9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar reenters the US. The CIA and FBI have recently been showing interest in him, but have still failed to place him on a watch list of US-designated terrorists. Had he been placed on a watch list by this date, he would have been stopped and possibly detained as he tried to enter the US. He enters on a new US visa obtained in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on June 13, 2001. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 169 
]
Invalid Passport, Indicator of Terrorist Affiliation – His passport is invalid, as it lacks an expiry date. However, his passport does contain an indicator that he is a terrorist, an indicator used by the Saudi authorities to track his movements (see June 1, 2001 and July 4, 2001), but this indicator is not recognized by US officials. The precise state of US knowledge about the indicator at this time is not known (see Around February 1993). The CIA will learn of it no later than 2003, but will still not inform immigration officials then (see February 14, 2003). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 27 ] His visa application said that he had not previously been to the US, which is not true (see January 15, 2000), so his entry is illegal. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 351 ]
‘Muscle’ Have Already Arrived – The FBI will note that he returns just days after the last of the hijacker “muscle” has entered the US, and will speculate that he returns because his job in bringing them over is finished. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 169 ]
Source: Lists WTC as Destination – According to a stipulation introduced at the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, he lists the Marriot Hotel in the World Trade Center complex as his destination, but does not stay there that night. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 52 ]
July 5, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Warns Domestic Agencies of ‘Something Spectacular’ Planned by Al-Qaeda
At the request of National Security Adviser Rice and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke leads a meeting of the Counterterrorism Security Group, attended by officials from a dozen federal agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FAA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, Customs, the CIA, and the FBI. The CIA and FBI give briefings on the growing al-Qaeda threat. [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Time, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258] Then Clarke later recalls saying, “You’ve just heard that CIA thinks al-Qaeda is planning a major attack on us. So do I. You heard CIA say it would probably be in Israel or Saudi Arabia. Maybe. But maybe it will be here. Just because there is no evidence that says that it will be here, does not mean it will be overseas. They may try to hit us at home. You have to assume that is what they are going to do.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 236] Two attendees later recall Clarke stating that “something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it’s going to happen soon.” One who attended the meeting later calls the evidence that “something spectacular” is being planned by al-Qaeda “very gripping.” [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Time, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 256] Clarke directs every counterterrorist office to cancel vacations, defer non-vital travel, put off scheduled exercises, and place domestic rapid-response teams on much shorter alert. However, there is very poor follow up to the meeting and the attendees don’t share the warnings with their home agencies (see Shortly After July 5, 2001). By early August, all of these emergency measures are no longer in effect. [CNN, 3/2002; Washington Post, 5/17/2002]
July 5, 2001: CIA Officer Says Malaysia Summit Attendees May Be Linked to Current Threat Reporting
Tom Wilshire, a CIA officer assigned to the FBI, sends an e-mail to managers at Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, saying there is a potential connection between recent warnings of an attack against US interests and al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit in January 2000 (see January 5-8, 2000). He notes “how bad things look in Malaysia” and points out that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar may be connected to the radicals who attacked the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000). He recommends that the Cole bombing and the Malaysia summit be re-examined for potential connections to the current warnings of an attack. The e-mail ends, “all the indicators are of a massively bad infrastructure being readily completed with just one purpose in mind.” [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 298 ] This is one of a series of e-mails sent around this time by Wilshire to Alec Station about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit (see July 13, 2001 and July 23, 2001). Presumably, one of the recipients at CIA headquarters is Richard Blee, the manager responsible for Alec Station, as he apparently receives at least one of the e-mails (see July 13, 2001).
July 5, 2001: CIA Warns Attorney General Ashcroft of Imminent, Multiple Attacks from Al-Qaeda
The CIA briefs Attorney General Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat. Several senior CIA Counterterrorist Center officials warn him that a significant attack is imminent, preparations for multiple attacks are in the late stages or already complete, and that little additional warning can be expected. He is told the attack is more likely to occur overseas than in the US. He was also briefed by the CIA on the al-Qaeda threat on May 15, 2001. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258-259, 534; Tenet, 2007, pp. 150] CIA Director Tenet will later claim in a book that at the end of the briefing, Ashcroft turned to some FBI personnel and asked them, “Why are they telling me this? Why am I not hearing this from you?” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 150] However, in fact, the FBI did brief Ashcroft for an hour an the al-Qaeda threat one week earlier (see June 28, 2001). One week later, the FBI will brief him again about the al-Qaeada threat and he will reportedly reply, “I do not want to hear about this anymore” (see July 12, 2001). By the end of July, he will stop flying commercial aircraft in the US (see July 26, 2001).
