President Bush’s motorcade leaves the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, to take Bush and his entourage to Air Force One, but it initially heads in the wrong direction and has to turn around in order to proceed toward the airport. [Washington Times, 10/8/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] Bush has just participated in a reading demonstration at the school (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001) and given a brief statement to the nation in which he addressed the attacks on the World Trade Center (see 9:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [White House, 9/11/2001; Associated Press, 8/25/2002] He now heads out of the school and gets into his limousine, which then speeds off to take him to his plane. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 98-99; LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013] Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, where Air Force One is waiting, is three and a half miles away from the school. [Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ; Studies in Intelligence, 9/2006
] Bush’s motorcade drives there much faster than it normally travels. Whereas it usually goes at around 40 to 45 miles per hour, on this occasion the vehicles are driven at 80 to 85 miles per hour. [LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013] However, it initially speeds off in the wrong direction and, after several kilometers, the vehicles have to perform a U-turn in order to head toward the airport. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] During the journey, Bush notices people at the sides of the road, smiling and waving at him, apparently unaware of the crisis that is taking place. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 98] The Secret Service is concerned that he might be attacked on his way to the airport and provides a high level of security for him during the journey (see (Between (Between 9:35 a.m. and 9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BBC, 9/1/2002; Rove, 2010, pp. 251; Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016] Bush will learn about the attack on the Pentagon while he is being driven to the airport (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). His motorcade will arrive at the airport between 9:42 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. (see (9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39]
Shortly After 9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Evacuates Lynne Cheney from Hair Salon, but Changes Destination following Pentagon Attack
Lynne Cheney, the wife of Vice President Dick Cheney, is evacuated from a hair salon in Washington, DC, by her Secret Service agents, but, after initially heading toward the vice president’s residence, her car changes direction and heads to the White House after the Pentagon is hit. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; White House, 11/9/2001] Cheney was at the Nantucket Hair Salon, near the White House, at the time of the plane crashes at the World Trade Center, but the Secret Service agents accompanying her did not evacuate her in response to those attacks (see (8:48 a.m.-9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] At around 9:33 a.m., however, air traffic controllers informed the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39]
Cheney Driven at ‘High Speed’ Away from Hair Salon – Presumably just a short time later, the Secret Service Joint Operations Center alerts the agents accompanying Cheney to the suspicious aircraft. One of the agents therefore decides to evacuate Cheney to the vice president’s residence, which is on the grounds of the US Naval Observatory in northwest Washington. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; CNN, 10/26/2001; Washington Post, 11/27/2008] Cheney will later recall that her agents move her “rather briskly into a car” and then drive “at rather high speed” toward the vice president’s mansion. [White House, 11/9/2001; Newsweek, 12/30/2001]
Car Makes ‘Dramatic U-turn’ and Heads to White House – During the journey, one of Cheney’s Secret Service agents phones a colleague who tells them that “the suspect airplane had crashed into the Pentagon,” according to Michael Seremetis, who is one of the agents accompanying Cheney this morning. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] (The Pentagon is hit at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10] ) The colleague says that since Cheney’s motorcade is “on 15th Street and near the White House,” it should change destination and take Cheney to “the White House shelter” where she can join her husband. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] Cheney will recall that after her car has been heading toward the vice president’s residence for about five minutes, “we made a rather dramatic U-turn in the middle of the street and headed toward the White House.” [White House, 11/9/2001] She will comment that after the Pentagon has been hit, the Secret Service “decided that maybe it would be safer for me to be underneath the White House. The immediate threat was gone, so they took me there.” [Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 7/2/2002; NPR, 7/2/2002] Cheney will arrive at the White House as it is being evacuated (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/30/2001]
Shortly After 9:33 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Asks DC Air National Guard If It Can Launch Fighters
The Secret Service calls the District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, and asks if it can get fighter jets launched. [Filson, 2003, pp. 78]
Secret Service Calls DCANG – Major Daniel Caine, the supervisor of flying with the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews, called his contact at the Secret Service earlier on to see if they needed assistance from his unit, but was told they did not (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But the Secret Service has just learned of a suspicious aircraft five miles from the White House (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and so one of its agents now calls Caine back. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ; Spencer, 2008, pp. 124, 156] Caine’s previous call to the Secret Service had been with agent Kenneth Beauchamp, who told Caine he would call back. However, he did not do so. The name of the agent that makes the current call is unstated. [9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004
