The anthrax attacks occurred at a crucial moment in U.S. history. The attacks had to vie for space in the newspapers with several other important events. As October of 2001 progressed and more anthrax cases became known, the legislation that would eventually be called the USA PATRIOT Act (“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism” Act) was being hurried through Congress. It was signed into law by George W. Bush on October 26. During this same month Bush gave his approval to the first bulk domestic spying by the NSA.
But in the fall of 2001 war overshadowed all else and enabled other transformations. The first U.S. military strike on Afghanistan took place two days after the first anthrax victim, Robert Stevens, died of inhalation anthrax in Florida. As the anthrax attacks developed, so did the invasion of Afghanistan. And in the background, preparations were underway for the invasion of Iraq.
It is important to reflect on the relationship between war and civil liberties, and on the steps that were taken in 2001 to ensure that a state of war was recognized so that the administration’s goals could be achieved. Without understanding the role of war and the nature of the domestic preparations required to conduct it, we will not be in a position to understand the 2001 anthrax attacks.
War’s Influence on Civil Liberties
War leaders, especially in recent history, have typically sought to achieve a high degree of social unity and public confidence in the executive during wartime. When mobilization begins the leadership seeks to ensure that there is no loss of energy or purpose, no doubt about the rectitude of the direction in which society is heading, no holding back from sacrifice. The entire social body is to cooperate. Although attempts to get the support of the general population have certainly been found in ancient times, the tendency to seek passionate, enthusiastic engagement during war became more common with the spread of republican forms of government and the replacement of professional armies with citizen armies.
This desired unity and confidence in leadership can be, at times, a spontaneous development, but at other times propaganda has been necessary to help achieve the required “confidence in one’s own cause and one’s leaders.”
The social unity common in war does more than facilitate the use of force against an external enemy: it also reduces the space for dissent, and, therefore, the space for civil liberties, in the domestic population. As David Dodge put it, reflecting on what he saw around him in the U.S. during the war of 1812: “to inflame a mild republic with the spirit of war is putting all its liberties to the utmost hazard.”
A hundred years after Dodge, in a famous essay generally known as “War Is the Health of the State,” Randolph Bourne recorded the process of mobilization in the U.S. as the nation joined WWI. He noted that “it is precisely in war that the urgency for union seems greatest,” and he observed that once an executive has made the decision to go to war the entire domestic population will commonly adopt the decision even if it was given little or no role in the process: “The moment war is declared…the mass of the people, through some spiritual alchemy, become convinced that they have willed and executed the deed themselves.”
The people, said Bourne, “with the exception of a few malcontents, proceed to allow themselves to be regimented, coerced, deranged in all the environments of their lives, and turned into a solid manufactory of destruction.” War “automatically sets in motion throughout society those irresistible forces for uniformity, for passionate cooperation with the Government in coercing into obedience the minority groups and individuals which lack the larger herd sense.”
Where the executive sees insufficient uniformity it may simply crush dissent. Republics, Bourne claimed, can in times of war be difficult to distinguish from autocracies.
In short, during wartime the very liberties democracies claim to be fighting to protect are reduced. Whether these liberties will be regained depends on several factors, including the degree of persistence of a perceived external threat. References to the Global War on Terror as the “Long War,” possibly lasting for generations, have naturally caused great concern among those who care about U.S. civil liberties.
The Case of 9/11
The Constitution of the United States explicitly gives to Congress the power to declare war. But the Constitution also says that the President will be Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces during war. What was intended as a check and balance measure becomes a recipe for struggle. When taking on the role of Commander-in-Chief, presidents may demand certain powers—for decision-making and for deploying institutions arguably connected to war-making— that they normally do not have. Once a war is in motion, presidents keen on expanding their power can take advantage of the powers war grants them, and subsequent presidents can then cite these occasions as precedents for seizing further power.
In the case of 9/11, effort was expended from the very outset to define the day’s attacks as an act of war, rather than simply an incident of terrorism. If the public were convinced that an act of war had taken place, if a condition of war was established, then it would seem natural for the U.S. government to respond within that framework. In that case—and especially if Congress gave some sign of approval—the President could arguably assume his role as Commander-in-Chief, and as embodiment of the executive branch of government, take whatever extraordinary powers he could assert were required.
