A Department of Energy study group chaired by former CIA Director James Woolsey and Harvard professor Joseph Nye warns that the United States is unprepared for the rising threat of a nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorist attack on the homeland. [Science & Technology Review, 1/1998] Despite the urgency of the threat, Woolsey and Nye say they doubt that the US can really mobilize in time. In an essay published in the Los Angeles Times, they write: “The very nature of US society makes it difficult to prepare for this security problem. Within recent memory, we have not had to battle a foreign invading force on US soil. Because of our ‘Pearl Harbor’ mind-set, we are unlikely to mount an adequate defense until we suffer an attack. Because the threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction is amorphous (rogue states, transnational groups, ad hoc groups or individuals) and constantly changing, it is difficult to make predictions and preparations. However, given the current geopolitical state of the world, there is every indication that terrorism will be the most likely physical threat to the US homeland for at least the next decade. Only if we go beyond business as usual and respond in a broader and more systematic manner do we stand a chance of dealing with this problem before the horror of another Pearl Harbor.” [Los Angeles Times, 6/1/1997; Washington Diplomat, 12/2001]
June 3, 1997: PNAC Think Tank Issues Statement of Principles
The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank formed in the spring of 1997, issues its statement of principles. PNAC’s stated aims are: 
to “shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests”
to achieve “a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad”
to “increase defense spending significantly”
to challenge “regimes hostile to US interests and values”
to “accept America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”
[Project for the New American Century, 6/3/1997] The Statement of Principles is significant, because it is signed by a group who will become “a roll call of today’s Bush inner circle.”
[Guardian, 2/26/2003] ABC’s Ted Koppel will later say PNAC’s ideas have “been called a secret blueprint for US global domination.”
[ABC News, 3/5/2003]
June 9-13, 1997: Military Exercise Simulates ‘Electronic Pearl Harbor’; Reveals Vulnerability to Cyberterrrorism
The US military and other government agencies conduct a military exercise called “Eligible Receiver 97” to ascertain the nation’s vulnerability to electronic attacks by other states or terrorists. A Red Team of “hackers” from the NSA penetrates military computers and civilian infrastructure in the telecommunications and electricity industries. While the details are classified, officials say that the exercise shows that the US could suffer a catastrophic attack in the form of an “electronic Pearl Harbor.” The electricity could be shut down and the 911 emergency phone service could be disrupted. These fears will find confirmation after 9/11 when evidence of possible cyber attacks by al-Qaeda will be uncovered (see Summer 2001 and 2002). [CNN, 11/7/1997; Washington Times, 4/16/1998; Washington Post, 5/24/1998; CNN, 4/6/1999; Air Force Magazine, 12/2005] However, George Smith, a computer security expert, discounts the threat. An electronic Pearl Harbor, he says, is “not likely.” Computer viruses and other forms of computer attack are not effective weapons and the vulnerability of the civilian infrastructure is exaggerated. [Issues in Science and Technology, 1998]
June 11, 1997: FBI Agent O’Neill Warns of the Danger Posed by Islamic Extremists in a Major Speech
John O’Neill, special agent in charge of the FBI’s national security division in New York, gives an extensive speech in which he warns of the threat posed by religious extremist groups, which, he says, “have the ability to strike us here in the United States.” [New Yorker, 1/14/2002; Graff, 2011, pp. 200] O’Neill gives the 45-minute speech to the National Strategy Forum in Chicago. [Weiss, 2003, pp. 180, 185]
O’Neill Says Islamic Extremism Is Growing ‘Very Fast’ – In it, he points out that the FBI and most of the intelligence community, in their efforts to stop terrorism, still investigate states that sponsor terrorism, such as “Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, [and] Sudan.” However, he says, the bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993 (see February 26, 1993) “made us painfully aware that there is this new realm that’s out there that’s growing at a pretty fast pace” and this is “religious extremism.” He adds that while there is extremism in all of the major religions of the world, “one of the ones that we see growing very, very fast is Islamic extremism.” Islamic extremists, he says, are “bound by a jihad, a religious belief as opposed to any nation or state.” He also explains why the US could be the target of terrorist attacks. “[N]o intelligent state will attack the United States in the foreseeable future because of our military superiority,” he says. Instead, he continues, “the only way that these individuals can attack us and have some effect is through acts of terrorism.”
