threat conference call. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta immediately concurs. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; Filson, 2003, pp. 73] Unlike a full SCATANA, this modified version allows ground navigation aids to stay on, for the benefit of aircraft that are still airborne. Under the plan, for about the next three days all flights other than military, law enforcement, fire fighters, and medevac, will require approval from the national Defense Department/FAA Air Traffic Services Cell, located within the FAA’s Herndon Command Center. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/10/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Notice is sent out to all civil and military air traffic control facilities, informing them that the skies now officially belong to NORAD. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 269]
Order Supposedly Made Late Due to Safety Concerns – The SCATANA order is issued over an hour after the FAA ordered all planes down (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and after at least three-quarters of them have already landed. [USA Today, 8/13/2002] Eberhart will later say the delay is due to safety concerns, because NORAD would have been unable to control US airspace—with over 4,000 planes airborne at the time of the attacks—with its radar capabilities. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Defense Week magazine will suggest SCATANA is not implemented until even later, at around 2:00 p.m. It says NORAD issues a “notice to airmen” implementing the modified version of SCATANA about five hours after Flight 11 hit the World Trade Center. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/2001]
11:03 a.m.-11:12 a.m. September11, 2001: NORAD Personnel Ordered to Defcon 3
The message goes out within NORAD that the military’s defense readiness condition has been raised to Defcon 3. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; 9/11 Commission, 2004] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed that the defense readiness condition be raised from Defcon 5—the lowest level—to Defcon 3 at around 10:45 a.m. (see (10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131] At 10:52 a.m., an emergency action message about the increased defense readiness condition was issued. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
NORAD Personnel Learn of Defcon Change – Word of the change is then communicated within NORAD. At 11:03 a.m., NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is ordered to Defcon 3. Four minutes later, at 11:07 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Steve Usher, the director of combat operations at the headquarters of the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) in Florida, announces that Defcon 3 has been ordered. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003] And a military log will state that “NORAD has directed Defcon change” at 11:12 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 2004] Staff Sergeant Brent Lanier, an emergency action controller in NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) in Colorado, is tasked with sending out a message about the change to the defense readiness condition. He will later recall: “I’d sent out false Defcon messages during exercises, but I never thought I’d have to send out an actual Defcon change message—but I did. It was frightening.” [Airman, 3/2002]
NORAD Officers Discuss Defcon Change – Major General Larry Arnold, the CONR commander, will tell the 9/11 Commission that he hears of the change to the defense readiness condition either from Major General Rick Findley, the director of operations at the CMOC, or from one of NORAD’s computer chat logs. [9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004 ] Usher will tell the 9/11 Commission that the instruction to raise the defense readiness condition comes either from the CONR Regional Air Operations Center or from Arnold. He will add that there is an emergency action message confirming the transition. [9/11 Commission, 2/4/2004
] Arnold will recall that, at some unspecified time, he calls General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, about the change to the defense readiness condition, with the intention of informing Eberhart “of what was ongoing.” [9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004
]
Change in Defcon Affects Who Can Declare a Target Hostile – Steve Hedrick, an air weapons officer at NEADS, will tell the 9/11 Commission that “any change in Defcon is authenticated immediately” with the fighter jets under NORAD control. He will also say that “the main change when a Defcon level changes is in who has the authority to declare a target hostile.” Hedrick will note that the order from Vice President Dick Cheney, that NORAD fighters were “cleared… to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond” (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001), is “distinct and different from the transition in Defcon levels.” [9/11 Commission, 10/27/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42]