NORAD briefs the NMCC teleconference on the possible hijacking of Delta Flight 1989. Four minutes later, a representative from the White House bunker containing Vice President Cheney asks if there are any indications of other hijacked planes. Captain Charles Leidig, temporarily in charge of the NMCC, mentions the Delta Flight and comments, “that would be the fourth possible hijack.” Flight 1989 is in the same general Ohio region as Flight 93, but NORAD doesn’t scramble fighters toward either plane at this time. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Enters the NMCC and Joins the Air Threat Conference
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, arrives at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon and starts participating in the conference call being conducted from there. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 
; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Myers recently arrived at the Pentagon following a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Shortly Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] He joined Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, at the River Entrance and the two men then headed to the NMCC. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] The NMCC is the US military’s “worldwide monitoring, crisis response center,” according to Myers. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] It is “a communications hub, a switchboard connecting the Pentagon, the civilian government, and the combatant commanders,” he will later write. Klimow will call it “the nerve center of the Pentagon.” It includes the large Current Actions Center (CAC), which is filled with computer cubicles.
Myers Goes to the Deputy Director’s Office – When Myers and Klimow arrive at the NMCC, they find “soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines” sitting at “their consoles, their telephones, and their computers, manning communication links around the world.” They head to the deputy director for operations’ office, located at one end of the CAC. This small, windowless room, also known as the “DDO shack,” has several desks, a conference table, and lots of telephones. It is where the 24-hour watch takes place and is “the heart of the NMCC,” according to Klimow. In it, Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations, is participating in a conference call. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] This conference call commenced at 9:29 a.m. as a “significant event conference” (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001) but was upgraded to an “air threat conference” at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37] It links the NMCC to NORAD, the White House, and other agencies. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
Myers Is Concerned about What Could Happen Next – After arriving in the NMCC, Myers wants to gain “situational awareness.” His first thought is, “What’s next?” [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] One of his priorities is “looking ahead and giving strategic guidance to make sure we were prepared to handle whatever came next,” he will recall. “We didn’t know at that time if we were in the middle of a several-day long attack, what kind of attacks could come next, or who and what might be targeted,” he will add. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ]
Myers Discusses Evacuating the Sears Tower – The exact time when Myers reaches the NMCC is unclear. He will estimate that he arrives there between 10:00 a.m. and 10:10 a.m. when he is interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] However, the 9/11 Commission will conclude that he joins the air threat conference being run from there shortly before 10:00 a.m. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] And evidence will indicate that he in fact reaches the NMCC at around 9:58 a.m. or shortly before then. Leidig will tell the 9/11 Commission that he is “certain that the vice chairman was in the room” when the “Sears Tower issue” was discussed over the air threat conference. He will say he recalls telling Myers there is a recommendation to evacuate the Sears Tower, and Myers saying in response that this is a good idea and the military supports it. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] The discussion Leidig will be referring to is apparently one that occurs at 9:58 a.m. At that time, he is recorded saying over the air threat conference, “The vice chairman recommends evacuating [the] Chicago Tower [i.e. the Sears Tower in Chicago] based on the flight plan of one of the possible hijacked aircraft.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ] However, after spending only a short time in the NMCC, Myers will leave there in order to search for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152]
9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Goes to Search for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leaves the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon shortly after arriving there to look for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, but is unable to find him. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 151-152] Myers recently arrived at the Pentagon following a meeting on Capitol Hill (see (Shortly Before 9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006] Once there, he headed to the NMCC and reached it at around 9:58 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
Myers Leaves the Command Center – A conference call is being conducted from the NMCC linking the command center to NORAD and the White House, among others (see 9:29 a.m.-9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:37 a.m.-9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Myers is content that Captain Charles Leidig, the acting deputy director for operations in the NMCC, who convened the conference call, is “doing a good job of managing the information flow and keeping the chain of command plugged in,” he will later recall. He therefore decides to leave the command center to look for Rumsfeld. He will recall seeing the collapse of the South Tower of the World Trade Center on television as he is heading out. This means he leaves the NMCC at around 9:59 a.m., when the collapse occurs (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001)—possibly as little as a minute after he arrived there.
