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Home / Books and Series / Another Nineteen / Chapter 8: Ralph Eberhart and NORAD

Chapter 8: Ralph Eberhart and NORAD

Kevin Ryan | June 2013
030313 F 2615E 007

In a 2004 U.S. Senate hearing, Senator Mark Dayton remarked that “this country and its citizens were completely undefended” for “109 minutes” on 9/11.[1] Dayton went on to clarify that officials within the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) had covered up the facts about the lack of air defenses by lying to the 9/11 Commission, to Congress, and to the American people. And they were not held accountable. 

One man was most responsible for both the air defense failures and the lying that covered it up. U.S. Air Force General Ralph E. Eberhart had taken over command of NORAD from General Richard Myers in February 2000. The position included leadership of all air defense operations in North America and, also, the U.S. Space Command. Therefore, on 9/11, Eberhart was responsible for the failure to intercept the four hijacked aircraft over a period of nearly two hours. 

NORAD is the joint U.S.-Canadian military organization charged with monitoring and defending the airspace over North America. Long-standing operating procedures at NORAD, for dealing with airliners that have gone off-course or been hijacked, were not followed on 9/11. Each of the four flights involved in the 9/11 attacks should have been intercepted when they lost radio contact, deviated from their course, or turned off their transponders.[2] 

The procedures for interception were automatic and required no special orders to implement.[3] Through these procedures, interceptor jets had been scrambled 129 times in the year 2000 and 67 times in the year prior to June 2001. A 1994 government report stated, “Overall, during the past four years, NORAD’s alert fighters took off to intercept aircraft (referred to as scrambled) 1,518 times, or an average of 15 times per site per year. Of these incidents, the number of suspected drug smuggling aircraft averaged … less than 7 percent of all of the alert sites’ total activity. The remaining activity generally involved visually inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress.”[4] 

On 9/11, the NORAD interception system failed completely and we have been given multiple, conflicting explanations for why that happened. Considering that there is strong evidence for an alternative hypothesis of insider involvement in 9/11, it is reasonable to assume that an intentional compromising of the U.S. air defenses might have occurred that day. Adding to this suspicion is the fact that guilt tends to be reflected in false testimony. And as Senator Dayton said, NORAD officials “lied to the American people, they lied to Congress and they lied to your 9/11 Commission.”[5]

Exactly which NORAD statements were lies and which were not is a matter that is still not clear to this day. This is partly because the explanations and testimony that are now said to have been false were far more damning to NORAD than the final account, which exonerates NORAD entirely. Why would NORAD leaders want to lie so as to make their performance look worse?

In order to determine the facts, investigators should begin with at least three areas of inquiry: 1) the times at which NORAD was notified (or made aware) of the hijackings, 2) the times at which NORAD responded in the form of scrambling jets to intercept, and 3) the instructions given to the interceptor pilots in terms of speed and direction.

NORAD’s Ever-changing Story

The military’s explanations began with a short description of the response to the hijackings. Two days after the attacks, General Richard Myers gave this account to the Senate Armed Services Committee, in an official hearing for his confirmation as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). He said that no fighter jets were scrambled to intercept any of the hijacked 9/11 flights until after the Pentagon was hit.[6] 

Although Myers was not in command of NORAD on 9/11, he should have known two days later if normal procedures had been followed. As Acting CJCS on 9/11, and as vice chairman otherwise, his role was to ensure the president and secretary of defense were informed of critical military matters.  

A second story was given a week after the attacks, when NORAD provided a partial timeline of the notifications it had received from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the responses that followed. General Eberhart reiterated this timeline in testimony to the U.S. Senate a few weeks later and for over two years it stood as the official account.[7] This timeline said that NORAD had received notification about three of the hijacked planes with plenty of time left to ensure interception and had scrambled jets from multiple bases as the attacks proceeded. 

The timeline showed that NORAD was notified about the hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43 am, a full twenty minutes before it impacted the south tower of the World Trade Center (WTC). Moreover, F-15 interceptor jets from Otis Air Force Base (AFB) were said to be airborne by 8:52, having been scrambled in response to the first hijacking. This allowed twice the time needed for the jets to reach New York City before Flight 175 crashed. 

Eberhart added that NORAD was notified about the hijacked Flight 77 coming into Washington at 9:24 am, fourteen minutes before it impacted the Pentagon. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee (repeatedly) that this was a “documented notification.”[8] If true, interceptor jets from Andrews AFB, only ten miles from the Pentagon, could have easily reached the errant airliner given this lead time. 

Although the military might use the excuse that Andrews AFB was not technically under the command of NORAD, the 9/11 Commission said that Eberhart’s statement was simply not true. In fact, both Commission counsel Dan Marcus and team leader John Farmer were later very blunt about this being false.[9] Therefore, it is clear that Eberhart should be charged with the related crime. It is illegal to make any materially false statement or representation in testimony to the Unites States Congress.[10] And that was not the only false statement that Eberhart apparently made to the senators.

In May 2003, Eberhart’s subordinates General Arnold and Colonel William Alan Scott presented a slightly revised version of NORAD’s timeline. They contradicted the timeline for Flight 175, saying that NORAD was not notified of the hijacking until 9:05, three minutes after the aircraft crashed into the south tower. This was despite the fact that when asked by a U.S. Senator about “the second hijacked plane somewhere up there” (Flight 175), Eberhart had previously said “Yes, sir. During that time, we were notified.”[11] 

Arnold and Scott also revealed for the first time that NORAD was notified about the hijacking of Flight 93 at 9:16 am. This was 47 minutes before that flight allegedly crashed in Pennsylvania, at 10:03 am. Obviously, interceptor jets could have easily reached and escorted Flight 93 given this revised timeline.

The fourth and final story from NORAD was the official account given by the 9/11 Commission Report, now supported by NORAD. In this explanation NORAD received “no advance notice” on any of the last three hijacked airliners.[12] Instead of 20 minutes of notice on Flight 175, and 14 minutes notice on Flight 77, and 47 minutes notice on Flight 93, we were told that NORAD was not notified about any of them until it was too late. The military was off the hook entirely.

