The US intelligence community obtains information suggesting al-Qaeda is planning attacks in specific West Coast areas, possibly involving the assassination of several public officials. [US Congress, 7/24/2003] While these attacks do not materialize, this is the same month the CIA learns that two known al-Qaeda operatives have just flown to Los Angeles (see March 5, 2000).
March 2000-February 2001: London Mosque Worshipper Helps Purchase $335,000 of Equipment for Chechen Rebels
A group of London radicals purchases communications equipment worth $335,000 for the Chechen rebels. One of the purchasers is Abu Doha, one of the most senior al-Qaeda members ever to have lived in Britain (see February 2001) and a worshipper at the Finsbury Park mosque of Abu Hamza al-Masri. The equipment includes 19 satellite telephones and 36 SIM cards with airtime. [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 67-8]
March-April 2000: Able Danger Data Confiscated by Federal Agents
James D. Smith is working for the private company Orion Scientific Systems on a contract that assists the Able Danger project. Smith will later claim that around March or April 2000, armed federal agents come into Orion and confiscate much of the data that Orion had compiled for Able Danger. Orion’s contract stops at this time and Smith has no further involvement with Able Danger. However, Smith happens to have some unclassified charts made for Able Danger in the trunk of his car when the agents raid his office. The chart with Mohamed Atta’s picture on it will thus survive and be remembered well by Smith, though it will be destroyed in the summer of 2004 (see August 22-September 1, 2005). Smith will later state, “All information that we have ever produced, which was all unclassified, was confiscated and to this day we don’t know who by.” [US Congress, 9/21/2005; US Congress, 2/15/2006]
Spring 2000: NSA Does Not Inform FBI that 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US, Reason Unclear
The National Security Agency (NSA) intercepts calls between 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar in the US and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen, but does not notify the FBI that Almihdhar is in the US. However, the NSA disseminates reports about some of the calls, which are made from phones registered to Nawaf Alhazmi (see Spring-Summer 2000). The NSA will later say that it does not usually intercept calls between the US and other countries at this time, as it believes that this should be done by the FBI. Despite this, the NSA acquires information about such calls and provides the information to the FBI in regular reporting and in response to specific requests. The FBI, which has a standing request for such information about any calls between the communications hub in Yemen and the US (see Late 1998), then uses this information in its investigations based on warrants issued under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The NSA will later tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry the reason the FBI is not notified about Almihdhar is because it does not realize that Almihdhar is in the US. However, no explanation is offered for why the NSA fails to realize this. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 36, 73-4 
] This explanation will be contradicted by one offered in a 2004 article about the issue that reports the intercepts are not exploited precisely because the NSA knows one of the parties is in the US and therefore does not want to deal with his calls (see Summer 2002-Summer 2004 and March 15, 2004 and After). In addition, the FBI used information gained from intercepted calls to and from the hub in Yemen to make a world map of al-Qaeda’s organization, indicating that the locations talking to the hub could be determined by US intelligence (see Late 1998-Early 2002). [MSNBC, 7/21/2004]
Spring 2000: Ceremony Possibly Precedes 9/11 Hijackers’ Departure for Afghanistan
After 9/11, various media will report that a sort of ceremony is held before some of the Saudi hijackers depart for Afghanistan. According to the Boston Globe and the Daily Telegraph, the gathering is at the Seqeley mosque in Khamis Mushayt in the spring of 2000. It is led by Wail Alshehri and attended by Waleed Alshehri, Ahmed Alnami, and Saeed Alghamdi, who swear “an oath commit themselves to jihad.” [Boston Globe, 3/3/2002; Daily Telegraph, 9/15/2002] The Sunday Times agrees the gathering was led by Wail Alshehri, but says it was attended by five other people whose identities it is unable to ascertain. It speculates they may include Waleed Alshehri, Ahmed Alghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi, and Ahmed Alhaznawi. [Sunday Times (London), 1/27/2002]
Spring 2000: Al-Qaeda Recruits Future 9/11 Hijackers in Saudi Arabia
