ABC News reporter John Miller gives a speech in which he discusses the growing indications that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has plans to carry out an attack in the United States. Miller gives his speech at the annual conference of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 286-287] The conference, held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from June 24 to June 30, is attended by around 700 law enforcement officers from around the world. [Sandia LabNews, 6/15/2001] Miller will later explain some of the thinking behind his claim that bin Laden could be planning an attack in the US. “At that time,” he will write, “US authorities were divided over where bin Laden would strike next. Most officials believed that he was aiming at ‘soft’ US targets overseas, based on his past actions and electronic phone intercepts of al-Qaeda members around the world.” Other officials, though, taking into account al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam’s failed plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999 (see December 14, 1999), believe his next attack will take place on US soil. Miller will write that a “spike in phone traffic among suspected al-Qaeda members in the early part of the summer, as well as debriefings of Ressam,” have convinced investigators that bin Laden is planning “a significant operation” and he is “planning it soon.” Furthermore, he will comment, “[N]o one working on the problem seemed to doubt bin Laden’s intentions to target Americans.” [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 287] Miller has been a correspondent for ABC News, with a primary focus on terrorism, since 1995. Notably, he interviewed bin Laden in Afghanistan in May 1998 (see May 28, 1998). Before joining ABC News, he spent many years as a television crime reporter in New York, and between 1994 and 1995 served as deputy police commissioner of New York City. [ABC News, 5/28/1998; Cincinnati Enquirer, 1/16/2002; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 8/23/2005; Hollywood Reporter, 10/17/2011]
June 29, 2001: Surveillance Indicates Al-Qaeda Will Attack Genoa Summit with Multiple Planes
The Italian Secret Service SISDE records a meeting in the Finsbury Park mosque, in northern London, Britain. Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri (an Afghanistan war veteran heading a radical Islamic group), Mustapha Melki (linked to al-Qaeda member Abu Doha—see February 2001), and a man only known as Omar talk to each other. Notes of the meeting state, “Abu Hamza proposed an ambitious but unlikely plot which involved attacks carried by planes.” This is apparently a reference to an attack on the upcoming G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, scheduled in several weeks (see July 20-22, 2001). But unlike other reports of an al-Qaeda attack on that summit, this refers to an attack using more than one plane. The notes of the meeting conclude, “The belief that Osama bin Laden is plotting an attack is spreading among the radical Islamic groups.” [Discovery News, 9/13/2001]
June 30, 2001: White House Warned ‘Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks’
A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials is entitled, “Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks.” It states that bin Laden operatives expect near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions. Despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened US security, the planning for the attacks is continuing. The briefing also contains another report entitled, “Bin Laden Threats Are Real.” SEIBs are typically based on the previous day’s President Daily Briefings (see January 20-September 10, 2001), so it is probable Bush is given this warning. Also on this day, Saudi Arabia declares its highest level of terror alert. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 256-257, 534; US District Court of Eastern Virginia, 5/4/2006, pp. 3 
]
Late June 2001: CIA Holds Exercises to Consider Killing Bin Laden Using an Armed Drone
Air Force Lieutenant General John “Soup” Campbell, associate director of central intelligence for military support, holds two exercises at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to consider the issues around killing Osama bin Laden with an armed drone aircraft. With fears about an attack by al-Qaeda increasing, the CIA is now discussing the details of how a mission to kill the terrorist group’s leader with an armed drone might be carried out. Campbell holds the two exercises as part of this effort.
Officials from Several Agencies Attend the First Exercise – The first exercise, held in a windowless conference room at CIA headquarters, is attended by around 40 officials, action officers, and experts. About 20 of them sit around the conference table. These officials include Charlie Allen, assistant director of central intelligence for collection; Roger Cressey, deputy for counterterrorism on the National Security Council staff; and a number of lawyers from the CIA, Department of Defense, and National Security Council. The other 20 or so participants sit around the walls. They include officials from the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Air Force officers, and various “subject matter experts.”
Participants Agree to Kill Bin Laden in One Scenario – For about the first hour, a former Army officer who now works for the Counterterrorist Center presents what the CIA has learned about bin Laden from other sources since September 27, 2000, when a man believed to be the al-Qaeda leader was recorded on video by a Predator drone. The former Army officer then puts forward a specific scenario. Exercise participants are to imagine that human intelligence sources have informed the CIA that bin Laden is going to be at Tarnak Farms, an al-Qaeda base near Kandahar, Afghanistan, and so the decision has been made to launch an armed Predator while he is there. Campbell then plays the video of bin Laden recorded on September 27, 2000, which many in the room have never seen before. He asks who would be prepared to have the Predator fire a Hellfire missile at the man in the video and who thinks doing so might be a mistake, and why. Everyone in the room says they would support a decision to fire a missile at the man. They all feel certain that the total intelligence picture indicates he is bin Laden, the men around him must also be extremists, and there are no women or children nearby who would be at risk of injury when the missile struck.