Soviet-Afghan War Created a Network of Extremists – O’Neill highlights the significance of the 1979-1989 Soviet war in Afghanistan (see December 8, 1979), which he calls “a major watershed event.” He explains how the war created a network of Islamic extremists around the world who have the training and experience to carry out acts of terrorism. During the war, he says, “the jihad and Islamic players came together to fight the Russians.” These men received training in “insurgency” and “terrorist activity” while the conflict was taking place. However, an unfortunate consequence is that they are now “back in their various countries around the world with that training and having the network capabilities to know other jihad players around the world who have the same like mind, the same fundamentalist thinking, and the same type of training.” Their experiences in the Soviet-Afghan war might prompt them to carry out attacks against the United States, he suggests. He says a significant feature of the conflict was that “they won.” The extremists “beat one of the largest standing armies in the world at that time” and this “gave them a buoyed sense of success,” and a sense that “they could take on other countries like the US and be likewise successful.”
Extremist Groups ‘Have the Ability’ to Strike in the US – “Almost all of the extreme groups that we hear [about] in the newspaper, various organizations, have a presence in the United States today,” O’Neill comments. These groups, he explains, “are heavily involved in recruiting” and “heavily involved in fund-raising activity.” He adds that most of the groups, “if they chose to, have the ability to strike us here in the United States.” He also points out that while, over the last decade or so, the number of terrorist attacks around the world has fallen significantly, the attacks that do occur tend to be larger and deadlier. The reason for this is that “if you are going to engage in terrorist attacks for political or social agendas, you want to make it on the news.” “The larger the attack, the more newsworthy they can make it,” he comments. He ends on a pessimistic note, telling his audience: “Unfortunately, I cannot predict that no Americans will be injured or killed as a result of a terrorist attack. And, in fact, it will happen as long as violence is seen as the way to move along political or social agendas. We will have terrorism as a problem to contend with.” [National Strategy Forum, 6/11/1997]
FBI Headquarters Is Uninterested in Terrorism – Despite warning about the threat posed by Islamic extremists, O’Neill makes no mention of Osama bin Laden. All the same, his speech “electrified the crowd,” journalist and author Murray Weiss will later comment. Weiss will describe the speech as “a particular landmark” in which O’Neill manages to “trace a chillingly accurate picture of the danger posed by Islamic fundamentalism and its potential to unleash a virulent new strain of terrorism on the world.” [Weiss, 2003, pp. 180, 185] However, the agent’s concern about the threat posed by Islamic extremists makes him an exception within the FBI. Dale Watson, chief of the FBI’s international terrorism section, national security division, will comment that there is currently a lack of interest in the threat at FBI headquarters. “No one was thinking about the counterterrorism program—what the threat was and what we were trying to do about it,” he will say. He will remark that no one is thinking about where al-Qaeda’s next target might be and “no one [is] really looking.” [Weiner, 2012, pp. 391]
June 15, 1997: Killer of CIA Officers Captured in Pakistan and Rendered to US
Mir Aimal Kasi, an Islamic militant who killed two CIA officers and wounded another three in 1993 (see January 25, 1993), is arrested in Pakistan by a joint US-Pakistani team.
Betrayal – The capture is a result of reward money offered for information about him. After the shooting, Kasi hid in Pakistan, where he was protected by a local tribal leader. However, the leader decides he would like the reward money, and sends an emissary to the US consulate in Karachi, where he speaks to the FBI and provides evidence the leader can deliver Kasi. Pakistan’s ISI agrees to help and the three agencies send representatives to the town of Dera Ghazi Khan. [Coll, 2004, pp. 374-5; Associated Press, 12/27/2005] The town is in the Punjab, in central Pakistan. [Columbia Encyclopaedia, 2007] The tribal leader lures Kasi there and he is captured by the joint team, then rendered to the US.
