A number of pilots with the 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts are preparing to take off for a training mission and see two of their unit’s fighter jets being scrambled in response to the hijacked Flight 11, but they are not asked to respond to the emerging crisis themselves and continue with their preparations for the training mission. [102nd Fighter Wing, 2001; Richard, 2010, pp. 9-12]
Pilots Preparing for Training over the Atlantic – The pilots are preparing to fly a defensive counter-air mission in an area of military training airspace over the Atlantic Ocean, southeast of Long Island, known as “Whiskey 105.” [Richard, 2010, pp. 10, 12; Airman, 9/3/2011] According to most accounts, six of the 102nd Fighter Wing’s F-15 fighters will be participating in the training mission. [102nd Fighter Wing, 2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; Cape Cod Times, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 155] But Major Martin Richard, one of the pilots involved, will write in a 2010 book that eight of the unit’s F-15s take part in the mission. Richard will recall that after the coordination briefing for the training mission, he goes to the “life support shop” and puts on his flying gear, and then goes to the operations desk. There, the unit’s supervisor of flying, Lieutenant Colonel Jon Treacy, briefs the pilots preparing for the training mission on current weather and airfield updates, and gives them the status of a KC-135 tanker plane that will be refueling their fighters during the training mission. Richard then heads to his F-15, inspects it, and speaks to his crew chief.
Pilots Notice Commotion as Fighters Are Scrambled – As Richard starts his fighter’s engines, he notices a commotion on one side of the flight line ramp. He will recall: “The broken, disjointed communication over the ultra high frequency (UHF) radio indicated confusion. Members of the 102nd Security Forces Squadron, the cops, marshaled into protective positions. Two vehicles appeared with their blue emergency lights flashing. We all knew what was going on.” The 102nd Fighter Wing keeps a pair of F-15s on alert—armed, fueled up, and ready to take off within minutes of a scramble order—and, Richard will recall, “[T]he alert aircraft were being scrambled.” [Richard, 2010, pp. 10-11]
Pilots Watch Alert Fighters Take Off, but Unconcerned about This – The pilots preparing to take off for the training mission idle their engines and wait while the two alert fighters take off (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [102nd Fighter Wing, 2001] Richard will describe: “I watched from my jet as the clamshell doors on the alert hangars opened, heard the alert jets’ engines whine to life, and saw them aggressively emerge from the facility like an eager predator in search of its prey. Suddenly, the command post announced, ‘Scramble!’ They blasted off, shattering the previously still, calm, peaceful morning.” [Richard, 2010, pp. 12] The pilots involved in the training mission are apparently unaware of why these fighters are being scrambled. [Cape Cod Times, 9/11/2006] Richard will recall: “I wasn’t too concerned when I saw the scrambled aircraft take off. We see many scrambles during the year and most all are just aircraft or vessels that can’t be identified but are friendly.” [102nd Fighter Wing, 2001]
Pilots Continue Preparing for Training – Once the two alert fighters are airborne, the pilots on the ground continue preparing for their training mission. “Back on the flight line,” Richard will recall, “I arranged my formation for takeoff and followed the standard procedures en route to our training area southwest of Martha’s Vineyard.” [Richard, 2010, pp. 12] Richard and the other pilots will begin their training mission in Whiskey 105 (see (9:00 a.m.-9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001). They will only learn of the first crash at the World Trade Center and be recalled to their base at around 9:25 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and some of them will take off again to help protect US airspace, but that will only be after the terrorist attacks have ended (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (Shortly After 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [102nd Fighter Wing, 2001; 9/11 Commission, 10/14/2003 
; Spencer, 2008, pp. 244-246]
Unit’s Mission Is to Protect Northeast US – The 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis Air Base, according to its own statement, has aircraft and their crews “on continuous 24-hour, 365-day alert to guard our skies.” The unit says its “mission is to protect the Northeast United States from armed attack from another nation, terrorist attack, and activities such as smuggling, illicit drug activity, and illegal immigration.” Its large area of responsibility includes “the major industrial centers of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, and all national command centers in Washington, DC.” [Cape Cod Times, 9/12/2001] The 102nd Fighter Wing is equipped with 18 F-15 Eagles, including the two that are kept on alert. [Boston Globe, 9/15/2001; Cape Cod Times, 9/21/2001]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Director Leaves Post to Attend Meeting; Does Not Resume Duties until Attacks Have Ended
Brigadier General Montague Winfield, the deputy director for operations (DDO) in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, leaves his post to attend a pre-scheduled meeting, allowing a colleague, who only recently qualified to take over his position, to stand in for him, and not returning to his post until after the terrorist attacks have ended. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
Winfield Attends Air Force-Convened Meeting – Winfield leaves his post to attend what a 9/11 Commission memorandum will call “an unrelated, closed-door personnel meeting convened by the Air Force to discuss the rating of Air Force officers.” [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] Another Commission memorandum will state that this meeting is a “session for general officers who rated Air Force officers.” It is unclear whether the meeting takes place somewhere in the NMCC or outside the center. The Commission memorandum will only say that it takes place “elsewhere in [Joint Chiefs of Staff] spaces.” At least one of the NMCC’s other qualified DDOs, Brigadier General Norman Seip, is also attending it.