]
Agent Wants Planes Launched – The Secret Service agent asks, “Can you get airplanes up?” He then tells Caine to stand by, and says somebody else will call. Caine will later recall, “When I heard the tone in his voice, I called our bomb dump and told them to uncrate our missiles.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 78] But before Caine does this, Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville, the acting operations group commander under the 113th Wing, calls Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the 113th Wing, to get permission to use their “war-reserve missiles.” Wherley gives the go-ahead, and then Caine calls the weapons loaders across the base and orders them, “Get some live AIM-9s [missiles] and bring them over!” At the same time, Sasseville calls the unit’s maintenance officer and orders that their jets be prepared for launch (see (9:35 a.m.-11:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; 9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 ; Spencer, 2008, pp. 156-157] Someone from the Secret Service’s White House Joint Operations Center will soon call Caine, and request that armed fighters be launched over Washington (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 78; 9/11 Commission, 3/11/2004
]
Between 9:35 a.m. and 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001: White House Chief of Staff Card Possibly Learns of a Threat to Air Force One
White House chief of staff Andrew Card, according to his own later recollections, learns that a threat has been made against Air Force One while he is traveling with President Bush to the airport in Sarasota, Florida, although other accounts will indicate that Bush and his entourage are first alerted to the threat at around 10:30 a.m. [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106-107; White House, 8/12/2002; White House, 8/16/2002; White House, 8/16/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] Card is traveling with Bush in the presidential limousine to Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport, where Air Force One is waiting, after leaving the Emma E. Booker Elementary School (see (9:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [St. Petersburg Times, 9/8/2002; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004] Card will later recall that he and Bush are “both on the phones,” calling Washington, DC, to try and learn more about the terrorist attacks. He will say that as well as learning about the attack on the Pentagon (see (Between 9:38 a.m. and 9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001), “we also heard that there had been a threat” to Air Force One. “The Secret Service had indicated to us that someone had used the code name for Air Force One and had indicated that it might be a target,” Card will recall. He will say his goal, therefore, is “to get [Bush] to Air Force One as quickly as possible and get Air Force One in the air.” [White House, 8/16/2002; White House, 8/16/2002] Apparently contradicting Card’s claim, most accounts will indicate that Bush and his entourage are first informed that a threat has been made against Air Force One at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 106-107; Woodward, 2002, pp. 18; CBS News, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Fleischer, 2005, pp. 141-142] But Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Herman, a senior presidential communications officer who is in Sarasota with Bush, will support Card’s account. He will say that around the time the president’s motorcade is leaving the school, “There was some question… that Air Force One and the president were a target.” [Marist Magazine, 10/2002] And Dave Wilkinson, one of Bush’s Secret Service agents, will say that while the motorcade is heading to the airport, “we hear that’s there’s something vague about a threat to the president.” [Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016]
Between 9:35 a.m. and 9:43 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Is Worried that President Bush Could Be Attacked on His Way to the Airport
The Secret Service is concerned that President Bush might be the target of a terrorist attack while he is being driven to Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport and provides extensive security to protect him during the journey. [LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013; Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016] Bush and his entourage left the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, at around 9:35 a.m. to be driven to the airport, where Air Force One is waiting (see (9:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39] Bush’s Secret Service agents have arranged extensive security measures to protect the motorcade during the journey. Dave Wilkinson, assistant special agent in charge of the presidential protection division, will later describe: “We asked for double-motorcade blocks at the intersection. Double and triple blocks. Not just motorcycle officers standing there with their arms up, but vehicles actually blocking the road.” [Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016] Additionally, the vehicles in the motorcade are driven at around twice the normal speed, going at 80 to 85 miles per hour instead of the usual 40 to 45 miles per hour. [LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013] Furthermore, Secret Service agents in the motorcade “all had weapon barrels that were visible and they were pointing up at the ready position in case they needed to be used,” according to Officer Kevin Dowd of the Sarasota Police Department. [BBC, 9/1/2002] The Secret Service is specifically worried that a suicide bomber might be nearby and try to crash a truck bomb or a car bomb into Bush’s limousine. Edward Marinzel, the head of Bush’s Secret Service detail, has therefore arranged for the Sarasota Police Department to mobilize every available patrol car and, as it travels to the airport, the limousine is surrounded on all sides by these cars. The hope is that they will block any suicide attack on the vehicle, should one be attempted. [Rove, 2010, pp. 251; LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013] The Secret Service is also “using the limos [in the motorcade] as a shell game, to keep the president safe” during the journey, Wilkinson will say. [Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service, Concerned about Aircraft Approaching the White House, Orders Evacuation of Vice President Cheney
