Up until 2004, suicide bombings were almost unheard of in Afghanistan. But beginning that year, the Taliban launches six suicide attacks. In 2005, the number increases to 21. In 2006, the number skyrockets to 141, causing 1,166 casualties. In 2007, the number remains steady at 137, but the number of casualties increases 50 percent to 1,730. On September 8, 2006, a suicide bomber hits a US convoy just outside the US embassy in Kabul, killing two US soldiers and 16 Afghans. The resulting investigation uncovers a suicide bomb support network in Kabul that links to militants in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Amrullah Saleh, the head of Afghanistan’s intelligence agency, says: “Every single bomber we arrest is linked to Pakistan in some way. The training, provisions, explosives, technical equipment, are all being manufactured in Pakistan, and the CIA knows this.” [Rashid, 2008, pp. 366-367]
2004 and After: London-based Website and Radio Station Glorify Jihad, British Authorities Take No Action
Al-Tajdeed Radio, a station run by London-based Saudi Islamist Mohammed al-Massari, broadcasts in Iraq and Saudi Arabia calls for attacks on British troops. The station carries songs calling for jihad against the coalition forces and addresses by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of an Iraqi group of militants reported to be affiliated with al-Qaeda. In addition, al-Massari also posts videos of attacks on British troops on his website. For example, in August 2006 the Council of Holy Warriors posts a declaration praising a bombing in Iraq that results in 55 people killed and wounded. MP Patrick Mercer calls the broadcasts “desperately demoralizing” for British troops in Iraq. Al-Massari says that the broadcasts were not in Britain, but abroad, so they are legal. No action is taken against al-Massari over the radio station and website, even after Britain passes a new Terrorism Act in 2006 making glorifying or encouraging political violence a crime (see March 30, 2006). [BBC, 8/18/2005; New York Times, 8/21/2006]
Early 2004: CIA Lacks Resources to Monitor Al-Qaeda Haven in Pakistan, Due to Iraq War
In early 2004, the head of the CIA station in Kabul, Afghanistan, known only as “Peter,” reports a revival of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces near the border of Pakistan. He proposes a spring intelligence push in the Pakistani tribal regions of South Waziristan and Kunar. Since 2002, al-Qaeda has mainly been regrouping in Waziristan, and many speculate that Osama bin Laden may be hiding there (see August 2002). Peter estimates that 24 field officers and five station officers would be needed for the new push. However, CIA headquarters replies that it does not have the resources to make the surge, presumably due to commitments in Iraq. Peter is rotated out of his post a short time later. [Washington Post, 10/22/2004]
Early 2004: Weldon Fails to Convince 9/11 Commission to Look into Data Mining Programs
Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) is not yet familiar with Able Danger, though he will help bring information about the program to light in 2005. However, he is familiar with the closely related Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) program, having had dealings with it before 9/11. He says he is frustrated at the apparent lack of understanding about programs like LIWA based on the lines of questioning at public 9/11 Commission hearings in early 2004, so, “On at least four occasions, I personally tried to brief the 9/11 Commissioners on: NOAH [Weldon’s pre-9/11 suggestion to have a National Operations and Analysis Hub]; integrative data collaboration capabilities; my frustration with intelligence stovepipes; and al-Qaeda analysis. However, I was never able to achieve more than a five-minute telephone conversation with Commissioner Thomas Kean. On March 24, 2004, I also had my Chief of Staff personally hand deliver a document about LIWA, along [with] questions for George Tenet to the Commission, but neither was ever used.” [US Congress. Senate. Committee on Judiciary, 9/21/2005] He says: “The next week, they sent a staffer over to pick up some additional materials about the NIWA, about the concept, and about information I had briefed them on. They never followed up and invited me to come in and meet with them. So they can’t say that I didn’t try.” [Office of Congressman Curt Weldon, 9/17/2005]
Early 2004: 76 Percent of US Cities Receive No Federal Money for Emergency Crews, First Responders
The US Conference of Mayors releases findings showing that of 215 cities surveyed, 76 percent say they have not received any money whatsoever from the federal government for their emergency crews and first responders—the nation’s front line of defense against terrorist attacks. [Carter, 2004, pp. 21]
Early 2004: White House Asks 9/11 Commission Not to Call for CIA Director Tenet’s Resignation