Myers Learns that Rumsfeld Is Outside – Myers heads toward Rumsfeld’s office, on the third floor of the E Ring—the outer ring of the Pentagon. He finds thickening smoke in the E Ring corridor and conditions almost as bad in Rumsfeld’s office suite. He talks to one of Rumsfeld’s aides who tells him the secretary of defense is outside, helping the wounded. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152] Although Rumsfeld was in his office earlier on, he headed outside immediately after the Pentagon was attacked (see 9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001) and went to the crash site, where he helped carry an injured victim on a stretcher (see Between 9:38 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 37; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 1-2; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 130] Since the secretary of defense is not around, Myers leaves word that he is returning to the NMCC and then makes his way back to the command center. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 152-153]
Myers Will Rejoin the Conference Call – The length of time he spends away from the NMCC is unclear. However, he will be back there by 10:17 a.m. At that time, Leidig will state over the conference call that the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “would like to know who’s controlling the aircraft over Washington, DC.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ] Rumsfeld will arrive at the NMCC and start participating in the conference call at around 10:30 a.m. (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131] After then, he and the vice chairman “stayed joined the rest of the day together,” Myers will recall. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Director Finally Takes Over from Stand-In
Brigadier General Montague Winfield finally returns to his post as the deputy director for operations (DDO) in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, after leaving a colleague, who only recently qualified to take over the position, to stand in for him throughout the terrorist attacks. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] At 8:30 a.m. Winfield left his post to attend a pre-scheduled meeting that was unrelated to the morning’s attacks and had been convened by the Air Force. Since that time, Captain Charles Leidig has replaced him as the DDO (see 8:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). Leidig, the deputy for Command Center operations, only qualified to stand in as the DDO in the NMCC about a month ago. Even though officers in the NMCC realized the US was under terrorist attack when the second plane hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m., Winfield did not return to his post at that time (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ]
Winfield Returns to His Post, but Timing Unclear – Now Winfield finally relieves Leidig and resumes his duties as DDO. This happens after Flight 93 has crashed in Pennsylvania (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001), although the exact time is unclear. In a private interview with the 9/11 Commission, Leidig will say he is “certain that Winfield returned [from the meeting] after the Pentagon was hit” at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), but he “is not certain of Winfield’s arrival in relationship with the vice chairman” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] (According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Myers arrived at the NMCC shortly before 10:00 a.m. (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] ) Winfield then takes over as DDO “at some point in relation to the report of the Pennsylvania crash,” according to Leidig. As the 9/11 Commission will point out, since the crash of Flight 93 happened around 10:03 a.m., “any reporting would be after that time.” [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] During a public hearing of the 9/11 Commission, Leidig will similarly say that Winfield takes over from him “[r]ight after we resolved what was going on with United 93.” He will also say that a report over the NMCC’s air threat conference at 10:37 a.m., about an anonymous threat against Air Force One (see (10:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001), occurs “right after I was relieved on the watch by General Winfield.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] This would indicate that Winfield takes over from Leidig at around 10:30 a.m.
Unclear If Winfield Returns to Post Immediately after Meeting – It is also unclear whether Winfield returns to his position as DDO immediately after leaving the Air Force-convened meeting, or he allowed Leidig to continue in his place even while he was available to resume his duties. A 9/11 Commission memorandum will state, “Winfield transitioned into the position [of DDO] upon his return to the NMCC,” following the meeting. [9/11 Commission, 7/21/2003 ] Leidig will recall that he “looked up at one point and General Winfield was standing next to him.” He will also recall that Myers “looked at him at one time and realized the coordinator [i.e. the DDO] was not a general as the position called for, and asked who the general or admiral was that had duty that day.” The guidance that was subsequently given was “to get General Winfield briefed up and in the chair.”
