Sean Boger

The air traffic controller and his assistant in the control tower at the Pentagon’s heliport are concerned that they are in a prime location for another terrorist attack, and discuss the possibility of a plane crashing into the Pentagon. [Pentagram, 11/16/2001; Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002; Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 21] The controller, Sean Boger, a civilian who is working for the Army, and his assistant, Army Specialist Jacqueline Kidd, are working in the control tower located between the Pentagon and its heliport, from where they direct helicopter landings and departures. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 27; Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 21] They have seen the reports on television about the planes hitting the World Trade Center, and so realize that a terrorist attack is taking place. [Pentagram, 11/16/2001; Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002]
Controllers Discuss Possibility of Crash at Pentagon – Kidd will later recall that, after seeing the second crash on television, she and Boger begin “discussing the possibility of if it was a terrorist attack, and how we were at a prime spot to be hit. We started talking about that immediately.” She will add that Boger mentions to her that the flight path of Reagan National Airport, which is about a mile away, “comes right by the Pentagon, and I said, ‘Oh, yeah.’ And he said, ‘They can do the same thing to us.’” However, Kidd and Boger reportedly talk “casually” about the possibility of a plane hitting the Pentagon, “without seriously feeling threatened.” [Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002] According to other accounts, Boger wonders aloud why no airliner has ever hit the Pentagon, considering how close it is to Reagan Airport. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 27] Kidd tells him, “You’ve been saying that for three years,” and he responds, “Yeah, you’re right.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 21] Reportedly, Boger is “talking about an accident, not a terrorist attack.” [Pentagram, 11/16/2001]
Controller Discusses Concerns with Supervisor at Airfield – Boger also calls the control tower at Davison Army Airfield, which is about 12 miles south of the Pentagon, around this time, and discusses his concerns with the supervisor of air traffic control there. Boger works for the supervisor’s unit and has already called the supervisor to alert him to the attacks in New York. Boger now tells the supervisor how worried he is “that an aircraft can just easily do that,” presumably referring to the possibility of a plane crashing into the Pentagon. He also says, “I don’t know what I’m going to do if I see a plane coming like that towards—towards us.” The supervisor will later comment, “I always was aware of that, of how close some aircraft would fly over the facility… and how easy it would be for somebody to kind of storm the small tower.” The supervisor tells Boger that if he sees an airplane heading his way, “what you do is you grab [Kidd] and get out of the building, and just go towards Route 27,” the road in front of the heliport area. [US Army Center for Military History, 11/14/2001 ] However, while personnel like Boger, Kidd, and the supervisor of air traffic control are considering the possibility of a plane hitting the Pentagon at this time, no steps are taken to alert workers at the Pentagon before it is struck (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), and an order to evacuate the building will only go out over the Pentagon’s public address system shortly after the attack there. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 137-138; Vogel, 2007, pp. 429]
Pentagon Hit Close to Tower – Boger and Kidd will both suffer minor injuries when the Pentagon is hit less than 100 feet from where they are, and the heliport tower will be badly damaged by the explosion. [US Army Center for Military History, 11/14/2001 ; Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002] Kidd will be on the tower’s ground floor, on her way outside to her car, when the crash occurs. [Pentagram, 11/16/2001; Fort Belvoir News, 1/18/2002] Boger will still be up in the tower, and, he will say, sees Flight 77 flying low and fast toward—and then into—the Pentagon. [US Army Center for Military History, 11/14/2001 ; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 27]