The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report concludes that at least six 9/11 hijackers received “substantial assistance” from associates in the US, though it’s “not known to what extent any of these contacts in the United States were aware of the plot.” These hijackers came into contact with at least 14 people who were investigated by the FBI before 9/11, and four of those investigations were active while the hijackers were present. But in June 2002, FBI Director Mueller testified: “While here, the hijackers effectively operated without suspicion, triggering nothing that would have alerted law enforcement and doing nothing that exposed them to domestic coverage. As far as we know, they contacted no known terrorist sympathizers in the United States” (see June 18, 2002). CIA Director Tenet made similar comments at the same time, and another FBI official stated, “[T]here were no contacts with anybody we were looking at inside the United States.” These comments are untrue, because one FBI document from November 2001 uncovered by the Inquiry concludes that the six lead hijackers “maintained a web of contacts both in the United States and abroad. These associates, ranging in degrees of closeness, include friends and associates from universities and flight schools, former roommates, people they knew through mosques and religious activities, and employment contacts. Other contacts provided legal, logistical, or financial assistance, facilitated US entry and flight school enrollment, or were known from [al-Qaeda]-related activities or training.” [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ] The declassified sections of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s final report show the hijackers have contact with:
Mamoun Darkazanli, investigated several times starting in 1993 (see 1993; Late 1998); the CIA makes repeated efforts to turn him into an informer (see December 1999).
Mohammed Haydar Zammar, investigated by Germany since at least 1997 (see 1996), the Germans periodically inform the CIA what they learn.
Osama Basnan, US intelligence is informed of his connections to Islamic militants several times in early 1990s but fails to investigate (see April 1998).
Omar al-Bayoumi, investigated in San Diego from 1998-1999 (see September 1998-July 1999).
Anwar al-Awlaki, investigated in San Diego from 1999-2000 (see June 1999-March 2000).
Osama “Sam” Mustafa, owner of a San Diego gas station, and investigated beginning in 1991 (see Autumn 2000).
Ed Salamah, manager of the same gas station, and an uncooperative witness in 2000 (see Autumn 2000).
An unnamed friend of Hani Hanjour, whom the FBI tries to investigate in 2001.
An unnamed associate of Marwan Alshehhi, investigated beginning in 1999.
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, who had contact with Basnan, al-Bayoumi, al-Awlaki, Mustafa, and Salamah, “maintained a number of other contacts in the local Islamic community during their time in San Diego, some of whom were also known to the FBI through counterterrorist inquiries and investigations,” but details of these individuals and possible others are still classified. [US Congress, 7/24/2003
] None of the above people have been arrested or even publicly charged with any crime associated with terrorism, although Zammar is in prison in Syria.
August 2003: FBI and CIA Forced to Reopen Investigation into Saudi Link to 9/11
In the wake of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry report, and “under intense pressure from Congress,” as the Boston Globe puts it, the FBI and CIA reopen an investigation into whether Saudi Arabian officials aided the 9/11 plot. [Boston Globe, 8/3/2003] In early August, Saudi Arabia allows the FBI to interview Omar al-Bayoumi. However, the interview takes place in Saudi Arabia, and apparently on his terms, with Saudi government handlers present. [New York Times, 8/5/2003; Associated Press, 8/6/2003] Says one anonymous government terrorism consultant, “They are revisiting everybody. The [FBI] did not do a very good job of unraveling the conspiracy behind the hijackers.” [Boston Globe, 8/3/2003] But by September, the Washington Post reports that the FBI has concluded that the idea al-Bayoumi was a Saudi government agent is “without merit and has largely abandoned further investigation… The bureau’s September 11 investigative team, which is still tracking down details of the plot, has reached similar conclusions about other associates named or referred to in the congressional inquiry report.” [Washington Post, 9/10/2003] Yet another article claims that by late August, some key people who interacted with al-Bayoumi have yet to be interviewed by the FBI. “Countless intelligence leads that might help solve” the mystery of a Saudi connection to the hijackers “appear to have been underinvestigated or completely overlooked by the FBI, particularly in San Diego.” [San Diego Magazine, 9/2003] Not only were they never interviewed when the investigation was supposedly reopened, they were not interviewed in the months after 9/11 either, when the FBI supposedly opened an “intense investigation” of al-Bayoumi, visiting “every place he was known to have gone, and [compiling] 4,000 pages of documents detailing his activities.” [Newsweek, 7/28/2003]
