On November 15, 2003, two Jewish synagogues are struck by suicide truck bombs in Istanbul, Turkey. Five days later, the British HSBC Bank and British Consulate in Istanbul are hit by more truck bombs. Fifty-eight people are killed in the attacks, including the British consul general, and over 750 are wounded. Turkish investigators believe the attacks were orchestrated by local al-Qaeda operatives after getting approval from Osama bin Laden. [BBC, 11/20/2003; BBC, 2/16/2007] In 2007, seven people will be sentenced to life in a Turkish prison for their role in the attacks. One of them is Luai Sakra, who confessed to being one of the two masterminds of the attacks (see March 21, 2006-February 16, 2007). Forty-one people receive shorter sentences, and 26 people are acquitted. [BBC, 2/16/2007] Evidence will later emerge suggesting that Sakra was an informant for the CIA, Turkey, and Syria at least in 2000 and 2001 (see 2000 and September 10, 2001).
November 16, 2003: Yemeni Terror Financiers Extradited to US
Two alleged Yemeni terror financiers, cleric Mohammed Ali Hassan al-Moayad and his assistant Mohammed Mohsen Yahya Zayed, are extradited from Germany to the US to face trial. The FBI claims that the two men supported both Hamas and al-Qaeda, with al-Moayad having provided Osama bin Laden with up to $20 million. They were arrested in Germany in January in a sting operation run by the bureau (see January 2003). The extradition follows a ruling by Germany’s highest court that the men will face a fair trial in the US, not a military court or other special tribunal. [BBC, 11/16/2003]
November 20, 2003: US Government Issues Security Bulletin for Americans Abroad
The US government sends a security bulletin to law enforcement and government officials warning that a surge in terrorist violence abroad and the conclusion of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, has increased the possibility of attacks on US citizens and interests abroad. According to a senior law enforcement official, the bulletin states that the spate of bombings in Istanbul and elsewhere signals al-Qaeda’s continued intent to attack US interests abroad. However, the information is not specific enough to warrant an increase of the National Alert Level from yellow to orange. [CBS News, 11/21/2003]
November 24, 2003: President Bush Proposes Slashing Firefighting Program by a Third
In his proposed 2005 budget, President Bush proposes reducing the budget of the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (AFGP) from $750 million to $500 million. The budget allocates, in total, $27 billion for the nation’s first responders over the next four years. A Council on Foreign Relations study, based on surveys of emergency responder groups, shows that the minimum necessary to secure the US from a second major terrorist attack is around $94 billion—almost four times the amount approved by Bush. [Carter, 2004, pp. 20-21; White House, 4/3/2004; Federal Election Commission, 1/16/2008] Congress will manage to increase the funding for the program to $542 million. It had hoped to increase funding to around $900 million. [Center for American Progress, 8/25/2004; Charles Schumer, 9/22/2006]
Late 2003: Al-Qaeda Mostly Stops Leaving Electronic Footprints
According to journalist Ron Suskind, at the end of 2003, “The carefully constructed global network of [al-Qaeda’s] sigint and what can be called finint, or financial intelligence, started to go quiet. In short, al-Qaeda, and its affiliates and imitators, stopped leaving electronic footprints. It started slowly, but then became clear, a definable trend.” Al-Qaeda resorts more to low-tech methods, such as human couriers. One senior US intelligence official will later say, “We were surprised it took them so long” to figure out the dangers of electronic communication. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 277-279]
Late 2003: 7/7 London Bomber Visits Pakistan, Meets Islamist Militant Leader
Shehzad Tanweer, one of the suicide bombers in the 7/7 London bombings (see July 7, 2005), visits Pakistan. He visited Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, but he may have just been visiting family on those trips. However, investigators will later believe that on his 2003 trip, he meets Osama Nazir, a leader of the Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Investigators will later suggest that Nazir could have given Tanweer advice about bomb-making. Tanweer also meets with Sher Ali, alleged to be a Jaish-e-Mohammed recruiting agent with links to Nazir and al-Qaeda leader Amjad Farooqi. Tanweer will travel to Pakistan in late 2004 and meet with Nazir again (see November 18, 2004-February 8, 2005). Nazir will be arrested soon thereafter in Pakistan on charges of participation in several attacks there in 2002. Shortly after the 7/7 bombings, Nazir will confirm from prison that he met Tanweer in 2003 and 2004. [Guardian, 7/18/2005; Daily Telegraph, 7/19/2005; Time, 7/24/2005]
December 2003-May 2004: Study Indicates Extreme Temperatures Involved in WTC Collapses
A laboratory releases two reports focusing on the unique properties of the dust from the World Trade Center collapses, and finds evidence of extremely high temperatures involved in these collapses. The laboratory, RJ Lee Group of Pennsylvania, is the largest commercial electron microscope laboratory in the world. [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 5/2004, pp. 1 
] In April 2002, it was retained on behalf of Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas to investigate environmental contaminants in this company’s building at 130 Liberty Street, New York. [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 12/2003, pp. 1 ] The building, located next to the World Trade Center, was heavily damaged on September 11, suffering a 24-story gash when the South Tower collapsed. [New York Times, 6/20/2003; Real Estate Weekly, 9/14/2005] RJ Lee collected samples from it, which it then analyzed “using industry standard analytical laboratory methods.” [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 12/2003, pp. 3-4 ] In December 2003 and May 2004, it releases two reports that evaluate the features of the dust from the WTC that was deposited in 130 Liberty Street. It calls this evaluation “the most extensive microscopic investigation related to WTC dust ever performed.” [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 12/2003, pp. 1-2 ; RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 5/2004, pp. 4 ] The reports describe phenomena that indicate extremely high temperatures were involved in the WTC collapses: 
