An officer with the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) calls for the evacuation of the upper floors of the North Tower of the World Trade Center over a PAPD radio channel. Transcripts of PAPD radio transmissions will show that at 8:49 a.m., three minutes after Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), the PAPD officer talks to the PAPD desk, which is in Building 5 of the WTC, just northeast of the North Tower. He says: “Start doing the evac, the upper levels. Have the units put on the Scott air packs.” The officer at the PAPD desk then radios all PAPD units and tells them to “bring Scott air packs [to] One World Trade,” i.e. the North Tower. [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 9/11/2001, pp. 2 
; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 16 ; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 195]
Patrol Sergeant Recalls Requesting Evacuation – It is unclear which PAPD officer requests the evacuation at this time. According to some accounts, Alan DeVona, the PAPD patrol sergeant at the WTC, makes the request. [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 16 ; Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 78] DeVona will later recall that he had just walked out from the PAPD desk in WTC 5 when he heard the explosion as Flight 11 hit the North Tower. Along with his colleague, Anthony Basic, he radioed the PAPD desk and reported that the top floors of the North Tower were on fire, due to a “possible aircraft collision.” He headed into the North Tower to coordinate with emergency agencies as they arrived there. DeVona will recall that he then “radios to have all WTC police units get Scott air packs and begin evacuation of [the North Tower].” He will subsequently be “approached by numerous PAPD units as they entered the lobby” of the North Tower, and he “dispatches them through the concourse to evacuate the complex.” [Devona, 3/28/2002, pp. 24 ]
Police Commander Recalls Requesting Evacuation – However, Captain Anthony Whitaker, the PAPD commanding officer at the WTC, will also say that he calls for the evacuation of the WTC around this time. Whitaker was on duty in the shopping mall beneath the Twin Towers when Flight 11 hit the North Tower. [Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 78] He heard a “strange roar” and saw a “gigantic fireball” coming out of the lobby of the North Tower. He then contacts the PAPD desk in WTC 5. Whitaker will recall, “I had no idea what had just happened, but I knew it was bad.” Therefore, he will say, “I ordered the cop at the desk to begin a full-scale evacuation of the entire complex.” This will mean the evacuation of “both towers and the adjoining buildings.” Whitaker contacts one of his sergeants and then, he will recall, “we started placing Port Authority cops in strategic locations in the shopping mall to direct the evacuation.” Whitaker will say that after 9/11, he is repeatedly asked, “Why did you give that order to evacuate at that particular time?” following the first crash, but before the second plane hit the WTC. His explanation will be: “It just occurred to me that whatever was going on—and I still didn’t know what that was—was beyond my ability as a commanding officer of that facility to do anything about it. So it seemed to me that the only prudent thing to do was start a full-scale evacuation and get everybody out of there.” [Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 23-24; Murphy, 2002, pp. 179-181]
Evacuation Orders Cannot Be Heard by Fire Safety Directors – At 9:00 a.m., Whitaker will call for an evacuation of the entire WTC complex (see 8:59 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). However, both that instruction and the current one are given over PAPD radio channel W, which cannot be heard by the deputy fire safety directors in the Twin Towers, who are able to make announcements to the buildings’ occupants over the public address systems. [WTC News, 8/1995 ; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 19 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 293; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 195, 201] An announcement advising workers to evacuate will only go out over the public address system in the South Tower at 9:02 a.m. (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). And attempts to order workers to evacuate the North Tower are unsuccessful because that building’s public address system was damaged by the plane crash (see (Between 8:47 a.m. and 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 5/18/2004]
PAPD Investigates All Reports of Fires at WTC – The WTC is a Port Authority property, which means it is patrolled by the PAPD—the Port Authority’s independent police agency. Members of the PAPD respond to “thefts, injuries, fires, all species of crisis large and small, almost always more quickly than the city emergency responders could get there,” according to New York Times reporters Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn. “By plan,” Dwyer and Flynn will write, “the PAPD checked out every report of fire” and “its officers were trained in at least rudimentary firefighting.” [Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 78]
8:59 a.m.-9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001: Port Authority Police Officers Order Evacuation of WTC Buildings, but Orders Not Passed On
Sergeant Alan DeVona, an officer with the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), calls for the evacuation of the Twin Towers over a PAPD radio channel, and his colleague, Captain Anthony Whitaker, then calls for the evacuation of the entire World Trade Center complex, but their orders are apparently not passed on [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 19 ; 9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ; Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 78-79; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 200-202] DeVona, the PAPD patrol sergeant at the WTC, is currently in the lobby of the North Tower, coordinating with emergency agencies as they arrive there. [Devona, 3/28/2002, pp. 24 ] Whitaker, the PAPD commanding officer at the WTC, is outside the Twin Towers, looking up at the burning North Tower. [Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 25; Murphy, 2002, pp. 184]
Officers Request Evacuation of the WTC – At 8:59 a.m., DeVona calls for the evacuation of the Twin Towers. “As soon as we’re able,” he says over the PAPD radio channel, “I want to start a building evacuation, Building 1 [i.e. the North Tower] and Building 2 [i.e. the South Tower], till we find out what caused this.” Immediately after DeVona says this, at 9:00 a.m., Whitaker makes a similar request over the same radio channel. “Let’s begin an evacuation of the entire complex,” he says. “All buildings, copy?” [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 19 ; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 200-201] Unlike DeVona, Whitaker is ordering the evacuation of not just the Twin Towers, “but also the five other buildings throughout the 16-acre complex—the mercantile exchange, offices of major investment banking concerns, and government agencies, including the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA,” according to New York Times reporters Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn. [Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 79] Whitaker has decided to evacuate the WTC complex “because of the danger posed by highly flammable jet fuel from Flight 11,” which crashed into the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), and “because of the magnitude of the calamity in the North Tower,” according to the 9/11 Commission. [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 293]