During the day of September 11, as the television cameras rolled, one well-known personage after another proclaimed that the United States had been subjected to an act of war. (On CNN the list included John McCain, Curt Weldon, Samuel Berger, George Shultz, Shimon Peres, Lawrence Eagleburger, Orrin Hatch, James Woolsey, Dianne Feinstein and John Kerry.) Yet when CNN anchor Judy Woodruff challenged Senator John McCain to justify the claim, the best he could do was to repeat his assertion. Little wonder: it was not at all necessary to define the events as an act of war. Indeed, in light of the fact that no state seemed to have carried out the attacks, it was downright peculiar to call it an act of war, just as it was peculiar for the U.S. to consider carrying out an act of war in response. It would have been more natural to call the 9/11 events crimes and turn to either domestic U.S. law or international law for an appropriate response. The Taliban, who formed the de facto government in Afghanistan, indicated they would be willing to cooperate in a legal proceeding. When Osama Bin Laden was accused of the deed by the U.S. government, they offered at various times to hand him over for trial if the U.S. would supply some evidence of his guilt. From the perspective of law this was an entirely reasonable request.
No credible evidence had been presented. Bin Laden had not been formally charged with the crime by the FBI (nor, for that matter, would he ever be charged for the crime of 9/11). But on September 12 Bush publicly defined the 9/11 events as acts of war: “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war.” The Bush administration had by this time already decided that war, not law, would be the framework used to deal with 9/11.
Bush did not even acknowledge the Taliban request for evidence as what it was. Instead, operating entirely within the discourse of war, he referred to Taliban requests as pleas for “negotiation,” which he then declined. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the U.S. would soon be presenting, for the edification of the world, a document detailing evidence of Bin Laden’s guilt. When no such document was produced, the government of the United Kingdom stepped forward. The British document of October 4 was, however, astonishingly weak. The preamble noted that, “this document does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama Bin Laden in a court of law” even as it was purporting to provide something of much greater import: a casus belli. Indeed, the document consisted mainly of unverifiable claims from intelligence agencies, the evidence seldom rising to the level of circumstantial. Anthony Scrivener, Q.C., noted in The Times that, “it is a sobering thought that better evidence is required to prosecute a shoplifter than is needed to commence a world war.”
A familiar band of conservatives and neoconservatives rapidly made the point that since the attacks were an act of war, the U.S. must wage war in response. Henry Kissinger was among the first to make the point in writing. At about 9 p.m. on September 11 his article was posted online at the Washington Post site, and it showed up in print on September 12. Evoking Pearl Harbor, Kissinger made it clear that treating the attacks as a police matter was not good enough.
The U.S. response must end “the way that the attack on Pearl Harbor ended—with the destruction of the system that is responsible for it.” The U.S., Kissinger explained, should not confine its wrath to states connected, through evidence, to the 9/11 attacks: “any government that shelters groups capable of this kind of attack, whether or not they can be shown to have been involved in this attack, must pay an exorbitant price.”
On September 12 others, almost as quick with their pens as Kissinger, joined the chorus. Robert Kagan, one of the founders of the neoconservative Project for the New American Century, began his article with another evocation of Pearl Harbor (“Sept. 11, 2001—the date that will live in infamy…”) and then said that Americans must respond as did their grandfathers:
Not by engaging in an extended legal effort to arraign, try and convict killers, as if they were criminals and not warriors. But by doing the only thing we now can do: Go to war with those who have launched this awful war against us.
He continued: “Please let us make no mistake this time: We are at war now. We have suffered the first, devastating strike.” And he urged that Congress “immediately declare war.”
Neoconservative Charles Krauthammer was equally outspoken. “This is not crime,” he began his article. “This is war.” He criticized Colin Powell for pledging to “bring those responsible to justice.” You do not bring such people to justice, he said. “You bring criminals to justice; you rain destruction on combatants”.
