The al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) ends and the participants leave. Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar fly to Bangkok, Thailand, traveling under their real names. Al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash also travels with them and the three sit side by side in the airplane, but bin Attash travels under the false name “Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf” (see After January 8, 2000). [Associated Press, 9/20/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 131 
; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 248 ] Malaysian intelligence and the CIA are aware of this flight (see January 8, 2000).
January 8-9, 2000: CIA Obtains More Information about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar’s Companions on Bangkok Flight, Apparently Does Not Realize Nawaf Is Alhazmi’s First Name
After learning that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has flown from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Bangkok, Thailand, with two companions (see January 8, 2000 and January 8, 2000), the CIA obtains more information about the two men. Based on the flight manifest, it learns that one of them was traveling under the name “Alhazmi,” a reference to 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi. The CIA knows that one of the people Almihdhar associated with in Kuala Lumpur was named Nawaf, but, apparently, does not connect the first name Nawaf to the second name Alhazmi. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 227; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 5 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 353, 502] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will say that the CIA could have put the two names together and that this could have led to his watchlisting, but this does not happen (see January 8, 2000). [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 145 ] The 9/11 Commission will add that, if the State Department were asked about Nawaf Alhazmi, it would discover that he had been issued a US visa in Jeddah around the same time as Almihdhar (see April 3-7, 1999). The NSA has been intercepting Alhazmi’s calls to Almihdhar for at least a year (see Early 1999) and could promptly put Nawaf and Alhazmi together, but it is not asked (see January 9, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 353-4] The second companion is al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, who is initially reported to travel under the name “Salahsae.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181] The CIA will learn that this is part of the name Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf, one of bin Attash’s aliases, no later than March 2000. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 248 ] Bin Attash previously used this alias to apply for a US visa in Yemen (see April 3, 1999), but the CIA does not realize this (see After January 8, 2000). Bin Attash will leave Thailand in mid-January (see January 20, 2000).
January 8-15, 2000: 9/11 Hijackers Associate withColeBombers in Thailand
While in Thailand, 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi associate with three of the operatives who will later be involved in the bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). The two hijackers arrive with Khallad bin Attash, who will command the Cole operation. The three of them come from Malaysia, where they were under surveillance by the CIA (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 8, 2000). While in Bangkok, bin Attash meets Cole bombers Fahad al-Quso and Ibrahim al-Thawar, who give bin Attash some money, possibly $36,000. Some of this may be passed to Alhazmi and Almihdhar. Under interrogation after 9/11, bin Attash will claim that, even though they all stay in the same hotel for part of the time (see (January 5-8, 2000)) the two groups do not meet. However, such statements are thought to be unreliable because of the methods used to extract them (see June 16, 2004). [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 159; Wright, 2006, pp. 312] Shown photographs of Alhazmi and Almihdhar after 9/11 by the FBI, al-Quso will say that he recognizes the two, but indicate that this may be because he met them at camps in Afghanistan. [New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ] However, he is apparently photographed by Malaysian authorities standing next to Almihdhar in Kuala Lumpur (see (January 5-8, 2000)).
January 9, 2000: CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Asks for 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar and Associates to Be Identified in Thailand
Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, sends the CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, a NIACT cable about 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar and two associates, who turn out to be 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash. NIACT means the cable is a very high priority and has to be immediately acted on by the duty officer, even if it is received at night. Almihdhar and his two associates arrived in Bangkok the previous day, but the CIA in Thailand had apparently been unable to track them (see January 8, 2000 and January 8, 2000). Alec Station wants the Bangkok station to identify Almihdhar and his associates, although the precise contents of the cable and the response to it are unknown. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 227; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 5 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 247 ]
After January 8, 2000: US Apparently Does Not Realize Al-Qaeda Leader Has Applied for US Visa
On January 8, 2000, hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar plus al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash fly from Malaysia to Thailand together, sitting next to each other. Malaysian intelligence soon informs the CIA that Almihdhar was on the flight, sitting next to someone with the last name of Alhazmi and someone with the name Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (see January 8, 2000). This is an alias for bin Attash, and in fact is the same alias he used when applying for a US visa in 1999 (see April 3, 1999). Two months later, the CIA learns that several days later, Nawaf Alhazmi flew from Thailand to the US, which means he had to have had a US visa (see March 5, 2000 and March 6, 2000 and After). In fact, Almihdhar, Alhazmi, and bin Attash, using the “bin Yousaf” alias, all applied for US visas within days of each other (see April 3-7, 1999). Alhazmi and bin Attash even applied on the same day. However, apparently no check of visa application records is made that would reveal this. US intelligence also suspects that Alhazmi has a militant brother named Salem, which he does, and Salem Alhazmi also applied for and received a US visa from the same consulate on nearly the same day as his brother Nawaf, but this is not discovered either. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 155-6, 181-2, 492; 9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 9 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 248 ] The US will miss other opportunities to learn more about this alias (see After December 16, 2000 and After August 23, 2001).