August 1-3, 2003: Leaks Hint at Saudi Involvement in 9/11
In the wake of the release of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry’s full report, anonymous officials leak some details from a controversial, completely censored 28-page section that focuses on possible Saudi support for 9/11. According to leaks given to the New York Times, the section says that Omar al-Bayoumi and/or Osama Basnan “had at least indirect links with two hijackers [who] were probably Saudi intelligence agents and may have reported to Saudi government officials.” It also says that Anwar al-Awlaki “was a central figure in a support network that aided the same two hijackers.” Most connections drawn in the report between the men, Saudi intelligence, and 9/11 is said to be circumstantial. [New York Times, 8/2/2003] One key section is said to read, “On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a CIA memorandum, ‘incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists… On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations.’”(see August 2, 2002) Some of the most sensitive information involves what US agencies are doing currently to investigate Saudi business figures and organizations. [Associated Press, 8/2/2003] According to the New Republic, the section outlines “connections between the hijacking plot and the very top levels of the Saudi royal family.” An anonymous official is quoted as saying, “There’s a lot more in the 28 pages than money. Everyone’s chasing the charities. They should be chasing direct links to high levels of the Saudi government. We’re not talking about rogue elements. We’re talking about a coordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multiple places in the Saudi government.… If the people in the administration trying to link Iraq to al-Qaeda had one-one-thousandth of the stuff that the 28 pages has linking a foreign government to al-Qaeda, they would have been in good shape.… If the 28 pages were to be made public, I have no question that the entire relationship with Saudi Arabia would change overnight.” [New Republic, 8/1/2003] The section also is critical that the issue of foreign government support remains unresolved. One section reads, “In their testimony, neither CIA or FBI officials were able to address definitely the extent of such support for the hijackers, globally or within the United States, or the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. This gap in intelligence community coverage is unacceptable.” [Boston Globe, 8/3/2003]
August 26, 2003: FBI Agent Repudiates Theory US Failed to ‘Connect Dots’ before 9/11 in Interview with 9/11 Commission
In an interview with the 9/11 Commission, FBI agent Frank Pellegrino repudiates the theory that 9/11 happened because the US intelligence community failed to connect the dots. After a Commission staffer states the theory, Pellegrino responds angrily: “What dots? There are no dots to connect! It was all there, written in front of them [CIA officials].” [Soufan, 2011, pp. 302] Presumably this occurs on August 26, 2003, when Pellegrino is interviewed by the Commission, according to an endnote to its final report. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004] Pellegrino is the FBI agent who was previously assigned to track alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see Spring 2000). This incident is referenced in a 2011 book by former FBI agent Ali Soufan. Soufan thinks that the CIA’s failure to pass on information to the bureau was deliberate, and presumably Pellegrino agrees with him. [Soufan, 2011, pp. 301-302]
September 15, 2003: 9/11 Commission Staffer Apparently Agrees CIA Withheld Key Intelligence from FBI in Run Up to Attacks
In an interview, a key 9/11 Commission staffer, Doug MacEachin, reportedly agrees with an important witness, FBI agent Ali Soufan, that the CIA deliberately withheld from the bureau the knowledge that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash had attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit and was therefore linked to 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. [Soufan, 2011, pp. 301-302] However, the Commission’s final report will call the non-passage of this intelligence “an example of how day-to-day gaps in intelligence sharing can emerge even when there is mutual goodwill.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 267] This interview appears to be the second time the Commission talks to Soufan, which is on September 15, 2003. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 507; Soufan, 2011, pp. 297-302] Soufan discusses the case of “Omar,” a joint FBI-CIA source inside al-Qaeda. At an interview of Omar in January 2001 the CIA learned that bin Attash had attended al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit in early 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 4, 2001). However, it then failed to share this with the FBI (see January 5, 2001 and After). Soufan tells the Commission’s staff: “This shows that the CIA knew the significance of Malaysia, Khallad, and Almihdhar but actively went out of their way to withhold the information from us. It’s not a case of just not passing on information. This is information the FBI representative working with the source should have been told about. It was a legal requirement. Instead we were deliberately kept out of the loop.” A staffer responds that the CIA claims it shared the information, and Soufan asks whether the Commission checked the “regular cables” between the field and CIA headquarters. After the staffer says they have, Soufan asks whether the Commission has checked the “operational traffic,” and MacEachin responds, “That must be it.” Other staffers are initially puzzled by McEachin’s comment, but he explains it to them. Soufan will comment: “Operational traffic refers to cables sent during an operation. The officer will list procedures, leaving a record in case something goes wrong or something needs to be referred to. Because these cables are strictly procedural and not related to intelligence, they would not be sent to the FBI. If someone wanted to hide something from the FBI, that’s where he would put it. Because Doug had worked for the CIA, he knew what operational cables were, while other members of the team might not have.” The Commission later finds that the information about bin Attash was in an operational cable. [Soufan, 2011, pp. 301-302] The reason for the discrepancy between MacEachin’s attitude in the interview of Soufan and the Commission’s final report is unknown.
September 19, 2003: FBI Finds No Proof of 9/11 Insider Trading
Spokesperson Paul Bresson announces that the FBI has concluded that there was no insider trading in US securities markets by people with advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. According to Bresson, the “vast majority” of a pre-attack surge of trading in options that bet on a drop in the stock of AMR Corp., which owns American Airlines, and UAL Corp., which owns United Airlines, was conducted by investment hedge funds implementing bearish investment strategies or hedging a line position of common stock, and was not linked to terrorists. [9/11 Commission, 8/18/2003 ; St. Petersburg Times, 9/19/2003; Washington Post, 9/19/2003] However, seven months later, a paper by a professor of finance at the University of Illinois will conclude that “there is evidence of unusual option market activity in the days leading up to September 11” (see April 25, 2004). [Poteshman, 3/10/2004]
September 2003-May 21, 2004: US Government Refuses to Hold or Charge 9/11 Hijacker Associate Despite New Evidence against Him
In September and October 2003, Mohdar Abdullah, an associate of 9/11 hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar who is being held in a US jail, allegedly brags to fellow prisoners that he knew the two hijackers were planning a terrorist attack (see Early 2000 and see Late August-September 10, 2001). Despite suspicions that he knowingly assisted the hijackers’ plans, Abdullah is only being held for an immigration violation, and he is due to be deported soon. But, according to the 9/11 Commission, the US Attorney for the Southern District of California decides not to prosecute him on charges stemming from these new allegations. Furthermore, the US Justice Department does not even delay his deportation to allow further investigation of this new information. In May 2004, the 9/11 Commission first hears about the new evidence against Abdullah. However, Abdullah is deported to Yemen on May 21, 2004 (see May 21, 2004). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 217-219] Abdullah is a Yemeni citizen, and he has been stuck in prison for many months because the Yemeni government does not want him back. According to his lawyer, he is only able to be deported after intense pressure by the State Department on the Yemeni government (see May 21, 2004). [San Diego Union-Tribune, 5/26/2004] Not long after Abdullah is deported, a surveillance video will be discovered from the Los Angeles airport, showing Abdullah, Alhazmi, and an unknown third man seemingly casing the airport and recording security measures with a video camera (see June 10, 2000). It is not known when exactly this video is discovered, but a grand jury subpoena for it will be dated October 2004. In September 2006, some anonymous law enforcement officials will tell NBC News that they regret deporting Abdullah, given the discovered video. These officials will say that the FBI has reopened its investigation into Abdullah and is reexamining all of his contacts in the US. NBC News will comment: “Why didn’t they find these tapes until 2004 isn’t known—especially since the FBI knew that on the day these tapes were shot in June 2000, one of the hijackers went to Los Angeles Airport for a flight home to Yemen. Critics are certain to question whether the FBI again missed an important clue, and let a possible accomplice get away.” [MSNBC, 9/8/2006]
October 21, 2003: Patrick Fitzgerald Blames ‘Wall’ for Intelligence Problems
Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald testifies before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary about post-9/11 legislative changes, and says that the removal of the “wall” was a significant step forward for US counterintelligence. The wall was a set of procedures which regulated the passage of intelligence information within the FBI and from the FBI to prosecutors (see July 19, 1995). Fitzgerald says the removal of the wall represented “the single greatest change that could be made to protect our country.” He cites four cases that he says are examples of how the wall and other such obstacles have hampered counterterrorism efforts: The arrest of Ali Mohamed. Fitzgerald claims it would have been “far less difficult” to arrest al-Qaeda operative Ali Mohamed for his involvement in the attacks on US embassies in East Africa (see September 10, 1998) had it not been for the wall. [US Congress, 10/21/2003] However, author Peter Lance will point out, “But Fitzgerald neglected to tell the senators that… prosecutors and FBI agents had been monitoring the bombing cell members for two years or that they’d had multiple face-to-face meetings with Mohamed himself.” Mohamed, who was called a “key figure” in the Day of Terror plot in the US press in early 1995 (see February 3, 1995), had actually met Fitzgerald a year before the arrest and told him that he had trained bin Laden’s bodyguards, lived in bin Laden’s house, loved and believed in bin Laden, and that he didn’t need a fatwa to attack the US, as it was obvious the US was the enemy (see After October 1997). [Lance, 2006, pp. 274-6, 299-300]
The Day of Terror conspiracy. After the partial success of the World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993), the conspirators planned to attack other targets in New York, but were arrested by the FBI, which had penetrated their cell. All of the arrested plotters were successfully convicted. However, Fitzgerald tells the committee, “Prosecutors were in the dark about the details of the plot until very late in the day.” [US Congress, 10/21/2003; Lance, 2006, pp. 118-9]
The Millennium Alert. Fitzgerald says that in 1999, investigations into suspected millennium plots were hampered because “criminal prosecutors received information only in part and with lag time so as not to breach the wall.” All attacks planned for the millennium failed, including one plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport (see December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000).
Sharing Wadih El-Hage’s grand jury interview. In 1997, Al-Qaeda operative El-Hage provided information about bin Laden and his associates to a grand jury. Fitzgerald wanted to pass some of this information along to intelligence investigators (see September 24, 1997) but was unable to because grand jury information cannot be shared with intelligence investigators. To get around this restriction, an FBI agent had to get El-Hage to repeat the information outside the grand jury room. (Note: this example is not directly related to the “wall” under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but rather to a similar obstacle governing the passage of information in the opposite direction—from criminal agents to intelligence agents). [US Congress, 10/21/2003]
November 16, 2003: Yemeni Terror Financiers Extradited to US
Two alleged Yemeni terror financiers, cleric Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad and his assistant Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed, are extradited from Germany to the US to face trial. The FBI claims that the two men supported both Hamas and al-Qaeda, with al-Moayad having provided Osama bin Laden with up to $20 million. They were arrested in Germany in January in a sting operation run by the bureau (see January 2003). The extradition follows a ruling by Germany’s highest court that the men will face a fair trial in the US, not a military court or other special tribunal. [BBC, 11/16/2003]
December 2003: FBI Agent Says Officers in CIA’s Bin Laden Unit ‘Have Blood on Their Hands’ over 9/11
In an interview with author James Bamford, an unnamed FBI agent says that Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, deliberately hid 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from the FBI, allowing 9/11 to happen. He says: “They refused to tell us because they didn’t want the FBI, they didn’t want John O’Neill in particular, muddying up their operation. They didn’t want the bureau meddling in their business—that’s why they didn’t tell the FBI. Alec Station worked for the CIA’s CTC [Counterterrorist Center]. They purposely hid from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau that they were following a man in Malaysia who had a visa to come to America. The thing was, they didn’t want John O’Neill and the FBI running over their case. And that’s why September 11 happened. That is why it happened.… They have blood on their hands. They have three thousand deaths on their hands.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 224]