All the evidence for notifications and response, which had constituted the official account for nearly three years, had been thrown out the window. In place of these documents and testimonies, new explanations were given for why the scrambled aircraft never reached the hijacked airliners. These included unbelievable claims of communication failures and misdirection of the scrambled jets, as well as the introduction of a never-before mentioned “Phantom 11” scenario.[13]

The official account was supported two years later by an article in Vanity Fair. [14] Allegedly, the author of the article was given privileged access to audio tapes that were not available to the public. Although the newly revealed “NORAD tapes” ostensibly bolstered the Commission’s new timeline, credible explanations were never given for throwing out the years of testimony and evidence that had supported entirely different timelines.  

The changing stories given by NORAD led to placing more blame for the failed air defenses on the FAA. After NORAD’s 2003 timeline was issued, however, the FAA publicly stated that NORAD had in fact been informed throughout all the developments that morning. FAA official Laura Brown wrote a memo to the 9/11 Commission in which she stated that the FAA had shared “real-time information” with NORAD about “loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77.”[15]  

FAA leadership certainly did fail that morning and there are shocking questions to be answered in that regard.[16] Not the least of these questions is why evidence that might have helped was destroyed by an FAA official after the attacks.[17] But the multiple stories given by the military indicate that NORAD was at least as culpable as the FAA in the inexplicable lack of air defense. And the facts indicate that NORAD was in the loop earlier than its 2003 timeline suggested, meaning that there is no reasonable explanation for why NORAD-controlled jets did not intercept most, if not all, of the planes hijacked on 9/11. 

When questioned by the 9/11 Commission, Eberhart confirmed that if NORAD had been in the loop as the FAA said it was, his people would have been able “to shoot down all three aircraft – all four aircraft.”[18] 

Reasons to Suspect Eberhart

Investigation of NORAD and its commander Eberhart is warranted, apart from the evidence for lying to Congress. Additional reasons to focus on Eberhart include the following nine facts.

  1. As Commander in Chief of the U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE), Eberhart was responsible for setting Infocon levels.[19] Infocon is an alert system that defends against attacks on communications networks within the DOD. Just 12 hours before the 9/11 attacks, an order was given to lower Infocon to its least protective level.[20] Setting Infocon at a lower level made it easier for people to hack into or compromise the DOD computer networks, including the air defense system.[21]
  2. As both CINCSPACE and Commander in Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD), Eberhart was in charge of many of the highly coincidental military exercises (i.e. war games) that were going on that morning. 
  3. Eberhart did nothing effective in response to the 9/11 hijackings, despite being present in the military’s teleconference as those hijackings were in progress. He did not order the scrambling of jets, he did not order an escort for Air Force One, and he did not provide leadership.  
  4. Eberhart also failed to implement military control over U.S. airspace until well after the attacks were over. Although it was his prerogative to do so, Eberhart did not implement SCATANA, the process of assuming military control over the U.S. airspace, until an hour after the last plane had been destroyed. Eberhart later said that he had waited until it finally became “obvious” to him that a coordinated terrorist attack was underway.[22] He told the 9/11 Commission that, although people were telling him to take control of the airspace earlier, he didn’t feel that the military could “provide traffic de-confliction like the FAA has.”[23]
  5. In the middle of the 9/11 attacks, Eberhart decided to drive between Peterson Air Force Base and NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC). Normally this 12-mile drive takes 30 minutes but it took Eberhart between 45 minutes and an hour to make the drive that morning. No reason was ever given (or requested) for why Eberhart did not fly directly to CMOC from Peterson, making use of the Cheyenne Mountain helicopter port. Eberhart made conflicting statements about his reasons for making this trip, saying that he stayed for a while at Peterson because he “did not want to lose communication.”[24] Nevertheless, Eberhart lost communication at the most important time by leaving at approximately 9:30 am (EST), when two of the hijacked planes were still flying wildly off-course. His reason for doing this was that things had “quieted down.”[25]
  6. While on his way to the CMOC he was in the U.S. military’s air threat call via cell phone. In this call, at 9:49 am, Eberhart “directed all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.”[26] Although this might sound like decisive action, the command apparently grounded all interceptor jets that had not yet taken off due to the fact that “battle stations” is a grounded status. Other military leaders later gave orders to actually scramble the jets. And despite his involvement, Eberhart portrayed himself as being out of the loop entirely. For example, he told the 9/11 Commission that he had “no knowledge of the circumstances that initiated the scramble” of fighter jets from Langley AFB and that he had just “recently” been made aware that it happened (in March 2004).[27]
  7. Eberhart failed to explain the multiple changes in the account of 9/11 that were given by NORAD. In fact, he seemed to tell his staff to change the NORAD timeline as much as was needed in order to prevent further questioning about the military’s performance.[28]
  8. For whatever reasons, Eberhart also gave false information about the NORAD response to others. General Richard Myers, acting CJCS that morning, said that Eberhart told him there were “several hijack codes in the system.” Yet none of the four planes had squawked the hijack code on 9/11 and therefore it is not clear how such codes could have been in the system.[29]
  9. NORAD failed to cooperate with the 9/11 Commission. Even as late as March 2004, the Commission was struggling to get basic documents about 9/11 performance from Eberhart’s organization.[30] In some cases, such as with the after-action reports that follow all military actions, the Commission never received the NORAD documents. 

Of all these concerns, it is the military exercises that NORAD was conducting on 9/11 that have drawn the most attention from concerned citizens. When questioned about them, Eberhart claimed that the impact of the 9/11 exercises on NORAD’s response was that they “at most cost us 30 seconds.”[31] That was clearly not the case.

NORAD’s Coincidental Exercises

After several government officials had made incorrect statements about the military’s preparation for hijackings and the use of planes as weapons, General Myers responded to a pointed question on the subject. He reported that NORAD had practiced “five exercise hijack events,” between November 1999 and October 2000, all of which “included a suicide crash into a high value target.”[32] Records released since that time show that NORAD had practiced 28 hijack exercise events in the 20 months leading up to 9/11. At least six of these were focused on hijackings located entirely within the Unites States, which puts to rest the excuse that NORAD was only looking for threats coming from outside of U.S. borders.[33]

One of these exercises, Vigilant Guardian in October 2000, practiced interception of an airliner hijacked for a suicide attack against the 39-story United Nations building in New York City, just a few blocks from the WTC.[34] Another air defense exercise, called Amalgam Virgo and practiced just three months before 9/11, was accompanied by a planning document that had a picture of Osama bin Laden on the cover.[35] 

Many of the military exercises or war games that were occurring on the day of 9/11 were run under the control of CINCNORAD Eberhart. In fact, Eberhart was in command of the war games that had the greatest impact on the nation’s air defenses. Of course, he had help.