The Secret Service calls for the immediate evacuation of Vice President Dick Cheney from his office after learning that a suspicious aircraft is flying toward the White House. Air traffic controllers informed the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House at around 9:33 a.m. (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but the aircraft then turned away from the White House and so, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Secret Service made no attempt to evacuate Cheney from his office at that time. Now, however, the Secret Service learns that the aircraft is “beginning to circle back.” This news prompts it to order “the immediate evacuation of the vice president.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39] Someone at the Secret Service Joint Operations Center at the White House passes on the details of the suspicious aircraft to Special Agent James Scott, the “on-duty shift whip” for Cheney’s Secret Service detail, and the shift agents with him in the West Wing of the White House, where Cheney’s office is located. The agents hear the “broadcast alert” over their radios, telling them, “Unidentified aircraft coming toward the White House.” [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001
] Some or possibly all of the agents will immediately go into Cheney’s office, and hurry the vice president out of there and down toward the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker below the White House (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39-40; Gellman, 2008, pp. 114-116] However, a number of accounts will indicate that Cheney was evacuated from his office earlier on, at around 9:03 a.m., when the second plane crashed into the World Trade Center (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 9/13/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; ABC News, 9/14/2002]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Agents Respond to Attacks in Crisis Center, but Are Hindered by Conflicting Information
Danny Spriggs, the assistant director of the Secret Service’s Office of Protective Operations, arrives at the Director’s Crisis Center (DCC) at Secret Service headquarters and joins colleagues there in responding to the terrorist attacks, but the agents’ ability to take action is affected by the poor quality of the information they receive. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003] The DCC is used to direct operations in emergencies. It is located on the ninth floor of the Secret Service headquarters in Washington, DC, and maintained within the Secret Service’s intelligence division. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; Kessler, 2009, pp. 23-24] Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service, activated it after the two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, according to Spriggs (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Agent Joins Colleagues in Crisis Center – Spriggs will later recall that he arrives at the DCC at “approximately 9:35 a.m.,” and finds Stafford and Larry Cockell, the deputy director of the Secret Service, already there. At this time, Stafford is on the phone with the intelligence division. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] (However, White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will claim that Stafford is with him in the White House Situation Room around this time (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 6-7] ) Shortly after entering the crisis center, Spriggs uses his “DCC designated telephone” to call Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division. During the call, Spriggs alerts Truscott to a suspicious aircraft that is flying toward the White House (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]
Agents Receive ‘Conflicting’ and ‘Unconfirmed’ Information – Spriggs will say that his “area of concern” while he is at the DCC is “the location of our protective details and the safety of our protectees.” He will recall, however, that when he arrives at the DCC, “many of the telephones” there are “not operational.” [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] Furthermore, the amount of information that comes into the crisis center throughout the day is “enormous.” Spriggs will recall that, while he is at the DCC, the agents there receive “conflicting” information from the intelligence division, “unconfirmed data,” and “raw information,” which hinders their ability to make proper decisions. He will say that one of his colleagues at the DCC (whose name is unstated) is making decisions based on “inaccurate data that could have been quickly verified,” such as the misinformation that an aircraft crashed near Camp David (see (10:37 a.m.-11:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003]
Shortly After 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: DC Air National Guard Officer Receives Call from Secret Service at White House, Requesting Armed Fighters
The District of Columbia Air National Guard (DCANG) at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, receives a call from the Secret Service at its White House Joint Operations Center (JOC), requesting armed fighter jets over the capital.