Scenario Involving Weaker Evidence Is Considered – The former Army officer then asks those in the room to imagine a second scenario. In this situation, they have no information from human intelligence sources or other supplementary intelligence to base their decision on. All they have is another video captured by the Predator’s camera while the drone flew over a suspected al-Qaeda training camp the previous year. A tall man in white robes appears on the video walking along the wall outside the training compound, with some men surrounding him as if they are his security cordon. The appearance of the tall man and the behavior of those around him suggest he is bin Laden, but there is room for doubt and there is no intelligence from CIA agents or tribal allies to confirm this is the case.
Participants Disagree over Whether to Fire a Missile – Campbell asks those in the room who among them would be prepared to have a missile fired at the man and who would be unprepared to do so. This time, people disagree over what should be done. Some think the video alone is adequate evidence for firing a missile at the man, since if he was indeed bin Laden his death might eliminate a major threat to America. At the very least, the strike would eradicate some al-Qaeda terrorists. Others feel there is too much room for error without further evidence that the man in the video is bin Laden. Campbell feels encouraged to find those in the room disagreeing, since if an armed drone ever goes into use, he wants those handling it to be discerning about when to take action.
Aftermath of Killing Bin Laden Is Discussed – The exercise ends with Campbell leading a discussion of other, related issues. Participants are asked to consider what rules should be adopted to avoid collateral damage, especially the killing or injuring of women and children. They are also asked how the CIA and the rest of the US government should deal with the aftermath of a drone strike that killed bin Laden.
Second Exercise Is Attended by Senior Officials – Campbell and the former Army officer then hold their second tabletop exercise. This exercise, which takes place in the director’s conference room on the seventh floor of CIA headquarters, is smaller and attended by more senior CIA officials, including Director George Tenet. During it, there is more disagreement among participants than there was in the first exercise. Tenet is sure the CIA lacks the legal authority to kill someone by firing a missile from a drone at them, despite the existence of secret presidential orders, findings, and other directives relating to bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Other participants share his unease. Some of the officials express concern about what might happen if the CIA’s role in a drone strike became known. [Whittle, 2014, pp. 206-208]
July 2001: India Warns US of Possible Terror Attacks
India gives the US general intelligence on possible terror attacks; details are not known. US government officials later will confirm that Indian intelligence had information “that two Islamist radicals with ties to Osama bin Laden were discussing an attack on the White House,” but apparently, this particular information is not included in the July general warning and is not be given to the US until two days after 9/11. [Fox News, 5/17/2002]
July 2001-December 2001: Ali Mohamed Never Publicly Sentenced; Whereabouts Are Unknown
The State Department reported in May 2001, “[Ali Mohamed’s] sentencing date has been tentatively set for July 2001.” [Washington File, 5/15/2001] But in fact, his sentencing date never comes, or least is never publicly revealed. The Raleigh News and Observer notes in October 2001, “Defense lawyers and many other observers believe that Mohamed, who has not yet been sentenced, is now cooperating with the United States, though the government has never confirmed this. When he is sentenced, he could receive as little as 25 years under his plea agreement.” [Raleigh News and Observer, 10/21/2001] The San Francisco Chronicle similarly notes shortly after 9/11 that Mohamed “has never been sentenced, and defense lawyers and security experts believe he had begun giving evidence about bin Laden to the government in hopes of winning his release from prison.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 9/21/2001] At the end of December 2001, the Associated Press reports that Mohamed’s sentencing “has been postponed indefinitely.” [Associated Press, 12/31/2001] Larry Johnson, a former CIA agent and the State Department’s director of counterterrorism during the elder Bush’s administration, speculates, “He was an active source for the FBI, a double agent.” Further, Johnson believes that “The reason he didn’t testify was so they wouldn’t have to face uncomfortable statements on the FBI. They are more interested in covering their ass.” [Raleigh News and Observer, 10/21/2001] There are a flurry of articles about Mohamed in the months after 9/11, but then his story will fade. The 9/11 Commission will mention him only twice in their 2004 final report, and don’t bring up the possibility of him being a double agent, or even his collaboration with the CIA and FBI. They merely note his role in the 1998 embassy bombings and his training of some of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. He will be described as “a former Egyptian army officer who had moved to the United States in the mid-1980s, enlisted in the US Army, and became an instructor at Fort Bragg.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 67, 472] In 2006, his wife will reveal that he is still imprisoned and still has not been sentenced (see March 2006).
