The fire alarm system in World Trade Center Building 7 detects a possible fire somewhere in the building, although the exact location of this possible fire is not signified. The alarm system has been placed on “test condition,” which causes any alarms to be ignored, for a period of eight hours, beginning at 6:47 a.m. this morning (see 6:47 a.m.-2:47 p.m. September 11, 2001). [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 6/2004, pp. 28] But less than two minutes after the South Tower collapsed (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), while it is in this condition, the system registers an alarm. This does not necessarily mean there is a fire in the building, however. “Even though a fire alarm is indicated,” a report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will later comment, “the record might have been the result of dust entering smoke detectors.” The alarm record will show that the fire condition occurs in “AREA 1.” However, NIST will be informed that AREA 1 is not a specific area within WTC 7, but instead refers to the entire building. This means that “a fire detected in any fire alarm zone in the building would have resulted in the same AREA 1 identification,” NIST will state. While the alarm system is in test condition, as is currently the case, records of an alarm are recorded in its history file but alarm signals do not appear on the operator’s display. And NIST will state that none of the interviews conducted by its investigation team, which examines the collapse of WTC 7, “contained any mention of an alarm received at the fire command station” in the building’s third-floor lobby. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 11/2008, pp. 68-70]
10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Pilots Hear Warning that Planes Could Be Shot Down; Ordered to Protect the White House
The pilots that took off from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) hear a warning over radio that errant aircraft will be shot down, and receive an instruction from the Secret Service to protect the White House. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 222-223]
Pilots Learn of FAA Order – The three Langley fighter jets have now reached the Baltimore-Washington area. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 222] The pilots hear over their radios that the FAA has ordered all civilian aircraft to land. [New York Times, 10/16/2001] (The FAA issued this instruction at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Congress. House. Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure, 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29] )
Borgstrom Hears Shootdown Warning – The three pilots are all on different radio frequencies, but are able to communicate between themselves on their auxiliary frequency. According to author Lynn Spencer, one of them, Captain Craig Borgstrom, hears a message over the emergency radio frequency that is in response to the FAA’s recent order: “Attention all aircraft! Attention all aircraft! You are ordered to land at the nearest suitable airport. All aircraft must land immediately. Violators will be shot down.” The source of this message is unstated. [Filson, 2003, pp. 66; Spencer, 2008, pp. 222-223] (Author Leslie Filson will describe the Langley pilots hearing what is apparently a separate but similar message later on, some time after 10:42 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-11:05 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 82] )
Instructed to Protect the White House – Around the time Borgstrom hears this, Major Dean Eckmann, the lead Langley pilot, is on the radio with the FAA’s Washington Center. A Secret Service agent has arrived there and wants to talk to him. [Filson, 2003, pp. 68; Spencer, 2008, pp. 222-223] Eckmann then receives a garbled message over his radio, which is difficult to make out. [New York Times, 11/15/2001] The message is, “Protect the house.” Eckmann will later recall, “I took it to mean protect the White House.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 68] He notifies the two other pilots—Borgstrom and Major Brad Derrig—of this message. He tells them, “I think I just talked to the Secret Service, but I’m not sure.” [New York Times, 11/15/2001]
Possible Shootdown Order? – According to Spencer, this message means that “Unknown to NEADS” (NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector), Eckmann has been “given shootdown authority directly from the Secret Service, bypassing the military chain of command.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 223] But Borgstrom and Derrig will later say they “never received explicit orders to fire on incoming planes perceived to be hostile.” [New York Times, 11/15/2001] Borgstrom radios NEADS weapons director Steve Citino and asks for specific instructions about what to do (see 10:07 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Spencer, 2008, pp. 223] According to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS will only learn that NORAD has been given clearance to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m., and even then it does not pass this order along to the fighter pilots under its command (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42-43]
10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: United Airlines Loses Contact with Three Flights
United Airlines temporarily loses communication with three of its aircraft. Andrew Studdert, United Airlines’ chief operating officer, will tell the 9/11 Commission that at around 10:00 a.m., the airline loses contact with Flight 399, Flight 415, and Flight 641. Persistent attempts to communicate with these “missing” aircraft are eventually successful. [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004] At 10:45 a.m., the FAA’s Cleveland Center will report that Flight 641 is on the ground at Detroit Metro Airport in Michigan. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001]
Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Command Bus Is Moved after a Police Captain Warns that the North Tower Will Collapse
Inspector Joseph Morris, a commanding officer with the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), gives the order to move the PAPD’s mobile command post further away from the World Trade Center and thereby likely prevents those in it being killed or seriously injured when the North Tower collapses. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 100-101] The mobile command post is a vehicle the size of a bus that was dispatched from the PAPD’s headquarters in Jersey City when word reached there about the crash at the North Tower (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). It arrived near the Twin Towers at around 9:30 a.m. and was parked just north of the intersection of West and Vesey Streets, next to Building 6 of the WTC. [Urban Hazards Forum, 1/2002; Accardi, 3/7/2002 
; Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 8, 100] After the South Tower collapsed (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), Port Authority personnel gathered at the vehicle to regroup.