These suggestions may seem rather bold given the lack of evidence identifying a perpetrator, but Krauthammer claimed to know who the enemy was: “Our delicate sensibilities have prevented us from pronouncing its name… Its name is radical Islam.” After a few speculative comments about his chosen perpetrator, Krauthammer moved on to state sponsors. “And then there are the governments: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya among them. Which one was responsible? We will find out soon enough.” Whatever state sponsor was unmasked, said Krauthammer, it too must be included in the U.S. war plan. “Any country that harbors and protects him [Bin Laden] is our enemy. We must carry the war to them.” He finished his exercise by making the same point as Kagan: “We should seriously consider a congressional declaration of war.”
Daniel Pipes, in the Wall Street Journal, September 12, noted that among the U.S. government failures that had permitted the attacks of the previous day, foremost had been “[s]eeing terrorism as a crime.” “The better approach,” he claimed, “is to see terrorism as a form of warfare and to target not just those foot soldiers who actually carry out the violence but the organizations and governments that stand behind them.”
On the same day and also in the Wall Street Journal, Mark Helprin excitedly pondered past aggressors who had stirred America’s “ferocity,” paying for it with “a Berlin that we had reduced to rubble” and “a Tokyo we had reduced to rubble.” He confidently named the chief suspects in the 9/11 attacks—Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat— and concluded: “Let this spectacular act of terrorism be the decisive repudiation of the mistaken assumptions [sic] that conventional warfare is a thing of the past.”
One day later, September 13, neoconservative academic Laurie Mylroie wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal (“The Iraqi Connection”), which, in a tangle of allegations and suggestions, furthered her project, which had begun several years previously, of laying the blame for terrorist attacks on the U.S. on Iraq. She ended by asking whether terrorism against the U.S. cannot best be approached as: “acts of war, with all the complexity that wartime activities regularly involve?”
Is it not odd that all these intellectuals would risk urging such extreme actions against the wrong party? They were, after all, speaking in the absence of credible evidence. What if different perpetrators were shortly to be discovered or their identities were clarified by subsequent assaults on the U.S.? Why take the chance of losing your credibility by going after those who might very shortly turn out to be the wrong people? Were these accusers all simpletons, or were they parties, knowingly or not, to a plan that preceded 9/11? That they may have shared a predilection for accusing Muslims (whether Muslims were complicit or not) is not so surprising; that they united in calling for war as the appropriate response should give pause.
The process continued. On September 14, a Washington Post article by John Lancaster and Susan Schmidt noted: “Stunned by the magnitude of Tuesday’s terrorist attacks, Congress and the White House are reassessing an approach to fighting terrorism that until this week has favored the tools of law enforcement over those of war.” The intellectual framework for endorsing a policy of war was almost complete.
On September 12 Bush had met with Congressional leaders to explain the need for a resolution that would allow him to use force.22 Democratic Senator Tom Daschle indicated at that meeting that he was willing to step up and propose the bill to Congress. Since he was Senate Majority Leader that virtually guaranteed its acceptance. He did not, however, write the text of the bill: it was forwarded to him by the White House that evening. Despite his eagerness to be of help, Daschle was taken aback by the breadth of the resolution. It was not a full-fledged declaration of war but it gave the President of the United States extraordinary power and breadth of action. After a preamble the text read:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary means and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored, committed, or aided in the planning or commission of the attacks against the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001, and to deter and preempt any related future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.
Daschle understood that this resolution would give a “blank check to go anywhere, anytime, against anyone the Bush administration or any subsequent administration deemed capable of carrying out an attack.” So he had the resolution modified. The final resolution, after an expanded preamble, said:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary means and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Daschle had managed, through his revisions, to restrict permission for future aggression by keeping the focus more tightly on the September 11 events. But the resolution still had two profoundly important implications beyond the obvious facilitation of an attack on Afghanistan. First, this resolution arguably (not everyone agreed) let Bush assume the role of Commander-in-Chief, and that meant he would now be able to use his new special powers in ways that could have profound effects domestically. This, as we shall see, is what he immediately began to do. Second, there were crucial epistemic implications—implications having to do with knowledge and the validation of knowledge—of this resolution. The resolution gave Bush the right to determine matters of fact in relation to the events of 9/11: he got to say who planned, carried out, and so forth, the 9/11 attacks. Although he could call on U.S. intelligence agencies to help him, there was no requirement that their methods meet the standards of a legal process. George Bush could have determined that the Tooth Fairy was responsible for 9/11 and still have met the conditions of the resolution. This was a fatal mistake on the part of Congress.