“Various metals (most notably iron and lead) were melted during the WTC event, producing spherical metallic particles. Exposure of phases to high heat results in the formation of spherical particles due to surface tension.” [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 12/2003, pp. 17 ] “The amount of energy introduced during the generation of the WTC dust and the ensuing conflagration caused various components to vaporize.… Many of the materials, such as lead, cadmium, mercury, and various organic compounds, vaporized and then condensed during the WTC event.” [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 12/2003, pp. 21 ] “An additional characteristic of WTC dust is the presence of coated particles and fibers.… The presence of lead oxide on the surface of mineral wool indicate the existence of extremely high temperatures during the collapse which caused metallic lead to volatilize, oxidize, and finally condense on the surface of the mineral wool.” [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 5/2004, pp. 12 ] “WTC dust markers exhibit characteristics of particles that have undergone high stress and high temperature. Asbestos in the WTC dust was reduced to thin bundles and fibrils as opposed to the complex particles found in a building having asbestos-containing surfacing materials. Gypsum in the WTC dust is finely pulverized to a degree not seen in other building debris. Mineral wool fibers have a short and fractured nature that can be attributed to the catastrophic collapse. Lead was present as ultra fine spherical particles. Some particles show evidence of being exposed to a conflagration such as spherical metals and silicates, and vesicular particles (round open porous structure having a Swiss cheese appearance as a result of boiling and evaporation).” [RJ LeeGroup, Inc., 5/2004, pp. 17-18 ]
The reports offer no explanation for the origins of the extremely high temperatures that are indicated. But physics professor Steven E. Jones (see November 8, 2005) will later claim that molten metal found in the debris of the WTC is evidence that the towers were brought down deliberately and involving the use of an incendiary substance called thermite, which can melt steel. [Deseret Morning News, 11/10/2005; Deseret Morning News, 4/10/2006]
December 2003: Some Neoconservatives Want to Split Saudi Arabia to Control Its Oil Fields
Two prominent neoconservatives, Richard Perle and David Frum, publish a book titled An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror. Both are fellows at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute. In the book, they suggest mobilizing Shi’ites living in eastern Saudi Arabia, where most of the Saudi oil is. They note that the Saudi government has long feared “that the Shi’ites might someday seek independence for the Eastern Province—and its oil.… Independence for the Eastern Province would obviously be a catastrophic outcome for the Saudi state. But it might be a very good outcome for the United States. Certainly it’s an outcome to ponder. Even more certainly, we would want the Saudis to know we are pondering it.” [Dreyfuss, 2005, pp. 337-338] At the time, Perle is head of the Defense Policy Board, which advises the Defense Department. In 2002, a Defense Policy Board briefing argued that the US should work to split Saudi Arabia apart so the US can effectively control its oil (see July 10, 2002). Other neoconservatives like Michael Ledeen express similar views. In early 2003, James Akins, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, mentioned the possibility that Osama bin Laden could take over Saudi Arabia if the US invaded Iraq. “I’m now convinced that that’s exactly what [the neoconservatives] want to happen. And then we take it over.” [Dreyfuss, 2005, pp. 338]
December 2003: FBI Agent Says Officers in CIA’s Bin Laden Unit ‘Have Blood on Their Hands’ over 9/11
In an interview with author James Bamford, an unnamed FBI agent says that Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, deliberately hid 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from the FBI, allowing 9/11 to happen. He says: “They refused to tell us because they didn’t want the FBI, they didn’t want John O’Neill in particular, muddying up their operation. They didn’t want the bureau meddling in their business—that’s why they didn’t tell the FBI. Alec Station worked for the CIA’s CTC [Counterterrorist Center]. They purposely hid from the FBI, purposely refused to tell the bureau that they were following a man in Malaysia who had a visa to come to America. The thing was, they didn’t want John O’Neill and the FBI running over their case. And that’s why September 11 happened. That is why it happened.… They have blood on their hands. They have three thousand deaths on their hands.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 224]
December 2003: US Intelligence Discovers Al-Qaeda May Not Be Interested in New Attack Inside US
In December 2003, Norwegian intelligence discovers an al-Qaeda treatise on the Internet called “Jihadi Iraq, Hopes and Dangers.” Completed in September 2003, it is dedicated to Yusef al-Ayeri, head of al-Qaeda operations in the Arabian peninsula until he was killed in May 2003 (see May 31, 2003), and parts of it may have been written by al-Ayeri. The treatise has a series of recommendations on how to undercut US efforts in Iraq. One major idea is to separate the US from its allies in the Iraq war such as Britain, Spain, and Poland by bombing them. It suggests the political utility of an attack in Spain before 2004 elections there, which is what later occurs (see 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). It will later be determined that Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet, one of the leaders of the Madrid bombings, downloaded the treatise and was presumably influenced by it (it will also be alleged that Fakhet really was a government informant (see Shortly After October 2003). [New York Times Magazine, 11/25/2007] Interestingly, the treatise focuses on new attacks in Saudi Arabia and Europe, but not in the US. This dovetails with a growing consensus within the US intelligence community that al-Qaeda may not have been trying to attack the US since 9/11. One senior CIA official will later say, “Clearly, they had the capability to attack us in about a hundred different ways. They didn’t. The question was, why?” Journalist Ron Suskind will later comment that the idea “al-Qaeda might not, at this point, actually want to attack America” was “a conclusion that was the last thing anyone in the White House wanted publicized…” Suskind will later note that President Bush’s “central assertion that he should be reelected [in 2004] because he had kept [the US] from being attacked again” would have been severely undercut if the US public was aware of this US intelligence consensus. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 302-204]