NORAD is divided into several large areas that cover the U.S. and Canada, one of which is the region of the continental U.S. called CONR, headed on 9/11 by General Larry Arnold. Within CONR there are three sectors. The 9/11 attacks took place in the airspace monitored by CONR’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). Personnel at NEADS were therefore primarily responsible for trying to coordinate the NORAD response to the hijackings. CMOC was also an important facility in the response failures.

At NEADS, Colonel Robert Marr was in charge. Marr had been in the U.S. Air Force for over 20 years until 1994, at which time he spent a few months in Saudi Arabia as “director of combat operations.”[36] He then left the military to work two years for a private company called Phoenix Air. Coincidentally, Phoenix Air provided aircraft for the Amalgam Virgo exercises.[37] There is also reason to believe that Phoenix Air is associated with Huffman Aviation where the alleged 9/11 hijackers had trained.[38] After his stint at Phoenix Air, Marr returned to the military as the exercise coordinator at NEADS and, by 9/11, had risen to the position of commander of the facility.

NORAD exercise planners stated that several exercises were “planned” on 9/11.[39] These included Vigilant Guardian and Vigilant Overview, both command post exercises (CPX), and Amalgam Virgo and Amalgam Warrior, which were field training (or FTX) exercises. All four of these exercises were CJCS-approved and sponsored by CINCNORAD Eberhart.[40] 

It is clear that at least one of these planned exercises, Vigilant Guardian, was actually being conducted on 9/11. Additionally, another war game called Apollo Guardian was running on 9/11. This was an exercise conducted by the U.S. Space Command, meaning Eberhart was in control of that too. 

FTX exercises are sometimes what are referred to as SPADEs, meaning “a track is taken out of radar coverage and then re-introduced as an unknown track.”[41]  This exercise feature is interesting given that Flight 77 was lost on radar for a period of time on 9/11 and then reappeared in a way that has not yet been explained.[42] 

Amalgam Virgo 02 was a modification of Twin Star, a live-fly joint FAA/NORAD exercise conducted in 1995. This was described by NORAD exercise design manager Ken Merchant and Major Paul Goddard, the Canadian who was NORAD exercise chief.[43] According to Goddard, the Twin Star plan was to have interceptor jets scramble and escort a hijacked airliner. During this exercise, “the fighters never got off on the appropriate heading, and it took them forever to catch up.”[44] 

It seems worthwhile to consider that Amalgam Virgo 02, which was ostensibly only in the planning stages on 9/11, might actually have been in play that morning. One reason to consider this is that, on 9/11, the fighters “never got off on the appropriate heading, and it took them forever to catch up.” Another reason is that 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste showed considerable interest in Amalgam Virgo 02, as did the 9/11 Commission staff in its request for documents.[45] According to Ben-Veniste, this was a case in which “NORAD had already in the works plans to simulate in an exercise a simultaneous hijacking of two planes in the United States.”[46] The plan for Amalgam Virgo 02 was therefore similar to the 9/11 attacks, with multiple, simultaneous hijackings. 

Another large-scale exercise being conducted on 9/11 was Global Guardian, a joint nuclear war simulation run by the U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom) in conjunction with NORAD. This was essentially a practice for Armageddon that involved live nuclear bombs and at least three airborne command and control airliners called E-4Bs.[47] The E-4B that was seen circling the White House during the 9/11 attacks might have been part of this exercise.[48] 

The 9/11 Commission did not mention most of these exercises in its report. To the contrary, the report mentioned only Vigilant Guardian and then only once, in a deceptively stated footnote that said “On 9/11, NORAD was scheduled to conduct a military exercise, Vigilant Guardian, which postulated a bomber attack from the Soviet Union.”[49] This statement is false in several ways, not the least of which is that NORAD was involved in multiple exercises on 9/11. And Vigilant Guardian was not simply an exercise involving one bomber from the former Soviet Union. 

Vigilant Guardian 01 (VG) had been in play for several days as of 9/11. On September 9, it included a scenario in which terrorists hijacked an airliner and planned to attack New York City. The exercise presented a number of other scenarios based around airliner hijackings and in one of these, the fictitious terrorists threatened to “Rain Terror from the Skies.”[50]

According to the VG planning documents, the 9/11 exercise was to be conducted “sim over live,” meaning the simulated hijackings were to be inserted into the live air control system. This was repeated in the instructions – “Ensure all tracks of interest (sim or live) are input on the live chart.”[51] Furthermore, the VG plan was that “All expansions will be Real World.” Although frequently misunderstood, the term “Real World” does not refer to an actual hijacking, it refers to the use of real aircraft in live-fly exercises.[52] 

Due to these confusing circumstances, NEADS staff confused the actual hijackings on 9/11 with the exercises. As researcher Matthew Everett explained, “What is remarkable is that at a time when it should have been obvious to them that the U.S. was in the middle of a major terrorist attack, these key personnel [at NEADS] were uncertain whether what was happening was real or simulated.”[53] The confusion caused much more than a “30 second” problem as Eberhart suggested, because NEADS personnel thought the exercises were continuing well after the attacks.

On 9/11, VG was scheduled to include a simulated hijacking at 9:40 a.m., within an hour of when Flight 11 struck the WTC. When they first learned that Flight 11 was hijacked, NEADS staff noted that the “exercise” appeared to be starting an hour early that morning. The evidence indicates that everyone at NEADS, including Colonel Marr, thought the actual hijackings were exercises. They even joked about it.[54] That might have been due to the VG plan stating that the NEADS building where Colonel Marr and company were located was a planned “exercise play area” and everyone there, knowingly or not, was “subject to exercise play.”[55]

NEADS radar scopes were displaying simulated information at least until the time of the Pentagon attack. The same problem was going on at CMOC, another exercise play area, with radar screens showing false tracks as late as 10:12. In fact, personnel at CMOC called NEADs in an attempt to stop the exercise inputs.[56] Because those inputs did not stop, it appeared that someone wanted the NEADS and CMOC radar scopes to continue showing false information until after the four planes had been destroyed. 

