An unnamed CIA case officer with the agency’s Directorate of Operations (DO) later says: “I was working from the headquarters end in our Iraqi operations. In talking to the specialists, people who had worked on Iraqi issues or Iraq WMD for years, they said to me, ‘I always knew we didn’t have anything.’ This was before the war. But I mean, it was sort of horrific to me.… I talked to analysts and I talked to WMD experts, and I said, ‘Okay, is there a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq?’ ‘No, there’s not a link.’ ‘Do we have evidence of all this WMD we’re talking about?’ ‘No, we don’t have it.’ And then it was like a snowball, and all of a sudden we were at war. Everybody that I was talking to who did know about the issues were saying we didn’t have anything. And of course nobody’s speaking up. Who can they speak up to? There’s no forum for someone who’s involved in operations to talk to anyone and say, ‘We don’t have any Iraqi assets, we don’t have information on WMD, we don’t have anything there.’ But yet we all kind of knew it.… I understand that it [CIA] serves the President and the administration, but my thought is that it should serve the President and the administration in providing intelligence. And what has happened is that it serves the agenda—or at least for the Bush administration it’s serving the agenda of this administration, which is not what the CIA is supposed to do.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 336-337]
January-2002-December 2002: Prosecutors Not Allowed to Indict Al-Marabh
In November 2001, US police called Nabil al-Marabh one of their top five suspects in the 9/11 attacks. [Toronto Sun, 11/23/2001] In mid-January 2002, Canadian police call him “the real thing.” [Toronto Sun, 11/23/2001] In late January 2002, it is reported that in Chicago, “Federal agents say criminal charges spelling out his role [in 9/11 and other plots] are likely within a few weeks.” [ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002] Yet, shortly after this, there seems to be a dramatic change of opinion at Justice Department headquarters about al-Marabh. US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald in Chicago drafts an indictment against Nabil al-Marabh, charging him with multiple counts of making false statements in his interviews with FBI agents. Fitzgerald already has several successful al-Qaeda prosecutions. However, the indictments are rejected by Justice Department headquarters in the name of protecting intelligence. In December 2002, Fitzgerald tracks down a Jordanian informant who had spent time with al-Marabh in a federal detention cell earlier in the year because of minor immigration problems. Fitzgerald has the man flown to Chicago and oversees his debriefing. The man reveals numerous criminal acts that al-Marabh confessed to him in prison, and the information fits with what is already known of al-Marabh’s history (see December 2002). However, Fitzgerald is still not allowed to indict al-Marabh. Another prosecutor in Detroit, trying some associates of al-Marabh in an ultimately unsuccessful case there, also expresses a desire to indict al-Marabh, but is not allowed to do so (see Early 2003). [Associated Press, 6/3/2004] Al-Marabh will ultimately be deported to Syria after serving a short sentence on minor charges (see January 2004).
2002-Early 2003: Wolfowitz Still Pushing Unlikely Theory Linking WTC Bombing to Iraqi Government
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz proposes that President Bush should declare Ramzi Yousef an “enemy combatant.” Yousef is already in the “Supermax” prison, the most secure prison in the US, after being sentenced to life in prison for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing years before. But Wolfowitz contends that as an enemy combatant, heavy interrogation could get Yousef to admit he bombed the WTC on behalf of the Iraqi government. However, Wolfowitz’s proposal is strongly opposed by the FBI, which asserts that theories tying Yousef to the Iraqi government had been repeatedly investigated and debunked. Further, Yousef doesn’t meet any of the criteria the White House had laid out for designating enemy combatants. “At one point, the high-level discussions apparently prompted a top Bureau of Prisons official to make an unauthorized entry to Yousef’s [Supermax cell] to sound out his willingness to talk—a move that prompted strong protests to the Justice Department from the bomber’s lawyer…” The issue is debated until the start of the Iraq war, at which point apparently Wolfowitz loses interest. One lawyer involved in the discussions will later recall, “We talked it to death.” [Newsweek, 4/21/2004]
January 2002 and After: CIA Given Control of Al-Libi, Renders Him to Egypt
At the request of CIA Director George Tenet, the White House orders the FBI to hand Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a captured al-Qaeda operative being held in Afghanistan (see December 19, 2001), over to the CIA. One day before the transfer, a CIA officer enters al-Libi’s cell, interrupting an interrogation being conducted by FBI agent Russel Fincher, and tells al-Libi: “You’re going to Cairo, you know. Before you get there I’m going to find your mother and I’m going to f_ck her.” Soon after, al-Libi is flown to Egypt. [Newsweek, 6/21/2004; Washington Post, 6/27/2004; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 121] The CIA officer will later be identified as “Albert,” a former FBI translator. [Mayer, 2008, pp. 106] Presumably, this is the same former FBI translator named “Albert” who will later threaten al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with a gun and drill during interrogations (see Between December 28, 2002 and January 1, 2003 and Late December 2002 or Early January 2003). [Associated Press, 9/7/2010] Vincent Cannistraro, former head of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, will later say: “He’s carried off to Egypt, who torture him. And we know that he’s going to be tortured. Anyone who’s worked on Egypt, has worked on other countries in the Middle East, knows that. Egyptians torture him, and he provides a lot of information.” [PBS Frontline, 6/20/2006]
