In a meeting with Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, President Bush falsely promises to let Hambali stand trial in Indonesia. Hambali, an Indonesian citizen wanted for a string of attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002), was recently arrested in Thailand and taken in US custody (see August 12, 2003). White House communications director Dan Bartlett tells reporters that Bush has “committed to work with [the Indonesian authorities] at an appropriate time, that he would work to make sure that Hambali was handed over.” An Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman adds: “Absolutely, Bush promised to hand over Hambali to Indonesia for trial. The only condition is that the process of interrogation (by US agents) has to be completed. Bush said that still needed more time.” The US has been sharing some information from Hambali’s interrogation with Indonesian authorities, but does not allow them to question him directly, allegedly for fear of information leaks. [Associated Press, 10/24/2003] In 2002, the US did allow Indonesian investigators to directly interrogate another Indonesian in US custody, Omar al-Faruq. Ironically, it appears that extensive details of al-Faruq’s interrogation were leaked to the media, but by US officials, not Indonesian ones (see June 5, 2002). The US will not allow Indonesian officials to directly interrogate Hambali during a 2005 trial of his alleged close associate Abu Bakar Bashir, allowing Bashir to go free (see March 3, 2005). In late 2005, Hank Crumpton, a senior State Department official visiting Indonesia, again makes the promise that the US will eventually turn Hambali over to the Indonesian government. [New York Times, 10/19/2005] But in 2006, the US transfers Hambali to the Guantanamo prison with the intention of eventually trying him before a military tribunal (see September 2-3, 2006).
October 24, 2003: 9/11 Hijacker Associate Is Deported to Yemen
Omar Bakarbashat is quietly deported to Yemen after spending two years in US prisons. Bakarbashat, a Yemeni citizen, was arrested shortly after 9/11 and held as a material witness. He knew and worked with 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi at a gas station (see Autumn 2000). He was eventually charged with an immigration violation. He pled guilty to creating phony immigration documents and a Social Security card, and then served a six-month sentence. However, he chose to remain imprisoned so he could fight deportation. But after two years in prison, he gives up and agrees to be deported. According to his lawyer, he is interrogated and briefly jailed in Yemen, and then is let go. After that, he moves to Saudi Arabia. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 5/26/2004] It has been claimed that one day before the 9/11 attacks, Bakarbashat and others appeared to be celebrating the upcoming attacks (see Late August-September 10, 2001).
Shortly Before October 26, 2003: 9/11 Commission Chairman Blasts White House over Lack of Access to Presidential Daily Briefs
9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean gives an interview to the New York Times in which he attacks the White House over its withholding of classified intelligence about al-Qaeda and attacks on the US from the Commission (see Late January 2003, June 2003, Late Summer 2003, and October 16, 2003). Although he does not mention Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) specifically, thinking their name secret, he says, “We’re having trouble with the White House,” meaning that a subpoena may have to be issued. He adds: “Any document that has to do with this investigation cannot be beyond our reach. I will not stand for it.” The piece runs as the lead story on page one of the newspaper, causing a good deal of criticism of President George Bush. It is picked up by Democrats, such as presidential candidate Joe Lieberman, who says, “After claiming they wanted to find the truth about September 11, the Bush administration has resorted to secrecy, stonewalling, and foot-dragging.” [New York Times, 10/26/2003; Shenon, 2008, pp. 215-216] As a result of this story, President Bush makes a statement identifying the documents the Commission wants as PDBs and promising to work with the Commission to give it some access. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 216-217]
November 2003: US Military Frustrated They Cannot Fight Drugs in Afghanistan
Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the nonprofit think tank the International Crisis Group, later says that during a trip to Afghanistan in November 2003, he is told by US military commanders and State Department officials that they are frustrated by rules preventing them from fighting Afghanistan’s booming illegal drug trade. Author James Risen notes the US military’s rules of engagement in Afghanistan states that if US soldiers discover illegal drugs they “could” destroy them, which is “very different from issuing firm rules stating that US forces must destroy any drugs discovered.” An ex-Green Beret later claims that he was specifically ordered to ignore heroin and opium when his unit discovered them on patrol. Assistant Secretary of State Bobby Charles, who fights in vain for tougher rules of engagement (see November 2004), will later complain, “In some cases [US troops] were destroying drugs, but in others they weren’t. [Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld didn’t want drugs to become a core mission.” [Risen, 2006, pp. 152-162]
November 2003: Pakistan Bans Militant Groups Again after Pressure from US