On September 14 the revised resolution was proposed to, and approved by, both chambers of Congress. Democratic Representative Barbara Lee (in later years the Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus) cast the sole vote in Congress against the resolution. On September 18 Bush signed the bill into law.
Pollsters immediately got to work to determine how willing the public was, directly after the 9/11 assaults, to support military force while surrendering civil rights. A Washington Post-ABC poll was initiated on the evening of 9/11. The poll reportedly found that “nearly nine in 10 people supported taking military action against the groups or nations responsible for yesterday’s attacks even if it led to war. Two in three were willing to surrender ‘some of the liberties we have in this country’ to crack down on terrorism.”
Having induced Congress to approve the use of force, the executive kept up its momentum and, with the help of the anthrax attacks, put in place the systems that would reduce the civil liberties of everyone in the United States. And immediately after the Patriot Act and the NSA domestic spying were in place (this is discussed in the next chapter), the executive announced its intention to set up a special system of military tribunals to try people seized in the Global War on Terror.
In November and early December of 2001 the Senate Judiciary Committee held three days of hearings in which the proposed military tribunals were the central focus. Patrick Leahy, Chair of the Committee, noted that although he had been in daily contact with the Department of Justice during the negotiations leading to passage of the Patriot Act, no one from the DOJ had mentioned to him the setting up of military tribunals. He was concerned, and he saw it as his committee’s duty to look into the matter.
During the hearings many expert witnesses challenged the executive’s right to establish the tribunals, especially in view of the fact that the U.S. Constitution gives that power to Congress.
Neal Katyal, for example, Professor of Law at Georgetown University, said that what was taking place was clearly a seizure of power. “The Executive Branch is acting as lawmaker, law enforcer, and judge.”
To challenges such as Katyal’s, various responses were given by those witnesses who supported the proposed tribunals, but they all boiled down to some variation of the claim that the U.S. was at war and that the executive was entitled to special powers during war.
Michael Chertoff, then Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, was the first witness to appear at the hearings on behalf of the DOJ. “We are at war,” he explained. “We are dealing with a power that the President is exercising that comes from his status as Commander-in-Chief and not his status as head of the law-enforcement function.”
When Attorney General Ashcroft made a reluctant, scowling appearance on the last day of the hearings, he made the same point: “the Constitution vests the President with the extraordinary and sole authority as Commander-in-Chief to lead our Nation in times of war.”
William Barr, former Attorney General of the United States, added his weight:
…the President is acting as Commander-in- Chief of our armed forces—he is exercising the war powers of the United States. Our national goal in this instance is not the correction, deterrence and rehabilitation of an errant member of the body politic; rather, it is the destruction of foreign force that poses a risk to our national security.
Any reader of the hearings transcripts will quickly understand that the assault on civil liberties in the U.S. that began subsequent to the 9/11 attacks was entirely dependent on the claim that the country was at war. The separate ideas customarily contained in this claim were: the attacks on New York and Washington were acts of war; the U.S. was, from the moment of those attacks, in a de facto state of war which it could not avoid; the September 14 resolution on the use of force by Congress recognized these facts and gave the Congressional approval that allowed the President to become Commander-in-Chief. Every one of these separate claims can be disputed, but the fact remains that the notion that the U.S. was at war—and that it had come to this condition justly and as a victim—was central to the U.S. government’s initiatives, both internal and external, in the fall of 2001.
A legal proceeding is supposed to lead to a just decision, and it cannot do this unless it is able to uncover the truth. Both the pretrial stages of the procedure and the trial itself find their justification in truth. The relationship of the war system to evidence and truth is not at all the same. War leaders want social unity. They want everyone to get behind them. If telling the population the truth helps achieve social unity under the command of the executive, then the truth will be told; and if it has the opposite effect, as it will in many cases, it frequently will be avoided, hidden or distorted.