Winfield Asked Colleague to Replace Him on Previous Day – Winfield is temporarily replaced as DDO by Captain Charles Leidig. Leidig only joined the operations directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 2001, when he assumed duties as the deputy for Command Center operations. In that, his usual role, he is responsible for the maintenance, operation, and training of watch teams for the NMCC. He qualified to stand in as the DDO in the NMCC about a month ago, in August 2001. The previous afternoon, Winfield asked Leidig to relieve him for a portion of his duty this morning, and Leidig agreed to do so.
Leidig Takes Over as DDO – As arranged, Leidig takes over from Winfield as DDO at 8:30 a.m., allowing Winfield to attend his meeting. Upon arrival at the NMCC, Leidig receives the intelligence and other turn over briefings. After seeing the reports of the plane crashes in New York on television, he will be responsible for convening a significant event conference (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001), which he soon upgrades to an air threat conference (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ]
Winfield Does Not Resume Duties until Attacks Are Over – Even though it becomes obvious that a coordinated attack is under way when television shows the second plane hitting the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Winfield apparently remains in his meeting instead of resuming his duties as DDO (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will only take over from Leidig as DDO after Flight 93 crashes in Pennsylvania, apparently at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] In later interviews for television, Winfield will give the impression that he remained in charge of the NMCC throughout the 9/11 attacks, and make no mention of having allowed a stand-in to take his place during this most critical period of time. [CNN, 9/4/2002; ABC News, 9/11/2002]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Some US Leaders Are Scattered; Others in Washington
Just prior to learning about the 9/11 attacks, top US leaders are scattered across the country and overseas: 
President Bush is in Sarasota, Florida. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Secretary of State Colin Powell is in Lima, Peru. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is flying across the Atlantic on the way to Europe. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002; Giesemann, 2008, pp. 19-40] Attorney General John Ashcroft is flying to Milwaukee, Wisconsin. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Joe Allbaugh is at a conference in Montana. [ABC News, 9/14/2002] Others are in Washington: Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are at their offices in the White House. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is at his office in the Pentagon, meeting with a delegation from Capitol Hill. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] CIA Director George Tenet is at breakfast with his old friend and mentor, former Senator David Boren (D-OK), at the St. Regis Hotel, three blocks from the White House. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] FBI Director Robert Mueller is in his office at FBI headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC. [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta is at his office at the Department of Transportation. [US Congress, 9/20/2001] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is at a conference in the Ronald Reagan Building, three blocks from the White House. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 1]
Between 8:30 a.m. and 8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Boston Center Supervisor Alerts Otis Air Base Tower to Flight 11, Requests Fighters
Daniel Bueno, a supervisor at the FAA’s Boston Center, calls the air traffic control tower at Otis Air National Guard Base to alert it to the problems with Flight 11 and request military assistance. [Filson, 2003, pp. 47; Spencer, 2008, pp. 22] Otis Air Base, at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, is one of NORAD’s seven alert sites in the continental United States, which keeps two armed fighter jets ready for immediate takeoff. [Filson, 2003, pp. 50; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17]
Supervisor Calls Otis, Violating Protocol – Bueno calls the control tower at Otis even though, according to author Lynn Spencer, he “knows it’s not standard operating procedure to call the military directly—that’s supposed to be done by FAA headquarters.” But he has “checked the FAA regulation manual, and in the back under section FAAO 7610.4J, Appendix 16, it states that fighters can be launched directly at FAA request, so he is going to make that happen. He may not be FAA headquarters, but he is FAA!” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 22]
Bueno Requests Fighters, Told to Call NEADS – Bueno tells the controller at the Otis tower that Flight 11 has lost its identification signal and appears to be headed toward Manhattan; it looks like a possible hijacking, and fighter jets are needed, fast. [Filson, 2003, pp. 47] But the controller tells Bueno that he must follow the protocol, which is to contact NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). The controller says: “You’ve got to go through the proper channels. They’re the only ones with the authority to initiate a scramble order.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 22] Bueno asks the controller for the telephone number for NEADS. [102nd Fighter Wing, 2001] Following this call, the tower controller will contact the Otis Air Base operations desk, to let it know that it might be receiving a call from NEADS (see (Between 8:31 a.m. and 8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 27]
