Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and incorrectly notifies it that another aircraft, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, is a possible hijacking. [9/11 Commission, 2004; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] Boston Center previously called NEADS at 9:27 and said that Delta 1989 was missing (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003]
NEADS Technicians Respond – At NEADS, Stacia Rountree, the ID technician who takes Scoggins’s call, announces to her colleagues: “Delta ‘89, that’s the hijack. They think it’s possible hijack.… South of Cleveland.” The plane’s transponder is still on, and she adds, “We have a code on him now.” Rountree’s team leader, Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley, instructs: “Pick it up! Find it!” The NEADS technicians quickly locate Delta 1989 on their radar screens, just south of Toledo, Ohio, and start alerting other FAA centers to it. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 177] NEADS mission crew commander Major Kevin Nasypany will be notified by his staff of the suspected hijacking at about 9:41 or 9:42 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 
] NEADS never loses track of Delta 1989. It will follow it on radar as it reverses course over Toledo, heads east, and then lands in Cleveland (see (10:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28] It will order Air National Guard fighter jets from Selfridge and Toledo to intercept the flight (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-179] But it will soon learn that Delta 1989 is not in fact hijacked. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28]
Cleveland Center, Not Boston, Handling Delta 1989 – Although Boston Center notifies NEADS of the suspected hijacking, Delta 1989 is in fact being handled by the FAA’s Cleveland Center. [USA Today, 8/13/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 10-12] Cleveland Center air traffic controllers suspected that Delta 1989 had been hijacked at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but apparently only informed the FAA’s Command Center, and not NEADS, of this. [USA Today, 8/13/2002] To explain why Boston Center alerts NEADS to the flight, the 9/11 Commission will later comment that, “Remembering the ‘we have some planes’ remark” (see 8:24 a.m. September 11, 2001), the Boston Center simply “guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.”
Similar to First Two Hijacked Planes – Like Flights 11 and 175, the two aircraft that have crashed into the World Trade Center (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Delta 1989 took off from Boston’s Logan Airport. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28] According to the New York Times, it left there at about the same time as Flights 11 and 175 did, meaning around 8:00 to 8:15 a.m. [New York Times, 10/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 32] Like those two aircraft, it is a Boeing 767. [USA Today, 8/13/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-28] But, unlike those flights, its transponder has not been turned off, and so it is still transmitting a beacon code. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] It is unclear what Delta 1989’s intended destination is. According to some accounts, like Flights 11 and 175 were, it is bound for Los Angeles. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; New York Times, 10/18/2001; USA Today, 8/13/2002; Arizona Daily Star, 9/24/2007; Spencer, 2008, pp. 167] Other accounts will say that its destination is Las Vegas. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] Personnel at NEADS are apparently informed that Las Vegas is the intended destination. Around this time, one member of staff there tells her colleagues that the flight is “supposed to go to Vegas.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001]
One of Numerous Incorrect Reports – The 9/11 Commission will comment: “During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft (see (9:09 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001). The report of American 11 heading south was the first (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001); Delta 1989 was the second.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28]
10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controller Notices Unidentified Aircraft Approaching from East
An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Boston Center is concerned about an unidentified aircraft flying in from the east, approaching Cape Cod. Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the Boston Center in Nashua, New Hampshire, has noticed the large, slow-moving target on his radar screen. It is just off the coast and heading directly for Boston. Concerned as to what the aircraft is, he phones the Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility in Virginia Beach, Virginia. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 242] The facility, known by its call sign, “Giant Killer,” is the Navy air traffic control agency that handles all over-water military operations. [New York Times, 2/10/1997; Spencer, 2008, pp. 143] Scoggins says: “We have a large, slow-moving target approaching Cape Cod and heading for Boston. Do you have it? What is it?” The person at Giant Killer only replies, “We’re looking,” and then mentions, “We’ve got a fleet of ships heading toward the northeast and an Aegis cruiser [a high-tech warship] on the way.” Scoggins is worried that Giant Killer is unable to specifically identify the target he is seeing on his radar screen. It appears to be flying straight toward the Boston Center. He thinks to himself, “If I wanted to use airliners to attack a country, I would take out their air traffic control facilities!” Scoggins continues watching the suspicious aircraft on his radar screen. Shortly afterward, the Boston Center will be evacuated after the FAA’s New England regional office calls it and reports an unidentified aircraft heading toward the facility (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 242-243] This is apparently a different aircraft to the one Scoggins is tracking. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002] Whether the plane Scoggins is tracking is ever identified is unclear.
Shortly After 10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Air Traffic Control Center Evacuated following Report of Airborne Threat
The FAA’s Boston Center is evacuated after it receives a report that an unidentified aircraft is heading its way. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001; USA Today, 8/11/2002; New Hampshire Union Leader, 9/11/2006; Spencer, 2008, pp. 243] The Boston Center, located in Nashua, New Hampshire, manages air traffic above New England, and monitored Flight 11 and Flight 175 earlier on. [USA Today, 8/11/2002; Associated Press, 8/12/2002] Employees there are already concerned because a large tractor-trailer has parked directly in front of their facility, on New Hampshire’s Route 3. State police have been called to get it away from there.
