The radical Finsbury Park mosque becomes what one informer will call “an al-Qaeda guest house in London.” The informer, Reda Hassaine, works for two British intelligence services (see (November 11, 1998) and (May 1999)), and one of his tasks is to monitor the mosque’s leader Abu Hamza al-Masri, himself an informer for the British (see Early 1997).
Experienced Fighters – Authors Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory will later write: “For some visitors, the mosque was a secure retreat for rest and recreation after a tour of duty in the holy war. Such was Finsbury Park’s reputation that an international brigade of Islamic militants used it as a safe haven for a spot of leave before they returned to the jihad front line and undertook terror operations.”
Raw Recruits – Hassaine will say the mosque was especially important to al-Qaeda because the experienced fighters on leave could mix with potential recruits: “The mosque was secure. It offered money, tickets, and names of people to meet in Pakistan. It was an al-Qaeda guest house in London. The boys could come back from the jihad and find a place to stay, to talk about war, to be with their own kind of people, to make plans and to recruit other people. These people, if they thought you were willing to do the jihad, they paid special attention to you. If they thought you were willing, that is when Abu Hamza would step in to do the brainwashing. Once he started, you wouldn’t recover. You would become a ‘special guest’ of the mosque until they could measure your level of commitment and they could organize your trip to Afghanistan.”
Numbers – O’Neill and McGrory will say that the exact number of recruits who pass through Finsbury Park and the Afghan camps is unclear, although “hundreds and hundreds of suspects” from around the world are linked to the mosque. London Police Commissioner Sir John Stevens will say two thousand recruits from the mosque undergo terror training, whereas one of his successors, Sir Ian Blair, will say it was closer to a tenth of that number. O’Neill and McGrory will add: “MI5 has never revealed its tally. However many it was, not a single recruit who attended these camps was ever arrested when he got home.” The CIA will later be surprised by the “sizable number” of al-Qaeda recruits who both train in the camps in Afghanistan and attend Finsbury Park. After the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, the FBI will find questionnaires completed by the recruits, and some of these will specify Abu Hamza as the person who referred them to the camps, also giving “jihad” as their ambition after completing their training. O’Neill and McGrory will point out, “Such was Abu Hamza’s stature that having his name as a reference would guarantee his nominees acceptance at Khaldan,” an al-Qaeda camp.
‘The World Capital of Political Islam’ – O’Neill and McGrory will conclude, “The result of Abu Hamza’s recruitment regime—and that pursued by the other fundamentalist groups which had made London the world capital of political Islam—was that more young men from Britain embarked on suicide missions than from all the other countries of Europe combined.” [O’Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 86, 97-98, 101-102]
July 22, 2005: British Police Kill Innocent Brazilian
Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes, 27, is shot seven times in the head and once in the shoulder at Stockwell Tube station, south London. Police had mistaken him for a suicide bomber. Stockwell passenger Mark Whitby describes the scene: “One of them was carrying a black handgun – it looked like an automatic – they pushed him to the floor, bundled on top of him and unloaded five shots into him.” [BBC, 7/22/2005] Initial reports indicate that de Menezes was challenged and refused to obey an order to stop. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair says the shooting is “directly linked” to the ongoing London bombs inquiry and manhunt spurred by the previous day’s attempted terror attacks (see July 21, 2005). Other early reports say that de Menezes was wearing a heavy coat despite the fact that it was a very warm day, had vaulted the barrier, and attempted to run onto a Tube train. Later reports contradict all of these claims. In addition, police claim that there is an absence of CCTV footage of the pursuit and shooting. The Independent Police Complaints Commission investigation following the shooting is able to establish a probable timeline of events. A police surveillance team was assigned to monitor the Tulse Hill area where de Menezes lived, as evidence linked it to the July 21 attacks. Upon exiting the building on the day of the shooting, de Menezes was identified as a possible suicide bomber by the surveillance unit and followed to the Tube station. The police were under strict orders not to allow any potential bombers on to a train and so a quick decision was made to perform an armed “hard stop.” The unarmed surveillance officers subsequently had to call in an armed response team. By the time the armed unit arrived, de Menezes, wearing a light denim jacket, had paid for his Tube travel and was walking down towards the train. Eyewitnesses described men leaping the barriers and rushing down the stairs towards the same area. Other witnesses put other possible plainclothes officers on the train, searching for the suspect. Once de Menezes had been spotted, the officers, out of radio contact with their superiors on the surface, made their decision quickly. New training had advised officers that it was crucial not to allow a suspect any time to detonate a device and that shots to the chest could cause a bomb to explode. This training instructed officers to wear plain clothes, not identify themselves until the last possible moment, and to aim for the head. The officers in the Tube station chased de Menezes on to the train, pinned him down and shot him. [Guardian, 8/14/2005] Prime Minister Tony Blair says he is “desperately sorry” about the shooting and expresses Britain’s “sorrow and deep sympathy” to the de Menezes family. He also says the police must be supported in doing their job. London Mayor Ken Livingstone says, “Consider the choice that faced police officers at Stockwell last Friday – and be glad you did not have to take it.” The de Menezes family retain legal counsel and consider suing Scotland Yard. [BBC, 7/25/2005] On November 1, 2007, prosecutors accuse the Metropolitan Police Service of “shocking and catastrophic error” during a trial at London’s Old Bailey Central Criminal Court. They say that police had criminally endangered the public, first by allowing a man they believed was a bomber to board an underground train, then by shooting him at point blank range. A jury convicts the police of a single charge of breaching health and safety rules which require it to protect the public. Judge Richard Henriques says “No explanation has been forthcoming other than a breakdown in communication. It’s been clear from the evidence that the surveillance team never positively identified Mr. De Menezes as a suspect.” The force is fined £175,000 and ordered to pay legal costs of £385,000. No individual officers are punished over the shooting, the Crown Prosecution Service having decided last year there was insufficient evidence to charge any individual with crimes. Police Chief Sir Ian Blair faces calls to resign, including from the opposition Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. He is however supported by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Interior Minister Jacqui Smith says “The Commissioner and the Metropolitan Police remain in the forefront of the fight against crime and terrorism. They have my full confidence and our thanks and support in the difficult job that they do.” Blair says the conviction does not represent “systemic failures” in the police force and that he will not quit over events “of a single day in extraordinary circumstances.” The de Menezes family’s representatives say they are pleased at the conviction but call for an open inquest at which they could present evidence, and for manslaughter charges to be brought against individual officers. [Reuters, 11/1/2007] A week later, renewed calls for Blair’s resignation come from the Independent Police Complaints Commission, who find he was responsible for “avoidable difficulty” following the killing of de Menezes. The report reveals that prosecutors considered and rejected murder charges against the two officers who fired the fatal shots, as well as charges of gross negligence against Assistant Metropolitan Police Commissioner Cressida Dick, who was in charge of the operation. IPCC chairman Nick Hardwick says “Very serious mistakes were made that could and should have been avoided. But we have to take the utmost care before singling out any individual for blame.” The report highlights a series of failings, including poor communication between officers and Blair’s initial attempts to block inquiries into the shooting. [Irish Times, 11/8/2007]