In a speech, President Bush lists ten terrorist plots the US has supposedly foiled since 9/11, as well as five “casings and infiltrations.” Here are the plots, exactly as they are described in a White House press release, rearranged into a rough chronological order:
West Coast Airliner Plot – In mid-2002 the US disrupted a plot to attack targets on the West Coast of the United States using hijacked airplanes. The plotters included at least one major operational planner involved in planning the events of 9/11.
Jose Padilla Plot – In May 2002 the US disrupted a plot that involved blowing up apartment buildings in the United States. One of the plotters, Jose Padilla, also discussed the possibility of using a “dirty bomb” in the US.
2002 Straits of Hormuz Plot – In 2002 the US and partners disrupted a plot to attack ships transiting the Straits of Hormuz.
2002 Arabian Gulf Shipping Plot – In late 2002 and 2003 the US and a partner nation disrupted a plot by al-Qaeda operatives to attack ships in the Arabian Gulf.
2003 Karachi Plot – In the spring of 2003 the US and a partner disrupted a plot to attack Westerners at several targets in Karachi, Pakistan.
East Coast Airliner Plot – In mid-2003 the US and a partner disrupted a plot to attack targets on the East Coast of the United States using hijacked commercial airplanes.
2003 Tourist Site Plot – In 2003 the US and a partner nation disrupted a plot to attack a tourist site outside the United States.
Heathrow Airport Plot – In 2003 the US and several partners disrupted a plot to attack Heathrow Airport using hijacked commercial airliners. The planning for this attack was undertaken by a major 9/11 operational figure.
2004 UK Plot – In the spring of 2004 the US and partners, using a combination of law enforcement and intelligence resources, disrupted a plot to conduct large-scale bombings in [Britain].
2004 [British] Urban Targets Plot – In mid-2004 the US and partners disrupted a plot that involved urban targets in [Britain]. These plots involved using explosives against a variety of sites.
Here are the five additional “casings and infiltrations”:
2001 Tasking – In 2001, al-Qaeda sent an individual to facilitate post-September 11 attacks in the US. US law enforcement authorities arrested the individual.
2003 Tasking – In 2003, an individual was tasked by an al-Qaeda leader to conduct reconnaissance on populated areas in the US.
Gas Station Tasking – In approximately 2003, an individual was tasked to collect targeting information on US gas stations and their support mechanisms on behalf of a senior al-Qaeda planner.
Iyman Faris and the Brooklyn Bridge – In 2003, and in conjunction with a partner nation, the US government arrested and prosecuted Iyman Faris, who was exploring the destruction of the Brooklyn Bridge in New York. Faris ultimately pleaded guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and is now in a federal correctional institution.
US Government & Tourist Sites Tasking – In 2003 and 2004, an individual was tasked by al-Qaeda to case important US Government and tourist targets within the United States. [White House, 10/6/2005]
However, later in the month the Washington Post publishes a story questioning the importance of most of these plots. The article states that the plot list “has confused counterterrorism experts and officials, who say they cannot distinguish between the importance of some incidents on the list and others that were left off. Intelligence officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the White House overstated the gravity of the plots by saying that they had been foiled, when most were far from ready to be executed. Others noted that the nation’s color-coded threat index was not raised from yellow, or ‘elevated’ risk of attack, to orange, or ‘high’ risk, for most of the time covered by the incidents on the list.” An anonymous former CIA counterterrorism official tells the Post that Bush made it “sound like well-hatched plans… I don’t think they fall into that category.” Another anonymous counterterrorism official says, “We don’t know how they came to the conclusions they came to… It’s safe to say that most of the [intelligence] community doesn’t think [the list is] worth very much.” [Washington Post, 10/23/2005]