Request Is the Second Time Evacuation Is Called For – Whitaker will later say that his current request is the “second time” he has called for the evacuation of the WTC complex. He will recall making his previous request—for “a full-scale evacuation of the entire complex”—shortly after Flight 11 crashed. [Fink and Mathias, 2002, pp. 23-25; Murphy, 2002, pp. 180-181, 184-185] Transcripts of PAPD radio transmissions will show that an evacuation was requested at 8:49 a.m., but only for the upper floors of the North Tower (see 8:49 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 9/11/2001 ; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 195] And according to some accounts, that request was made by DeVona, not Whitaker. [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 16 ; Devona, 3/28/2002, pp. 24 ; Dwyer and Flynn, 2005, pp. 78]
Officer Repeats Order, for the Written Record – At 9:01 a.m., an officer at the PAPD desk in Building 5 of the WTC asks if they should evacuate their building. DeVona instructs the officer to wait, saying, “Stand by on Building 5.” Whitaker then asks the officer at the PAPD desk if they have started a “chrono log” yet. [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 19 ; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 201] A “chrono” is a written record of what the PAPD is doing. [Murphy, 2002, pp. 182] The officer replies, “That’s affirmative.” At 9:02 a.m., Whitaker repeats his previous instruction, apparently to make sure it is officially recorded. He says: “For the chrono, evacuate all buildings in the complex. You copy? All building in the complex.” The officer at the PAPD desk acknowledges the instruction and then radios all PAPD units in the field, and tells them to evacuate “all tenants in the buildings… at the Trade Center.” [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 9/11/2001 ; Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 11/12/2001, pp. 19 ; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 202]
Orders Not Passed on to Other Agencies – It is unclear whether DeVona and Whitaker’s orders to evacuate the WTC are passed on. Their orders are given over PAPD radio channel W, which cannot be heard by the deputy fire safety directors in the Twin Towers, who are able to make announcements over the buildings’ public address systems. [WTC News, 8/1995 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 293; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 200-202] According to the 9/11 Commission, there is “no evidence” that the orders are “communicated to officers in other Port Authority Police commands or to members of other responding agencies.” [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] Despite this, an announcement is made over the public address system in the South Tower, advising workers to evacuate, at 9:02 a.m. (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). Attempts to order workers to evacuate the North Tower are unsuccessful because that building’s public address system was damaged by the plane crash (see (Between 8:47 a.m. and 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 5/18/2004]
Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Command Bus Is Moved after a Police Captain Warns that the North Tower Will Collapse
Inspector Joseph Morris, a commanding officer with the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), gives the order to move the PAPD’s mobile command post further away from the World Trade Center and thereby likely prevents those in it being killed or seriously injured when the North Tower collapses. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 100-101] The mobile command post is a vehicle the size of a bus that was dispatched from the PAPD’s headquarters in Jersey City when word reached there about the crash at the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). It arrived near the Twin Towers at around 9:30 a.m. and was parked just north of the intersection of West and Vesey Streets, next to Building 6 of the WTC. [Urban Hazards Forum, 1/2002; Accardi, 3/7/2002 ; Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 8, 100] After the South Tower collapsed (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), Port Authority personnel gathered at the vehicle to regroup.
Police Captain Says the North Tower Will Collapse – At some point, Captain Anthony Whitaker, the PAPD commanding officer at the WTC, comes to the mobile command post and warns that the North Tower is in danger of collapsing, like the South Tower did. [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] He is convinced that the North Tower is “about to come down any minute,” he will later recall. [Murphy, 2002, pp. 187] He approaches Morris outside the vehicle and urgently tells him that “the area is not safe, because [the North Tower] is coming down.” [9/11 Commission, 11/10/2003] Presumably in response to Whitaker’s warning, Morris decides that the vehicle needs to be moved to somewhere safer. “I knew that the mobile command post must be moved north on West Street,” he will state. [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] He gets into the vehicle and gives the order, “Move the command post.”
Instruction Is Given to Move the Command Bus – Those in the vehicle groan in frustration when they hear Morris’s order, since “[p]eople were in motion, the command post was almost operational, [and] no one wanted to disconnect everything and start all over,” according to a book by Lieutenant William Keegan of the PAPD. But Morris ignores their objections, points to a location on a map of the city, and says, “Move it there.” [9/11 Commission, 11/10/2003; Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 100]
Fire Trucks Move to Allow the Vehicle to Drive Away – Sergeant William Zika, who is at the mobile command post with Morris, talks with Police Officer Frank Accardi, the vehicle’s driver, and Police Officer Thomas Kennedy “about moving the bus further north to a safer location.” [Zika, 3/9/2002] But before they can start the vehicle, Accardi and Kennedy have to clean its air filter, which became clogged with debris when the South Tower collapsed. [Merrill, 2011, pp. 232; Law Officer, 8/16/2011] Meanwhile, Whitaker starts yelling at the fire trucks parked nearby to free up space so the vehicle can get away. [Murphy, 2002, pp. 187]
Moving the Command Bus Reportedly Saves Lives – Accardi then starts the mobile command post, moves it north, and parks it on West Street, between Murray and Chambers Streets. The North Tower of the WTC will collapse while the vehicle is at this location, at 10:28 a.m. (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Accardi, 3/7/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 11/10/2003; 9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] The tower will crush Building 6 of the WTC, “covering the exact spot where the command post had stood with tons of debris,” Keegan will write. This will mean that Morris’s order to move the vehicle “prevented the deaths of everyone in the PAPD command post,” according to Keegan. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 100-101]