Ken Merchant added that the NMCC, located at the Pentagon, regularly participated in NORAD exercises by interjecting emergency action messages (EAMs).[57] On 9/11, the performance of the NMCC, which plays a critical role in establishing the military chain of command and communicating orders, was remarkably poor. Officers there lacked any sense of urgency and were completely ineffective with regard to communications.[58] 

The disruptive effect of the ongoing NORAD exercises that morning continued until after all the hijacked planes had crashed. One military newspaper said VG continued until 30 minutes after attacks.[59] Similarly, Global Guardian was “formally terminated” at 10:44 a.m. but certain actions taken after that time, including that the CMOC’s blast doors were closed (a needless action in response to hijacked airliners), suggested that the exercise continued.[60] 

Examining the details of how the interceptor jets were managed with respect to the different hijacked flights gives a better understanding of what questions are most important. Jets from Otis AFB were the first to respond and it seemed that those jets had the best chance of catching up with Flight 175.

The Otis Interceptor Jets and Flight 175

The FAA was aware of the hijacking of Flight 11, the first plane, as early as 8:15 a.m. when radio communication was lost. The 9/11 Commission Report says that the FAA’s Boston Center notified NEADS of this hijacking at 8:38. This suggests that the FAA waited 23 minutes to notify NORAD about the hijacking, despite the fact that the military had a communications liaison office (the ATSC) located at FAA’s Herndon Command Center.

According to the first timeline provided by NORAD J3, the executive officer for which was Lt. Col. Thomas Browning, FAA notified NEADS of the Flight 175 hijacking at 8:43.[61] This gave the military twenty full minutes to scramble and intercept, and Otis fighters were airborne at 8:52. The F-15 interceptor jets should have needed only six minutes to travel the 192 miles to New York City at the aircraft’s maximum speed (Mach 2.5). 

The official account now says that NORAD found out about Flight 175 at 9:05, after it crashed. The reasoning given to Colonel Marr by 9/11 Commission staffers as they were trying to convince him of the new timeline was that Flight 175 was not hijacked until 8:46 a.m., so therefore NORAD could not have been notified of it at 8:43.[62] This, however, is not convincing as the 9/11 Commission Report says the “likely takeover” of Flight 175 was between 8:42 and 8:46 a.m., not exactly at 8:46. If the FAA was aware of the hijacking occurring at 8:42, and with everyone on high alert due to the first hijacking notice at 8:38, the FAA could have notified NORAD a minute later as was originally claimed. This reasoning for the change is therefore not credible.

The Otis fighters therefore should have reached New York City (NYC) before Flight 175 crashed. Instead, the fighters engaged in some strange detours en route to NYC. The Otis fights first flew in a “holding pattern” over the Atlantic.[63] Then they made a sharp turn to the east, away from NYC, and the pilots were told “Remain in current position until FAA requests assistance.”[64] Why the Otis pilots flew as they did has did not been revealed.

According to the final account, Flight 175 never turned off its transponder and therefore was clearly visible and fully identified on radar. Nonetheless it lost radio contact with controllers at 8:42 a.m., and it flew without being intercepted for nearly twenty minutes after Flight 11 had crashed into the WTC. Meanwhile, those in charge of national air traffic and defenses watched the airliner the entire time as it flew to New York City and crashed into the WTC.

Just after Flight 175 hit the WTC, an Air National Guard (ANG) commander in Syracuse, New York told Marr, “Give me 10 min. and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 min. and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams].” And Marr replied, “I want it all.” Apparently, this means that Marr wanted to wait for another hour before responding with interceptor jets after two hijacked aircraft had already crashed.  

Critics of this interpretation might say that Marr was only trying to ensure the jets would be able to do something when they arrived. But this is contradicted by the fact that other fighters scrambled that day were, according to Commissioner Ben-Veniste and General Craig McKinley, authorized “to use their airplanes to bring down Flight 77 or 93 if they could interdict them. That means to clip their wings, crash into them, perhaps the pilots at the risk of their own lives [sic].”[65]

After the 9/11 Commission released its report, Commission staff seemed to make a lot of fuss about the idea that “certain NORAD and FAA” officials might have been deceptive in their testimony.[66] Ultimately this charge seemed to focus on Colonel Marr, but General Eberhart would have been as guilty of the same crimes and he was not criticized. The Commission memo on the subject claimed that the “chat logs” were suddenly more authoritative than all other primary source data including interviews and documented timelines. Could it be that the Commission used the idea that Marr had been deceptive to re-frame the entire NORAD timeline to their own liking? If so, this would mean that the original timelines for Flights 175 and 93 might have been correct but were changed to “no notification given.” 

The Langley Interceptor Jets and Flight 77

The January 2004 interview of Colonel Marr by five 9/11 Commission staff members, including U.S. Army intelligence officer Miles Kara, suggests that Marr was being coerced into accepting a revised NORAD timeline that had been created by the Commission staff. On the other hand, Marr might not have needed much coaxing. It could be that he simply did not know how he would be viewed according to the new explanations. The interview memorandum says that “Commission staff presented to Marr that it appears Langley was launched in response to AA 11 [Phantom 11].” Marr simultaneously “agreed” yet “did not concede” the point.[67]   

According to the long-standing timeline prior to the 9/11 Commission Report, the FAA notified NORAD about the Flight 77 hijacking at 9:24. Commissioner Ben Veniste interrogated Arnold’s deputy Colonel William Alan Scott and General McKinley, who was substituting for Eberhart, about this notification. Ben Veniste said the Commission had evidence that NORAD was in a teleconference with FAA and was receiving real-time information, as Laura Brown from the FAA said. This meant that when FAA learned of Flight 77’s hijacking, at around 9:02 a.m., so did NORAD.[68] Eberhart “was not pleased with the hearing” in which Ben-Veniste challenged NORAD so strongly.[69] It was after this, and after the refusal of NORAD to cooperate in providing documents to the Commission, that the timeline began to change to “no notifications.” 

In the 2003 hearing that Eberhart didn’t attend and was unhappy about, Ben-Veniste went on to grill McKinley and Scott about Eberhart’s previous statements to the Senate Armed Services Committee (he mistakenly called it the House Committee). Ben-Veniste had, just the day before, found that FAA Commissioner Jane Garvey was clueless about the major questions that Eberhart had asked the 9/11 Commission to put to the FAA 18 months before.[70] Ben-Veniste wanted clarification, twenty months after 9/11, and the answers were even more confusing.

