An unmanned spy plane called the Predator begins flying over Afghanistan, showing incomparably detailed real-time video and photographs of the movements of what appears to be bin Laden and his aides. It flies successfully over Afghanistan 16 times. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] President Clinton is impressed by a two-minute video of bin Laden crossing a street heading toward a mosque inside his Tarnak Farms complex. Bin Laden is surrounded by a team of a dozen armed men creating a professional forward security perimeter as he moves. The Predator has been used since 1996, in the Balkans and Iraq. One Predator crashes on takeoff and another is chased by a fighter, but it apparently identifies bin Laden on three occasions. Its use is stopped in Afghanistan after a few trials, mostly because seasonal winds are picking up. It is agreed to resume the flights in the spring, but the Predator fails to fly over Afghanistan again until after 9/11. [Washington Post, 12/19/2001; Clarke, 2004, pp. 220-21] On September 15, 2001, CIA Director Tenet apparently inaccurately tells President Bush, “The unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft that was now armed with Hellfire missiles had been operating for more than a year out of Uzbekistan to provide real-time video of Afghanistan.” [Washington Post, 1/29/2002]
December 2000: Incoming Bush Administration Briefed on Terrorism Threat; Apparently Ignores Recommendations
CIA Director Tenet and other top CIA officials brief President-elect Bush, Vice President-elect Cheney, future National Security Adviser Rice, and other incoming national security officials on al-Qaeda and covert action programs in Afghanistan. Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt recalls conveying that bin Laden is one of the gravest threats to the country. Bush asks whether killing bin Laden would end the problem. Pavitt says he answers that killing bin Laden would have an impact but not stop the threat. The CIA recommends the most important action to combat al-Qaeda is to arm the Predator drone and use it over Afghanistan. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; Reuters, 3/24/2004] However, while the drone is soon armed, Bush never gives the order to use it in Afghanistan until after 9/11 (see September 4, 2001).
January 10-25, 2001: National Security Adviser Rice Rejects Resuming Use of Surveillance Drone to Track Bin Laden
Even before President Bush’s official inauguration, Clinton holdover counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke pushes National Security Adviser Rice and other incoming Bush officials to resume Predator drone flights over Afghanistan (originally carried out in September and October 2000) in an attempt to find and assassinate bin Laden. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002; CBS News, 6/25/2003] On January 10, Rice is shown a video clip of bin Laden filmed by a Predator drone the year before. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] Aware of an Air Force plan to arm the Predator, when Clarke outlines a series of steps to take against al-Qaeda on January 25 (see January 25, 2001), one suggestion is to go forward with new Predator drone reconnaissance missions in the spring and use an armed version when it is ready. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The original Air Force development plan calls for three years of Predator testing, but Clarke pushes so hard that a Hellfire missile is successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. The armed Predator will be fully ready by early June 2001 (see Early June-September 10, 2001). [CBS News, 6/25/2003; New Yorker, 7/28/2003] However, Rice apparently approves the use of the Predator but only as part of a broader strategy against al-Qaeda. Since that strategy will still not be ready before 9/11, the Predator will not be put into use before 9/11. [Associated Press, 6/22/2003]
Early June-September 10, 2001: Armed Drone Ready to Hit Bin Laden, but Bureacratic Concerns Prevent Its Use
An armed version of the Predator drone successfully passes a test showing it is ready for use in Afghanistan. The Predator had been used successfully in 2000 to spot bin Laden (see September 7-October 2000), but it was not used in early 2001 while an armed version was prepared (see January 10-25, 2001). A Hellfire missile was successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. [CBS News, 6/25/2003] In early June 2001, a duplicate of the brick house where bin Laden is believed to be living in Kandahar, Afghanistan, is built in Nevada, and destroyed by a Predator missile. The test shows that the missile fired from miles away would have killed anyone in the building, and one participant calls this the long sought after “holy grail” that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] But National Security Adviser Rice reportedly wants to use the Predator only after an overall strategy for confronting al-Qaeda is worked out, and no such plan is close to being ready. [Associated Press, 6/22/2003] She and her deputy Steve Hadley decide to delay reconnaissance flights until all the arrangements for using the armed version can be worked out. In July 2001, Hadley directs the military to have armed Predators ready to deploy no later than September 1. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The main hold up seems to be bureaucratic. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke repeatedly advocates using the Predator, armed or unarmed. However, infighting between the CIA and the Air Force over who would pay for it and take responsibility delays its use. Clarke later says, “Every time we were ready to use it, the CIA would change its mind.” [New Yorker, 7/28/2003] The issue comes to a head in early September 2001, but even then, a decision to use the Predator is delayed (see September 4, 2001). [New Yorker, 7/28/2003] The armed Predator will finally be used in Afghanistan just days after 9/11. [Associated Press, 6/25/2003]
Late June 2001: CIA Holds Exercises to Consider Killing Bin Laden Using an Armed Drone
Air Force Lieutenant General John “Soup” Campbell, associate director of central intelligence for military support, holds two exercises at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to consider the issues around killing Osama bin Laden with an armed drone aircraft. With fears about an attack by al-Qaeda increasing, the CIA is now discussing the details of how a mission to kill the terrorist group’s leader with an armed drone might be carried out. Campbell holds the two exercises as part of this effort.