July 1, 2001: Senators Publicly Warn ‘Major Probability’ of Terrorist Attack within Three Months
Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Richard Shelby (R-AL), both future members of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, appear on CNN’s “Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer,” and warn of potential attacks by bin Laden. Feinstein says, “One of the things that has begun to concern me very much as to whether we really have our house in order, intelligence staff have told me that there is a major probability of a terrorist incident within the next three months.” [CNN, 3/2002]
July 2001: CIA Executive Director Krongard Holds a Briefing to Discuss Using a Drone to Kill Bin Laden
A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, executive director of the CIA, holds a briefing during which he plays a video taken by a drone aircraft that shows a man who appears to be al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and asks delegates if they think the US should try to assassinate the man based on this evidence. The briefing apparently takes place at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and is attended by representatives from various agencies.
‘Tall Man with the Cane’ Is Bin Laden – On a large screen on the wall, Krongard shows his audience the video. He freezes it at a certain point. “You can see the tall man with the cane—that’s Osama bin Laden,” he says. “You can’t make out his facial features, but there’s little doubt that we’ve isolated him, right there, out in the open in the field,” he adds. A CIA analyst then explains that the recording was made by a Predator drone in Afghanistan three weeks ago, in June 2001, after the CIA received intelligence that bin Laden would be meeting his people at the location shown in the video. He points out what he says are bin Laden’s security detail and the al-Qaeda leader’s SUV. As the video is moved forward a few frames at a time, the analyst explains that the overall scene led to a determination that the man shown was indeed bin Laden.
Audience Is Asked if This Evidence Is Sufficient to Kill Bin Laden – “Our evidence isn’t going to get any better than this,” Krongard interjects. He says: “The question is, what are we willing to do? Is the evidence sufficiently compelling? Is it good enough to kill Osama bin Laden the next time we have him in our crosshairs?” No one says anything in response. Krongard explains that the US Air Force has developed a missile called the Hellfire that can be mounted on a drone, thereby giving the drone the capability to kill. Air Force Lieutenant General John “Soup” Campbell then takes over the briefing to elaborate. [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020] Campbell is the associate director of central intelligence for military support. In this role, he is the principal adviser to CIA Director George Tenet on military issues. [US Air Force, 11/1/2003] He provides the audience with details of the Hellfire, describes test results, and says the missile is now ready for deployment on the Predator drone, which was previously only used for reconnaissance missions.
Decision Whether to Fire Lies with the President – In light of the information that has been presented, Krongard poses a question to the audience. He says: “This might be our only chance to take out the al-Qaeda leadership before they launch another attack on the US. I want a show of hands. If we get another film like this, should we fire at the tall man with a cane?” Many hands are raised by audience members who agree that they should try to kill the man. When Krongard asks if anyone disagrees, just a few hands are raised. Krongard then reassures the interagency representatives at the briefing that the decision whether to fire would not be theirs to make and instead would lie with the president. “Only the president can authorize the use of an armed drone,” he explains, adding, “It requires a covert action finding.” He says their job is simply to define the rules of engagement, meaning they have to determine “[u]nder what circumstances should the president’s authority to fire a drone be delegated, and to whom?”
Audience Discusses Issues around Using Armed Drones – The audience members then get into a lively discussion about the issues that have been raised during the briefing. Some of them assert that the president should personally approve any drone strikes. While the time taken to obtain presidential approval might result in missed opportunities, they believe that since drone strikes are new, the implications and consequences of their use are uncertain. But most of them take a more aggressive stance. They believe al-Qaeda’s escalating series of attacks against the US has shaken the nation’s confidence and there is a sense that more attacks are imminent. They feel that armed drones represent a potential breakthrough, providing the capability to neutralize terrorist threats before they evolve into attacks on the US.
Requirements for Executive Action Are Discussed – Further discussion ensues in which the requirements for taking executive action are fleshed out. Conditions are considered regarding how to limit civilian casualties, and prohibit strikes on mosques and holy sites. It is decided that the target of a drone strike must be clearly identifiable and on a carefully vetted targets list. The briefing’s attendees decide that a comprehensive set of recommendations should be composed for the CIA director to take to the president. If the president decided to proceed with the drone strikes, the CIA would work out modalities with the Air Force and the Department of Defense. After the briefing ends, some CIA officials who attended it will get together and discuss further whether the agency should carry out assassinations, and during the meeting Richard Blee, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, will emphasize the threat bin Laden poses and the benefits of killing him (see (July 2001)). [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020]
July 2001: Head of the CIA’s bin Laden Unit Compares the Current Situation to the Period before World War II and Bin Laden to Hitler
During a meeting with other CIA officials, Richard Blee, head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, compares al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler before World War II and emphasizes that the terrorist threat would be significantly reduced if he was killed. The officials have just attended a briefing for representatives from various agencies during which A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, executive director of the CIA, played a video recently taken by a drone aircraft that showed a man who appeared to be bin Laden. Krongard asked audience members if they thought the US should try to assassinate the man based on this evidence (see (July 2001)). After the briefing ends, James Pavitt, the CIA’s deputy director for operations, gathers together the CIA operations officers who attended it to further discuss the issues that were covered. Those at Pavitt’s meeting include Blee; Hugh Turner, the associate deputy director for operations; and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, deputy associate director of central intelligence for military support.