The US Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell publicly complains that Pakistani militant groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Taliban have reconstituted themselves. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf banned the groups in January 2002 (see Shortly After January 12-March 2002). Powell says, “These banned groups are re-establishing themselves with new names.” Several days later, Musharraf bans the groups again. Between November 15 and 20, six groups are banned, including Jamiat ul-Ansar (formerly Harkat ul-Mujahedeen) and Khuddam ul-Islam (formerly Jaish-e-Mohammed). Notably, Jamaat al-Dawa (the renamed Lashkar-e-Toiba) is not rebanned. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 230, 436] Powell’s comments simply state what has been well known for a long time. For instance, the Washington Post reported in February 2003 that the organizations were active again after changing their names. [Washington Post, 2/8/2003]
November 2003: 9/11 Commission Fails to Ask CIA about Detainee Interrogation Methods
Despite asking some questions about the way the CIA is putting some of its questions to high-ranking al-Qaeda detainees it is interested in (see October 2003), the 9/11 Commission fails to inquire more deeply into the harsh interrogation methods the CIA uses on detainees. One Commission staffer will say: “We did not delve deeply into the question of the treatment of the prisoners. Standards of treatment were not part of our mission.” Another will admit: “We did not ask specifically. It was not in our mandate.” In 2008, Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, will say he is “shocked” by the failure to ask about interrogation techniques, “If you’re sitting at the 9/11 Commission, with all the high-powered lawyers on the Commission and on the staff, first you ask what happened rather than guess.” [MSNBC, 1/30/2008]
November 2003: 9/11 Commission Subpoenas New York Emergency Tapes and Transcripts
The 9/11 Commission issues its third and final major subpoena, this time for emergency tapes and transcripts from New York City authorities. However, New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg decides to fight the subpoena and says he will go to court. A settlement is reached a couple of weeks after the subpoena is issued and the Commission gets access to all the material, under the condition that nobody heard on the tapes will be named in a public document without their consent, or that of their survivors. The Commission’s staff is puzzled by Bloomberg’s tactics, as he was not mayor on 9/11 and personally has nothing to hide. There is speculation he was, in the words of author Philip Shenon, “put up to it by his Republican predecessor, Rudy Giuliani, who might not be so eager to see all of the facts aired, especially given the glory that his performance on 9/11 had otherwise brought him.” Shenon will add, “They [the tapes] were the clearest evidence obtained by the Commission of just how unprepared the city was to deal with a catastrophic terrorist attack.” [Shenon, 2008, pp. 306-307]
Shortly After October 2003: Leader of Madrid Train Bombings May Be Government Informant
Imam Abdelkader Farssaoui, a.k.a. Cartagena, will testify under oath as a protected witness in 2007 that he was an informant and informed on a group of the 2004 Madrid train bombers from 2002 to 2003 (see September 2002-October 2003). He informed for the UCIE, a police unit dealing with terrorism. The group he watches is led by Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, who will later be considered one of about three top leaders of the bomb plot. Farssaoui moves from Madrid in October 2003 and stops informing on Fakhet’s group (see October 2003). But not long after that, he is back in Madrid and claims that he sees Fakhet go by on a moped with close associate named Said Berraj. He follows them, and sees Fakhet meeting with two UCIE officers who used to be his handlers at the same spot where he used to meet them. He does not see Berraj and assumes he has gone to the bathroom or something like that. The next day he asks his handler if Fakhet is an informant too, and his handler dodges the question. Farssaoui is wearing a motorcycle helmet and is not spotted. He keeps this information to himself until after the bombings. [El Mundo (Madrid), 3/7/2007; ABC (Spain), 3/7/2007] Berraj is said to be Fakhet’s assistant, and other sources will confirm that Berraj was a government informant in 2003. Berraj will flee Spain two days before the bombings and has not been seen since. [El Mundo (Madrid), 1/15/2007] About one month after the bombings, Fakhet will be killed with six of the other bombers after police surround their hideout (see 9:05 p.m., April 3, 2004).
October 2003 or After: Detainee Allegedly Sees Cameras in Cells and Interrogation Rooms
Muhammad Bashmilah, a Yemeni detained in Jordan and then moved to a CIA prison in Afghanistan, will later say that he sees cameras in the prison. He will describe to his lawyer cameras both in his cells and in interrogation rooms, some on tripods and some on the wall. [New York Times, 12/11/2007] This claim contrasts with a later statement by the CIA saying that it stopped recording detainee interrogations in late 2002 (see Spring-Late 2002).
Late 2003: Key Investigator Transferred within 9/11 Commission
Barbara Grewe, the leader of the 9/11 Commission’s team that is investigating law enforcement and intelligence collection inside the US, is moved to another part of the investigation. 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow will say that Grewe is brought “into the CIA part of the work and give[n]… a lead role in developing our draft on some of the specific FBI-CIA operational problems before 9/11 and on the ‘summer of threat.’” Grewe had previously worked on similar aspects of the Justice Department inspector general’s report into the FBI’s pre-9/11 failings (see Between December 2002 and May 2003). Zelikow will add, “She ultimately became our lead drafter for chapter eight of the report.” [Zelikow and Shenon, 2007 
] That chapter, entitled “The System Was Blinking Red,” will deal with warnings of a terrorist attack on the US in the summer of 2001, the government’s response to them, and failures to share intelligence at that time. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 254-277]