Officials from Several Agencies Attend the First Exercise – The first exercise, held in a windowless conference room at CIA headquarters, is attended by around 40 officials, action officers, and experts. About 20 of them sit around the conference table. These officials include Charlie Allen, assistant director of central intelligence for collection; Roger Cressey, deputy for counterterrorism on the National Security Council staff; and a number of lawyers from the CIA, Department of Defense, and National Security Council. The other 20 or so participants sit around the walls. They include officials from the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Air Force officers, and various “subject matter experts.”
Participants Agree to Kill Bin Laden in One Scenario – For about the first hour, a former Army officer who now works for the Counterterrorist Center presents what the CIA has learned about bin Laden from other sources since September 27, 2000, when a man believed to be the al-Qaeda leader was recorded on video by a Predator drone. The former Army officer then puts forward a specific scenario. Exercise participants are to imagine that human intelligence sources have informed the CIA that bin Laden is going to be at Tarnak Farms, an al-Qaeda base near Kandahar, Afghanistan, and so the decision has been made to launch an armed Predator while he is there. Campbell then plays the video of bin Laden recorded on September 27, 2000, which many in the room have never seen before. He asks who would be prepared to have the Predator fire a Hellfire missile at the man in the video and who thinks doing so might be a mistake, and why. Everyone in the room says they would support a decision to fire a missile at the man. They all feel certain that the total intelligence picture indicates he is bin Laden, the men around him must also be extremists, and there are no women or children nearby who would be at risk of injury when the missile struck.
Scenario Involving Weaker Evidence Is Considered – The former Army officer then asks those in the room to imagine a second scenario. In this situation, they have no information from human intelligence sources or other supplementary intelligence to base their decision on. All they have is another video captured by the Predator’s camera while the drone flew over a suspected al-Qaeda training camp the previous year. A tall man in white robes appears on the video walking along the wall outside the training compound, with some men surrounding him as if they are his security cordon. The appearance of the tall man and the behavior of those around him suggest he is bin Laden, but there is room for doubt and there is no intelligence from CIA agents or tribal allies to confirm this is the case.
Participants Disagree over Whether to Fire a Missile – Campbell asks those in the room who among them would be prepared to have a missile fired at the man and who would be unprepared to do so. This time, people disagree over what should be done. Some think the video alone is adequate evidence for firing a missile at the man, since if he was indeed bin Laden his death might eliminate a major threat to America. At the very least, the strike would eradicate some al-Qaeda terrorists. Others feel there is too much room for error without further evidence that the man in the video is bin Laden. Campbell feels encouraged to find those in the room disagreeing, since if an armed drone ever goes into use, he wants those handling it to be discerning about when to take action.
Aftermath of Killing Bin Laden Is Discussed – The exercise ends with Campbell leading a discussion of other, related issues. Participants are asked to consider what rules should be adopted to avoid collateral damage, especially the killing or injuring of women and children. They are also asked how the CIA and the rest of the US government should deal with the aftermath of a drone strike that killed bin Laden.
