Two fighter pilots with a Toledo, Ohio, military unit that answer a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), requesting assistance in response to the morning’s attacks, respond as if they think the call is a joke. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-179] The pilots belong to the 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard, which is based at Toledo Express Airport. [GlobalSecurity (.org), 1/1/2002; WTOL, 9/11/2006]
Pilot Puzzled by Call – When a weapons technician at NEADS contacts the Toledo unit, his call is answered by F-16 pilot Ed Rinke. The weapons technician says, “We need you to scramble two airplanes right now.” However, according to author Lynn Spencer, “to Rinke, the order makes no sense.” The Toledo unit “is not an alert squadron and does not report to NEADS.” Rinke is only a part-time pilot, and thinks someone more suitable should be taking the call. He shouts down the hall: “Hey, we’ve got a phone call at the duty desk. Some guy wants us to launch alert fighters!” Pilot Scott Reed responds: “What? We don’t do that!” Pushing the phone toward Reed, Rinke says: “You take it! It’s somebody on drugs.”
Second Pilot Tells NEADS It Is Calling ‘the Wrong People’ – After Reed takes the phone, the weapons technician repeats his request, saying, “Major Reed, we need you to scramble two airplanes.” Yet Reed sounds as baffled as Rinke had been. He answers: “You’re calling Toledo, Ohio. Do you not understand who you’re calling here? Who are you trying to call, because you are obviously calling the wrong people. This is Toledo. We don’t have any alert birds. This is Toledo. Do you understand that?”
Commander Takes Call, Orders Launch – Fortunately, the two pilots’ wing commander then takes over the call and responds to it more appropriately. Within minutes, according to Spencer, he will instruct Reed and Rinke to take off in two F-16s. Rinke reportedly thinks to himself, “Things must be really bad if NEADS is launching Toledo on an active air scramble!” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-179] The Toledo Blade will later comment, “Toledo’s response on Sept. 11 is believed to be the first time the unit has answered a call from the North American Aerospace Defense Command.” Two 180th Fighter Wing jets will take off from the Toledo unit at 10:17 a.m., but accounts will conflict over who the pilots are (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 179]
10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001: Non-Alert Jets Take off from Toledo Unit
Two F-16 fighter jets take off from a military unit in Toledo, Ohio, in response to the morning’s attacks, but accounts will conflict over what their mission is and who the pilots are. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; Filson, 2003, pp. 71; WTOL, 9/11/2006] The 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard is based at Toledo Express Airport. Although the unit is not one of NORAD’s seven alert facilities around the US, it has recently received a call from NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), requesting that it launch two of its fighters (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Airman, 12/1999; Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-179] The 180th Maintenance Squadron, which is responsible for maintaining the unit’s aircraft and equipment, was also contacted, and has loaded the F-16s’ guns with 500 rounds of 20-caliber ammunition. [180th Fighter Wing, 9/19/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006]
Jets Head East – The two F-16s, which were being set up for training missions, now take off and head east. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] According to author Lynn Spencer, they are piloted by Scott Reed and Ed Rinke. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 179] However, a local television station will report that the pilots are Scott Reed and Keith Newell. [WTOL, 9/11/2006]
Mission Unclear – It is unclear what role the two jets play in defending the nation. Toledo Air National Guard officials will later refuse to talk about this morning’s events, even in the general terms permitted by the military. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] According to Spencer, NEADS wanted the 180th FW jets to respond to Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, which is incorrectly thought to have been hijacked and will land in Cleveland at around 10:18 (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will similarly say the Toledo jets are ordered to intercept Delta 1989. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/16/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28; Spencer, 2008, pp. 177-178] But Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say the 180th FW was contacted “because we thought [Flight] 93 or Delta Flight 1989 might be headed toward Chicago.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 71] NEADS battle commander Colonel Robert Marr will say the two F-16s “never had a track close enough that they were directed to engage. [But] if a valid direction had come from the appropriate level to engage a target, or shoot down a target at some time, they could have done that.”
Response Is ‘Very Quick’ – Marr will describe the 180th FW’s response to NEADS’s request for assistance as “very, very, very quick.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] However, the fourth hijacked aircraft, Flight 93, has already crashed by the time the two jets take off (see (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30]
Shortly After 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Controller Passes on Shootdown Authorization to Toledo Fighters, Because NEADS Cannot Reach Them
The FAA’s Cleveland Center has to authorize two Ohio Air National Guard fighter jets to shoot down threatening aircraft, because NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is unable to communicate directly with those jets and give them the authorization itself. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 241-242] The two F-16s, which belong to the 180th Fighter Wing of the Ohio Air National Guard, took off from Toledo Express Airport at 10:17 a.m. (see 10:17 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001; WTOL, 9/11/2006]
NEADS Unable to Contact Fighters – NEADS has just received a message, informing it that Vice President Dick Cheney has authorized NORAD to shoot down suspicious aircraft (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42] A weapons officer wants to pass this important information to the two 180th FW fighter pilots. However, since the jets took off, NEADS has been unable to bring them up on their UHF frequency, and so the weapons officer has had to communicate with them indirectly, via the FAA’s Cleveland Center. He now phones the Cleveland Center and asks it to pass on the new rules of engagement to the 180th FW pilots.
Controller Passes on Shootdown Authorization – A Cleveland Center air traffic controller then radios one of those pilots, Scott Reed, and asks him, “Sting 1-1 [Reed’s call sign], Cleveland Center, do you know what your ROE is?” Reed is surprised to hear a civilian controller use the military acronym for “rules of engagement.” He responds, “Sting 1-1, no.” The controller asks, “Would you like to know?” and then tells Reed, “Sting 1-1, if you have a non-military aircraft moving toward a population center, you are clear to engage.” Reed says, “Cleveland Center, Sting 1-1, please confirm ROE.” The controller responds, “Sting 1-1, if the airplane you are vectored against does not comply with your instructions, you are cleared to engage.” According to author Lynn Spencer, Reed “is shocked; he’s just been given clearance—from a civilian controller—to shoot down a commercial airliner.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 241-242] The two 180th FW jets never receive any subsequent orders to engage specific aircraft. According to NEADS battle commander, Colonel Robert Marr, the pilots “never had a track close enough that they were directed to engage. [But] if a valid direction had come from the appropriate level to engage a target, or shoot down a target at some time, they could have done that.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] Though it notifies the 180th FW jets, NEADS fails to pass on the shootdown authorization to the fighters from Otis Air National Guard Base and Langley Air Force Base that are under its command (see 10:32 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 43; Farmer, 2009, pp. 229]
