Colonel Matthew Klimow, executive assistant to General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls Myers to let him know that NORAD wants to talk to him. Klimow is at the Pentagon and has seen the news of the crashes at the World Trade Center on television. Myers, meanwhile, is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). He is aware of the two crashes at the WTC and realizes that they were terrorist attacks (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Eberhart has just called Klimow on a secure line and said he urgently wanted to speak to Myers (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Executive Assistant Calls Myers’s Military Aide – After hanging up the secure phone, Klimow sets about contacting the vice chairman. He picks up the unsecured phone on his desk and calls the cell phone of Captain Chris Donahue, Myers’s military aide, who is with Myers on Capitol Hill. When Donahue answers, Klimow says, “Chris, get the old man on the phone.” Myers is apparently still meeting with Cleland, since Donahue hesitates and then asks, “Do you really want me to interrupt the senator?” But Klimow exclaims, “It’s urgent!” and orders, “Get in there!”
Myers Is Advised to Return to the Pentagon – Donahue therefore goes and finds Myers. When the vice chairman comes on the line, Klimow asks him if he knows about what happened in New York. Myers says Cleland’s staff has just briefed him on this. Klimow says in a calm and precise voice, “It looks like there’s a major hijacking underway and I recommend that you return to the Pentagon as soon as possible,” Myers will later recall. Myers will also recall that Klimow tells him the White House Situation Room called at 9:16 a.m. and confirmed that American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston to Los Angeles hit the North Tower of the WTC. Klimow will recall telling Myers: “NORAD needs to talk. It sounds pretty bad.” He then asks the vice chairman, “Can you get back to the Pentagon?” According to Klimow, Myers replies: “I’ll call NORAD from my sedan. I’ll be there in 15 minutes.” “We’re on our way back to the Pentagon now,” Myers will recall saying. Myers ends the call and Klimow then starts making preparations for his arrival back at the Pentagon.
Myers Talks to the NORAD Commander – The time when this call takes place is unclear. However, it apparently takes place sometime before 9:29 a.m., since Klimow will recall that after he makes it, he receives a call inviting him to join the “significant event conference.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call will be convened by the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 9:29 a.m. (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] Myers talks over the phone with Eberhart, who updates him on what is happening and the actions NORAD is taking in response to the attacks (see (Before 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, while Klimow’s account will imply that the call between Myers and Eberhart takes place after Klimow’s conversation with the vice chairman, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will describe it taking place before he receives the call from Klimow. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 
; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Acting Joint Chiefs Chairman Myers Updates Clarke Videoconference on Fighter Response
According to his own account, during a video conference with top officials that he is directing, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers, “I assume NORAD has scrambled fighters and AWACS. How many? Where?” Myers, who is at the Pentagon, replies, “Not a pretty picture, Dick. We are in the middle of Vigilant Warrior, a NORAD exercise, but… Otis has launched two birds toward New York. Langley is trying to get two up now [toward Washington]. The AWACS are at Tinker and not on alert.” Vigilant Warrior may be a mistaken reference to either the on-going war game Vigilant Guardian, or perhaps another exercise called Amalgam Warrior (see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). Otis Air National Guard Base is in Massachusetts, 188 miles east of New York City; Langley is in Virginia, 129 miles south of Washington; Tinker Air Force Base is in Oklahoma. Clarke asks, “Okay, how long to CAP [combat air patrol] over DC?” Myers replies, “Fast as we can. Fifteen minutes?” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5] The first fighters don’t reach Washington until perhaps more than 30 minutes later (see (Between 9:49 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, this account—or at least the time Clarke alleges the conversation occurs—is contradicted by Myers himself and Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). Myers claims he has been at a meeting on Capitol Hill with Cleland since about 9:00 a.m., and does not arrive back at the Pentagon until after it is hit, which is at 9:37 a.m. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; CNN, 4/15/2003; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] Cleland confirms the existence of this meeting, and claims that Myers is with him until around the time of the Pentagon attack. [CNN, 11/20/2001; Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003] (There are, though, some inconsistencies in Myers and Cleland’s accounts of this period—see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijackers Take over Flight 93
The 9/11 Commission will later conclude that the four hijackers take over Flight 93 at 9:28 a.m., one minute after the plane’s crew made their last communication with the FAA’s Cleveland Center (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Commission, the hijackers “wielded knives (reported by at least five callers); engaged in violence, including stabbing (reported by at least four callers and indicated by the sounds of the cockpit struggle transmitted over the radio); relocated the passengers to the back of the plane (reported by at least two callers); threatened use of a bomb, either real or fake (reported by at least three callers); and engaged in deception about their intentions (as indicated by the hijacker’s radio transmission received by FAA air traffic control).” Flight 93 suddenly drops 685 feet in the space of just 30 seconds, and the Cleveland Center hears two suspicious radio transmissions from its cockpit (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will add, “While this appears to show the exact time that the hijackers invaded the cockpit, we have found no conclusive evidence to indicate precisely when the terrorists took over the main cabin or moved passengers seated in the first-class cabin back to coach.” The four hijackers waited about 46 minutes after takeoff before beginning their takeover of Flight 93. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 38-39] Yet, the Commission claims, when alleged hijacker ringleader Mohamed Atta met with fellow Hamburg cell member Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Spain about two months earlier (see July 8-19, 2001), he’d said that the “best time [for the hijackers] to storm the cockpit would be about 10-15 minutes after takeoff, when the cockpit doors typically were opened for the first time.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 245] The Commission will state, “We were unable to determine why [the Flight 93 hijackers] waited so long.” [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 39] The long wait is particularly notable, considering that Flight 93 had already been significantly delayed before taking off from Newark Airport (see 8:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). In fact, in an early timeline, Pentagon officials will state the hijacking occurred significantly earlier, at around 9:16, and in 2003, NORAD officials repeat this claim (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003]
9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cleveland Flight Control Hears Sounds of Struggle as Flight 93 Is Hijacked
According to the 9/11 Commission, less than a minute after Flight 93 acknowledged a routine radio transmission from the FAA’s Cleveland Center (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001), John Werth—the controller handling the flight—and pilots of other aircraft in the vicinity of Flight 93 hear “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ; CBS News, 9/10/2006] Someone, presumably Flight 93’s pilot Jason Dahl, is overheard by controllers as he shouts, “Mayday!” [New York Times, 7/22/2004] Seconds later, the controller responds, “Somebody call Cleveland?” Then there are more sounds of screaming and someone yelling, “Get out of here, get out of here.” [Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001; Newsweek, 9/22/2001; Observer, 12/2/2001; MSNBC, 7/30/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] Then the voices of the hijackers can be heard talking in Arabic. The words are later translated to show they are talking to each other, saying, “Everything is fine.” [Newsweek, 12/3/2001] Later, passenger phone calls will describe two dead or injured bodies just outside the cockpit; presumably these are the two pilots. [New York Times, 7/22/2004]
9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001: Cleveland Center Controllers Mistakenly Think Delta 1989 Is Hijacked
The FAA’s Cleveland Center incorrectly concludes that Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 has been hijacked, but accounts will conflict over how it comes to this conclusion. [USA Today, 8/13/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 167] Delta 1989, a Boeing 767, is currently in the sector of airspace being monitored by Cleveland Center air traffic controller John Werth. [9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 ; USA Today, 9/11/2008] It is flying west over Pennsylvania, approaching the Ohio border, and is about 25 miles behind Flight 93. FBI agents suspected Delta 1989 might be the next plane to be hijacked and called the Cleveland Center after the second attack on the World Trade Center, with the warning to watch this flight (see Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/13/2002] A supervisor at the center told Werth to keep an eye on the flight because, as Werth will later recall, “he was a suspected hijacking because he had taken off from Boston at approximately the same time as” the first two hijacked aircraft, Flights 11 and 175. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; USA Today, 9/11/2008]
Controllers Hear Suspicious Communications – When, at 9:28, Werth hears the sound of screaming (subsequently determined to have come from Flight 93) over the radio (see (9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he is unsure which of seven or eight possible aircraft it is coming from. The radio frequency is put on the speaker so other controllers can hear it, and they subsequently make out the words, “get out of here.” [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 11, 28]
Controllers Think Delta 1989 Is Hijacked – According to USA Today, when Cleveland Center controllers then hear a voice with a heavy accent over the radio, saying “Ladies and gentlemen: Here the captain.… We have a bomb on board” (see (9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), they mistakenly think it is coming from Delta 1989, not Flight 93. They suspect the flight has been hijacked, and start informing their chain of command. “Officials at Cleveland Center rush word to Washington: Hijackers have another flight. At the Federal Aviation Administration’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, Delta Flight 1989 joins a growing list of suspicious jets.” [USA Today, 8/13/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 12]
Werth Decides Hijacked Aircraft Is Flight 93 – Werth then calls all of the aircraft in his sector, and Flight 93 is the only one that does not respond. He also sees Flight 93 go into a quick descent and then come back up again. Werth therefore concludes that it is Flight 93, not Delta 1989, that has been hijacked, and instructs his supervisor to “tell Washington” of this. [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 ] However, events in the following minutes will cause Cleveland Center controllers to remain suspicious of Delta 1989 (see (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001). [USA Today, 8/13/2002; 9/11 Commission, 10/2/2003 ; Spencer, 2008, pp. 168; USA Today, 9/11/2008]
Book Gives Alternative Account – In a book published in 2008, author Lynn Spencer will give a different explanation for why Cleveland Center becomes suspicious of Delta 1989. According to her account, after hearing a later radio transmission where a hijacker again says “There is a bomb on board” (see (9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), Werth begins to hand off his flights to other controllers so he can devote his full attention to Flight 93. “In the distraction of the emergency, the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.” As a result, “News travels fast,” and “Soon, word on the FAA’s open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989… is added to the list of suspect aircraft.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 167] At 9:39 a.m., even though it is not responsible for handling Delta 1989, the FAA’s Boston Center will call NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and incorrectly tell it that Delta 1989 is another possible hijack (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2004; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Holds Significant Event Conference Call