Leidig Listens to Conference before Returning to Post – After Winfield returns to his position as DDO, Leidig initially “stands next to him and listens to the [NMCC’s air threat] conference.” Leidig will then transition into his regular job, which involves making sure the NMCC operates properly, and start dealing with the smoke coming into the center and other issues effecting operations there. [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ]
10:43 a.m.-10:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Defense Readiness Condition Is Raised to the Highest Level in 28 Years
The US military’s defense readiness condition is raised from Defcon 5, the lowest possible level, to Defcon 3, an intermediate level that requires a heightened alert status for US armed forces worldwide, and which is the highest the defense readiness condition has been for 28 years. [Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7/18/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 131; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
Rumsfeld Recommends Raising the Defcon – The decision to go to Defcon 3 is reportedly made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] Rumsfeld will later recall that after he arrives at the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) (see (10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), he talks with General Richard Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and “[w]e discussed and I recommended raising the defense condition level from five to three.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004]
Teleconference Participants Are Told to ‘Hold Off’ on Defcon 3 – Rumsfeld directs that the US military go to Defcon 3. At 10:43 a.m., it is announced on the air threat conference call that the secretary of defense “has directed that we go to Defcon 3 and be prepared to go to [Defcon] 2.” However, a minute later, Rumsfeld talks to Vice President Dick Cheney on the conference call, and Cheney says he will have to run the decision to go to Defcon 3 by the president, “and let him make the call.” Therefore, at 10:45 a.m., those on the conference call are told to “hold off on Defcon 3.”
Order to Raise the Defcon Is Reinstated – But Rumsfeld believes raising the defense readiness condition is urgent. [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326, 554] There is therefore a “historical discussion about how the move to Defcon 3 went during previous crises, Cuba specifically [i.e. the Cuban missile crisis in 1962],” Captain Charles Leidig, who is also in the NMCC, will later recall. With their reference being “a book on the shelf,” according to Leidig, Myers is shown that he has “approval authority to go to Defcon 3.” [9/11 Commission, 4/29/2004 ] After consulting Defense Department directives, Rumsfeld concludes that he has the authority to issue the order to raise the defense readiness condition. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554] Therefore, at 10:46 a.m., those on the air threat conference call are told: “Override last instructions. The vice chairman [i.e. Myers] is directing we go to Defcon 3.” A few minutes later, an announcement is made on the conference call, “Emergency action message released at 14:52 [Zulu time, i.e. 10:52 a.m. Eastern time], re: Defcon 3.” [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2004]
Raising the Defcon Is a ‘Huge Move’ – Rumsfeld will later agree with an interviewer that raising the defense readiness condition is “a very serious step for the nation.” [US Department of Defense, 8/12/2002] It was last raised to Defcon 3 during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when Rumsfeld had been the United States ambassador to NATO. Regarding the decision to raise it, Myers tells Rumsfeld, “It’s a huge move, but it’s appropriate.” [US Department of Defense, 1/9/2002; Wall Street Journal, 3/22/2004 ; Rumsfeld, 2011, pp. 338]
President Is Later Told of the Decision – The decision to go to Defcon 3 will soon be communicated within NORAD (see 11:03 a.m.-11:12 a.m. September11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2003; 9/11 Commission, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 2/3/2004 ] Rumsfeld will brief President Bush on the decision (see (11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 554; Bush, 2010, pp. 133] Apparently around the time the defense readiness condition is raised, Rumsfeld and/or Myers also decide to raise the force protection condition of US military installations (see (Between 10:10 a.m. and 10:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004 ; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153]
Defcon 3 Was Intended for the Cold War – Some individuals will later be critical of the decision to raise the defense readiness condition at this time. John Farmer, the senior counsel to the 9/11 Commission, will write that Defcon 3 is in fact “a Cold War-era designation, devised to respond to a nuclear threat.” [Farmer, 2009, pp. 235] According to Farmer and other 9/11 Commission staffers, it is “suited more to a Cold War conflict than to al-Qaeda’s attack.” [Rutgers Law Review, 9/7/2011 ] General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, will similarly say that Defcon 3 is “not intended for [events like] the attacks of 9/11 and thus could have complicated the response to the attacks.” He will say he does not think that raising the condition would have “done anything for us” within the continental United States. [9/11 Commission, 3/1/2004 ]
Defcons Are Phased Increases in Combat Readiness – The defense readiness condition is a “uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands, and for use by the [armed] services,” according to the Department of Defense. [US Department of Defense, 11/8/2010 ] Defcons are phased increases in combat readiness and are graduated to match situations of varying military severity. They are numbered, from Defcon 5, which means “normal peacetime readiness,” down to Defcon 1, which means “maximum force readiness.” The current level, Defcon 3, represents an “increase in force readiness above normal readiness.” [Federation of American Scientists, 4/29/1998] The defense readiness condition will remain at Defcon 3 until three days later, when it will be reduced one notch, to Defcon 4 (see September 14, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/30/2002]