Choosing the war system rather than the legal system has, therefore, grave implications. If law is chosen official prosecutors will be obligated to provide evidence and to provide a chain of reasoning that connects the evidence to the criminal charge. If either the evidence or the argument fails, conviction is not possible. (Of course, in the real world the process is imperfect, but this is the formal aim of the process and this is how we judge whether or not the legal process is unfolding as it should.) War is a different sort of system altogether. When George W. Bush said he was going to respond to the events of 9/11 with war he was signaling that the process of seeking and evaluating evidence appropriate to the legal system would not be in operation.
As for the tribunals proposed by the executive, they were to be designed and established by the Secretary of Defense (Donald Rumsfeld), and, in accordance with this, were subordinated to the war system and lacked the truth-finding obligations of a legal proceeding. Charles Siegel, in a submission on behalf of the Human Rights Committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association, wrote the following about the proposed military commissions:
Every single Constitutional guarantee intended to prevent the conviction and punishment of the innocent is deliberately sacrificed in the design of the Commissions. There is no indictment by grand jury, no jury trial, no presumption of innocence, no privilege against self-incrimination, no public trial, no right to counsel of the defendant’s choosing, no right to confront the evidence against one, no right to trial by an independent and impartial judge, no right to be convicted only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Conviction and death sentence may be imposed by two-thirds of the hand-picked commission members. There is no appeal. There are no rules of evidence.
Critics of the proposed tribunals who made submissions to the Senate hearings appear to have been mystified. Why use a process that was so flawed in its ability to discover the truth that it was almost certain to convict the wrong people? Not only would innocent people languish in prison, but the guilty would remain at large, free to plan further acts of violence against the United States. Moreover, by putting to one side a tried and respected legal system in favor of a system helpless to discover the truth, the administration would be held in contempt by allies in the Global War on Terror, who might respond by withholding their cooperation. This particular executive power seizure seemed not only illegitimate but perverse. How would it favor the war plans of the executive?
Timothy Edgar, Legislative Counsel at the Washington National Office of the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote:
The right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers, presided over by an impartial judge, also helps ensure a process designed to arrive at the truth, not at a pre-ordained conclusion.
Without enforcement of these rights, the government may focus on the wrong people, and even obtain convictions of innocent people, while the terrorists go free to engage in more acts of terror.
Edgar’s insight was surprisingly rare in submissions to the hearings, and it is not clear that even he realized the extent to which the truth was in peril. If the entire narrative of Bin Laden and his 19 men was fiction, and if key members of the executive branch knew this and wished to keep this truth hidden, would it not be essential to construct a system of tribunals entirely obedient to the executive and entirely impotent to discover the truth? This possibility seems to have been too sinister even for most critics of the administration to foresee or entertain.
There were some in the aftermath of the 9/11 events who understood that the process of truth-seeking was in peril. Two days after the attacks Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois, was interviewed on FOX News channel by Bill O’Reilly. Refusing to endorse a war in Afghanistan, Boyle said: “We have to look at this very rationally. This is a democracy. We have a right to see what the evidence is and proceed in a very slow and deliberate manner.” O’Reilly replied: “No, we don’t. We do not, as a republic, we don’t have the right to see what the evidence is if the evidence is of a national security situation.”
Boyle was insistent. Before he would endorse a war with anyone, he said:
I want to see the evidence that we are relying on to justify this. So far, I do not see it. I see allegations. I see innuendo. I see winks and I see nods, but I do not see the evidence that you need under international law and the United States constitution so far to go to war. Maybe that evidence will be there, but it is not there now.
Boyle was prepared to speak of the possibility of war, but only if war was constrained by, and understood within, the framework of law. For this he received not just O’Reilly’s denunciation, but hate mail and a public repudiation by the Dean of his law school. Clearly, law was out and war was in.
The U.S. executive did not hesitate to seize the opportunity.