JOC Calls DC Air National Guard – Major Daniel Caine is the supervisor of flying with the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard at Andrews, and is currently at the operations desk, where a Secret Service agent recently called him and asked if the DCANG could launch fighters. The agent then told Caine to stand by and said someone else would call (see (Shortly After 9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Now the phone rings, and Caine answers it. The caller, from the JOC, asks for armed fighter jets over Washington. Caine is unsure how the JOC has got the operations desk phone number. He will later speculate that it got it from Secret Service agent Kenneth Beauchamp, who he’d contacted earlier on (see (Between 9:05 a.m. and 9:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Caine Possibly Hears Cheney in Background – The name of the caller is unstated. However, Caine believes he can hear Vice President Dick Cheney’s voice in the background. He will tell author Lesley Filson: “I could hear plain as day the vice president talking in the background. That’s basically where we got the execute order. It was ‘VFR [visual flight rules] direct.’” He will later tell the 9/11 Commission that he “thought, but would not swear to it, that he heard the vice president’s voice in the background.”
Caine Learns of Pentagon Attack – Around this time, Caine learns that the Pentagon has been hit. Even though the Pentagon is just 10 miles from Andrews Air Force Base, he will later recall that he only learns of the attack from news reports, and “no other source.” The result of learning this, according to Caine, is that “the intensity level increased even more.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 76, 78; 9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/11/2004
]
Commander Arrives, Takes over Call – At some point during Caine’s call with the JOC, apparently soon after the Pentagon attack, Brigadier General David Wherley, the commander of the DC Air National Guard, finally arrives at the headquarters of the 121st Fighter Squadron, where Caine and his colleagues are (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001). (The 121st Fighter Squadron is part of the 113th Wing of the DCANG.) At this time, Caine has a phone to each ear. He passes the phone with the call from the JOC to Wherley, saying, “Boss… here, you take this one!” He passes the other to Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson, the chief of safety for the 113th Wing. Caine has decided he is going to fly, and so Thompson will be replacing him as the unit’s supervisor of flying. Caine then goes to join the other pilots that are suiting up, ready to take off in their jets. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9/9/2002; Filson, 2003, pp. 78-79; 9/11 Commission, 3/8/2004 ; Spencer, 2008, pp. 184] Caine will take off from Andrews at 11:11 a.m. (see 11:11 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 84; 9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004]
9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Vice President Cheney Evacuated from Office, according to Some Accounts
Vice President Dick Cheney is taken by the Secret Service from his office to an underground tunnel leading to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House around this time, according to some accounts, including the 9/11 Commission Report, although other accounts will suggest he was evacuated from his office about half an hour earlier. [United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001 ; Newsweek, 12/30/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39-40; Hayes, 2007, pp. 333, 335] Cheney, who is in his office in the West Wing of the White House, is aware of the two plane crashes in New York and realizes this is a terrorist attack. He is now “watching developments on the television,” he will later recall, and starting “to get organized to figure out what to do.” [Meet the Press, 9/16/2001; Hayes, 2007, pp. 330-331] The Secret Service was informed that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House at around 9:33 a.m. (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Concern about this aircraft prompted it to order the evacuation of Cheney “just before 9:36,” according to the 9/11 Commission Report (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001
; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39]
Armed Agents Enter Cheney’s Office – Four or five Secret Service agents carrying submachine guns therefore enter Cheney’s office, according to Washington Post reporter Barton Gellman. One of them, Special Agent James Scott, pushes through the group of government officials who are gathered around Cheney (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and tells the vice president, “Sir, we need to move you—now.” Cheney nods, indicating that he will respond to the agent in a moment, and then turns to say something to another person. But Scott brings down the flat of his hand sharply on Cheney’s desk and commands, ”Now!” [Gellman, 2008, pp. 114-115]