It is interesting that when McKinley gave his testimony in May 2003, providing a narrative that has since been entirely abandoned, he began by saying “I’d like to thank the Commission staff, especially Miles Kara, for his help in preparing for this.”[71] That is, 9/11 Commission staff including Miles Kara prepped at least this one witness from NORAD before the Commissioners had a chance to interview him. It appears that Kara helped to create NORAD’s early, presumably false, story by helping General McKinley to prepare. As with the “minders” used in Commission interviews and the apparent production of a new timeline by Commission staff, this practice seems to reflect a manipulation that has not been thoroughly considered by investigators. 

In any case, at Langley AFB on 9/11, the 119th Fighter Wing of the District of Columbia (DC) ANG was on duty. The Detachment Commander there, Lt. Col. Michael Connor, was on leave but fighter pilots were on alert and ready for air defense. Lead pilot Captain Dean Eckmann and his wingman Major Brad Derrig were the assigned alert pilots. They had been given a “battle stations” order at 9:09, presumably because NORAD wanted them to be ready for anything. At 9:24 a.m., the time that NORAD was originally said to be notified of the hijacking of Flight 77, Eckmann and Derrig were given a scramble order. 

Minutes later, the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) at Langley, Captain Craig Borgstrom, was mysteriously ordered via phone, by some unknown person at NEADS, to launch along with the two alert pilots.[72] This was an unprecedented order and to this day no one knows why the SOF, who was needed to coordinate activities from the ground, was scrambled in a spare jet that just happened to be there. Borgstrom called his Wing Commander in Fargo to communicate the order which was “something that had never been done on alert, ever.”[73]

Borgstrom said that Mark “Fifi” Lafond was the “ground guy that coordinated a lot of the initial movements.”[74] One of Borgstrom’s instructors from his training days in Mississippi, Lafond later went on to run a company called Skyblazer Aviation out of Georgia.

Borgstrom doesn’t recall the exact heading they were given. He wrote “020” in his logbook but others in the loop remembered it as “010” with an altitude of 29,000 feet. The scramble order would have sent the jets directly to Washington, DC but, after they launched, someone changed their order to “090 for 60,” sending them out over the Atlantic Ocean. This new heading was supposedly recorded in a flight strip generated by the Langley tower.

The fact that the scramble order was different than the flight strip was a serious point of concern that was discussed by many people in the 9/11 Commission interviews. But it was ultimately said that the air traffic controllers at the Langley tower, Master Sergeant Kevin Griffith and Senior Airman Raymond Halford, had used this heading on the strip because it was more typical than the scramble order and would get the jets off in a safe way. Why the jets remained going east for so long, when the flight strip was meant to simply get them into the air safely, is another unanswered question.

Griffith and Halford were interviewed along with their commander in the tower, Captain Jay Scherer. They were shown a “duplication” of the flight strip from 9/11 (redacted in the released document) with an odd reason given. Another odd thing is that all of these people from the Langley tower are listed as coming from “Norfolk Tower”, which if anything would seem to be referring to the Naval Air Base at Chambers Field, not Langley. 

The staff at Norfolk TRACON, an FAA radar control tower in Virginia Beach to which such fighters were automatically relayed after takeoff, were confused by the “090 for 60” order. The supervisor there, John Harter, said that “All they could figure out was that someone through secure communications changed the scramble order to which they were not privy.”[75] 

The Langley jets were given yet another unprecedented order when they were ordered to go “max-subsonic”, meaning they were not to break the sound barrier. Borgstrom told an interviewer that “I’ve never heard of [max-subsonic] before in my short career, but I don’t think anybody has ever heard that order before.”[76] Eckmann made the point that he “had never heard a speed given in any of his previous scrambles.” The order resulted in the jets flying at less than half their maximum speed but, since they were headed in the wrong direction anyway, this was simply another factor in a series of delays. 

The Langley jets were handed off again, this time from Norfolk TRACON to “Giant Killer,” a military station that was in control of the airspace over the Atlantic coast. When interviewed, the staff at Giant Killer also expressed that the “090 for 60” flight strip was a problem, although the flight strip was not available for any of them to see. Instead, as with Norfolk TRACON and the Langley tower staff, they were presented with a “replication” during their interviews.[77] 

Interviews with those at Giant Killer showed that they never talked to the Langley fighters (NEADS had control) and they were not able to explain why the scramble order was different than the flight strip. Additionally, they could not explain a further set of unprecedented orders given to the Langley pilots. These were the orders delivered as the jets finally started heading toward Washington – to squawk “Quad 7s” and defer to “AFIO control.” 

Both of these orders were given by the military controller called Huntress at NEADS.[78] The reason for the order to squawk “Quad 7s” was never explained, but AFIO is an FAA procedure that is apparently not used within the continental United States.[79] Neither the pilots nor anyone at Giant Killer or Norfolk TRACON had ever heard of these orders before.   

There are, therefore, several important issues that need to be investigated with regard to the Langley fighters that were scrambled on 9/11. Among these are:

  • Why was the SOF scrambled from Langley, leaving no one to coordinate further orders from the base, and who gave that order?
  • Why did the heading for the Langley jets get changed to “090 for 60” and why did they continue to go east?
  • Why did they get the unprecedented “max-subsonic” order which caused them to go much slower than they were capable?
  • Why were the Langley jets ordered to squawk “Quad 7s” and defer to “AFIO control”?

Note also that the Langley fighters were scrambled at the same time that CINCNORAD Ralph Eberhart decided to drive for nearly an hour between Peterson AFB and Cheyenne Mountain, despite Cheyenne Mountain having its own helicopter port.

The Andrews Interceptor Jets

Many people have wondered why NORAD scrambled jets from Langley when there was another base with jets at the ready that was much closer to Washington. Although interceptor jets were eventually scrambled from Andrews AFB after all the hijacked aircraft had been destroyed, the official reason for not turning to Andrews first was that the jets there were not under NORAD command.

Eberhart stated, in his Commission interview, that Andrews jets “were not under our command and control.” Air Force Public Affairs Officer Don Arias reiterated the claim, saying “Andrews was not part of NORAD.”[80] This disclaimer was confusing considering that the website for Andrews and its DC Air National Guard unit claimed that its mission was “to provide combat units in the highest possible state of readiness.” What’s more, Colonel Marr had ordered his staff to “Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack.”[81]

Regardless, interceptor jets did not launch from Andrews, which was only ten miles from the Pentagon, until 10:38 a.m., and those were not armed. This was more than an hour after the Pentagon was hit, almost two and a half hours after the first plane was known to be hijacked, and approximately 90 minutes after Andrews personnel had first offered assistance (see Chapter 9). 