Notes to Chapter 3
- A key work in the evolution of modern war is Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport, trans. J. J. Graham (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968). This work, still unfinished at the author’s death in 1831, recognized the energy and power of the citizen army fired with zeal and purpose. Clausewitz had personally witnessed the French citizen armies of his time defeating the professional standing armies of other European nations, and he was keen to set down the lessons of the experience.
- Sidney Rogerson, Propaganda in the Next War (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972; originally published in 1938), 11.
- Peter Brock, ed., The First American Peace Movement (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), 32.
- Randolph Bourne, “The State (‘War Is the Health of the State’),” 1918, http://www.antiwar.com/bourne.php.
- “Constitution of the United States,” http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/ charters/constitution_transcript.html.
- CNN same-day coverage of September 11, 2001. This footage appears to be available only sporadically on the internet. The author has depended on his own copy of the full CNN same-day coverage.
- The McCain-Woodruff interaction occurred slightly after 12:30 p.m.
- “History Commons: Complete 911 Timeline,” September 13, 2001: Taliban Says Bin Laden Denies Role in 9/11. The theme continues and is documented in the Complete 911 Timeline. http://www.historycommons.org/project.jsp?project=911_project.
- Bianca May and Morgan Ulery, “No Hard Evidence Connecting Bin Laden to 9/11,” Project Censored, April 28, 2010, http://www.projectcensored. org/16-no-hard-evidence-connecting-bin-laden-to-9-11/; “FBI: No Evidence Osama Behind 9/11,” KSLA News (Los Angeles: KSLA News 12, October 25, 2006), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_6tpY2f35A.
- “History Commons: Context of ‘September 12, 2001: Bush Calls 9/11 Attacks “Acts of War,”’” n.d., http://www.historycommons.org/context. jsp?item=a091201actsofwar.
- “Exchange [of G. W. Bush] With Reporters on Returning From Camp David, Maryland,” October 14, 2001, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ WCPD-2001-10-22/pdf/WCPD-2001-10-22-Pg1477-2.pdf.
- “History Commons: Complete 911 Timeline,” September 23-24, 2001: Secretary of State Powell Says White House Will Provide Evidence of Al-Qaeda Role in 9/11, but He Is Contradicted by White House.
- Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States (London, U.K.: British Government, October 4, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/uk_news/politics/1579043.stm.
- Anthony Scrivener, “Evidence Would Not Stand up in a Court,” The Times, October 5, 2001.
- Henry Kissinger, “Destroy the Network,” Washington Post, September 12, 2001; I. Berg, “Henry the Great on September 11,” April 2002, http:// www.dailybattle.pair.com/2010/henry-the_great_on_september_11. shtml.
- Robert Kagan, “We Must Fight This War,” The Washington Post, September 12, 2001.43 43
- Charles Krauthammer, “To War, Not to Court,” The Washington Post, September 12, 2001.
- Daniel Pipes, “Mistakes Made the Catastrophe Possible,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2001.
- Mark Helprin, “We Beat Hitler. We Can Vanquish This Foe, Too,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2001.
- Laurie Mylroie, “The Iraqi Connection,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2001.
- John Lancaster and Susan Schmidt, “U.S. Rethinks Strategy for Coping With Terrorists; Policy Shift Would Favor Military Action, Tribunal Over Pursuing Suspects Through American Courts,” The Washington Post, September 14, 2001.
- Tom Daschle and Michael D’Orso, Like No Other Time: The 107th Congress and the Two Years That Changed America Forever (New York: Crown Publishers, 2003), 122 ff.
- Ibid., 123.
- Authorization for Use of Military Force, 2001, https://www.govtrack. us/congress/bills/107/sjres23.
- Richard Morin, “Almost 90% Want U.S. To Retaliate, Poll Finds,” The Washington Post, September 12, 2001.
- Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism (Washington, D.C., 2002), http://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg81998/pdf/CHRG-107shrg81998.pdf.
- Ibid., 15.
- Ibid., 97.
- Ibid., 14.
- Ibid., 55.
- Ibid., 313.
- Ibid., 62.
- Ibid., 465.
- Ibid., 2.
- Ibid., 3.
- Ibid., 376.
- FOX News, The O’Reilly Factor, Sept. 13, 2001.
- Private correspondence with Francis Boyle.