Shortly After July 5, 2001: Warning from Urgent Meeting Is Not Shared within Domestic Agencies
On July 5, 2001, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke gave a dramatic briefing to representatives from several domestic agencies on the urgent al-Qaeda threat (see July 5, 2001). However, the warnings given generally are not passed on by the attendees back to their respective agencies. The domestic agencies were not questioned about how they planned to address the threat and were not told what was expected of them. According to the 9/11 Commission, attendees later “report that they were told not to disseminate the threat information they received at the meeting. They interpreted this direction to mean that although they could brief their superiors, they could not send out advisories to the field.” One National Security Council official has a different recollection of what happened, recalling that attendees were asked to take the information back to their agencies and “do what you can” with it, subject to classification and distribution restrictions. But, for whatever reason, none of the involved agencies post internal warnings based on the meeting, except for Customs which puts out a general warning based entirely on publicly known historical facts. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258, 264] The FAA issues general and routine threat advisories that don’t reflect the level of urgency expressed by Clarke and others (see January-August 2001). FAA Administrator Jane Garvey later claims she was unaware of a heightened threat level, but in 2005 it will be revealed that about half of the FAA’s daily briefings during this time period referred to bin Laden or al-Qaeda (see April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001). [New York Times, 4/18/2004] Clarke said rhetorically in the meeting that he wants to know if a sparrow has fallen from a tree. A senior FBI official attended the meeting and promised a redoubling of the FBI’s efforts. However, just five days after Clarke’s meeting, FBI agent Ken Williams sends off his memo speculating that al-Qaeda may be training operatives as pilots in the US (see July 10, 2001), yet the FBI fails to share this information with Clarke or any other agency. [Washington Post, 5/17/2002; Clarke, 2004, pp. 236-37] The FBI will also fail to tell Clarke about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 16, 2001), or what they know about Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (see August 23, 2001).
July 6, 2001: CIA Counterterrorism Chief Black Warns Some Arab Visitors that a Major Al-Qaeda Attack Is Imminent
Cofer Black, director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, tells a visiting group from an Arab country that an attack on an unprecedented scale is going to happen, but the details of when and where it will occur are unknown. [Kiriakou and Ruby, 2010, pp. 99-100; Real News Network, 4/23/2015; Truthdig, 8/12/2017] The CIA occasionally holds visits for members of the intelligence services of friendly foreign countries at its headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The visitors are usually given a tour of the CIA’s operations center, and allowed to meet the CIA director and other senior officials, if possible. The visit is a chance for them to get acquainted with the CIA, exchange gifts, and take some photos. “We wanted to make them feel welcome and important” because these intelligence services “could be additional eyes and ears in places where our own access was limited,” CIA officer John Kiriakou will later write. Today, Kiriakou is hosting one such group, which comes from an unnamed small Middle Eastern state. The group, which includes some relatively low-level military officers, is made up of people Kiriakou has been training. Kiriakou asked Black if he would stop by to meet the group and, to his surprise, Black agreed to do so.
Black Gives a Detailed Briefing on Al-Qaeda – “This is a really big deal,” Kiriakou explains to the visitors. Black, he says, is “the head of counterterrorism for the entire world, which makes him a crucial guy in our shop.” After he arrives, Black shakes the hands of all the visitors and, once everyone is seated in a conference room, he welcomes them to the CIA and says how much the agency values their friendship. In light of the Counterterrorist Center director’s busy schedule, Kiriakou is expecting Black to stay for only a short time, perhaps taking a few questions before leaving. But he stays for about 30 minutes, and delivers a detailed and comprehensive briefing on what he considers the most important topic: al-Qaeda.
Black Says, ‘Something Terrible Is Going to Happen’ – Black begins by telling the visitors about the growing terrorist threat. He then warns them that some kind of major catastrophic event is imminent, saying: “We know something terrible is going to happen. We don’t know when and we don’t know where.” He adds that, despite the lack of knowledge of its details, “We do know it’s going to be against US interests and it’s going to be big, perhaps bigger than anything we’ve seen before.” The visitors are silent upon hearing this alarming information.
