In 2002, Newsweek will report: “The White House acknowledged for the first time, [President] Bush was privately beginning to worry about the stream of terror warnings he was hearing that summer, most of them aimed at US targets abroad. On July 5, five days before the Phoenix memo (see July 10, 2001), Bush directed [Condoleezza] Rice to figure out what was going on domestically.” [Newsweek, 5/27/2002] In 2004, President Bush will explain why he requested this: “[T]he reason I did is because there had been a lot of threat intelligence from overseas. And part of it had to do with the Genoa [Italy] G8 conference that I was going to attend.” [US President, 4/19/2004] Though he does not mention it, the chief security concern at the late July 2001 conference he mentions is intelligence that al-Qaeda plans to fly an airplane into the conference. This threat is so widely reported before the conference (with some reports before July 5 (see June 13, 2001 and Mid-July 2001) that the attack is called off (see July 20-22, 2001). For instance, in late June, Time magazine mentioned a German intelligence report of an Osama bin Laden plot “to fly remote-controlled model aircraft packed with Semtex into the conference hall and blow the leaders of the industrialized world to smithereens”
(see June 20, 2001). Bush will later claim that this request is specifically for the later-famous August 6, 2001 briefing entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001), although the CIA analysts who draft it will deny this (see July 13, 2004). [US President, 4/19/2004]
July 5, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Warns Domestic Agencies of ‘Something Spectacular’ Planned by Al-Qaeda
At the request of National Security Adviser Rice and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke leads a meeting of the Counterterrorism Security Group, attended by officials from a dozen federal agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs, the CIA, and the FBI. The CIA and FBI give briefings on the growing al-Qaeda threat. [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Time, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258] Then Clarke later recalls saying, “You’ve just heard that CIA thinks al-Qaeda is planning a major attack on us. So do I. You heard CIA say it would probably be in Israel or Saudi Arabia. Maybe. But maybe it will be here. Just because there is no evidence that says that it will be here, does not mean it will be overseas. They may try to hit us at home. You have to assume that is what they are going to do.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 236] Two attendees later recall Clarke stating that “something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon.” One who attended the meeting later calls the evidence that “something spectacular” is being planned by al-Qaeda “very gripping.” [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Time, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 256] Clarke directs every counterterrorist office to cancel vacations, defer non-vital travel, put off scheduled exercises, and place domestic rapid-response teams on much shorter alert. However, there is very poor follow up to the meeting and the attendees don’t share the warnings with their home agencies (see Shortly After July 5, 2001). By early August, all of these emergency measures are no longer in effect. [CNN, 3/2002; Washington Post, 5/17/2002]
Shortly After July 5, 2001: Warning from Urgent Meeting Is Not Shared within Domestic Agencies
On July 5, 2001, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke gave a dramatic briefing to representatives from several domestic agencies on the urgent al-Qaeda threat (see July 5, 2001). However, the warnings given generally are not passed on by the attendees back to their respective agencies. The domestic agencies were not questioned about how they planned to address the threat and were not told what was expected of them. According to the 9/11 Commission, attendees later “report that they were told not to disseminate the threat information they received at the meeting. They interpreted this direction to mean that although they could brief their superiors, they could not send out advisories to the field.” One National Security Council official has a different recollection of what happened, recalling that attendees were asked to take the information back to their agencies and “do what you can” with it, subject to classification and distribution restrictions. But, for whatever reason, none of the involved agencies post internal warnings based on the meeting, except for Customs which puts out a general warning based entirely on publicly known historical facts. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258, 264] The FAA issues general and routine threat advisories that don’t reflect the level of urgency expressed by Clarke and others (see January-August 2001). FAA Administrator Jane Garvey later claims she was unaware of a heightened threat level, but in 2005 it will be revealed that about half of the FAA’s daily briefings during this time period referred to bin Laden or al-Qaeda (see April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001). [New York Times, 4/18/2004] Clarke said rhetorically in the meeting that he wants to know if a sparrow has fallen from a tree. A senior FBI official attended the meeting and promised a redoubling of the FBI’s efforts. However, just five days after Clarke’s meeting, FBI agent Ken Williams sends off his memo speculating that al-Qaeda may be training operatives as pilots in the US (see July 10, 2001), yet the FBI fails to share this information with Clarke or any other agency. [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Clarke, 2004, pp. 236-37] The FBI will also fail to tell Clarke about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001), or what they know about Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (see August 23, 2001).