Cheney Propelled out of His Office – Scott then puts his hand on Cheney’s shoulder, grabs the vice president by the back of his belt, and moves him out the door. [Hayes, 2007, pp. 333] Cheney will comment that Secret Service agents “practice this, I’m sure, because… whether you wanted to move or not, you’re going. They don’t exactly pick you up and carry you. It’s more like they propel you forward.” [White House, 11/19/2001] As the Secret Service agents take Cheney through his outer office, the vice president manages to grab the latest issue of The Economist off a table. “I’m always carrying something in case I get hung up someplace,” he will explain. “I’ve got to have something to read.” [Newsweek, 12/30/2001; Hayes, 2007, pp. 333] Carrying the magazine but nothing more, Cheney is hurried down the hallway, past the Oval Office, and down into the basement of the White House. [White House, 11/19/2001]
Other Officials Left in Cheney’s Office – The officials who were with Cheney are left in his office. Mary Matalin, one of Cheney’s senior advisers, will recall: “[S]peechwriter John McConnell and I were left behind in his office, staring at each other as if to say, ‘What are we, chopped liver?’ I think I actually said that.” [National Review, 9/8/2011] Cheney will arrive in the underground tunnel leading to the PEOC about a minute after he leaves his office (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). There he will learn that the Pentagon has been hit and talk over the phone with the president (see (9:45 a.m.-9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001) before heading into the PEOC (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 40; Hayes, 2007, pp. 335-336] However, according to some accounts, Cheney was evacuated from his office a significant time earlier on, around 9:03 a.m., when the second plane crashed in New York (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 9/13/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; ABC News, 9/14/2002; Clarke, 2004, pp. 1-2]
Shortly After 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Senior Secret Service Agent Tells Colleague about Suspicious Plane Approaching Washington
Danny Spriggs, the assistant director of the Secret Service’s Office of Protective Operations, informs Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, that a suspicious aircraft is flying toward the White House. Spriggs is currently in the Director’s Crisis Center (DCC) on the ninth floor of the Secret Service headquarters in Washington, DC (see (9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Truscott is at his office in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House, meeting with three other senior Secret Service agents to discuss security enhancements at the White House (see (9:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Deputy Director Tells Colleague about Approaching Aircraft – Spriggs phoned Truscott after learning that a Secret Service agent he was inquiring about is in Truscott’s office. Now, while he is talking to Truscott, Spriggs is told by Larry Cockell, the deputy director of the Secret Service, who is with him in the DCC, that an aircraft is flying toward the White House and the Secret Service is evacuating the White House. Spriggs passes this information on to Truscott. According to Truscott, Spriggs says that “the intelligence division duty desk [is] reporting Federal Aviation Administration information that a suspicious aircraft [is] coming toward Washington, DC, and that the White House [is] being evacuated.” [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] (Personnel from the intelligence division at Secret Service headquarters are participating in a phone conference with Federal Aviation Administration headquarters, according to the 9/11 Commission Report. Presumably this is where the intelligence division duty desk received its information from. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 464] )
Agent Says He Will Evacuate the White House – Truscott tells Spriggs he had been unaware of the approaching aircraft, and says he will initiate the evacuations of the White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. Truscott will later recall that while Spriggs is telling him about the approaching aircraft, a Secret Service agent who is with him in his office is receiving “similar FAA information via telephone” from another agent. The name of that agent is unstated. The exact time at which Spriggs tells Truscott about the aircraft flying toward the White House is unclear. Truscott will say that Spriggs called him at 9:43 a.m. However, Spriggs will say he arrived at the DCC at “approximately 9:35 a.m.,” and he apparently called Truscott shortly after that. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]