James Ujaama, a follower of militant London imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, contacts Abu Hamza from the US and offers the use of a ranch in the remote town of Bly, Oregon, as a militant training camp. Ujaama found out about the ranch through a friend, Sami Osman, who lives there with a group of radical Muslims. Abu Hamza is having problems in Britain due to tight firearms laws and the collapse of a scheme he had to send his recruits to Yemen for weapons training (see (June 1998)). Ujaama faxes Abu Hamza, saying that the ranch could be used to establish a training camp and that he and his associates are stockpiling weapons and ammunition. In addition, the ranch looks “just like Afghanistan” and Oregon is a good place for the camp because it is a “pro-militia and firearms state.” Finally, the ranch is good because, if Abu Hamza comes there, the unbelievers will not be able to remove him “without a serious armed fight.” Two leading associates of Abu Hamza will soon arrive to check the ranch out (see November 1999-Early 2000). Calls between Abu Hamza and the US are noted by the authorities around this time, although it is unclear if this fax is intercepted (see November-December 1999). Osman is under surveillance by the FBI until he moves to the ranch, but the FBI will lose him due to his relocation and only find him again after he is mentioned in a report by an Oregon policeman in the middle of December. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 188-189]
October 17, 1999: Yemen Says Al-Qaeda Leader Executed, but Doubts Persist
The government of Yemen says that it has executed Zein al-Abidine Almihdhar, leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate group the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), for his part in a kidnapping and murder plot (see December 28-29, 1998). However, the execution is not public and his body is not returned to his family. This leads Abu Hamza al-Masri, a leading supporter of the IAA, to speculate that Almihdhar is still alive in prison. Yemeni journalist Bashraheel Bashraheel will also comment: “The execution would have sparked a civil war.… The tribal leaders know [Almihdhar] is still alive and have been bribed to persuade their followers not to rebel.” [Quin, 2005, pp. 126, 157-8, 187] It will later be suggested that Almihdhar is a distant relative of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. [New York Times, 12/7/2001]
November 1999-Early 2000: Possible 7/7 Bombings Mastermind Tries to Set up Militant Training Camp in Oregon
Haroon Rashid Aswat and Oussama Kassir, assistants to leading London-based radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, arrive in the US to assess the suitability of a proposed terrorist training camp. Upon arrival, they meet up with James Ujaama, another associate of Abu Hamza who proposed the camp (see October 1999) and its owner Sami Osman. Aswat is considered a close aide to Abu Hamza, who himself is an informer for the British (see Early 1997), and will later be described as the mastermind of the 7/7 London bombings.
Unsuitable Facility – However, Aswat and Kassir are unhappy with what they find, especially as Ujaama does not have a key to unlock the gate to the ranch when they arrive. In addition, the ranch lacks food, running water, toilet facilities, and barracks, and only has a simple trailer on it. They stay at the ranch for about two months and conduct weapons training for around 15 militants present. According to a witness, Kassir brags that he is a “hit man” for Abu Hamza and Osama bin Laden and has had jihad training in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Lebanon. Jihadi videos are shown and a computer disc with details of how to improvise poisons is displayed. In addition, a scheme for poisoning a water supply is discussed, as are armed robberies, building an underground bunker to conceal weapons, and firebombing vehicles.
FBI Investigation – However, on December 13 Osman’s car is stopped due to a faulty brake light and the police officer notices that two men, who turn out to be Aswat and Kassir, are acting strangely in the car. For example, Aswat clutches a briefcase closely to his chest as the police officer questions him. The FBI previously had Osman under surveillance, but has lost him. A database check performed by the officer alerts the FBI and an agent is immediately dispatched to Bly. He shows a surveillance photo of Aswat and Kassir to the officer, who identifies them as the other two men in the car. More FBI agents arrive to investigate the ranch, but, before they can raid it, Aswat and Kassir leave for Seattle. There, Aswat allegedly boasts of being bin Laden’s “hit man,” just as Kassir has done.