General Arnold stated in testimony, “It is my understanding that the Secret Service asked [Andrews] to get anything they could airborne, and I think the quote was “to protect the House.”[82] The official account confirmed that the Secret Service was behind the order and added a disclaimer for the military. 

The President and the Vice President indicated to us they had not been aware that fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret Service and outside the military chain of command. There is no evidence that NORAD headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew-during the morning of September 11-that the Andrews planes were airborne and operating under different rules of engagement.[83]

The man in charge of Andrews AFB that day was General David Wherley. In an interesting and unique situation, it was the 9/11 Commission’s executive director Philip Zelikow who prepared the interview summary for General Wherley, based on his recollection of a conversation the two men had the same day. According to the document, Zelikow’s same-day recollection was helped out by the presence of Ernest May, his collaborator on the early outline for the 9/11 Commission Report. In so many words, Zelikow and May blamed everything on Wherley and said – “All of this was separate from NORAD.”[84] 

It is no longer possible to confirm this claim. That’s because General Wherley died in an extraordinary train wreck, in the Washington DC metropolitan area, in June 2009.[85]

The Destruction of Flight 93

Colonel Marr repeated, several times, in his January 2004 interview with 9/11 Commission staff members, that he recalled monitoring Flight 93 during the time that it was hijacked. That would be impossible given the Commission’s finding that NORAD was never notified about the hijacking of Flight 93 until after it crashed. But again, Marr’s interview suggests that the Commission had come up with a new NORAD timeline and just needed to convince NORAD personnel to buy into it in order to calm the storm of public outcry over the lack of air defense.

It was not only Marr who remembers monitoring Flight 93 in the NEADS battle cab. NEADS intelligence officer Lt. Col. Mark Stuart, who was standing right next to Marr during the crisis, reported the same thing.[86] Both of them said that they were tracking Flight 93. And many air traffic controllers made clear in their handwritten notes from that day, and their personal statements afterward, that Flight 93 was known as a hijacking long before it was destroyed.[87] 

General Arnold clarified in testimony to the Commission that – “It was our intent to intercept United Flight 93. And in fact my own staff, we were orbiting now over Washington, D.C. by this time, and I was personally anxious to see what 93 was going to do, and our intent was to intercept it. But we decided to stay over Washington, D.C., because there was not that urgency. So we elected to remain over D.C. until that aircraft was definitely coming towards us.”[88]

Eberhart also detailed how Flight 93 was being tracked. The summary of his Commission interview stated that “He believes he reported to Cheyenne Mountain as UAL 93 was ongoing.” 

It appears that, in order to explain away the considerable evidence for knowledge about the hijacking of Flight 93, the Commission decided to use the false report of another hijacking as a point of confusion. This was Delta Airlines Flight 1989, which was reported hijacked that morning despite the pilot of that aircraft saying that he was not hijacked.[89] 

In his interview with the Commission in 2004, Eberhart “commented that Delta 1989 and UAL 93 may have been interchanged. He commented that he understands that there is ‘support’ for this theory.”[90] These flight confusion remarks are remarkable given that there is reason to believe that Delta Flight 1989 was actually a “live-fly” aircraft in of one of Eberhart’s exercises that day.[91]

One problem with this new explanation, however, is that General Arnold made clear, in an interview with 1st Air Force public relations writer Leslie Filson, that NORAD was tracking both United 93 and Delta 1989. Filson said that she was told they were tracking United 93 specifically.[92] Since NORAD was aware of both, it could not be that Delta 1989 was mistaken for United 93.

Eberhart and others remarked that the vice president had given a shoot down order with respect to Flight 93. Eberhart stated that “the VP order occurred slightly prior to his arrival at the mountain.” He said that he “assumed that the order was passed to the level of the fighter pilot.” Eberhart went on to describe the challenges with shooting down an airliner.[93]

This disagrees with remarks made by Commission vice-chairman Lee Hamilton in the May 23, 2003 hearing, when he said, “As of September 11th, only the president had the authority to order a shootdown of a commercial aircraft.” The 9/11 Commission Report gave a confused picture of exactly who gave the order. Although saying the vice president “authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane,” this was somehow based on “his earlier conversation with the President.”[94] Unfortunately, the Commission said there was “no documentary evidence for this call.”

Exactly when the order was received was also a point of confusion. For example, General Arnold couldn’t recall when he got the shoot down order and he didn’t have it recorded. This was despite the fact that it was the first time that it had ever happened. 

Moreover, it was claimed that Marr decided not to pass on the order to shoot down aircraft.[95] Commissioner Timothy Roemer called this decision “so surprising, so shocking to some people.”[96] When questioned about this, Eberhart first said that he would have to speculate as to why Marr made that decision. Yet, when pressed, he said that Marr was asked about it.[97] 

The physical evidence and eyewitness testimony indicates that Flight 93 was, in fact, shot down. This includes the wide debris field generated around the crash site and eyewitness testimony to a military-type jet at the scene.[98] Additional evidence suggests that electrical disturbances in the area at the time might have contributed to the demise of the aircraft.[99]

In 2013, Cheney admitted that he was actually making the decisions on 9/11. He said in an interview for a documentary that he told the president not to be in one location, causing Bush to fly around the country aimlessly. Cheney also said that he made the decision to shoot down United 93.[100] This further explains why the chain of command failed on 9/11, and points to an additional need to investigate Cheney and his colleagues. 

Investigating Eberhart

Investigation of Ralph Eberhart and his subordinates would almost certainly reveal more of what the public needs to know. Whether Eberhart or others were part of a conspiracy to attack the United States is not the only reason. The main purpose would be to understand how such an inexplicable failure to follow the long-standing and most critical procedures of the U.S. defense system could be followed by a string of lies about that inexplicable failure.

Eberhart was among those who lied and he was in charge of NORAD at the time. Was he lying to make himself and his organization look bad, as the 9/11 Commission suggests? Or is he lying now, along with the 9/11 Commission, in order to remove NORAD’s responsibility and eliminate questioning about 9/11?

Eberhart and the military as a whole definitely benefited from the 9/11 attacks. In the few years before 9/11, the ongoing Base Realignment and Closure program continued to close bases and cut back defense programs, and NORAD was affected by that. After 9/11, of course, the U.S. military saw the greatest boom in funding it has ever seen. Eberhart himself was rewarded by being placed in charge of the new NORTHCOM organization.

