In late 1999, Abu Bakar Bashir, the alleged spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), called a meeting to improve cooperation between Islamist militant groups in Southeast Asia. The meeting is held in January 2000 at the International Islamic University in Selangor, Malaysia, and is chaired by Hambali, a leader in both JI and al-Qaeda. Militants from Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines attend. They set up a forum called Rabitatul Mujahidin (RM). The Australian television news program SBS Dateline will later call the list of attendees “a who’s who of accused terrorists.”
Meeting Attendees – One attendee is Fauzi Hasbi, a JI militant who is also working as an Indonesian government mole (see 1979-February 22, 2003). Hasbi also has a private meeting in his hotel with Bashir and the representative from Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a militant group in the Philippines. Other attendees include Agus Dwikarna and Faiz abu Baker Bafana, who both assist al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. Bafana will later help host Zacarias Moussaoui and 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar as they pass through Malaysia (see September-October 2000, October 2000 and June 2001).
Other Meetings – The group holds two more meetings later in 2000. Hasbi does not attend them, but his son Lamkaruna Putra does. The group discusses specific bombing plans in these later meetings. Hasbi also attends a meeting of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in November 2000. This is considered a more public umbrella group for Islamist militants. That meeting is chaired by Bashir. [International Crisis Group, 12/11/2002; Conboy, 2003, pp. 210-211; SBS Dateline, 10/12/2005] Indonesian intelligence has another deep mole known by the alias Dadang, who has penetrated militant groups since about 1992. He also attends some key MMI meetings in 2000 and 2001, but other than that, little is known about him. [Conboy, 2003, pp. 212-213] It is not known whether the Indonesian government shares its intelligence about this meeting, or the other meetings, with US intelligence. If they do, it would help the US better understand Hambali’s importance, as he attends a monitored al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia that same month (see January 5-8, 2000).
Spring 2000: Candidate Hijacker Obtains Pilot’s Licence in Malaysia
Zaini Zakaria, a Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda operative who has been assigned to a 9/11-style operation, is instructed to take flight training by al-Qaeda commander Mohammed Atef and travels to Malaysia to obtain a pilot’s license. He meets fellow JI operative Faiz abu Baker Bafana in Kuala Lumpur and visits the Royal Selangor Flying Club at a nearby Malaysian Air Force base. Zaini had earlier traveled to Afghanistan with JI leader Hambali, Bafana, and another operative called Zamzulri in 1999 to receive military training, and had met Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Karachi, Pakistan. Zaini obtains a pilot’s license and makes inquiries in Australia about learning to fly jets, but eventually drops out of the plot in 2001. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 17; London Times, 2/10/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006] The school may have been recommended by Yazid Sufaat. An important al-Qaeda summit was held at Sufaat’s Kuala Lumpur condominium in January 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). Sufaat will later claim that some of the summit attendees (including two future 9/11 hijackers) asked him about flying schools in Malaysia, and he recommended the one in the region where the Royal Selangor Flying Club is. [Time (Asia), 2/5/2002] Zacarias Moussaoui will later visit the same flying school while staying with Sufaat (see Early September 2000). The CIA stopped the surveillance of Sufaat’s condominium some point in 2000 (see Between February and September 2000); it is not known if this happened before or after Zakaria was in Malaysia.
Mid 2000: Jemaah Islamiyah Passes Casing Video to Al-Qaeda Leadership to Get Approval for Attack
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) prepares to attack US military personnel in Singapore, but consults al-Qaeda’s top leaders and passes them a casing video before it begins carrying out the plot. The initial plan is to attack a bus that transports US military personnel from a metro station in Singapore and is devised by a JI operative called Faiz abu Baker Bafana. However, when the proposal is shown to JI leader Hambali, Bafana is told that he needs the approval of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) for the operation and that he has to travel to Afghanistan to get it. Bafana cannot find KSM, so he talks to Mohammed Atef, who promises to provide funding and suicide bombers, as long as JI contributes explosives and transport. KSM subsequently sends Bafana money for the operation. 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar apparently visits Malaysia twice to move the plot forward (see October 2000 and June 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006] JI sends Atef a casing video, which will be found after the US invasion of Afghanistan. Even though the US sits on the video for a month, Singapore is able to roll the plot up based on information it obtains on its own (see November 15-Late December 2001).
