NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) tries to get fighter jets from a military unit in Duluth, Minnesota, sent after Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, but the unit is unable to respond. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 
] NEADS has been contacted by the FAA’s Boston Center and incorrectly told that Delta 1989 is a possible hijacking (see 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). The aircraft is just south of Toledo, Ohio, and Colonel Robert Marr and Major Kevin Nasypany order the troops at NEADS to call Air National Guard bases in that area to see if any of them can launch fighters. [9/11 Commission, 2004; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
NEADS Calls Duluth – The staff attempts to get a unit in Duluth to send jets toward the Delta flight. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004 ] Presumably the unit they call is the 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard, which is located at the Duluth International Airport and flies the F-16 Fighting Falcon. [GlobalSecurity (.org), 8/21/2005] Unlike Otis Air National Guard Base and Langley Air Force Base, the 148th FW at Duluth is not one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US. However, its mission does include “air superiority and air defense functions.” [Airman, 12/1999; US Air Force, 2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17]
Duluth Has ‘Nobody Available’ – The Duluth unit is unable to respond to NEADS’s request for help. [9/11 Commission, 1/22/2004 ] The reason for this is unclear. At 9:46 a.m., a member of staff on the NEADS operations floor will report that “Duluth has night flying, so there’s nobody available.” [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/11/2001; Donaldson and Johnson, 6/2008, pp. 47 ] Marr will subsequently instruct NEADS personnel to contact every Air National Guard unit in the Northeast US with instructions to get their fighters airborne (see (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). NEADS will also order Air National Guard jets from Selfridge and Toledo to intercept Delta 1989 (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 28; Spencer, 2008, pp. 178-180]
10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Alert Fighters at Tyndall Air Base Do Not Launch to Escort Air Force One
Although the White House has requested a fighter escort for Air Force One (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), fighter jets that are kept on alert at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida reportedly fail to launch in order to accompany the president’s plane after it takes off from Sarasota, Florida (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 87; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38]
Fighters on ‘Battle Stations’ but Not Launched – The 148th Fighter Wing of the Minnesota Air National Guard has a full time active duty detachment at Tyndall Air Force Base, near Panama City. [Filson, 1999; US Air Force, 2004; GlobalSecurity (.org), 8/21/2005] This unit serves as one of NORAD’s seven “alert” sites around the US, which all have a pair of fighter jets on the runway, armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes if called upon. [Airman, 12/1999; Air Force Magazine, 2/2002; Bergen Record, 12/5/2003] But, according to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, although NORAD’s Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) puts the alert jets at Tyndall on “battle stations,” it does not launch them. The jets’ pilots sit “in their cockpits awaiting word to go, but Air Force One moved so quickly they were never scrambled.” Instead, F-16s from Ellington Field in Texas are scrambled, and escort Air Force One to Barksdale Air Force Base (see (After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 87] However, in a 2002 interview, Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will claim that after NORAD is told “just to follow the president” on Air Force One, it “scrambled available airplanes from Tyndall and then from Ellington in Houston, Texas. The Ellington F-16s chased Air Force One and landed with the president at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana.” [Code One Magazine, 1/2002]
Other Alert Fighters in Florida Not Launched – NORAD also keeps two fighters on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base, near Miami, Florida, but it is unclear whether these are scrambled after Air Force One, and apparently they never accompany the president’s plane (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Philip Melanson, an expert on the Secret Service, will later comment: “I can’t imagine by what glitch the protection was not provided to Air Force One as soon as it took off. I would have thought there’d be something in place whereby one phone call from the head of the security detail would get the fighters in the air immediately.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 87; St. Petersburg Times, 7/4/2004]