He has more recently been praised and honored for his great work on 9/11. Called a “9/11 hero” despite having been a disastrous failure on that day, he was honored by having the new NORTHCOM headquarters at Peterson AFB named after him.[101]

Eberhart personally benefited from the 9/11 attacks as well. He continued on as head of NORAD and NORTHCOM through 2004. After that he went on to become the chairman for more than half a dozen stock or bond equity funds, and a board director for a similar number of companies profiting from increased military expenditures, oil and gas services, and “Homeland Security.”[102] 

NORAD officials working for Ralph Eberhart covered up the facts about the lack of air defenses on 9/11 by lying to the American people and by failure to cooperate with the 9/11 investigations. For those reasons alone, Eberhart’s performance that day and the related statements should be thoroughly investigated. Considering the nine facts presented above about Eberhart’s activities on 9/11, and that Eberhart appears to have violated U.S. law by lying to Congress, that investigation should be performed with the utmost legal authority including the use of subpoenas and formal charges.

Notes to Chapter 8

  1. Nicholas Levis, Senator Dayton: NORAD Lied About 9/11, 911Truth.org, August 1, 2004, 
  2. Bob Arnot, What Was Needed to Halt the Attacks?: Cockpit security, quick response not in evidence Tuesday, MSNBC, September 12, 2001
  3. North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD Regulation 55-7, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, July 6, 1990, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/norad/reg55007.htm. Also see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) And Destruction Of Derelict Airborne Objects, June 1, 2001, http://tinyurl.com/brmjd2p 
  4. United States General Accounting Office, Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer Needed, May 3, 1994
  5. Nicholas Levis, Senator Dayton: NORAD Lied About 9/11
  6. Senate Armed Services Committee, General Myers Confirmation Hearing, September 13, 2001
  7. Transcript of Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, October 25, 2001, U.S. Government Printing Office
  8. Transcript of Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, October 25, 2001, U.S. Government Printing Office
  9. See memo from Dan Marcus to the Inspector General of both the DOD and Department of Transportation, dated July 29, 2004. See also email response from John Farmer to 9/11 Commission staff (dated 1/19/2004) and associated messages. See also memorandum from John Farmer and Philip Zelikow to the 9/11 Commissioners in which they state that “Team 8 has unearthed evidence strongly suggesting the possibility that a USAF officer, and possibly others at the USAF and FAA, must have known that the official story was false, yet persisted in telling it or did not correct the record.”
  10. United States Code, 18 USC § 1001, This law is otherwise known as “making false statements”
  11. The NORAD notification of Flight 175’s hijacking at 8:42 am was listed in an email from NORADJ3 to Eberhart. It was also listed in the NORAD timeline given by Eberhart to the Senate Armed Services Committee in October 2001.
  12. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission Report, p 31
  13. David Ray Griffin, The 9/11 Commission’s Incredible Tales, first published at 911Truth.org, December 13, 2005
  14. Michael Bronner, “9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes”, Vanity Fair, September 2006, 262-285
  15. Kyle F. Hence, UQ Wire: Statement from FAA Contradicts 911 Report, Unanswered Questions Wire, August 2, 2004 
  16. Kevin R. Ryan, FAA Failures on 9/11: The Wall Street Lawyer and the Special Ops Hijack Coordinator, DgWithin.net, April 2011
  17. Matthew L. Wald, F.A.A. Official Scrapped Tape of 9/11 Controllers’ Statements, The New York Times, May 6, 2004
  18. [1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Transcript of twelfth public hearing, June 17,2004  
  19. On 1 October 1999, the Commander, USSPACECOM (USCINCSPACE), assumed command of a brand new mission area, DoD-Computer Network Defense (CND). Also effective the same date, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) delegated to USCINCSPACE the authority to declare DOD Infocon levels. 
  20. 1st Fighter Wing History Excerpt, July through December 2001, p 61, accessed at 911Document Archive, Scribd, http://tinyurl.com/cnzmhyz. The Infocon level was raised again during the morning of September 11, immediately after the second attack on the World Trade Center.
  21. The Infocon alert system was developed in response to a coordinated hacking called Solar Sunrise that occurred in 1998 and started at Andrews Air Force Base. For more on Solar Sunrise, see Kevin Poulsen, Video: Solar Sunrise, the Best FBI-Produced Hacker Flick Ever, Wired, September 23, 2008
  22. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart, prepared by Geoffrey Brown,, March 1, 2004
  23. Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearings for June 17, 2004, published at The Washington Post, June 17, 2004
  24. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  25. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  26. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission Report, p 38
  27. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  28. Eberhart told the Commission that the “newest NORAD time line [delivered to Commission staff on February 23, 2004] was likely the result of his ‘standing order’ to correct the record of events whenever possible.” 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  29. Matthew Everett, The Actions and Inactions of the Commander in Charge of the U.S. Air Defense Failure on 9/11, Shoestring 911, June 18, 2010
  30. See memorandum from 9/11 Commission Team 8 re: DOD Document Production, dated October 29, 2003
  31. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Transcript of twelfth public hearing, June 17,2004
  32. Transcript of Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, August 16 and 17, 2004, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg24495/html/CHRG-108shrg24495.htm 
  33. A NORAD Exercises Hijack Summary, released by the 9/11 Commission, lists 28 exercise events involving hijackings between October 1998 and September 10, 2001. This does not include the Amalgam Virgo exercises, http://www.scribd.com/doc/16411947/NORAD-Exercises-Hijack-Summary 
  34. Matthew Everett, NORAD Exercise a Year Before 9/11 Simulated a Pilot Trying to Crash a Plane into a New York Skyscraper–The UN Headquarters, Shoestring 911, July 27, 2010
  35. SEADS Concept Proposal: Amalgam Virgo 01, accessed at www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/linkscopy/AmalgumVirgo.pdf 
  36. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Colonel Robert Marr, prepared by Geoffrey Brown,, January 23, 2004
  37. SEADS Concept Proposal: Amalgam Virgo 01