Tenet’s Reaction – CIA Director George Tenet calls hundreds of the agency’s staff together to celebrate the operation, declaring, “No terrorist should sleep soundly as long as this agency exists,” and encouraging employees to “have a cocktail before noon.” [Coll, 2004, pp. 374-5; Associated Press, 12/27/2005]
Reason for Rendition – National Security Council official Daniel Benjamin will explain why Kasi and Bojinka plotter Ramzi Yousef (see February 7, 1995) are not extradited in the normal manner, but rendered: “Both were apprehended in Pakistan, whose leaders decided that the nation would rather not have those two—folk heroes to some—sitting in jail, awaiting extradition. Pakistan’s leaders feared that cooperating with the United States would be dangerously unpopular, so they wanted the suspects out of the country quickly.” [Washington Post, 10/21/2007]
Mid-1997: Militant Operative Uses British Intelligence Phone to Call All Over Europe
Omar Nasiri, who informs on al-Qaeda for the British intelligence service MI5 and the French service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), lends his phone to an operative of the Algerian militant Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) his handlers are interested in. The operative, known only as “Khaled,” uses the phone to make a call to Algeria that is recorded by MI5. Khaled later borrows the phone several times, and MI5 records calls he makes all over Europe. [Nasiri, 2006, pp. 291-2]
July 1997: Canadian Intelligence Learns of Militant Recruitment Effort in Canada
In July 1997, Islamic Jihad operative Mahmoud Jaballah receives a fax from Ahmad Salama Mabruk, a member of Islamic Jihad’s ruling council living in Azerbaijan. Canadian intelligence has been closely monitoring Jaballah since he arrived in Canada in 1996 (see May 11, 1996-August 2001) and they learn the contents of this fax while monitoring him. Mabruk’s fax gives guidance on how to recruit new operatives. Jaballah responds by telling Mabruk and Thirwat Salah Shehata, another member of Islamic Jihad’s ruling council, that he already has recruited some people affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, they have Canadian residence papers, they have been tested, and they have proven reliable. He says it is time for them to be briefed about their duties. Mabruk replies that he is pleased and that these new recruits are very much needed. [Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2/22/2008 
] Perhaps not coincidentally, it will later be reported that also in 1997, Canadian intelligence begins a large-scale investigation of Islamic militants in Canada that will eventually be formally named Project A/O Canada. [Globe and Mail, 3/17/2007]
Mid-1997: Radical London Imam Abu Hamza Establishes Training Camps in Britain, Hires Former Soldiers to Teach Recruits
Leading radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri, an informer for Britain’s security services (see Early 1997), begins to establish a series of training camps in Britain in order to toughen up recruits he wishes to send to fight for Islam abroad. He knows that not all the training can be performed in Britain, but thinks that British teenagers may not be able to cope with the rigors of foreign camps straightaway; the British camps are simply meant as an introduction to the training regime. His first step is to establish a group to examine the laws about firing guns on private property and consider acquiring a country retreat for his militia. Initially, Abu Hamza takes advantage of venues used by companies for team bonding exercises, but he later hires an old monastery in Kent and a farm in Scotland for the groups to use. There, recruits learn to strip down AK-47 machine guns and decommissioned grenades, as well as working with mock rocket launchers. Another site he uses is the Brecon Beacons in Wales, and he hires two ex-soldiers who claim to have been in Special Forces to train his recruits. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 83-84] Abu Hamza will later attempt to start a similar camp in the US (see November 1999-Early 2000).
July 11, 1997: George Tenet Becomes New Director of CIA
George J. Tenet becomes the new director of the CIA. He will remain in the position well after 9/11. Tenet was never a CIA field agent, but started his government career as a Congressional aide. From 1993 to 1995 he was a senior intelligence staffer on the National Security Council. He was a CIA deputy director from 1995. In December 1996, John Deutch abruptly resigned as CIA director and Tenet was made acting director until he is confirmed as the new director in July 1997. [USA Today, 10/9/2002]
After July 11, 1997: CIA Significantly Expands Paramilitary Capacity under New Director Tenet
The CIA significantly expands its paramilitary capacity under new Director George Tenet (see July 11, 1997). The agency had a large paramilitary arm that had been used during the 1960s and 1970s, for example in Vietnam, but the capacity was wound down following scandals at the end of the 1970s implicating the CIA in assassinations and torture. However, at some point in the late 1990s the CIA again begins to enlarge its paramilitary unit, known as the Special Operations Group (SOG). [Time, 12/10/2001; Time, 2/3/2003] The SOG becomes involved in the CIA’s rendition program. [Grey, 2007, pp. 142]