After 9/11, US investigators will find evidence that there is an active branch of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, and will believe it recruits most of the Saudi hijackers there. [Washington Post, 10/17/2001] The 9/11 Commission will comment: “Like many other al-Qaeda operatives, the Saudis who eventually became the muscle hijackers were targeted for recruitment outside Afghanistan—probably in Saudi Arabia itself. Al-Qaeda recruiters, certain clerics, and—in a few cases—family members probably all played a role in spotting potential candidates. Several of the muscle hijackers seem to have been recruited through contacts at local universities and mosques. According to the head of one of the training camps in Afghanistan, some were chosen by unnamed Saudi Sheikhs who had contacts with al-Qaeda. Abdulaziz Alomari, for example, is believed to have been a student of radical Saudi cleric Sulayman al-Alwan. His mosque, which is located in al Qassim Province, is known among the more moderate clerics as a ‘terrorist factory.’ The province is at the very heart of the strict Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 232-3] Dr. Ali al-Mosa, a Saudi academic from Asir Province, will later say that a cleric known as Sheikh al-Hawashi, who runs a mosque in Khamis Mushayt, is also instrumental in recruiting the hijackers: “Sheikh al-Hawashi was the evil father of the whole thing here. He was the one behind it all and he is still there—he knew five of the kids and he was praying with them.” When Asir is visited by Australian journalist Paul McGeough in 2002, Sheikh al-Hawashi will still be preaching and Dr. al-Mosa will comment: “He has been here for 25 years and he’s very popular.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 10/5/2002]
March 5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Have Entered US, but Does Not Tell FBI or Other Agencies
After being prompted by CIA colleagues in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to provide information about what happened to future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash after they flew from Malaysia to Thailand on January 8, 2000 (see January 8, 2000 and (February 25, 2000)), the CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, sends out a cable saying that Alhazmi arrived in the US from Thailand with an apparently unnamed companion on January 15 (see January 15, 2000). This information was received from Thai intelligence, which watchlisted Almihdhar and Alhazmi after being asked to do so by the CIA (see January 13, 2000 and January 15, 2000). [New York Times, 10/17/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 502]
Companion – The companion to whom the cable refers is presumably Almihdhar. According to later testimony of a senior FBI official, the CIA learns the companion is Almihdhar at this time: “In March 2000, the CIA received information concerning the entry of Almihdhar and Alhazmi into the United States.” [US Congress, 9/20/2002] The CIA disputes this, however. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ] If the companion the cable refers to is Almihdhar, then it is unclear why he would not be named, as the NSA has been intercepting his calls for at least a year (see Early 1999), he was under CIA surveillance earlier in January (see January 5-8, 2000), he is known to have a US visa (see January 2-5, 2000), he is associated with Alhazmi (see January 8-9, 2000), and this cable is prompted by another cable specifically asking where Almihdhar is (see February 11, 2000).
Missed Opportunity – Later, CIA officials, including CIA Director George Tenet and Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black, will admit that this was one of the missed opportunities to watchlist the hijackers. Black will say: “I think that month we watchlisted about 150 people. [The watchlisting] should have been done. It wasn’t.” Almihdhar and Alhazmi will not be added to the US watchlist until August 2001 (see August 23, 2001). [New York Times, 10/17/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ]
Unclear Who Reads Cable – Although Tenet will tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that nobody at CIA headquarters reads this cable at this time (see October 17, 2002), the CIA’s inspector general will conclude that “numerous” officers access this cable and others about Almihdhar. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria District, 3/28/2006 ] These officers are not named, but Tom Wilshire, the CIA’s deputy unit chief in charge of monitoring the two men at this time, will access it in May 2001 at the same time as he accesses other cables about Almihdhar from early 2000 (see May 15, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will say that the cables are “reexamined” at this time, suggesting that Wilshire may have read them before. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 267, 537] Wilshire certainly did access at least two of the cables in January 2000, indicating he may read the cable about the arrival of Alhazmi and the unnamed companion in the US in March 2000. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 240, 282 ]
FBI Not Informed – The knowledge that Alhazmi has entered the US will be disseminated throughout the CIA, but not to the FBI or other US intelligence agencies (see March 6, 2000 and After). When asked about the failure by the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Wilshire will be unable to explain it, saying: “It’s very difficult to understand what happened with that cable when it came in. I do not know exactly why it was missed. It would appear that it was missed completely.” [US Congress, 9/20/2002]
March 6, 2000: Operatic Version of a Renowned Dystopian Novel Includes Mock Footage of the WTC Blowing Up
An opera version of the bestselling dystopian novel The Handmaid’s Tale is premiered in Copenhagen, Denmark, which begins with a giant mock newsreel that shows various buildings, reportedly including the World Trade Center, being blown up. [Independent, 4/2/2003; Sander, 5/2003, pp. 10; Variety, 4/10/2018] The novel of The Handmaid’s Tale was written by the Canadian author Margaret Atwood and first published in 1985. [Reuters, 4/17/2017] The music for the operatic version of the story was written by Poul Ruders, a young Danish composer, who began work on it in 1996. [Stephen Johnson, 2001; Guardian, 3/22/2003] The libretto—the words sung in the opera—were written by the British actor and author Paul Bentley, and then translated into Danish by Ruders. [Classical Net, 2001; Guardian, 8/3/2001] Director Phyllida Lloyd and designer Peter McKintosh, who are also British, contributed to the opera, but Atwood was not involved. [Time, 4/3/2000; Guardian, 3/22/2003; Globe and Mail, 9/18/2004] The premiere, at the Royal Theater in Copenhagen, is on March 6, 2000, and The Handmaid’s Tale will then be performed another seven times in Copenhagen. [Time, 4/3/2000; Guardian, 8/3/2001; Opera Canada, 9/22/2004]