  38. Daniel Hopsicker, Will secret deal bring old management back to Venice Airport FBO?, Mad Cow Morning News, January 5, 2010
  39. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Ken Merchant and Paul Goddard, Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown, March 4, 2004
  40. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Ken Merchant and Paul Goddard
  41. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Ken Merchant and Paul Goddard
  42. [1] History Commons Complete 9/11 Timeline, Context of ‘9:05 am (and After) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Reappears on Radar, but Flight Controllers Do Not Notice’
  43. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Ken Merchant and Paul Goddard
  44. History Commons Complete 9/11 Timeline, Profile: Twin Star
  45. For example, see 9/11 Commission “DOD Document Request No. 18.”
  46. Transcript of 9/11 Commission Hearing of May 23, 2003  
  47. Joe Dejka, Inside StratCom on September 11 Offutt exercise took real-life twist, The Omaha World-Herald, February 27, 2002
  48. Mark H. Gaffney, Why Did the World’s Most Advanced Electronics Warfare Plane Circle Over The White House on 9/11?, The Journal of 9/11 Studies, July 2007. See also the update several months later at same source.
  49. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission Report, Notes to Chapter 1, footnote 116
  50. Vigilant Guardian 01-02 planning document, Accessed at 911Document Archive, Scribd, http://tinyurl.com/cn52tpf 
  51. Vigilant Guardian 01-02 planning document
  52. Matthew Everett, ‘Real-World or Exercise’: Did the U.S. Military Mistake the 9/11 Attacks for a Training Scenario?, Shoestring 911, March 22, 2012
  53. Matthew Everett, ‘Real-World or Exercise’
  54. Matthew Everett, ‘Real-World or Exercise’ 
  55. Vigilant Guardian 01-02 planning document
  56. Matthew Everett, ‘Let’s Get Rid of This Goddamn Sim’: How NORAD Radar Screens Displayed False Tracks All Through the 9/11 Attacks, Shoestring 911, August 12, 2010
  57. Matthew Everett, On 9/11, the U.S. Military Was Preparing for a Simulated Nuclear War, Shoestring 911, November 23, 2011
  58. Matthew Everett, The Repeatedly Delayed Responses of the Pentagon Command Center on 9/11, Shoestring 911, November 7, 2010
  59. Matthew Everett, ‘Let’s Get Rid of This Goddamn Sim’
  60. Matthew Everett, On 9/11, the U.S. Military Was Preparing for a Simulated Nuclear War
  61. Email timeline provided to General Eberhart by “NORAD J3”, September 14, 2001, available at Scribd, 911Document Archive
  62. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Colonel Robert Marr
  63. Paul Schreyer, Anomalies of the Air Defense on 9/11, Journal of 9/11 Studies, Volume 33, October 2012
  64. Ibid
  65. Transcript of 9/11 Commission Hearing of May 23, 2003
  66. Memoranda dated July 29, 2004 from 9/11 Commission counsel Dan Marcus, and emails between 9/11 Commission staff members
  67. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Colonel Robert Marr
  68. Transcript of 9/11 Commission Hearing of May 23, 2003
  69. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  70. Excerpts from May 22 and May 23, 2003 9/11 Commission Hearings, with Richard Ben Veniste questioning Jane Garvey and the military, 911Workin Group, http://tinyurl.com/c75t89h 
  71. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Public Hearing, Friday, May 23, 2003
  72. Interview of Craig Borgstrom by Leslie Filson
  73. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Craig Borgstrom, Prepared by Miles Kara, December 1, 2003
  74. [1] Transcript of interview with Craig Borgstrom and David E. Somdahl, Conducted Thursday, 25 October 2001 at Langley AFB, VA
  75. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with John Harter, Operations Supervisor, prepared by Miles Kara, December 1, 2003
  76. Interview of Craig Borgstrom by Leslie Filson
  77. 9/11 Commission, Memoranda for the Record:, GIANT KILLER visit, December 3,2003
  78. 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, DRM DAT2, CHANNEL 3 WDl-3 TK. WAV, Transcribed by Judy Zenge, Seak Professional Services accessed at 911Depsoitory.info
  79. [1] North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD Regulation 55-7
  80. David Ray Griffin, Flights 11, 175, 77, and 93: The 9/11 Commission’s Incredible Tales, 911Truth.org, December 4, 2005
  81. Paul Thompson, The Failure to Defend the Skies on 9/11, HistoryCommons.org
  82. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Public Hearing, Friday, May 23, 2003, http://www.9-11commission.gov
  83. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission Report, p 44
  84. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with General David Wherley, Prepared by: Philip Zelikow, August 28, 2003
  85. Christopher Conkey, Retired Major General Wherley Died in Crash, Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2009
  86. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with Lt Col Mark E. Stuart, Prepared by Miles Kara, October 30, 2003
  87. The handwritten notes and personal statements of ATCs and air traffic managers can be found at the website of the 9/11 Working Group of Bloomington, http://www.911workinggroup.org/p/foia-research.html. See, for example, “5 AWA 204.” 
  88. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Public Hearing, Friday, May 23, 2003
  89. See documents obtained by the 9/11 Working Group of Bloomington, 5AWA323 and 5AWA342, at http://www.911workinggroup.org/p/foia-research.html.  
  90. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  91. Matthew Everett, Was Delta 1989 Part of a Live-Fly Hijacking Exercise on 9/11?, Shoestring 9/11, July 22, 2009
  92. Transcript of Leslie Filson interview with Craig Borgstrom
  93. 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the Record: Interview with CINCNORAD Eberhart
  94. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, 9/11 Commission Report, p 41
  95. Lynn Spencer, Touching History, Pp 225-226
  96. Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearings for June 17, 2004
  97. Ibid
  98. Jim Hoffman, The Crash of Flight 93: Evidence Indicates Flight 93 Was Shot Down, 911Research.wtc7.net
  99. Mark H. Gaffney, Black 9/11: Money, Motive & Technology, Trine Day, 2012
  100. Maureen Dowd, Vice comes clean: He was the real president, and he stands by all of his mistakes, The Pittsburgh Post-Gazaette, March 7, 2013
  101. NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, NORAD and USNORTHCOM honour 9/11 heroes, October. 15, 2012
  102. See Bloomberg Businessweek profile for Ralph Eberhart. He has been a director at Triumph Group (military aviation), Jacobs Engineering (Oil & gas services), VSE Corp. (DOD equipment support), Rockwell Collins (military aviation), The Spectrum Group (Homeland security), Eid Passport (Homeland security), Standard Aero Holdings (military aviation), ObjectVideo (Homeland Security), and ICx Technologies (Homeland security).