September-October 2000: Moussaoui Visits Malaysia After CIA Stops Surveillance There
Zacarias Moussaoui visits Malaysia twice, and stays at the very same condominium where the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit (see January 5-8, 2000) was held. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002; Washington Post, 2/3/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] After that summit, Malaysian intelligence kept watch on the condominium at the request of the CIA. However, the CIA stopped the surveillance before Moussaoui arrived, spoiling a chance to expose the 9/11 plot by monitoring Moussaoui’s later travels (see Between February and September 2000). [Newsweek, 6/2/2002] During his stay in Malaysia, Moussaoui tells Jemaah Islamiyah operative Faiz abu Baker Bafana, at whose apartment he stays for one night, that he had had a dream about flying an airplane into the White House, and that when he told bin Laden about this, bin Laden told him to go ahead. They also discuss purchasing ammonium nitrate, and Moussaoui says that Malaysia and Indonesia should be used as a base for financing jihad, but that attacks should be focused against the US. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006] While Moussaoui is in Malaysia, Yazid Sufaat, the owner of the condominium, signs letters falsely identifying Moussaoui as a representative of his wife’s company. [Washington Post, 2/3/2002; Reuters, 9/20/2002] When Moussaoui is later arrested in the US about one month before the 9/11 attacks, this letter in his possession could have led investigators back to the condominium and the connections with the January 2000 meeting attended by two of the hijackers. [USA Today, 1/30/2002] Moussaoui’s belongings also contained phone numbers that could have linked him to Ramzi bin al-Shibh (and his roommate, Mohamed Atta), another participant in the Malaysian meeting (see August 16, 2001). [Associated Press, 12/12/2001]
Early September 2000: Moussaoui Checks Out Malaysian Flight School
While in Malaysia (see September-October 2000), Zacarias Moussaoui visits the Royal Selangor Flying Club at a Malaysian Air Force base near Kuala Lumpur to inquire about learning to fly there, but decides not to pursue lessons after learning the cost. Moussaoui is driven to the club by Jemaah Islamiyah operative Faiz abu Baker Bafana, who had previously taken another al-Qaeda trainee pilot, Zaini Zakaria, to the same flying club (see (Spring 2000)). Moussaoui will eventually begin his training in the US (see February 23-June 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006]
October 2000: Almihdhar Visits Malaysia to Discuss Attack on US Interests in Singapore
Faiz abu Baker Bafana, an operative of al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, receives an Arab visitor and they discuss attacks on US interests in Singapore. Bafana knows the Arab as “Bandar,” but this is not his real name and it appears that “Bandar” is an alias for 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar. Almihdhar again stays in Yazid Sufaat’s apartment and travels to Afghanistan after the meeting. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006] The apartment is also used by Zacarias Moussaoui at around the same time (see September-October 2000), and Almihdhar and several other al-Qaeda commanders had used it for a summit at the start of the year (see January 5-8, 2000). Malaysian intelligence had been monitoring the apartment and passing the results on to the US, but the CIA did not ask for the surveillance to continue and it ended, apparently before this visit. Malaysian Legal Affairs minister Rais Yatim will express puzzlement over the CIA’s lack of interest in the apartment: “We couldn’t fathom it, really. There was no show of concern.” [Newsweek, 6/2/2002] Almihdhar will return to Malaysia to continue the planning for the Singapore attack in the middle of 2001 (see June 2001).
January 2001 and after: Security Services Increase Surveillance of Jemaah Islamiyah after Bombing Campaign
Following a wave of bombings in Indonesia and the Philippines in late 2000 (see December 24-30, 2000), regional intelligence services increase surveillance of al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Police find that a call claiming responsibility for the bombing was made from a phone registered to JI operative Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi and trace calls from this phone to JI leader Hambali and one of his subordinates, Faiz abu Baker Bafana. Philippines authorities then keep al-Ghozi under surveillance for a year, before arresting him in January 2002. [Christian Science Monitor, 2/14/2002] Hambali is named in the media as a JI leader around this time (see January 24, 2001).
June 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Visits Malaysia Again, Requests More Information about Planned Attack on US Warship
9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar makes another visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to continue planning for an attack on a US warship in Singapore (see October 2000). He asks Faiz abu Baker Bafana, an operative for the al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group, for more information about the operation and for a proposed budget. Almihdhar was apparently involved in the attacks on the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in Yemen (see Late 1999 and Around October 12, 2000). Bafana then begins meeting with two other bin Laden operatives to discuss the Singapore operation and an attack that is being planned for Manila. They end up only meeting twice, because by the second meeting Bafana believes he is under surveillance by Malaysian intelligence. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 3/8/2006] JI has been under increased surveillance from the authorities in Southeast Asia since a series of bomb attacks at the end of 2000 (see December 24-30, 2000 and January 2001 and after). Malaysian intelligence also monitored an al-Qaeda summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which Almihdhar and JI leader Hambali attended (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). If Malaysian intelligence did monitor this meeting, they had an opportunity to recognize Almihdhar from their earlier surveillance of the 2000 al-Qaeda summit, but it is not known if they did so.