Advised to Abandon Ranch – Aswat and Kassir eventually return to Britain and advise Abu Hamza against putting any further effort into the ranch. Kassir will be arrested in the Czech Republic and extradited in 2007 to stand trial. [Daily Mail, 7/24/2005; Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 7/31/2005; Seattle Times, 8/9/2005; O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 185-186, 194; Associated Press, 9/26/2007]
November-December 1999: British, US Authorities Monitor Terrorist Trainers in Oregon
British authorities notice that leading London-based radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri is making a number of calls to the same number in the small town of Bly in Oregon, USA. Abu Hamza is an informer for British intelligence (see Early 1997), but they are monitoring him anyway. The Oregon number is for a mountain ranch where Abu Hamza intends to establish a terrorist training camp (see October 1999 and November 1999-Early 2000). The calls, made from Abu Hamza’s office in Finsbury Park mosque, lead the British to contact the local sheriff’s department to ask for information about the ranch. The department flies over it and sends a detective to take photographs, but nothing of significance is discovered. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 188-189]
December 1999: British Authorities Return Confiscated Bomb Manual and Violence-Inciting Tapes to Top Militant and Informer Abu Hamza
British authorities return items they previously confiscated from leading cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri over his involvement in the murder of Western tourists in Yemen (see December 28-29, 1998).
Tapes – The material is returned after Britain decides not to prosecute Abu Hamza for his part in the murders, and includes video and audio tapes “packed with the usual messages of intolerance and hatred, and culminating in exhortations to kill the enemies of Islam.” The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) deemed the evidence gathered by the police “insufficient” for a prosecution, although it will later be found that three of the tapes show Abu Hamza committing the offense of “soliciting to murder.” Apparently, detectives only watched one of the tapes, as they were not the focus of their inquiries, and the police report to the CPS did not mention them. Abu Hamza will later say that he takes their return as proof nothing he says in his sermons is illegal.
Encyclopedia of Jihad – He is also given back his encyclopedia of Afghan jihad, which contains “hundreds of pages of instructions and diagrams on making bombs, organizing ambushes, laying landmines and selecting targets—among them Big Ben, the Eiffel Tower and the Statue of Liberty.” The encyclopedia has been known to investigators in Europe for some time (see March 1995 and 1998-December 11, 1999). Authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory will note ironically that the authorities apparently believe that the encyclopedia is “a legitimate thing for an advocate of eternal Holy War to have in his library.” The encyclopedia will later be described at a “terrorist manual” in a court case against Abu Hamza, where it will be a key piece of evidence against him.
Passport – However, the police do retain his passport, preventing Abu Hamza, an informer for Britain’s security services (see Early 1997), from traveling abroad. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 146, 289-290]
2000: Radical London Cleric and Informer Gives Followers OK for Martyrdom Operations
During a question and answer session after a speaking engagement in Blackburn, London-based radical imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, an informer for the British authorities (see Early 1997), tells his followers that suicide bombings are okay. A young man in the audience asks if it is permissible to blow oneself up in the cause of the jihad. Abu Hamza replies: “It is not called suicide, it is called shahid operation. It is not called suicide, this is called Shahada, martyring, because if the only way to hurt the enemies of Islam except by taking your life for that then it is allowed.” He adds: “If he is a person who actually wants to go to paradise, if he’s sincere about the beautiful women of paradise which one day, insha’Allah, he will go to paradise and she will tell him ‘I used to watch you‘… This religion quenches this thirst with the blood of martyrs. This religion fires the people with the blood of its sons and if it wasn’t for those minority few, the weak in their armoury, strong in their blood and their faith, without them the world wouldn’t have shook.” [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 58]
2000-2001: British Authorities Repeatedly Refuse to Allow Italian Judge to Interview Leading London-Based Radical Imam Abu Hamza
British authorities repeatedly reject requests submitted by Italian judge Stefano D’Ambruoso, who wants to interview leading London-based radical imam Abu Hamza al-Masri. The requests are made because D’Ambruoso is surprised by how many times Abu Hamza’s name crops up in connection with terror inquiries in Italy. However, the Metropolitan Police, for which Abu Hamza works as an informer (see Early 1997), declines the requests, saying that it cannot force Abu Hamza to talk to D’Ambruoso. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 107-108] The Metropolitan Police had previously hampered an interview of Abu Hamza by French authorities (see 1997). The exact timing of the requests is not known, but links between terror cells based in Milan and London are discovered in 2000-2001 (see Early 2000-2001, Between 2000 and April 2001, and June 29, 2001), so they presumably begin to be submitted at this time. Britain has a “covenant of security” with Abu Hamza and other leading radicals which allows them to encourage militant operations outside Britain (see August 22, 1998).