Otis Pilots Critical of Bueno – The two alert pilots at Otis Air Base will later criticize Bueno for calling the base directly. One of them, Major Daniel Nash, will complain: “It sounds like the FAA didn’t have their [act] together at all when they were calling the [Otis] tower.… To me, it sounded like there was someone who didn’t know what they were doing.” [Boston Globe, 9/11/2005] Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Duffy, the other alert pilot, will comment: “It didn’t happen the way it was supposed to.… We were the ones who were contacted right away and knew about it before the air defense sector.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 50]
Time of Call Unclear – Bueno also calls the FAA’s Cape Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), which is located on Otis Air Base, at 8:34 a.m. and requests that fighters be launched from Otis (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 4/19/2002; 9/11 Commission, 9/22/2003 ] Whether he makes that call before or after he calls the Otis tower is unstated. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 11 had been hijacked” is when the FAA’s Boston Center calls NEADS just before 8:38 a.m. (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20] If that is correct, it would indicate that Bueno calls the Otis tower after he calls the Cape TRACON.
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: NBC Team near WTC, Working on Drama Series about Terrorist Attacks in New York
A group from NBC is in New York, near the World Trade Center, doing preparatory work for a drama miniseries about al-Qaeda committing a series of terrorist attacks in the city. [Variety, 9/10/2001; Hollywood, Health and Society, 4/2/2002 ; CNN, 9/9/2002; USA Today, 12/5/2002] The big-budget five-hour miniseries, called Terror, will combine the casts of all three of NBC’s Law & Order crime drama series: the original show, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit, and Law & Order: Criminal Intent. It is intended to be broadcast in May 2002. Its storyline follows a devotee of Osama bin Laden who goes from an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan to New York. There, he sets off explosives in the subway under Times Square, killing over 1,000 people. A bioterrorist release of anthrax is subsequently discovered. [Variety, 9/10/2001; Los Angeles, 4/2002; USA Today, 12/5/2002]
Group Doing Planning Work for Show – This morning, Neal Baer, one of Law & Order’s executive producers, is in New York with some of his colleagues, doing preproduction planning for Terror. The group is at a facility at Chelsea Piers, on Manhattan’s West Side, only a couple of miles from the WTC. Baer and his colleagues are “ironing out details” for the miniseries, according to CNN. After the attacks on the WTC take place, they will watch in shock as people run up the West Side Highway, “first panicky groups fleeing the initial hit, then ash-covered survivors of the towers’ collapse.” [Hollywood, Health and Society, 4/2/2002 ; CNN, 9/9/2002]
Magazine Has Front-Page Story about Show – Writers have been working on Terror for several months (see June-September 11, 2001) and filming is scheduled to begin later this month. [Los Angeles, 4/2002; Hollywood, Health and Society, 4/2/2002 ] This morning, Variety magazine even has a front-page story about the miniseries. [Variety, 9/10/2001; CNN, 9/9/2002] But Terror will be canceled less than a week after the 9/11 attacks. The show’s producers will say that it would be “[i]nappropriate to produce the Law & Order miniseries dealing with terrorists, dealing with terrorism, in light of the horrifying events that have unfolded over the past week.” [Variety, 9/17/2001]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Army Base Near Pentagon Holds Terrorist Attack Exercise
At Fort Belvoir, an army base 12 miles south of the Pentagon, Lt. Col. Mark R. Lindon is conducting a “garrison control exercise” when the 9/11 attacks begin. The object of this exercise is to “test the security at the base in case of a terrorist attack.” Lindon later says, “I was out checking on the exercise and heard about the World Trade Center on my car radio. As soon as it was established that this was no accident, we went to a complete security mode.” Staff Sgt. Mark Williams of the Military District of Washington Engineer Company at Fort Belvoir also later says: “Ironically, we were conducting classes about rescue techniques when we were told of the planes hitting the World Trade Center.” Williams’ team is one of the first response groups to arrive at the site of the Pentagon crash and one of the first to enter the building following the attack. [Connection Newspapers, 9/5/2002] A previous MASCAL (mass casualty) training exercise was held at Fort Belvoir a little over two months earlier (see June 29, 2001). It was “designed to enhance the first ready response in dealing with the effects of a terrorist incident involving an explosion.” [MDW News Service, 7/5/2001] Located at Fort Belvoir is Davison Army Airfield, from where UH-1 “Huey” and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters fly. Davison’s mission includes maintaining “a readiness posture in support of contingency plans,” and providing “aviation support for the White House, US government officials, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and other government agencies.” [Pentagram, 5/7/1999; Military District of Washington, 8/2000]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Washington Police Unit Holding Training Event for Upcoming IMF and World Bank Meetings