The National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon finally commences and runs a “significant event conference” in response to the ongoing crisis, 26 minutes after the second plane hit the World Trade Center and officers in the NMCC realized the US was under terrorist attack. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37; American Forces Press Service, 9/7/2006]
NMCC Directors Decided to Establish Conference – After those in the NMCC saw Flight 175 hitting the WTC live on television at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations (DDO) in the center throughout the attacks, and Commander Pat Gardner, the assistant DDO, talked about the need to convene a significant event conference so there could be a discussion of what actions were to be taken in response. The DDO and the assistant DDO are the two officers responsible for deciding what type of conference the NMCC should convene, and when it should do so. Because there is no specific procedure for dealing with terrorist attacks, Leidig and Gardner decided a significant event conference would most suit their needs, because it would have the flexibility of allowing more people to be added in as required. They also discussed who would need to be on this conference. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] But Major Charles Chambers, who is currently on duty in the NMCC, will give a slightly different account. According to Chambers, Staff Sergeant Val Harrison had a phone in her hand and said NORAD was asking for a significant event conference. Leidig had agreed, and so Harrison started establishing the conference.
Conference Begins with Recap of Situation – According to Chambers, “The computer does a mass dialing to connect to those command centers that are always included” in an NMCC conference call, but Harrison also had to manually call the civilian agencies that were going to be included in the conference, such as the FAA, the FBI, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). [US Department of Defense, 9/2001] The conference then begins at 9:29 a.m. with a brief recap: Two aircraft have hit the WTC, there is a confirmed hijacking of Flight 11, and fighter jets have been scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). The FAA is asked to provide an update, but its line is silent as the agency has not yet been added to the call (see (9:29 a.m.-12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). A minute later, Leidig states that it has just been confirmed that Flight 11 is still airborne and is heading toward Washington, DC. (This incorrect information apparently arose minutes earlier during a conference call between FAA centers (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001).) [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] NMCC conference calls are moderated by the DDO. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] Leidig will tell the 9/11 Commission that they are conducted over “a special phone circuit, and it’s classified to be able to pass information, relay information between very senior leadership all the way over to the White House.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
NMCC Struggled to Convene Conference – Some officers currently on duty in the NMCC will later complain about circumstances that delayed the establishing of the significant event conference. Chambers will recall that the conference took “much longer than expected to bring up.” [US Department of Defense, 9/2001] Gardner will tell the 9/11 Commission that the NMCC had been “struggling to build the conference,” which “didn’t get off as quickly as hoped.” [9/11 Commission, 5/5/2004] He will describe his “frustration that it wasn’t brought up more quickly.” [9/11 Commission, 5/12/2004]
Other Conference and Connection Problems Delayed Call – Preparations for the conference were disrupted as a result of the CIA convening a National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officer Network (NOIWON) conference call between government agencies in the Washington area, reportedly at sometime between 9:16 a.m. and 9:25 a.m. (see (Between 9:16 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to a 9/11 Commission memorandum, the NMCC had “abandoned its attempt to convene a [significant event conference] so its watch officers could participate in the NOIWON conference.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] Another factor that slowed attempts to convene the significant event conference was a problem with connecting some agencies to it. According to Chambers, “A couple of the civil agencies couldn’t be reached and others kept dropping off moments after connecting.” He will recall, “We finally decided to proceed without those agencies that were having phone problems.” [US Department of Defense, 9/2001] Leidig had announced that the NMCC would have to start without those agencies and add them to the conference later on. [9/11 Commission, 5/12/2004]
Call Ends after Five Minutes – The significant event conference ends after only a few minutes, following a recommendation by NORAD that it be reconvened as an “air threat conference.” It is brought to an end at around 9:34 a.m., and will resume as an air threat conference at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37]
Before 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Commander Eberhart Updates Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers on the Attacks