July 6, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Tells Rice to Warn Agencies to Prepare for 3 to 5 Simultaneous Attacks; No Apparent Response
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke sends National Security Adviser Rice an e-mail message “outlining a number of steps agreed on” at the Counterterrorism Security Group meeting the day before (see July 5, 2001), “including efforts to examine the threat of weapons of mass destruction and possible attacks in Latin America. One senior administration official [says] Mr. Clarke [writes] that several agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon, [have] been directed to develop what the official [says are] ‘detailed response plans in the event of three to five simultaneous attacks.’” However, no response or follow-up action has been pointed out. [New York Times, 4/4/2004]
July 10, 2001: CIA Officials Black, Blee, and Tenet Warn National Security Adviser Rice about Possible Imminent Al-Qaeda Attacks
CIA Director George Tenet and two other senior CIA officials give a briefing at the White House in which they present National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and other officials with information indicating an al-Qaeda attack, possibly in the United States, is imminent. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151-153; Whipple, 2020, pp. 186-187] Earlier today, Richard Blee, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, went to Cofer Black, director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, with compelling evidence that al-Qaeda will attack the United States in the near future, and the two men then presented this information to Tenet. Realizing its significance, Tenet called Rice and arranged to meet her right away (see July 10, 2001). [Politico Magazine, 11/12/2015; WBUR, 10/13/2020]
Briefing Is the CIA’s ‘Starkest Warning’ about Al-Qaeda – After arriving at the White House, Tenet, Blee, and Black meet Rice in her office. Also present are Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, and Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism chief. To emphasize the urgency of the information they are going to present, the three CIA officials sit at the conference table instead of on the couch. “I thought the more formal setting and stiff-backed chairs were appropriate for what was about to be said,” Tenet will later comment. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151; Whipple, 2020, pp. 186] The meeting that ensues will stand out “in the minds of both Tenet and Black as the starkest warning they had given the White House on [Osama] bin Laden and al-Qaeda,” according to journalist and author Bob Woodward. [Woodward, 2006, pp. 52]
‘Spectacular’ Attacks against the US Are Expected – Blee hands out briefing packages to the White House officials. He then begins with a PowerPoint presentation. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151; Whipple, 2020, pp. 186] Rice will recall that it includes “the threat information that we had been reviewing daily along with some new intelligence.” [Rice, 2011, pp. 67] Blee describes the threat facing the nation, saying: “There will be significant terrorist attacks against the United States in the coming weeks or months. The attacks will be spectacular. They may be multiple. Al-Qaeda’s intention is the destruction of the United States. This is an attack that is intended to cause thousands of American casualties somewhere.” He notes, however, that the location where any attack will occur is unknown. “We cannot say it will be New York City or the United States, but it is geared toward US citizens,” he says. It is also impossible to determine when an attack might occur. “We know from past attacks that [bin Laden] is not beholden to attacks on particular dates” and will act “when he believes the attack will be successful,” he explains.
Recent Statements Suggest an Imminent Attack – Blee then lays out the signs of an impending attack that have been observed. He says Ibn Khattab, a Chechen rebel leader, has promised some “very big news” to his troops (see (July 9, 2001)). He shows a chart that depicts seven pieces of evidence gathered over the last 24 hours that suggest an attack is imminent. These include an increase in the number of Islamic extremists that have been traveling to Afghanistan and significant departures of extremist families from Yemen. He then shows another chart that lists some of the most chilling statements the CIA has compiled through its intelligence work. These include a statement made by bin Laden to trainees in mid-June that there will be an attack in the near future; information from late June that referred to an imminent “big event”; information that mentioned moving toward decisive acts; and two pieces of information received just days earlier in which people were predicting “a stunning turn of events in the weeks ahead.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151-152; Whipple, 2020, pp. 186-187]
Threats Are Serious, Blee Maintains – Rice, Clarke, and Hadley are told that all the intelligence, from human and technical sources, is consistent and while some of it is uncertain, this kind of information is often the best indicator. [Woodward, 2006, pp. 51; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Blee also asserts that bin Laden’s threats are serious. “Throughout the Arab world, [bin Laden’s] threats are known to the public,” he says. There would therefore be “a loss of face, funds, and popularity” if the threatened attacks were not carried out.