A large training event is being held at the US Park Police Aviation Unit in preparation for the upcoming meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington, DC, on September 29-30, and some of the participants will later be involved in the emergency response to the terrorist attacks. [International Monetary Fund, 9/17/2001; Reuters, 9/17/2001; US Naval Historical Center, 11/19/2001; McDonnell, 2004, pp. 18-20 ] The Park Police Aviation Unit is located in Anacostia Park in southeast Washington, across the Potomac River from the Pentagon. [Aviation International News, 10/1/2001; National Park Service, 10/16/2004]
Event Preparing for Possibly Violent Demonstrations – According to Sergeant Ronald Galey, a helicopter pilot with the aviation unit, because of the preparations taking place for the IMF and World Bank meetings, “it started out to be a little bit of an unusual day.” [US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001] Sergeant Keith Bohn, another Park Police helicopter pilot, will later recall, “As fate would have it, we were having a large training event right out in front of the building here [the aviation hangar in Anacostia Park] for the upcoming IMF, the International Money Fund demonstrations.” Consequently, there are “horse-mounted officers, motorcycle officers, ground troops all training together to handle the movement of large groups of people.” [US Naval Historical Center, 11/19/2001] According to Galey, “[W]e all anticipated” the protest demonstrations at the IMF and World Bank meetings “to be very violent, very different than anything we’ve had in a long time.” [US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001]
Helicopter Pilot Giving ‘Riot Training’ – Another of the aviation unit’s helicopter pilots, Sergeant Kenneth Burchell, is reportedly “conducting riot training… in preparation for the upcoming World Bank/International Monetary Fund protest demonstrations.” The riot training is being attended by 40 police officers belonging to an (unnamed) force other than the Park Police, along with some Department of Defense medical personnel. [McDonnell, 2004, pp. 18-20 ]
Medical Personnel Participating in Training – Personnel from the Casualty Care Research Center (CCRC)—a medical outfit from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) in Bethesda, Maryland—are attending the training event at the aviation unit. The CCRC provides medical support to law enforcement agencies and their “protectees” during emergencies. [US Medicine, 10/2001] One of these personnel, Jason Kepp, is reportedly teaching members of the Park Police “how to respond safely and effectively to the crowds of demonstrators expected to turn out at the upcoming meeting of the International Monetary Fund.” [USU Medicine, 12/2002 ]
Training Participants Involved in Response to Attacks – The Park Police Aviation Unit will be among the first agencies to respond to the Pentagon attack at 9:37 a.m. (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 161] Two medics from the USUHS who are attending the training event—Kepp and his colleague, Keith Kettell—will take off in the second Park Police helicopter to launch following the Pentagon attack, so as to assist in the emergency response. [USU Medicine, 12/2002 ; McDonnell, 2004, pp. 20 ] In addition to members of their own force, Park Police commanders will deploy the 40 police officers attending the riot training at the aviation unit when the attacks occur. [McDonnell, 2004, pp. 18 ] Members of firefighting agencies that later respond to the attack on the Pentagon are also involved in preparations for the upcoming IMF and World Bank meetings this morning (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A-4 ; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 69-70]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Many Trainees Are in the Battle Cab at NEADS to Observe a Russian Military Exercise
A number of trainees are in the battle cab at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in order to observe a Russian military training exercise. [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ] The Russian Air Force is conducting a major exercise this week over the North Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. The exercise began yesterday and is scheduled to continue until Friday, September 14 (see September 10, 2001). [BBC, 2001, pp. 161; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/9/2001; Washington Times, 9/11/2001] At NEADS, “a lot of trainees” are in “the battle cab positions” this morning because they have the opportunity to observe this exercise, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stuart, an intelligence officer at NEADS, will later say. Stuart is among those on duty in the battle cab because of the ongoing Russian exercise. Whether the presence of these trainees has any impact on the ability of NEADS to respond to the terrorist attacks later on today is unknown. [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ] The battle cab is a glass-walled command area that overlooks the NEADS operations floor. [Filson, 2003, pp. 55; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 460] It is already staffed this morning due to NEADS’s participation in the NORAD exercise, Vigilant Guardian (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ; Jones, 2011, pp. 24]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Battle Cab at NEADS Is Already Manned because of the Ongoing NORAD Exercise
