Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, a senior Taliban commander, gives an interview on Pakistani television, and says Osama bin Laden is in good health and Mullah Omar remains in direct command of the Taliban. [Reuters, 6/18/2005] Several days later, US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad will criticize Pakistan, pointing out that if a TV station could get in contact with a top Taliban leader, Pakistani intelligence should be able to find them too (see June 18, 2005).
Mid-June 2005: British Intelligence Concludes No Group Has Intent or Capability to Attack in Britain; Threat Level Lowered
British intelligence concludes that “at present there is not a group with both the current intent and the capability to attack” inside Britain. The assessment is made by the Joint Terrorist Analysis Center, which is made up of about 100 top intelligence and law enforcement officials from Britain’s main intelligence agencies, as well as its Customs and police forces. The secret report is sent to various British government agencies, foreign governments, and corporations. As a result of the report, the British government lowers its formal threat assessment one level, from “severe defined” to “substantial.” “Substantial” is the fourth most serious threat level on a scale of one to seven. The report also states, “Events in Iraq are continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist related activity in [Britain].” After the 7/7 bombings about three weeks later (see July 7, 2005), British officials will deny that British involvement in the Iraq war served as a motivation for the 7/7 bombings. Senior British officials will not deny the report after its contents are leaked to the New York Times shortly after the 7/7 bombings, but will refuse to comment on it. One senior official will say that there was a sharp disagreement about lowering the threat level. [New York Times, 7/19/2005; London Times, 7/19/2005] In March 2005, senior officials from Scotland Yard came to opposite conclusions, and one official even predicted that Britons with bombs in backpacks would blow themselves up on the London subway (see March 2005).
June 17, 2005: Al-Zawahiri Apparently Releases New Video Criticizing US Influence in Middle East
A new video tape said to show al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is broadcast on Al Jazeera. In the video, the first said to be from al-Zawahiri since February, he attacks the US and its influence in the Middle East, saying, “The removal of the Crusader and Jewish invaders won’t occur by peaceful demonstrations,” and, “Reform and expelling the invaders from the countries of Islam won’t happen except through fighting for God’s sake.” The video shows the man thought to be al-Zawahiri sitting before a plain backdrop with an automatic weapon leaned next to him. He wears a white turban and black and white robes. It is unclear how Al Jazeera obtains the tape. [Associated Press, 6/17/2005]
June 18, 2005: US Ambassador Criticizes Pakistan for Not Arresting Taliban Leaders
US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad criticizes Pakistan’s failure to act against Taliban leaders living in Pakistan. Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani, a senior Taliban commander, recently gave an interview on Pakistani television in which he said Osama bin Laden is in good health and Mullah Omar remains in direct command of the Taliban (see June 15, 2005). Khalilzad further points out that Taliban spokesman Abdul Latif Hakimi frequently gives interviews from the Pakistani city of Quetta, and asks, “If a TV station can get in touch with them, how can the intelligence service of a country, which has nuclear bombs and a lot of security and military forces, not find them?” [Reuters, 6/18/2005]
June 19, 2005: CIA Director Says He Has ‘Excellent Idea’ Where Bin Laden Is Hiding
Asked if he has a good idea where Osama bin Laden is hiding, CIA Director Porter Goss replies: “I have an excellent idea of where he is. What’s the next question?” Although he doesn’t mention the country, Goss implies he is referring to Pakistan. He mentions the “very difficult question of dealing with sanctuaries in sovereign states,” which appears to be a diplomatic way of referring to the tribal region of Pakistan, where many believe bin Laden is located. [BBC, 6/20/2005] Vice President Dick Cheney will make a similar comment several days later (see June 23, 2005).