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talks briefly over the phone with General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, who updates him on what is happening and the actions NORAD is taking in response to the terrorist attacks. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Myers is on Capitol Hill, where he has been meeting with Senator Max Cleland (D-GA). He is aware of the two crashes at the World Trade Center and realizes they were terrorist attacks (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9] Eberhart, meanwhile, is in his office at NORAD’s headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He, too, is aware of the crashes at the WTC and has determined that a coordinated terrorist attack is underway (see (9:03 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 465] He called Colonel Matthew Klimow, Myers’s executive assistant, who is at the Pentagon, and said he urgently wanted to speak to the vice chairman (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Klimow then called Myers and let him know that NORAD wanted to talk to him (see (Before 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Has to Talk on an Unsecured Line – As Myers is coming out of Cleland’s office following his meeting with the senator, his military aide, Captain Chris Donahue, approaches him and says Eberhart is on his cell phone and wants to talk to him. “In this emergency, I had to forgo the luxury of a secure encrypted Red Switch phone and use Donahue’s cell,” Myers will later comment. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9] Myers and Eberhart then have a “short conversation.”
Eberhart Describes the ‘Confused’ Situation in the Air – Eberhart updates Myers on the current situation. He says the two towers of the WTC have been hit and there are “several hijack codes in the system.” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] By this, he means that “the transponders in the aircraft are talking to the ground and they’re saying… ‘We’re being hijacked,’” Myers will explain. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] However, none of the pilots of the planes hijacked this morning punched the emergency four-digit code that would indicate a hijacking into their planes’ transponders (see (8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2001; Newsday, 9/13/2001] It is therefore unclear what “hijack codes” Eberhart is referring to. In one interview, Myers will recall Eberhart saying that the situation in the air is “confused.” He says there are “aircraft squawking that they had been hijacked” and he is “going to land them all at the nearest suitable base to sort it out.” [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] On another occasion, Myers will recall him saying, “The decision I’m going to make is, we’re going to land everybody and we’ll sort it out when we get them on the ground.” [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
Eberhart and Myers Don’t Discuss ‘Rules of Engagement’ – Eberhart says NORAD has scrambled fighter jets in response to the hijackings (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, the two men do not discuss the issue of “rules of engagement” for the fighter pilots during this conversation. Indeed, Myers makes no decisions and takes no action at this time. Instead, Eberhart does most of the talking. Myers will recall that he “mainly listened” during the call. He tells Eberhart he needs to get to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon because he cannot communicate from a cell phone, presumably referring to the fact that it is an unsecured line. “I’m going to head back to the Pentagon. I’ll talk to you there,” he says. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] “Get back to the Pentagon,” Eberhart tells him. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004]
Call Occurs before 9:30 a.m. – The time when this call occurs is unclear. At some time after talking to Myers, Eberhart will head out to NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (see (Between 9:35 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will estimate that he leaves Peterson Air Force Base at “approximately” 9:30 a.m. If correct, this would mean the call occurs before 9:30 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004] Myers, meanwhile, will be vague about when it occurs, telling the 9/11 Commission only that it takes place after the second crash at the WTC, sometime between 9:03 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. Furthermore, while Klimow’s account of this morning’s events will imply that it occurs after Klimow called the vice chairman and let him know that NORAD wanted to talk to him, in his 2009 memoir, Myers will describe talking to Eberhart before he receives the call from Klimow. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Myers will subsequently head back to the Pentagon. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] He does so “immediately” after talking to Eberhart, he will say. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001] He will learn about the attack on the Pentagon, which occurs at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), around the time he is leaving the building and getting into his car on Capitol Hill (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ]
9:29 a.m.-12:00 p.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Struggles to Connect FAA to Conference Calls
Officers at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon have serious problems trying to connect the FAA to the conference calls they convene in response to the terrorist attacks. [US Department of Defense, 9/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The NMCC commences a “significant event conference” at 9:29 a.m., to gather and disseminate information relating to the crisis from government agencies (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Minutes later, this is upgraded to an “air threat conference” (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). According to the 9/11 Commission Report, operators at the NMCC work “feverishly to include the FAA” in the conference, but they have “equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers.” [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37]
NMCC Unable to Connect to FAA – The FAA is not on the NMCC’s established checklist of parties to call for either a significant event conference or an air threat conference. Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations (DDO) in the NMCC during the attacks, therefore has to ask Staff Sergeant Val Harrison to add the FAA to the air threat conference. Harrison tries contacting the operations center at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, but has difficulty getting through. She finally asks the White House switchboard to help her connect the call to the FAA, but even after a line has been established it is repeatedly lost. [US Department of Defense, 9/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] According to Leidig, the FAA is only “intermittently in,” and “[m]ost of the time they were not in the conference.”