The battle cab at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is staffed this morning due to the sector’s participation in the training exercise, Vigilant Guardian. [9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ; Jones, 2011, pp. 24] The battle cab is a glass-walled command area that overlooks the NEADS operations floor. [Filson, 2003, pp. 55; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 460] The “battle staff”—presumably the personnel working in it—is only formed when a training exercise or an “air defense event” is underway, according to Lieutenant Colonel Dawne Deskins, who is on duty in the battle cab. [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ] Because NEADS is currently participating in an exercise, therefore, the battle cab is manned this morning. [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ] “If the exercise had not been planned, there would not have been any staffing in the battle cab,” Lieutenant Colonel Ian Sanderson, who is also in the battle cab this morning, will later say. He will add that if a battle cab has not already been formed and is required, it would be necessary to call the NEADS director of operations in order to arrange for one to be set up. Forming a battle cab would only take a few minutes once it is understood that a serious incident is taking place, according to Sanderson. Sanderson will comment that if the battle staff had not already been in place when the terrorist attacks began this morning, the NEADS operations floor would still have functioned the same way. But the advantage of already having the battle staff in place is that “key figures of authority [are] there and ready to respond” when NEADS learns of the crisis. [9/11 Commission, 10/29/2003 ] Vigilant Guardian is a major annual air defense exercise simulating an attack on the United States (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Across NORAD, “from Alaska to Canada and throughout the continental United States,” author Leslie Filson will describe, “battle staffs [are] poised to fight the simulated air war” this morning, due to their participation in it. [Filson, 2003, pp. 55, 122; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 458; Arkin, 2005, pp. 545]
8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Several Senior Members of FAA Staff Away From Base When Attacks Begin
A number of key senior FAA personnel happen to be away from their usual bases this morning, at the time of the attacks. Bill Peacock, the FAA director of air traffic services, is in New Orleans for a meeting with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). Among his many duties, Peacock is “the ultimate manager of all the air traffic controllers in the country’s system.” He will be transported from New Orleans later in the day in an FAA business jet, one of the few aircraft permitted to fly, and only arrive at FAA headquarters shortly after 5:00 p.m. [Freni, 2003, pp. 12 and 70] Jack Kies, the FAA’s manager of tactical operations, is in Nashua, New Hampshire for a meeting with representatives of the Canadian air traffic control organization. [Freni, 2003, pp. 65-66] Consequently Linda Schuessler, the deputy director of system operations, has to take his place in charge of the FAA Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. [Federal Aviation Administration, 5/18/2006] Tony Ferrante, the manager of the FAA’s air traffic investigation arm, is in Chicago to testify at a hearing. He will become frustrated later in the day about being stuck there, knowing he should he at his post in Washington gathering forensic data on the hijackings and crashes. [Freni, 2003, pp. 7, 19 and 47-48] Rick Hostetler, a member of the FAA’s planning and procedures organization, is at the dentist’s in Waldorf, Maryland when the attacks begin. His job includes acting as the FAA’s primary air traffic liaison for the Secret Service, the US Special Operations Command, and the Pentagon. After seeing the second WTC tower hit live on television, reportedly while sitting in the dentist’s chair, he will quickly set out for his duty station at the FAA Command Center. But due to the heavy traffic, his journey will take hours and the attacks will be over by the time he gets there. [Freni, 2003, pp. 27, 47 and 90] Mike Canavan, the director of the FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security, is visiting the airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico. He will only make it back to Washington in the evening, on a special Army flight. [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] As part of his job, Canavan is the FAA’s hijack coordinator, responsible for requesting military assistance in the event of a hijacking (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17-18] FAA Administrator Jane Garvey is in a breakfast meeting at the Department of Transportation, in Washington, DC. She will quickly relocate to FAA headquarters soon after the first attack (see (8:48 a.m.-9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Freni, 2003, pp. 62-63]
Whether the absence of these senior personnel impairs the FAA’s ability to respond to the attacks is unknown.