America ‘Must Take the Battle’ to Bin Laden – Blee summarizes efforts that have been made to disrupt specific targets tied to bin Laden. One goal of these actions was to prompt the targets to spread the word that bin Laden’s plans have been compromised, in the hope that this might cause bin Laden to delay any planned attacks. Blee then says immediate consideration should be given to moving from a defensive to an offensive posture. “We must consider a proactive instead of a reactive approach to [bin Laden],” he says, adding, “Attacking him again with cruise missiles after this new terrorist attack will only play to his strategy.” He says the US “must take the battle to [bin Laden] in Afghanistan. We must take advantage of increasing dissatisfaction of some Afghan tribes with the Taliban. We must take advantage of the Afghan armed opposition.”
US Needs to Go on a ‘War Footing’ – After Blee has finished his briefing, Rice turns to Clarke and asks him: “Dick, do you agree? Is this true?” “Clarke put his elbows on his knees and his head fell into his hands, and he gave an exasperated yes,” Tenet will recall. She then asks Black, “What should we do now?” In response, he slams his fist on the table and declares, “This country needs to go on a war footing now!” Rice asks what can be done to go on the offensive right away against al-Qaeda. “We need to re-create the authorities that we had previously submitted in March,” she is told (see Early March 2001). Tenet reminds her that before these authorities can be approved, President Bush will need to align his policy with the new reality. Rice assures him that this will happen. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 152-154; Whipple, 2020, pp. 187] She also asks him if there is more the CIA could do to capture Abu Zubaida, whom the government believes to be al-Qaeda’s chief facilitator and therefore someone who might know the details of the plot. [Rice, 2011, pp. 67]
Black and Blee Think the Meeting Was a Success – There will be contradictory accounts of how the CIA officials feel about the meeting after it ends. Blee and Black will say they felt they had gotten their message across. As they walk across the West Wing parking lot, they high-five each other. “We thought we’d finally gotten through to these people,” Black will recall, adding, “We had executed our responsibilities.” Blee will recall them telling each other: “Boom! We hit a home run. She got it.” [Whipple, 2020, pp. 187] But according to Woodward, Black, along with Tenet, feels that “they were not getting through to Rice” and Tenet leaves the meeting “feeling frustrated.” [Woodward, 2006, pp. 51; Washington Post, 10/1/2006]
Tenet Will Say He Was Happy with Rice’s Response – Woodward’s account will be disputed, though. “[B]oth current and former officials, including allies of Mr. Tenet, took issue with Mr. Woodward’s account that [Tenet] and his aides had left the meeting feeling that Ms. Rice had ignored them,” the New York Times will report. And members of the 9/11 Commission who interview Tenet in 2004 will say the CIA director “never indicated he had left the White House with the impression that he had been ignored” when he discussed today’s meeting with them. [New York Times, 10/2/2006] When Daniel Marcus, the 9/11 Commission’s general counsel, asks Tenet how Rice reacted to his message about the dangers of al-Qaeda, Tenet will answer: “She got it. She agreed. We were all working on it.” [Newsweek, 4/29/2007]
‘Nothing Happened’ after the Briefing, Blee Will Say – Black and Blee will be disappointed at what they see as the White House’s lack of action following the briefing. Blee’s assessment will be, “From July to September, nothing happened.” [Whipple, 2020, pp. 187] “To me it remains incomprehensible,” Black will complain. “How is it that you could warn senior people so many times and nothing actually happened?” he will ask. [Politico Magazine, 11/12/2015] Tenet will come to regard today’s meeting as “a tremendous lost opportunity to prevent or disrupt the 9/11 attacks,” according to Woodward. [Woodward, 2006, pp. 79] However, according to the New York Times, records will show that “far from ignoring Mr. Tenet’s warnings,” Rice “acted on the intelligence” and asked Tenet to make the same presentation he gave today to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft (see July 11-17, 2001).