‘Chatter’ Indicates an Attack Is Imminent – “The mood in the al-Qaeda training camps is one of jubilation,” Black continues. “We’ve never seen them as excited and as happy as they are now,” he adds. He says “chatter” has been picked up that appears to be filled with code words and phrases that CIA analysts consider frightening, such as, “There’s going to be a great wedding,” “There’s going to be a great soccer game,” and, “The salesman is coming with great quantities of honey.” These are all coded references to a terrorist attack, he asserts. “We’re sure it’s going to happen, we just don’t know where,” he says of the predicted attack. Black then asks the visitors for their cooperation in tackling the threat. “If you have any sources inside al-Qaeda, please work them now because whatever it is, we have to do everything we can to stop it,” he says. By the end of the briefing, the visitors are clearly unsettled. They are so shocked at the power of what they have been told that when Black asks if they have any questions, no one can think of any. Finally, the senior member of the group stands up and says he will pass on Black’s information to his country’s intelligence service, and it would do everything in its power to assist the US.
Black Will Say He Was ‘Very Serious’ in the Briefing – Later on, when he thanks Black for giving his time, Kiriakou will ask the Counterterrorist Center director, “Did you just make that up or embellish the state of play for their benefit, or were you serious in that briefing?” Black will say he was “very serious.” He will tell Kiriakou he has been to the White House and talked with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice about the threat, and White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke is also making a noise about the issue, but no one is paying much attention to them. [Kiriakou and Ruby, 2010, pp. 99-101] Black is one of only a few people in the CIA who have been trying to alert the Bush administration to the growing threat posed by al-Qaeda. [WBUR, 10/13/2020] All through the summer, he is telling anyone who will listen that something terrible is going to happen and a massive attack is imminent (see April 2001, July 10, 2001, and August 15, 2001). “But,” journalist and author Jane Mayer will comment, “one of the things that mystified Black’s colleagues was how he could have been as alarmed as he was about al-Qaeda yet fail to piece together the many fragments of the September 11 puzzle that reached the [CIA] prior to the attacks.” [Mayer, 2008, pp. 12]
July 6, 2001: CIA Warns Upcoming Al-Qaeda Attack Will Be ‘Spectacular’ and Different
The CIA warns the interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) that al-Qaeda members “believe the upcoming attack will be ‘spectacular,’ qualitatively different from anything they have done to date.” [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 259] Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who leads the CSG, similarly warned the CSG of a “spectacular” al-Qaeda attack the day before (see July 5, 2001).
July 6, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Tells Rice to Warn Agencies to Prepare for 3 to 5 Simultaneous Attacks; No Apparent Response
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke sends National Security Adviser Rice an e-mail message “outlining a number of steps agreed on” at the Counterterrorism Security Group meeting the day before (see July 5, 2001), “including efforts to examine the threat of weapons of mass destruction and possible attacks in Latin America. One senior administration official [says] Mr. Clarke [writes] that several agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon, [have] been directed to develop what the official [says are] ‘detailed response plans in the event of three to five simultaneous attacks.’” However, no response or follow-up action has been pointed out. [New York Times, 4/4/2004]
July 9, 2001: Chechen Leader Promises Fighters ‘Very Big News’; CIA Learns of This and Briefs White House
Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab promises some “very big news” to his fighters and this statement is communicated to the CIA. The CIA then forwards the warning to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice together with several similar pieces of intelligence, saying it is evidence that an al-Qaeda attack is imminent (see July 10, 2001). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151] The FBI is already aware that Ibn Khattab and Osama bin Laden, who have a long relationship (see 1986-March 19, 2002), may be planning a joint attack against US interests (see Before April 13, 2001). One of the operatives, Zacarias Moussaoui, will be arrested a month later (see August 16, 2001), but a search warrant for his belongings will not be granted (see August 16, 2001, August 22, 2001 and August 28, 2001).
July 9-10, 2001: CIA Receives Several New Pieces of Intelligence Indicating Al-Qaeda Will Attack Soon
The CIA receives several pieces of intelligence over a 24-hour period, all of which predict an imminent attack. They include: 
Ibn Khattab, a Chechen radical connected to Osama bin Laden (see 1986-March 19, 2002), promises his troops “very big news” (see (July 9, 2001)); Islamic extremists are traveling to Afghanistan in greater numbers; There have been significant departures of extremist families from Yemen; There are indications of threats against US interests in Lebanon, Morocco, and Mauritania.
This information will be promptly communicated to CIA Director George Tenet (see July 10, 2001) and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (see July 10, 2001). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151]