Pavitt Is Uneasy about the CIA Assassinating Terrorists – Pavitt appears uncomfortable with the implications of authorizing the CIA to deploy armed drones—something that was discussed during the briefing. He tells his colleagues: “We have to think long and hard about getting back into the assassination business. We should think about the impact it will have on our mission, on our organization. It’s dangerous to kill people in secret… even terrorists.” He adds, “We need to have a rock-solid case that conducting assassinations is necessary and justifiable, and also consistent with the broader principles that we serve as agency officers.”
Colleague Suggests Raising Concerns with the White House – Turner responds to Pavitt’s concerns, saying in a sullen manner: “Times are different than they were during the agency’s assassination and covert action days. The world has changed since the l960s and 1970s. We have congressional oversight, lots of oversight.” He advises Pavitt to raise his concerns with the White House. “They need to hear your reservations about repeating the mistakes of the past,” he tells him. He says that if the CIA is to go ahead and use armed Predator drones, it should make sure it has first received specific authorities in writing from the National Security Council. Additionally, he says, “Our lawyers need to square away the CIA’s legal authorities with [the] Department of Justice.”
Pavitt Wonders if Killing Bin Laden Is ‘Worth It’ – Pavitt gives more details of his reservations, saying: “We rejected assassination in our past because it was corrosive to our culture and to democracy. And we weren’t any good at it. It caused more harm than good.” He notes that killing people remotely using an armed drone “is dangerously seductive” since it would leave the CIA with “no blood on our hands.” In light of these concerns, he asks: “Is killing bin Laden worth it? Would it matter? Would his departure from the scene change things so much that it would justify a return to assassination operations?”
Bin Laden’s Death Would Be a ‘Major Blow’ to Al-Qaeda – Pavitt looks at Blee to see his reaction. “Pavitt would listen to Blee, an experienced and highly respected counterterrorist expert,” Mowatt-Larssen will later note. Blee clearly thinks the al-Qaeda leader is a serious enemy who poses a major threat to the United States. “Osama bin Laden is a charismatic leader. He is the heart and soul of al-Qaeda. He created this terrorist organization and declared war on America,” he says. He adds that no one else in al-Qaeda has the same influence and vision. He therefore indicates that he thinks assassinating bin Laden would have significant benefits. “His death would be a major blow to the movement,” he says. “The threat would be greatly diminished if bin Laden was eliminated,” he adds.
Blee Compares Bin Laden to Hitler – Blee explains the severity of the threat he feels bin Laden poses by comparing the al-Qaeda leader to Hitler. “The situation we’re in reminds me of the situation before World War II,” he says. “How would history have been different if we had a chance to take out Adolf Hitler before the war?” he asks. “Without Hitler, World War II war might have been averted,” he states, adding that similarly, “Without bin Laden, al-Qaeda is not the threat it represents with him as their leader.” Blee makes clear that he therefore believes the US should assassinate him, concluding: “We can’t pass up the chance to kill [bin Laden]. No, we have to take our shot if we get the chance.” Pavitt is surprised but also reassured by the firmness of Blee’s conviction. According to Mowatt-Larssen, while the deputy director for operations will continue to have misgivings about using armed drones to kill terrorists, it is now clear he will do nothing to prevent such action being taken. [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020]
July 2, 2001: Osama bin Laden Periodically Undergoes Dialysis with Approval of the ISI
Indian sources claim that “bin Laden, who suffers from renal deficiency, has been periodically undergoing dialysis in a Peshawar military hospital with the knowledge and approval of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), if not of [Pakistani President] Musharraf himself.”
[SAPRA (New Delhi), 7/2/2001] While one might question the bias of an Indian newspaper on this issue, highly respected intelligence newsletter Jane’s Intelligence Digest later reports the story, and adds, “None of [these details] will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives who have been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities.”
[Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 9/20/2001] CBS will later report bin Laden had emergency medical care in Pakistan the day before 9/11. [CBS News, 1/28/2002] If these stories are true, it appears Pakistan could have captured bin Laden for the US at any time. The Jane’s Intelligence Digest article adds, “It is becoming clear that both the Taliban and al-Qaeda would have found it difficult to have continued functioning—including the latter group’s terrorist activities—without substantial aid and support from Islamabad [Pakistan].”
[Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 9/20/2001]