Rice Will Have a Poor Recollection of the Meeting – Controversy will arise when the existence of today’s meeting comes to light in 2006 and details of the meeting will be disputed (see September 29, 2006 and September 30-October 3, 2006). Rice will initially tell reporters she does not recall this specific meeting and note that she met Tenet numerous times this summer to discuss terrorist threats (see October 1-2, 2006). [Washington Post, 9/30/2006; New York Times, 10/2/2006; New York Times, 10/2/2006] However, in her memoir, published in 2011, she will simply write that her “recollection of the meeting is not very crisp” because she and Tenet “were discussing the [terrorist] threat every day.” [Rice, 2011, pp. 67] Furthermore, although Tenet discusses the meeting when he testifies before the 9/11 Commission, there will be no mention of it in the Commission’s final report. [Washington Post, 10/1/2006; Tenet, 2007, pp. 153; Politico Magazine, 11/12/2015]
July 10, 2001: CIA Officials Black and Blee Show Director Tenet Compelling Evidence of an Imminent Al-Qaeda Attack
Richard Blee, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, goes to his boss, Cofer Black, director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, with evidence suggesting al-Qaeda will attack the United States in the near future, and the two men then go and present the information to CIA Director George Tenet. Blee has been tracking “a cascade of threats,” according to writer and documentary filmmaker Chris Whipple, and “[t]he intelligence, while not specific about targets, left no doubt that major attacks were imminent.” “You saw 50 different signs of impending attack,” Blee will later recall. These are the kinds of indications that would lead a person to say, “Oh, f_ck, it’s coming,” he will say. He therefore bursts into Black’s office at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to report what is known. “Okay, the roof’s fallen in,” he announces. “Whatcha got?” Black asks and Blee shows him information about the alarming terrorist threat. Black finds this “absolutely compelling.” The information, derived from multiple sources, is “sort of the last straw,” he will say.
Tenet Is Shown Evidence of a Possible Imminent Attack – Black therefore promptly arranges to see Tenet. He calls Tenet’s secretary and tells her, “I have to see the director, I’m coming up with Rich.” The secretary says Tenet is unavailable. “I’m sorry, he’s in with the head of some foreign intelligence service,” she tells Black. But he retorts, “Kick the guy out, we’re coming up now.” Black and Blee then go to Tenet’s office to brief the CIA director. [Politico Magazine, 11/12/2015; CBS, 5/21/2016; Whipple, 2020, pp. 185-186] They show him communications intercepts and other top-secret intelligence that reveal the increasing likelihood of al-Qaeda attacking the US in the near future. “It was a mass of fragments and dots that nonetheless made a compelling case,” according to journalist and author Bob Woodward. [Woodward, 2006, pp. 49; Washington Post, 10/1/2006]
Information Makes Tenet’s ‘Hair Stand on End’ – Tenet realizes the importance of the information he is shown. Black will recall him “[c]hewing on his cigar, going back and forth, jumping up and down, his eyes flashing.” [Whipple, 2020, pp. 186] “The briefing… literally made my hair stand on end,” Tenet will comment. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151] Black, Blee, and Tenet agree that a meeting at the White House to discuss the information is urgently needed. [Politico Magazine, 11/12/2015]
Tenet Tells Rice He Needs to See Her Immediately – Tenet therefore calls the White House and talks to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. “I can recall no other time in my seven years as [CIA director] that I sought such an urgent meeting at the White House,” he will remark. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151] “I have to come see you, we’re comin’ right now,” he tells Rice. [CBS, 5/21/2016; Whipple, 2020, pp. 186] Rice immediately makes time to see him, Tenet will recall. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151] However, White House logs will show that the CIA director already has a meeting with Rice scheduled for today. The meeting that is supposedly arranged now is therefore “not an emergency meeting,” according to Philip Zelikow, who will be the executive director of the 9/11 Commission. [Newsweek, 4/29/2007] Furthermore, Rice will give a different account of what Tenet tells her when he calls the White House. He only says, “I’m worried about the chatter,” she will write. Then, after she asks him what he wants to do, he suggests that he come to the White House immediately and she agrees. [Rice, 2011, pp. 67] Black, Blee, and Tenet will subsequently make the 15-minute drive to the White House, and present Rice and other officials there with the information Blee has compiled (see July 10, 2001). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151-153; Politico Magazine, 11/12/2015]