White House chief of staff Andrew Card calls 9/11 Commission Chairman Tom Kean and asks him not to demand the resignation of CIA Director George Tenet. Card says that he has heard the Commission will issue a statement tomorrow, but that President George Bush does not wish it. “You know, the president likes George,” he says, so such a call from the Commission would put Bush in an impossible position. Card asks that the Commission reconsider its apparent demand. However, Kean tells Card that he must have heard a false rumor, and that the Commission has no intention of calling for Tenet’s head in the middle of its inquiry. Card had actually heard the rumor from Tenet himself, although it is not known where Tenet learned it. At this point the Commission is considering recommending a long-mooted split of Tenet’s responsibilities. As director of central intelligence (DCI), Tenet runs the CIA and is also responsible for the intelligence community as a whole, although he does not have any real power over the other agencies supposedly under him. The split would mean that the CIA director would only run the CIA, and a director of national intelligence would be appointed above him, to coordinate the activities of all agencies in the intelligence community. It is possible that Tenet has misinterpreted talk of such a split as preparations for calling on him to resign. [Kean and Hamilton, 2006, pp. 144; Shenon, 2008, pp. 403]
Early 2004: Bin Laden and Al-Zarqawi Begin Exploring Idea of Allying Their Forces
In 2005, Hutaifa Azzam, son of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and a longtime acquaintance of militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, says al-Zarqawi had “no relations with Osama until he left to Iraq. His relation with Osama started [in 2004] through the Internet.” [Bergen, 2006, pp. 363-364] The Atlantic Monthly will later report that negotiations between al-Zarqawi and bin Laden about an alliance between them begin in early 2004. Al-Zarqawi will pledge loyalty to bin Laden in October, “but only after eight months of often stormy negotiations” (see October 17, 2004). [Atlantic Monthly, 6/8/2006]
Early 2004: Bush Administration Orders Seizing of US Boats Believed to Be Traveling to Cuba
The Bush administration directs the Department of Homeland Security to seize any vessel, sailing anywhere in US waters, that DHS believes might be headed to Cuba. The justification for the directive is “the Cuban government’s support of terrorism,” according to the DHS, even though there is little evidence to back up that claim. According to Business Week’s Paul Magnusson, the directive may well violate the Bill of Rights, and requires the US Coast Guard to “draw up regulations and enlist cash-strapped local police departments and harbor patrols in the effort.” The editor of a boating magazine observes: “That’s right, Popeye. If you’re unlucky enough to be reading this magazine in the cockpit of your most cherished possession—be it in San Diego, Seattle, Saginaw, or South Florida—and you wonder aloud how you’d always wanted to chase Hemingway’s wake, by the letter of this new edict you have now forfeited the right to keep your boat.” [Carter, 2004, pp. 17]
January 2004: Nabil al-Marabh Mysteriously Deported to Syria
After Nabil al-Marabh’s eight-month prison sentence was completed in 2003, he remained in a Chicago prison awaiting deportation. However, deportation proceedings were put on hold because federal prosecutors lodged a material witness warrant against him. When the warrant is dropped, al-Marabh is cleared to be deported to Syria. [Associated Press, 1/29/2003; Associated Press, 6/3/2004] In late 2002, the US government argued that there was no evidence al-Marabh had ever been involved in any terrorist activity or connected to any terrorist organization (see September 3, 2002). However, in al-Marabh’s deportation hearing, the judge rules that he “does present a danger to national security,” is “credibly linked to elements of terrorism,” and has a “propensity to lie.” A footnote in his 2003 deportation ruling states, “The FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility that al-Marabh has engaged in terrorist activity or will do so if he is not removed from the United States.” He is deported nonetheless, and prosecutors from two US cities are not allowed to indict him. Both Democratic and Republican Senators will later express bafflement and complain about this deportation (see June 30, 2004). [Associated Press, 6/3/2004]
January 2004: DNA Tests Indicate Hijackers Could Be Middle Eastern or European
The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) publishes a report on the examination of DNA of the presumed hijackers of Flight 77, which hit the Pentagon on 9/11, and Flight 93, which went down near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The hijackers’ DNA is identified by a process of elimination, i.e. it is presumed to be that which does not match the samples provided by the passengers’ relatives. Samples are not requested from the hijackers’ families (see After September 11, 2001), but it is determined that the DNA may have come from Middle Eastern men, although in two cases current but not very comprehensive databases indicate they are more likely to come from Europeans. Also, the DNA samples from the Pentagon indicate that two of the presumed hijackers may well have been brothers. Presumably this refers to Nawaf and Salem Alhazmi. [Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory, 1/2004, pp. 82-84 
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