Provides Mix of Valid, False Information – It is unclear whether al-Libi is interrogated solely by Egyptian officials, or by a combination of Egyptian and CIA interrogators. Al-Libi is subjected to a series of increasingly harsh techniques, including at least one, waterboarding, that is considered torture (see Mid-March 2002). Reputedly, he is finally broken after being waterboarded and then forced to stand naked in a cold cell overnight where he is repeatedly doused with cold water by his captors. Al-Libi is said to provide his Egyptian interrogators with valuable intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the US Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb, and the location of Abu Zubaida, who will be captured in March 2002 (see Mid-May 2002 and After). However, in order to avoid harsh treatment he will also provide false information to the Egyptians, alleging that Iraq trained al-Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases. Officials will later determine that al-Libi has no knowledge of such training or weapons, and fabricates the statements out of fear and a desire to avoid further torture. Sources will later confirm that al-Libi did not try to deliberately mislead his captors; rather, he told them what he thought they wanted to hear. [ABC News, 11/18/2005; New York Times, 12/9/2005]
Using Allegations in White House Statements – Both President Bush (see October 7, 2002) and Secretary of State Colin Powell (see February 5, 2003) will include these allegations in major speeches.
Shifting Responsibility for Interrogations to CIA from FBI – The FBI has thus far taken the lead in interrogations of terrorist suspects, because its agents are the ones with most experience. The CIA’s apparent success with al-Libi contributes to the shift of interrogations from the bureau to the CIA. [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] Such methods as making death threats, advocated by the CIA, are opposed by the FBI, which is used to limiting its questioning techniques so the results from interrogations can be used in court. [Washington Post, 6/27/2004] “We don’t believe in coercion,” a senior FBI official says. [Guardian, 9/13/2004]
Early January 2002: Some Top Taliban Leaders Surrender Then Are Released
Seven former Taliban leaders surrender to the Northern Alliance near Kandahar, Afghanistan, but are released. Two are on a US list of twelve most wanted Taliban leaders: Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah Akhund and Justice Minister Mullah Nooruddin Turabi. Akhund “is considered by American intelligence officials to have been one of the Taliban leaders closest to Mr. bin Laden.” The US military denies reports of their release, but officials of the new Afghan government confirm the account and are unrepentant about it. They claim they are following through on an announced policy to grant amnesty to any Taliban leaders who surrender. CNN reports, “Though US forces expressed interest in the men,… they accepted the Afghan decision to let them go, and have given no indication they are pursuing them…” This follows other accounts of Taliban leaders being released in December 2001 (see December 24, 2001). A senior Pakistani official will later note, “Unbelievably, not one [Taliban cabinet minister] was killed, arrested, or defected to opposition forces during the two-month-long, nonstop bombing.” It appears that the highest ranking Taliban leader to have been killed or captured is the deputy foreign minister, who was killed in a bombing raid. [Washington Post, 12/17/2001; New York Times, 12/20/2001; Washington Post, 1/10/2002; CNN, 1/10/2002] Mullah Obaidullah Akhund will later become one of the most important leaders of the continued Taliban resistance. In 2004, it will be reported that Pakistan is allowing him and other Taliban leaders to freely come and go through Pakistan (see August 18, 2005). [Boston Globe, 7/11/2004]
Early January-January 9, 2002: Indonesia Arrests Suspected Al-Qaeda Operative at CIA’s Request, Extradites Him to Egypt
The CIA sends a request to Indonesia to arrest suspected 24-year old al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni and extradite him to Egypt. The CIA found his name in al-Qaeda documents obtained in Afghanistan. The agency believes that Iqbal, a Pakistani, worked with Richard Reid (see December 22, 2001), the Briton charged with attempting to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami on December 22 with explosives in his shoes. A few days later, the Egyptian government sends Jakarta a formal request to extradite Madni in connection with terrorism, providing Indonesian authorities with a convenient cover for complying with the CIA request. On January 9, Iqbal is detained in Jakarta by Indonesia’s State Intelligence Agency at the insistence of the CIA. He is flown to Egypt two days later (see January 11, 2002). [Washington Post, 3/11/2002]
January 1, 2002: Ex-Unocal Employee Becomes US Special Envoy to Afghanistan
Zalmay Khalilzad, already Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues, and a prominent neoconversative (see May 23, 2001), is appointed by President Bush as a special envoy to Afghanistan. [BBC, 1/1/2002] In his former role as Unocal adviser, Khalilzad participated in negotiations with the Taliban to build a pipeline through Afghanistan. He also wrote op-eds in the Washington Post in 1997 (see October 7, 1996) supporting the Taliban regime, back when Unocal was hoping to work with the Taliban. [Independent, 1/10/2002] He will be appointed US ambassador to Afghanistan in 2003 (see November 2003).