January 13, 2000: Thai Intelligence Puts 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar and Al-Qaeda Leader’s Alias on Watch List
Acting on a tipoff by the CIA, Thai intelligence puts 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi on its watch list. In addition, it puts an alias al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash is using (Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf) on the watch list (see January 20, 2000). The CIA is aware that the three men arrived in Bangkok on January 8 (see January 8, 2000), but seems to be unable to locate them in Thailand (see January 13, 2000). The Thai authorities will note their departure from Bangkok on January 15, but will not stop them and apparently will not inform the CIA of this for some time (see January 15, 2000 and March 5, 2000). [Bamford, 2004, pp. 230; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ] The CIA is apparently unaware of Alhazmi’s full name at this point (see January 8-9, 2000), but this does not prevent the watchlisting. The CIA will not add the three to the US watch list until late August 2001 (see August 23, 2001).
January 13, 2000: CIA Says it Is Unable to Locate 9/11 Hijackers in Thailand
The CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, sends a cable to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, saying that it is unable to locate 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar and two companions, who turn out to be 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, in Bangkok. The three had been under surveillance in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000), but the CIA’s Bangkok station had been unable to pick them up at the airport when they flew to Thailand on January 8 (see January 8, 2000 and January 8, 2000). According to an official, this was because “when they arrived we were unable to mobilize what we needed to mobilize.” Despite the high priority allocated to the search by CIA headquarters (see January 9, 2000) and the fact bin Attash was under surveillance in Malaysia when he called the hotel where the three are staying in Bangkok (see (January 5-8, 2000)), they cannot be found. The precise steps taken to locate them are unknown. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 502; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 247 ]
January 20, 2000: Al-Qaeda Leader Leaves Thailand; CIA Later Notified
Al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash leaves Thailand and returns to Karachi, Pakistan. Bin Attash had come to Thailand with 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 8, 2000), who had departed for the US five days previously (see January 15, 2000). Bin Attash, Alhazmi, and Almihdhar had been under surveillance in Malaysia shortly before (see January 5-8, 2000) and were watchlisted around January 13 by the Thai authorities (see January 13, 2000), which are supposed to inform the US of the departure of the three men from Thailand. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 159, 181; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 248 ] The CIA is informed of bin Attash’s departure in early March, but he is traveling under an alias and the CIA does not connect the alias to bin Attash. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ] Under interrogation after being captured by the US, bin Attash will say that after leaving Karachi he travels to Kandahar to meet Osama bin Laden. However, such statements are considered unreliable due to the methods used to extract them (see June 16, 2004). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 159, 494]
February 11, 2000: CIA Station in Malaysia Reminds CIA Station in Thailand about 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar and Companions
The CIA station in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, asks the CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, what is happening with surveillance of future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash. The CIA station in Kuala Lumpur had monitored the three when they were in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000) and passed the surveillance over to Bangkok when they flew there in early January (see January 8, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 502; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 247 ] Although, according to the 9/11 Commission, Bangkok station probably already knows that Alhazmi has departed for the US, it fails to respond for two weeks, when it claims it does not know what has happened (see (February 25, 2000)).
February 25, 2000: CIA Bangkok Station Falsely Claims It Does Not Have Information about 9/11 Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar
The CIA station in Bangkok, Thailand, replies to a request from the CIA station in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for information about future 9/11 hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash by saying that there will be a delay with the response due to difficulties obtaining the information. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 247-8 ] The relevant information that should be passed to Kuala Lumpur station concerns the departure of Alhazmi and Almihdhar to the US (see January 15, 2000 and January 15, 2000). Kuala Lumpur station coordinated surveillance of the three men in Malaysia in early January (see January 5-8, 2000). When the trio flew to Bangkok, the surveillance was passed on to Bangkok station (see January 8, 2000). According to the 9/11 Commission: “Presumably the departure information was obtained back in January, on the days that these individuals made their departures. Because the names were watchlisted by the Thai authorities we cannot yet explain the delay in reporting the news.” It is therefore unclear why the CIA’s Bangkok station says it is having difficulty obtaining information it already apparently has in its possession. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 181, 502] The information will be reported about a week later, but will be incomplete, as Bangkok station will only report that Alhazmi has flown to the US, failing to name his companion as Almihdhar (see March 5, 2000).