March 2000-February 2001: London Mosque Worshipper Helps Purchase $335,000 of Equipment for Chechen Rebels
A group of London radicals purchases communications equipment worth $335,000 for the Chechen rebels. One of the purchasers is Abu Doha, one of the most senior al-Qaeda members ever to have lived in Britain (see February 2001) and a worshipper at the Finsbury Park mosque of Abu Hamza al-Masri. The equipment includes 19 satellite telephones and 36 SIM cards with airtime. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 67-8]
After April 21, 2000: Informer Thinks British Authorities Do Not ‘Give a Sh*t’ Islamist Killers Live in London
After deciding to end his career as an informant against radical Islamists in London (see April 21, 2000), Reda Hassaine reflects bitterly on his experience of the British security services, MI5 and the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch: “These guys I was risking my life for—they hadn’t arrested anybody, they didn’t do a proper job. All the work I had done, all the risks I took didn’t seem to amount to anything. All this killing was taking place abroad, but the British didn’t give a sh*t that the killers were here in London. As long as nothing happened in Britain, then everything was alright. Abu Hamza [al-Masri, another MI5 informer (see Early 1997)] was left to do whatever he liked, to brainwash, to recruit, and send people off to the training camps. I was telling the British this all the time. ‘This group is going to Afghanistan,’ I would say. ‘They’re leaving on Friday, they have tickets to fly to Pakistan.’ And the only reply I got was, ‘There’s nothing we can do about it.’”
‘Harmless Clown’? – Hassaine will add: “I wasn’t surprised. When I began to work with MI5 I already knew from the French that they would do nothing, that they weren’t interested in what was happening in London, the threat didn’t register. They told me that they thought Abu Hamza was a ‘harmless clown,’ but I felt obliged to carry on with the work. [Note: a group closely associate with Abu Hamza murdered some British citizens and others in Yemen in 1998 (see December 28-29, 1998).] I had started this thing, I wanted to pursue it. I later learned that Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada were both talking to MI5 and Special Branch too. The British must have thought they had these guys under control, that they were collaborating with them.”
‘A Factory for Making Terrorists’ – Hassaine will continue: “Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Abu Hamza was busily recruiting hundreds of people, sending them off to Afghanistan, from where they were returning unnoticed and undetected to do whatever they like. Abu Hamza had this great big mosque where these people could hide, pick up a new identity, get money and support, and receive the blessing of the imam for their actions. Seven days a week that place was producing recruits for the jihad. It was a factory for making terrorists.” [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 150-151]
October 13, 2000: Radical London Imam Abu Hamza Inspires Followers to Take Up Global Holy War
In a Friday sermon one day after the USS Cole was bombed with the loss of 17 lives (see October 12, 2000), leading radical imam and British intelligence informer (see Early 1997) Abu Hamza al-Masri encourages his followers to wage a global jihad (holy war). The sermon is nominally about the Palestinian intifada, which is in the headlines at this time, but Abu Hamza does not confine himself to this topic.
‘If It Is Killing, Do It’ – He says: “You must increase your action, you must increase your jihad, because when you wake up you wake the scholars up and when you and the scholars are woken up the tyrants are shaking… It’s time for you and me and everybody to sacrifice, it’s a time to prove that we are not here in the West just for the honey pot, just to take and not to give anything.” He adds: “My dear brothers, if you can go [on jihad] then go. If you can’t go, sponsor. If you can’t sponsor, speak. If you can’t do all of this, do all of that. If you can send your children, send them, you must help, you must have a stand. You must have a stand with your heart, with your tongue, with your money, with your sword, with your Kalashnikov, anything you think will help… don’t ask ‘Shall I do this, shall I do that?’ Just do it. Anything that will help the intifada, just do it. If it is killing, do it. If it is paying, pay, if it is ambushing, ambush, if it is poisoning, poison.”
‘They Are All Kuffar’ – Authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory will comment: “Stop, rewind a second, and listen again. Abu Hamza was not just talking Palestine or the old jihad battlefields of the past. This was eleven months before the World Trade Center would be demolished and three thousand people killed in the worst terrorist atrocity the world had ever seen, and here was one of al-Qaeda’s most potent mouthpieces telling a congregation at Friday prayers in London to help their oppressed brothers, ‘in any way you like and anywhere you like. They are all kuffar [non-believers], and can all be killed. Killing a kuffar who is fighting you is OK. Killing a kuffar for any reason, you can say it is OK, even if there is no reason for it.’” [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 55-57]