NMCC Establishes Non-Secure Line with FAA – Commander Pat Gardner, the assistant DDO, has to set up an unclassified line with the FAA, because the agency’s only STU-III secure phone is tied up. This unclassified line is separate to the conference call, which is on a special, classified phone circuit. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] According to Major Charles Chambers, who is currently on duty in the NMCC, because it isn’t in the NMCC’s conference, the FAA “couldn’t go secure and so we couldn’t get first-hand information from them.” [US Department of Defense, 9/2001]
Connection Problems ‘Hampered Information Flow’ – Leidig is frustrated at being unable to keep the FAA in the conference. Sometimes questions are asked of the agency, but it is no longer on the line and so the NMCC has to redial it. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] Leidig will tell the 9/11 Commission that the connection problems, which occur “throughout the morning… hampered information flow to some degree,” because the NMCC is “getting information in a more roundabout way from FAA. Sometimes it would come from a local commander to NORAD back to us, or sometimes it would come on an open line” with the FAA operations center, rather than over the conference. Leidig will add that if the FAA “had been in the same conference that was being directed by the National Military Command Center, the information flow would have went directly to NORAD because [NORAD was] in that conference.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
FAA Employee Joins Conference – According to Harrison, the NMCC is not presently aware of the existence of the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, and also does not realize that there is a military liaison at the FAA operations center. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] However, at 10:17 a.m., FAA representative Rayford Brooks, who is at the agency’s Command Center, finally joins the air threat conference (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001), although accounts indicate there are problems keeping him connected after that time. [9/11 Commission, 4/15/2004; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37, 463]
‘Compatibility Issues’ Supposedly Cause Connection Problems – The FAA keeps getting cut off the NMCC conference because of “technical problems,” according to a 9/11 Commission memorandum. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] Leidig will tell the Commission it is his understanding that there were some “compatibility issues” between the FAA’s secure phone and the secure phones in the NMCC, and these caused the FAA to keep dropping out of the conference, although he is unaware of the technical aspects of the problem. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Between 9:28 a.m. and 10:06 a.m. September 11, 2001: Executive Jet Tracks Flight 93
A small jet plane—ExecuJet 956—tracks Flight 93 for what is described as “a substantial period of time” before it crashes, and picks up some of the radio transmissions from it, as both planes are operating on the same frequency. [Government’s motion for protective order regarding cockpit voice recorder pursuant to 49 USC 1154. United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, 8/8/2002 ; Washington Post, 8/9/2002] The exact period over which ExecuJet 956 follows Flight 93 is unclear. But as early as 9:31 it calls the FAA’s Cleveland Center and, referring to Flight 93, reports: “[W]e’re just answering your call. We did hear that, uh, yelling too.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 461] At 9:40, after being asked, “did you understand that transmission [from Flight 93]?” ExecuJet 956 tells Cleveland Center: “Affirmative. He said that there was a bomb on board.” [Associated Press, 4/12/2006] Cleveland Center then asks the ExecuJet pilot if he can change course and try to spot Flight 93. He sees it, loses it, and then sees it again. He then has to make an evasive turn, as Flight 93 is heading directly for him. [Longman, 2002, pp. 104] ExecuJet 956 is one of a fleet of small jets available for hire from a company based in Woodbridge, New Jersey called NetJets, which sells shares in private business aircraft. [Associated Press, 8/8/2002; Washington Post, 8/9/2002] NetJets’ owner is the multi-billionaire Warren Buffet. [Knight Ridder, 11/6/2001; Observer, 1/12/2003] Another small business jet is reportedly within 20 miles of Flight 93 when it crashes, but this is apparently a different one, belonging to a North Carolina clothing firm (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Pittsburgh Channel, 9/15/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/16/2001]
9:29 a.m. September 11, 2001: Autopilot on Flight 77 Disengaged
Flight 77’s autopilot is disengaged. The plane is flying at 7,000 feet and is about 38 miles west of the Pentagon. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 9] Information from the plane’s recovered flight data recorder (see September 13-14, 2001) later will indicate the pilot had entered autopilot instructions for a course to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (which is nearby the Pentagon). [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004]
