Five undercover agents posing as passengers and would-be terrorists manage to get weapons through security checkpoints at Logan Airport in Boston. The agents, sent by Department of Homeland Security inspector general Clark Kent Ervin, take knives, a bomb, and a gun through checkpoints in different terminals. The Transportation Security Administration says that such exercises are useful for spotting holes in airport security, but the Boston Globe writes, “The fact that such weapons made it past checkpoints two years after an overhaul of airport security is likely to be seen as a serious indictment of the government’s efforts to protect air travel from terrorists.” Ervin then orders similar tests at 15 airports, but the problems are also apparent at some of these other airports. For example, at Newark, from which Flight 93 departed on 9/11, screeners miss one in four test bombs or weapons. [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 171-2]
Spring 2004: Review Finds Airport Security Is Poor
Following tests of the standard of security at US airports (see October 9, 2003), the Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and a private company provide a series of classified briefings to the House Aviation Subcommittee, saying the security is currently lax, bureaucratic, and no better than it was 17 years ago. After the briefings, committee chairman John Mica (R-FL) says, “We have a system that doesn’t work.” Congressman Peter DeFazio (D-OR), who supported the federal takeover of airport security, says, “The inadequacies and loopholes in the system are phenomenal.” A 2006 book by investigative reporters Joe and Susan Trento will say that the new federal screeners are “much worse” than the old private ones. A Transportation Security Administration (TSA) official will say that the “private sector was held to a standard of somewhere between 80 to 90 percent” for weapons detection, but now at one airport “they ran eight [tests] and we missed four of them.” He will add, “But what is really alarming to me is that they said we’re above the national average so they recognize you for a job well done.” Another official will complain about the lack of testing in the federal system, saying that the new screeners even have difficultly recognizing explosives when they appear on a screen, “And when you run an actual [improvised explosive device], they don’t know what it is.” The Trentos will attribute some of the blame to the way the security staff are trained, noting, “the TSA certifies and tests itself and classifies the results as secret.” [Trento and Trento, 2006, pp. 172-4]