Second Exercise Is Attended by Senior Officials – Campbell and the former Army officer then hold their second tabletop exercise. This exercise, which takes place in the director’s conference room on the seventh floor of CIA headquarters, is smaller and attended by more senior CIA officials, including Director George Tenet. During it, there is more disagreement among participants than there was in the first exercise. Tenet is sure the CIA lacks the legal authority to kill someone by firing a missile from a drone at them, despite the existence of secret presidential orders, findings, and other directives relating to bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Other participants share his unease. Some of the officials express concern about what might happen if the CIA’s role in a drone strike became known. [Whittle, 2014, pp. 206-208]
July 2001: US Government Opposes Targeted Assassinations
The US denounces Israel’s use of targeted killing against Palestinian terrorists. Martin Indyk, the US ambassador to Israel, says: “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations.… They are extrajudicial killings and we do not support that.” [New Yorker, 10/26/2009] Around the same time, the US military is working on arming the Predator drone to enable remote, targeted assassinations of terrorists like Osama bin Laden (see Early June-September 10, 2001). The US will begin frequently using targeted assassinations shortly after the 9/11 attacks two months later (see September 18-October 7, 2001). In 2009, Gary Solis, former head of the law program at the US Military Academy, will comment, “The things we were complaining about from Israel a few years ago we now embrace.” [New Yorker, 10/26/2009]
July 2001: CIA Executive Director Krongard Holds a Briefing to Discuss Using a Drone to Kill Bin Laden
A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, executive director of the CIA, holds a briefing during which he plays a video taken by a drone aircraft that shows a man who appears to be al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and asks delegates if they think the US should try to assassinate the man based on this evidence. The briefing apparently takes place at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and is attended by representatives from various agencies.
‘Tall Man with the Cane’ Is Bin Laden – On a large screen on the wall, Krongard shows his audience the video. He freezes it at a certain point. “You can see the tall man with the cane—that’s Osama bin Laden,” he says. “You can’t make out his facial features, but there’s little doubt that we’ve isolated him, right there, out in the open in the field,” he adds. A CIA analyst then explains that the recording was made by a Predator drone in Afghanistan three weeks ago, in June 2001, after the CIA received intelligence that bin Laden would be meeting his people at the location shown in the video. He points out what he says are bin Laden’s security detail and the al-Qaeda leader’s SUV. As the video is moved forward a few frames at a time, the analyst explains that the overall scene led to a determination that the man shown was indeed bin Laden.
Audience Is Asked if This Evidence Is Sufficient to Kill Bin Laden – “Our evidence isn’t going to get any better than this,” Krongard interjects. He says: “The question is, what are we willing to do? Is the evidence sufficiently compelling? Is it good enough to kill Osama bin Laden the next time we have him in our crosshairs?” No one says anything in response. Krongard explains that the US Air Force has developed a missile called the Hellfire that can be mounted on a drone, thereby giving the drone the capability to kill. Air Force Lieutenant General John “Soup” Campbell then takes over the briefing to elaborate. [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020] Campbell is the associate director of central intelligence for military support. In this role, he is the principal adviser to CIA Director George Tenet on military issues. [US Air Force, 11/1/2003] He provides the audience with details of the Hellfire, describes test results, and says the missile is now ready for deployment on the Predator drone, which was previously only used for reconnaissance missions.
Decision Whether to Fire Lies with the President – In light of the information that has been presented, Krongard poses a question to the audience. He says: “This might be our only chance to take out the al-Qaeda leadership before they launch another attack on the US. I want a show of hands. If we get another film like this, should we fire at the tall man with a cane?” Many hands are raised by audience members who agree that they should try to kill the man. When Krongard asks if anyone disagrees, just a few hands are raised. Krongard then reassures the interagency representatives at the briefing that the decision whether to fire would not be theirs to make and instead would lie with the president. “Only the president can authorize the use of an armed drone,” he explains, adding, “It requires a covert action finding.” He says their job is simply to define the rules of engagement, meaning they have to determine “[u]nder what circumstances should the president’s authority to fire a drone be delegated, and to whom?”
Audience Discusses Issues around Using Armed Drones – The audience members then get into a lively discussion about the issues that have been raised during the briefing. Some of them assert that the president should personally approve any drone strikes. While the time taken to obtain presidential approval might result in missed opportunities, they believe that since drone strikes are new, the implications and consequences of their use are uncertain. But most of them take a more aggressive stance. They believe al-Qaeda’s escalating series of attacks against the US has shaken the nation’s confidence and there is a sense that more attacks are imminent. They feel that armed drones represent a potential breakthrough, providing the capability to neutralize terrorist threats before they evolve into attacks on the US.