July 11-17, 2001: Rumsfeld and Ashcroft Receive Urgent Al-Qaeda Warning Recently Given to White House
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft receive the same CIA briefing about a likely imminent, multiple, and simultaneous al-Qaeda strike that was given to the White House on July 10, 2001 (see July 10, 2001). In 2006, the State Department will reveal the two were briefed within a week of the White House briefing, at the request of National Security Adviser Rice. One official who helped prepare the briefing later describes it as a “ten on a scale of one to ten” that “connected the dots” to present a stark warning that al-Qaeda is ready to launch a new attack. A Pentagon spokesman says he has no information “about what may or may not have been briefed” to Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld does not answer questions about it. Ashcroft says he was not given any briefing and calls it “disappointing” that he was not briefed. After it is confirmed that Ashcroft was briefed, apparently on July 17, Ashcroft will still claim not to remember the briefing, and will say he only recalls another CIA briefing earlier in the month (see July 5, 2001). Journalist Andrew Cockburn later reports that, “according to several intelligence sources,” Rumsfeld’s reaction to the briefing at the time “was one of vehement dismissal, complete with cutting observations about the CIA falling victim to ‘vast doses of al-Qaeda disinformation’ and ‘mortal doses of gullibility.’” McClatchy Newspapers will comment that these briefings raise “new questions about what the Bush administration did in response, and about why so many officials have claimed they never received or don’t remember the warning.” [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 9] On July 26, 2001, it will be reported that Ashcroft has stopped flying on commercial airlines within the US (see July 26, 2001).
Mid-July 2001: CIA Director Tenet Warns National Security Adviser Rice About Major Attack
CIA Director Tenet has a special meeting with National Security Adviser Rice and her aides about al-Qaeda. Says one official at the meeting, “[Tenet] briefed [Rice] that there was going to be a major attack.” Another at the meeting says Tenet displays a huge wall chart showing dozens of threats. Tenet does not rule out a domestic attack but says an overseas attack is more likely. [Time, 8/12/2002]
July 20-22, 2001: During G8 Summit, Italian Military Prepare against Attack from the Sky
The G8 summit is held in Genoa, Italy. Acting on previous warnings that al-Qaeda would attempt to kill President Bush and other leaders, Italian authorities surround the summit with anti-aircraft guns. They keep fighter jets in the air and close off local airspace to all planes. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/2001] The warnings are taken so seriously that Bush stays overnight on an aircraft carrier offshore, and other world leaders stay on a luxury ship. [CNN, 7/18/2001] No attack occurs. US officials state that the warnings were “unsubstantiated,” but after 9/11, they will claim success in preventing an attack. [Los Angeles Times, 9/27/2001] According to author Philip Shenon, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice is involved in discussions about the precautions, and this is the only time she focuses on al-Qaeda threats in the summer of 2001. Shenon will add: “There is no record to show that Rice made any special effort to discuss terrorist threats with Bush. The record suggested, instead, that it was not a matter of special interest to either of them that summer.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 154]
July 27, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Says Immediate Threat Is Over but Attacks Are Still Going Forward
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke informs National Security Adviser Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley that the spike in intelligence about a near-term al-Qaeda attack has stopped. However, he urges keeping readiness at a high level during August, when President Bush and many other top US leaders go on vacation. He warns that another recent report suggests that an attack has just been postponed for a few months “but will still happen.” Similarly, on August 3, the CIA sends a cable to the US intelligence community warning that the threat of impending al-Qaeda attacks is likely to continue indefinitely. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260, 534]