Opera Is Based on a Fundamentalist Group Taking Power – The story of The Handmaid’s Tale is set in the future and based on the premise that, early in the 21st century, a fundamentalist religious group assassinated the president and all of Congress and seized power in the United States. The US was then reconstructed as a male-controlled totalitarian dictatorship called the Republic of Gilead. A strict moral code was enforced, with women being deprived of all rights. War and environmental havoc have caused widespread infertility, and some of the women who are still able to breed are enslaved as handmaids and forced to bear children for childless couples. [Guardian, 3/22/2003; Independent, 4/2/2003; New York Times, 5/14/2003]
Mock Newsreel Shows the Twin Towers Blowing Up – The opera begins with about a minute of fast-moving images—including video and stills—and headlines from the period that led up to the establishment of the Republic of Gilead. The footage depicts, among other things, a wrecked nuclear power station, tanks and guns, and piles of corpses. It shows fundamentalist troops invading the White House and blowing up the Statue of Liberty. It also shows the Twin Towers of the WTC blowing up, Atwood will later recall. These incidents are supposed to have happened in the year 2002, meaning the WTC is meant to have been blown up a year after it actually came down in the 9/11 attacks. [Stephen Johnson, 2001; Ruders, 2002, pp. xviii; Evening Standard, 4/3/2003; Variety, 4/10/2018] In light of what happens on 9/11, Lloyd will comment in 2003, “Now we look at that [mock newsreel] and think, ‘My God, how chilling that is.’” [BBC, 4/8/2003] Atwood will, in 2015, call the inclusion of the Twin Towers blowing up in the newsreel a “creepy thing.” [Sharp, 9/29/2015]
Images of the WTC Will Be Removed from a Later Version of the Opera – The opera will be a huge success in Denmark, with all eight performances selling out. [Guardian, 8/3/2001] A version of it sung in English will be performed in London, England, three years later. But, due to the actual destruction of the Twin Towers on 9/11, the images of the WTC will have been removed from the mock newsreel at the start of the opera. [Independent, 4/2/2003; Evening Standard, 4/3/2003; Globe and Mail, 9/18/2004] “They did the opera again and they had to take [the images of the Twin Towers blowing up] out, because it was no longer in the future,” Atwood will comment. [Variety, 4/10/2018] The rest of the mock newsreel, though, will remain unchanged. [Independent, 4/2/2003]
March 6, 2000 and After: Numerous CIA Officers Learn 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Is in US; Fail to Inform FBI
After the CIA learns that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 2-5, 2000) and 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi and a companion have arrived in Los Angeles (see March 5, 2000), operational documents reporting this are accessed by numerous CIA officers, most of whom are in the Counterterrorism Division. [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005 ] In addition, the day after the cable reporting Alhazmi’s arrival in Los Angeles is received, “another overseas CIA station note[s], in a cable to the bin Laden unit at CIA headquarters, that it had ‘read with interest’ the March cable, ‘particularly the information that a member of this group traveled to the US…’” [US Congress, 9/20/2002] However, it is unclear what is done with this information as CIA Director George Tenet and Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black will later incorrectly testify that nobody read the cable stating Alhazmi had entered the US (see October 17, 2002), so the use to which the information is put is never investigated. In addition, the CIA fails to inform the FBI that Alhazmi has entered the US. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 182]
March 10, 2000: Review of Counterterrorism Efforts Show Continued Worries; Sleeper Cells Feared
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger chairs a Cabinet-level meeting to review the wave of attempted terror attacks around the millennium. There are counterterrorism reports that disruption efforts “have not put too much of a dent” into bin Laden’s overseas network, and that it is feared “sleeper cells” of al-Qaeda operatives have taken root in the US. It is recommended that the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service should begin “high tempo, ongoing operations to arrest, detain, and deport potential sleeper cells in the United States.” Some ideas, like expanding the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the US, are adopted. Others, like a centralized translation unit for domestic intercepts, are not. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] In July 2004, it is revealed that the Justice Department is investigating Berger for taking classified documents relating to this review effort out of a secure reading room in 2003. Most of the documents are returned, but a few apparently are lost. [Associated Press, 7/20/2004; Washington Post, 7/22/2004]