Requirements for Executive Action Are Discussed – Further discussion ensues in which the requirements for taking executive action are fleshed out. Conditions are considered regarding how to limit civilian casualties, and prohibit strikes on mosques and holy sites. It is decided that the target of a drone strike must be clearly identifiable and on a carefully vetted targets list. The briefing’s attendees decide that a comprehensive set of recommendations should be composed for the CIA director to take to the president. If the president decided to proceed with the drone strikes, the CIA would work out modalities with the Air Force and the Department of Defense. After the briefing ends, some CIA officials who attended it will get together and discuss further whether the agency should carry out assassinations, and during the meeting Richard Blee, head of the CIA’s bin Laden unit, will emphasize the threat bin Laden poses and the benefits of killing him (see (July 2001)). [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020]
July 2001: Head of the CIA’s bin Laden Unit Compares the Current Situation to the Period before World War II and Bin Laden to Hitler
During a meeting with other CIA officials, Richard Blee, head of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, compares al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler before World War II and emphasizes that the terrorist threat would be significantly reduced if he was killed. The officials have just attended a briefing for representatives from various agencies during which A. B. “Buzzy” Krongard, executive director of the CIA, played a video recently taken by a drone aircraft that showed a man who appeared to be bin Laden. Krongard asked audience members if they thought the US should try to assassinate the man based on this evidence (see (July 2001)). After the briefing ends, James Pavitt, the CIA’s deputy director for operations, gathers together the CIA operations officers who attended it to further discuss the issues that were covered. Those at Pavitt’s meeting include Blee; Hugh Turner, the associate deputy director for operations; and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, deputy associate director of central intelligence for military support.
Pavitt Is Uneasy about the CIA Assassinating Terrorists – Pavitt appears uncomfortable with the implications of authorizing the CIA to deploy armed drones—something that was discussed during the briefing. He tells his colleagues: “We have to think long and hard about getting back into the assassination business. We should think about the impact it will have on our mission, on our organization. It’s dangerous to kill people in secret… even terrorists.” He adds, “We need to have a rock-solid case that conducting assassinations is necessary and justifiable, and also consistent with the broader principles that we serve as agency officers.”
Colleague Suggests Raising Concerns with the White House – Turner responds to Pavitt’s concerns, saying in a sullen manner: “Times are different than they were during the agency’s assassination and covert action days. The world has changed since the l960s and 1970s. We have congressional oversight, lots of oversight.” He advises Pavitt to raise his concerns with the White House. “They need to hear your reservations about repeating the mistakes of the past,” he tells him. He says that if the CIA is to go ahead and use armed Predator drones, it should make sure it has first received specific authorities in writing from the National Security Council. Additionally, he says, “Our lawyers need to square away the CIA’s legal authorities with [the] Department of Justice.”
Pavitt Wonders if Killing Bin Laden Is ‘Worth It’ – Pavitt gives more details of his reservations, saying: “We rejected assassination in our past because it was corrosive to our culture and to democracy. And we weren’t any good at it. It caused more harm than good.” He notes that killing people remotely using an armed drone “is dangerously seductive” since it would leave the CIA with “no blood on our hands.” In light of these concerns, he asks: “Is killing bin Laden worth it? Would it matter? Would his departure from the scene change things so much that it would justify a return to assassination operations?”
Bin Laden’s Death Would Be a ‘Major Blow’ to Al-Qaeda – Pavitt looks at Blee to see his reaction. “Pavitt would listen to Blee, an experienced and highly respected counterterrorist expert,” Mowatt-Larssen will later note. Blee clearly thinks the al-Qaeda leader is a serious enemy who poses a major threat to the United States. “Osama bin Laden is a charismatic leader. He is the heart and soul of al-Qaeda. He created this terrorist organization and declared war on America,” he says. He adds that no one else in al-Qaeda has the same influence and vision. He therefore indicates that he thinks assassinating bin Laden would have significant benefits. “His death would be a major blow to the movement,” he says. “The threat would be greatly diminished if bin Laden was eliminated,” he adds.