2002-March 10, 2004: ’Emir’ of Madrid Bombings Is Surrounded by Informants
Allekema Lamari, one of about three of the 2004 Madrid train bombing masterminds, is released from a Spanish prison in 2002. The Spanish government will later call him the “emir” of the bombings. Most of the alleged Madrid bombers have little formal connection to any Islamist militant group or training camp, but Lamari has an extensive background as an Algerian militant. He was imprisoned in Spain in 1997 for belonging to the GIA militant group. When he is released from prison in 2002, an informant named Safwan Sabagh closely follows him. Sabagh travels with him, and moves towns at the same time Lamari does. Sabagh has a special assignment from the Spanish intelligence agency, the CNI, to focus on Lamari, since Lamari is considered such a dangerous character. Sabagh is considered an excellent informant and gives a steady stream of information about Lamari. For instance, on March 8, just three days before the Madrid bombings, Lamari calls Sabagh and appears nervous and concerned about something that has to happen soon. Sabagh is with Lamari when Lamari meets other masterminds of the plot, such as Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet. Sabagh also introduces Lamari to Mohamed Afalah and vouches that he is a person Lamari can trust. [El Mundo (Madrid), 10/17/2005] Afalah becomes Lamari’s driver, bodyguard, and confidante, but Afalah also is an informant for the CNI. [El Mundo (Madrid), 1/15/2007] Furthermore, three other CNI informants, Abdelkader Farssaoui (alias Cartagena), Smail Latrech, and Rabia Gaya, also sometimes keep tabs on Lamari. Several weeks after the Madrid bombings, Sabagh will be arrested and held for one day, and then let go. It has not been explained how the CNI is unable to stop the Madrid bombings when possibly the most important mastermind of those bombings was surrounded by so many informants. [El Mundo (Madrid), 10/17/2005]
2002-January 23, 2004: Pakistan Refuses to Arrest Al-Qaeda Leader Ghul, Who Is Linked to Militant Group Supported by ISI
The US wants al-Qaeda leader Hassan Ghul arrested, but the Pakistani government will not do so, apparently because he is part of a Pakistani militant group supported by the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency. Details and timing are vague, but US intelligence becomes increasingly interested in Ghul. He is believed to be part of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida’s secret network of moneymen and couriers. According to a 2011 article by the Associated Press, the CIA has been pressing the Pakistani government to arrest Ghul “for years.” After 9/11, Ghul hides in Lahore, Pakistan, in safe houses run by the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). This group helps many al-Qaeda operatives escape Afghanistan and hide in Pakistan after 9/11, and it even helps Zubaida escape and hide (see Late 2001-Early 2002). However, the ISI refuses to arrest Ghul. The Associated Press will report that “former CIA officers who targeted Ghul said he had ties to the Lashkar-e-Toiba terror group, which had the backing of the ISI.” Eventually, the CIA learns that Ghul plans to meet with al-Qaeda operatives fighting against US forces in Iraq. Ghul is captured in Iraq on January 23, 2004 (see January 23, 2004). However, the Pakistani government is said to be furious that Ghul has been captured, and the US is pressed to return him. The US transfers him to a secret CIA prison instead. [Associated Press, 6/15/2011]
January 4, 2002: Firefighter Magazine Scolds WTC Investigation
A firefighter trade magazine with ties to the New York Fire Department calls the investigation into the collapse of the WTC a “half-baked farce.” The article points out that the probe has not looked at all aspects of the disaster and has had limited access to documents and other evidence. “The destruction and removal of evidence must stop immediately.” The writer, Bill Manning, states, “I have combed through our national standard for fire investigation, NFPA 921, but nowhere in it does one find an exemption allowing the destruction of evidence for buildings over 10 stories tall.” He concludes that a growing number of fire protection engineers have theorized that “the structural damage from the planes and the explosive ignition of jet fuel in themselves were not enough to bring down the towers.” Yet, “[a]s things now stand and if they continue in such fashion, the investigation into the World Trade Center fire and collapse will amount to paper- and computer-generated hypotheticals.” [Fire Engineering, 1/2002; New York Daily News, 1/4/2002]