Possible Airborne Threat Leads to Evacuation – The FAA’s New England regional office in Burlington, Massachusetts, now calls the Boston Center and reports that an unidentified aircraft is heading for the facility. In response to this potential threat, managers at the center immediately order the closure and evacuation of their building. They also declare “ATC zero,” which shuts down the Boston Center’s airspace (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Employees run from the building while managers try to decide which, if any, personnel should remain in the facility. According to Colin Scoggins, the center’s military liaison, “at this time we honestly felt that we were targeted and an impact was imminent.”
Bomb Threat to Childcare Facility – Making matters worse, a bomb scare phone call is received at the center’s childcare facility, which is the employees’ usual evacuation point. Center managers therefore decide that everyone must leave the building. Employees are advised to go to either 11 Murphy Drive—an FAA administrative facility—or a nearby Holiday Inn. According to Scoggins, three or four Flight Service Data Processing System personnel remain in the basement of the Boston Center when it is evacuated, apparently because there is no paging system in their office on which they can receive the evacuation order.
Evacuation Time Unclear – The time the evacuation takes place at is unclear. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, it occurs some time shortly after 10:20 a.m. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001; USA Today, 8/11/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 242-243] At 10:34 a.m., John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center, reports that the Boston Center “has received a threat,” and is “going down to skeleton staffing.” [9/11 Commission, 11/4/2003] A 10:52 a.m. entry in the log of the FAA headquarters’ teleconference will state that the Boston Center is “evacuating the building.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002] USA Today will report that the center is evacuated at “about 11 a.m.”
Few Employees Return to Building – About 30 minutes to an hour after the building is evacuated, some of the center’s personnel will return to work. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001; USA Today, 8/11/2002] By 12:16 p.m., the center is back in operation, but with only a skeleton staff. [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002]
Suspicious Aircraft Only a Coast Guard Plane – As it turns out, the approaching aircraft that prompts the evacuation is just a Coast Guard plane. According to Scoggins, “We had already identified it.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001] The aircraft was noted in a 10:18 a.m. entry in the log of the FAA headquarters’ teleconference, which stated: “Aircraft 160 miles east of Nantucket is headed westbound toward Boston at a high rate of speed.” But a log entry five minutes later, at 10:23 a.m., noted that the aircraft “is identified as a Coast Guard flight from Nantucket.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002] Shortly before the Boston Center is alerted to this aircraft, Scoggins had been tracking what is apparently another unidentified target on his radar screen: a slow-moving large aircraft that is also flying toward the Boston Center from the east (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 242-243] The identity of that aircraft is unclear.
Shortly After 10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Boston Center Controller Contacts NEADS and Canadian Facility, Reports Center Evacuation and Airborne Threat
Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) and a Canadian air traffic control facility, to let them know that the Boston Center is shutting down its airspace and being evacuated, due to a possible airborne threat.
Scoggins Does Not Immediately Evacuate – The Boston Center in Nashua, New Hampshire, has just received a call from the FAA’s New England regional office, alerting it to an unidentified aircraft heading its way. In response, the center’s managers ordered the evacuation of the facility (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and declared “ATC zero,” which completely shuts down the center’s airspace (see (Shortly After 10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). But while others leave the building, Scoggins stays behind to make two phone calls.
Scoggins Calls Canadian Facility and NEADS – His first call is to the Moncton Center, which is the Canadian air traffic control facility that handles flights arriving from over the Atlantic. He tells a supervisor there, “We’re going to ATC zero and evacuating.” Scoggins then calls NEADS with the same information. He says: “I wanted to let you know, Boston Center has declared ATC zero and we are evacuating due to an airborne threat. It’s approaching Martha’s Vineyard and it’s coming our way.” Before hanging up, he gives NEADS the speed and coordinates of the approaching aircraft. Scoggins then heads out of the building. According to the account of author Lynn Spencer, Scoggins’s call prompts NEADS to immediately call Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and order it: “Get everything you’ve got in the air! Now!” (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
FBI and SWAT Teams Surround Center – By the time Scoggins is outside the Boston Center, FBI and SWAT teams are surrounding the facility. Scoggins will later recall that he sees the “Nashua SWAT team in the parking lot with automatic weapons, [and] the FBI running with the audio tapes with Bob Jones [a quality assurance specialist at the Boston Center] by their side.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/20/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 243-245] (The FBI reportedly arrived at the Boston Center “minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the World Trade Center,” and seized tape recordings of radio transmissions from the hijacked plane (see Soon after 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/2001] )
Scoggins Tracking Other Unidentified Plane – Before the Boston Center received the call from the FAA regional office about the approaching aircraft, Scoggins was tracking another unidentified target on his radar screen: a slow-moving aircraft also flying toward the center from the east (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Whether he alerts NEADS to that aircraft when he calls it is unclear. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 242-243]