June 22, 2005-December 2005: Swiss Open and Close Investigation on Financier Al-Qadi
In the years since the US declared Saudi multimillionaire Yassin al-Qadi a terrorism financier (see October 12, 2001), no criminal charges have been brought against him anywhere in the world. But on June 22, 2005, it is announced that Swiss prosecutors are pursuing a formal criminal case against him. The case focuses on a series of transactions made between February and August 1998 that were sent from one of al-Qadi’s companies to a firm owned by Saudi businessman Wael Hamza Julaidan. Julaidan reputedly associated with bin Laden in the 1980s. He was placed on US and UN terrorism financier lists in 2002. Over $1 million of the money in these transactions was sent to a Yemeni charity, but allegedly wound up funding al-Qaeda instead. Al-Qadi denies knowing that the money would go to al-Qaeda. [Newsweek, 6/22/2005] It is claimed that some of this money goes to support the 9/11 attacks. However, in December 2005, the Swiss apparently close the case. The Swiss court issues a statement, “Nothing in the file allows one to conclude with sufficient likelihood that Yassin al-Qadi knew or was able to know that the payments he made and for which he is implicated in the Swiss proceedings, could serve to specifically finance the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.” [Arab News, 12/25/2005]
June 23, 2005: NIST Releases 43 Draft Reports; Recommends Changes to Improve Safety of Tall Buildings
Based upon its three-year investigation of the WTC collapses, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) calls for changes in the planning, construction, and operation of skyscrapers. NIST releases 43 draft reports, totaling about 10,000 pages, for public comments. These include 25 pages of recommendations, intended to learn from 9/11 and make building occupants and emergency responders safer in any future disasters. NIST’s inquiry has been conducted by more than 200 technical experts and contractors, and had two main parts: to look at the causes of the collapses and to identify weaknesses in building codes. Their recommendations include specific improvements to building standards, codes and practices; changes to evacuation and emergency response procedures; and research to help prevent future building failures. NIST does not have the authority to change building codes, but hopes to influence the policies of local authorities. The cost of implementing their recommended changes would add an estimated extra 2 to 5 percent to the development costs of buildings. Some are critical of their recommendations. Structural engineer Jon Magnusson, whose firm is the descendant of the company that designed the Twin Towers, says, “They are leading the public down the wrong path. They are saying we are going to fix the codes in order to deal with Sept. 11th. The physics say that you can’t do that.” [New York Times, 6/22/2005; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 6/23/2005; Associated Press, 6/24/2005] The New York Times points out that between 1989 and 1999, only five civilians had been killed in some 6,900 reported high-rise office building fires within the US. [New York Times, 6/24/2005] NIST will release its final report on the Twin Towers collapses four months later (see October 26, 2005).
June 23, 2005: Vice President Cheney Has ‘Pretty Good Idea’ of Bin Laden’s General Location
Vice President Dick Cheney says about Osama bin Laden, “We’ve got a pretty good idea of a general area that he’s in, but I—I don’t have the street address.” [CNN, 6/23/2005] His comments come shortly after CIA Director Porter Goss’s comment that he has an “excellent idea” where bin Laden is (see June 19, 2005).
June 23, 2005 and After: Italians Issue Arrest Warrants for CIA Officers over Milan Kidnapping
Italian authorities issue arrest warrants for nine Italians and 26 Americans, including former CIA Milan substation chief Robert Seldon Lady, over the kidnapping of an Islamic extremist in Italy (see Noon February 17, 2003) [Washington Post, 12/6/2005; Associated Press, 1/26/2007; CNN, 2/16/2007] The kidnapped person, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar), had previously informed for the CIA (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After and Summer 2000), but was held hostage at two US airbases, Aviano in Italy and Ramstein in Germany, and then reportedly tortured in Egypt. This is the first time a foreign government files criminal charges against the CIA for an overseas counterterrorism mission. The Washington Post will comment, “Coming from a longtime ally, Italy, which has worked closely with the US government to fight terrorism and has sent troops to Iraq, the charges reflect growing unease in Europe about some US tactics against suspected Islamic terrorists.” The 13 are not in Italy to be arrested and many appear to have been using fake names. Court documents show they spent over $100,000 staying in luxury hotels in Milan, Florence, and Venice before and after the kidnapping. Nasr is released temporarily after being held for about a year, and Italian authorities monitor a call in which he says he has been tortured with electric shocks in Egypt. The operation is so badly planned and executed that former CIA bin Laden unit chief Michael Scheuer has difficultly believing the CIA could have done it, saying, “The agency might be sloppy, but not that sloppy.” [Washington Post, 6/24/2005]
June 26, 2005: Rumsfeld Unsure If US Is Eliminating More Terrorists than It Is Creating
Asked on NBC’s Meet the Press if the US is “capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day” than are being created, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld replies, “Tough to know. I don’t know the answer to the question.” [Meet the Press, 6/26/2005] Rumsfeld asked essentially the same question to his aides in a 2003 memo (see October 16, 2003). A US National Intelligence Estimate in 2006 will comment, “Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists… are increasing in both number and geographic distribution” (see April 2006). [Salon, 3/27/2008]