Blee Compares Bin Laden to Hitler – Blee explains the severity of the threat he feels bin Laden poses by comparing the al-Qaeda leader to Hitler. “The situation we’re in reminds me of the situation before World War II,” he says. “How would history have been different if we had a chance to take out Adolf Hitler before the war?” he asks. “Without Hitler, World War II war might have been averted,” he states, adding that similarly, “Without bin Laden, al-Qaeda is not the threat it represents with him as their leader.” Blee makes clear that he therefore believes the US should assassinate him, concluding: “We can’t pass up the chance to kill [bin Laden]. No, we have to take our shot if we get the chance.” Pavitt is surprised but also reassured by the firmness of Blee’s conviction. According to Mowatt-Larssen, while the deputy director for operations will continue to have misgivings about using armed drones to kill terrorists, it is now clear he will do nothing to prevent such action being taken. [Mowatt-Larssen, 2020]
September 4, 2001: Debate Heats Up Over Using Armed Predator Drone Against Bin Laden; Decision Again Delayed
Attendees to an important cabinet-level meeting on terrorism have a heated debate over what to do with the armed Predator drone, which has been ready for use over Afghanistan since June 2001 (see Early June-September 10, 2001). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke has been repeatedly pushing for the use of the Predator over Afghanistan (in either armed or unarmed versions), and he again argues for its immediate use. Everyone agrees that the armed Predator capability is needed, but there are disputes over who will manage and/or pay for it. CIA Director Tenet says his agency will operate the armed Predator “over my dead body.” [Washington Post, 10/2/2002] Clarke recalls, “The Air Force said it wasn’t their job to fly planes to collect intelligence. No one around the table seemed to have a can-do attitude. Everyone seemed to have an excuse.” [New Yorker, 7/28/2003] National Security Adviser Rice concludes that the armed Predator is not ready (even though it had been proven in tests during the summer), but she also presses Tenet to reconsider his opposition to immediately resume reconnaissance flights, suspended since September the year before. After the meeting, Tenet agrees to proceed with such flights. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004; 9/11 Commission, 3/24/2004] The armed Predator is activated just days after 9/11, showing that it was ready to be used after all. [Associated Press, 6/25/2003]
Shortly Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Director of a Secretive Air Force Program Is Asked about Launching Drones over Afghanistan
Colonel Bill Grimes receives a call in which he is asked about getting the Predator drone, a remotely controlled, unmanned plane, ready to fly over Afghanistan. [Whittle, 2014, pp. 235] Grimes is the director of Big Safari, a highly secretive Air Force program based at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio that specializes in modifying standard Air Force aircraft for time-sensitive and highly classified operations. [Defense Update, 5/3/2013; Wired, 12/17/2015] He was in his office at Wright-Patterson this morning when a colleague told him an airplane had crashed into the World Trade Center. He then joined others watching the television coverage of the incident in the conference room next to his office and saw the second hijacked plane crashing into the WTC, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). “Within a few minutes” of the second crash, according to journalist and author Richard Whittle, Grimes is called back to his office to take a call from Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Johns, who is at Air Force headquarters at the Pentagon. Johns wants to know what needs to be done to get three Predators, and whatever is needed to fly them over Afghanistan, ready to go. But just as the two men start discussing the matter, Johns says he will have to call again later, since the Pentagon is being evacuated. This evacuation is presumably in response to the attack on the Pentagon, which occurs at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Grimes says he will have answers by the time the two men talk again. [Whittle, 2014, pp. 235] He will subsequently call members of his team, and tell them to pack their bags and prepare to deploy. He will instruct them to go to the airfield at Palmdale, California, where a C-17 cargo plane will arrive soon to pick them up. Grimes will later write that he starts calling the members of his team “[m]ere moments after the second airliner crashed into the World Trade Center.” According to Whittle, he starts making the calls “shortly after” the second crash at the WTC. However, if his conversation with Johns occurs around the time of the Pentagon attack, he presumably only starts calling the members of his team after 9:37 a.m. A C-17 will set off tomorrow to fly three Predators, along with members of Grimes’s team, from California to Washington, DC (see September 12-14, 2001). [Whittle, 2011, pp. 25 
; Grimes, 2014, pp. 334-335; Whittle, 2014, pp. 239-240]