Police Captain Says the North Tower Will Collapse – At some point, Captain Anthony Whitaker, the PAPD commanding officer at the WTC, comes to the mobile command post and warns that the North Tower is in danger of collapsing, like the South Tower did. [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] He is convinced that the North Tower is “about to come down any minute,” he will later recall. [Murphy, 2002, pp. 187] He approaches Morris outside the vehicle and urgently tells him that “the area is not safe, because [the North Tower] is coming down.” [9/11 Commission, 11/10/2003] Presumably in response to Whitaker’s warning, Morris decides that the vehicle needs to be moved to somewhere safer. “I knew that the mobile command post must be moved north on West Street,” he will state. [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] He gets into the vehicle and gives the order, “Move the command post.”
Instruction Is Given to Move the Command Bus – Those in the vehicle groan in frustration when they hear Morris’s order, since “[p]eople were in motion, the command post was almost operational, [and] no one wanted to disconnect everything and start all over,” according to a book by Lieutenant William Keegan of the PAPD. But Morris ignores their objections, points to a location on a map of the city, and says, “Move it there.” [9/11 Commission, 11/10/2003; Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 100]
Fire Trucks Move to Allow the Vehicle to Drive Away – Sergeant William Zika, who is at the mobile command post with Morris, talks with Police Officer Frank Accardi, the vehicle’s driver, and Police Officer Thomas Kennedy “about moving the bus further north to a safer location.” [Zika, 3/9/2002] But before they can start the vehicle, Accardi and Kennedy have to clean its air filter, which became clogged with debris when the South Tower collapsed. [Merrill, 2011, pp. 232; Law Officer, 8/16/2011] Meanwhile, Whitaker starts yelling at the fire trucks parked nearby to free up space so the vehicle can get away. [Murphy, 2002, pp. 187]
Moving the Command Bus Reportedly Saves Lives – Accardi then starts the mobile command post, moves it north, and parks it on West Street, between Murray and Chambers Streets. The North Tower of the WTC will collapse while the vehicle is at this location, at 10:28 a.m. (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Accardi, 3/7/2002 ; 9/11 Commission, 11/10/2003; 9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004 ] The tower will crush Building 6 of the WTC, “covering the exact spot where the command post had stood with tons of debris,” Keegan will write. This will mean that Morris’s order to move the vehicle “prevented the deaths of everyone in the PAPD command post,” according to Keegan. [Keegan and Davis, 2006, pp. 100-101]
Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:25 a.m. September 11, 2001: Police Officers Find a Man of Middle Eastern Appearance Behaving Suspiciously in the North Tower
Officers belonging to New York Police Department’s elite Emergency Service Unit (ESU) who are making their way out of the North Tower of the World Trade Center encounter a man of Middle Eastern appearance who is behaving very suspiciously and subsequently arrest him. [Appel, 2009, pp. 125-128] The ESU officers were on the 31st floor of the North Tower when the South Tower collapsed, at 9:59 a.m. (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). A colleague who was outside at the time of the collapse promptly radioed them to say what had happened and instruct them to get out of the building. [9/11 Commission, 5/18/2004; PoliceOne, 9/9/2011]
Suspicious Man Is Apparently Slipping Back into the Tower – As the officers are making their way down the stairs, one of them, Detective Timothy Morley, overhears transmissions coming over the radios of the firefighters he passes about a “suspicious man” who has been ignoring the Fire Department’s orders and is “talking gibberish on his cell phone.” As they approach the 21st floor, Morley and his colleagues encounter this man. They see him watching firefighters going down the stairs and, once he is sure they have gone, slowly making his way into the stairwell. They find it odd that someone is apparently sneaking back into the building while it is being evacuated.
Man Refuses to Say Who He Is – Morley asks the man what he is doing. The man turns around and the ESU officers see that he is about 40 years old, is well dressed, wearing a suit and tie, and has an olive complexion, dark hair, and dark eyes. They think he looks Middle Eastern. He is holding a leather valise in front of him. Morley asks him, “Do you work here?” but the man just stands still and says nothing. Morley then asks, “Who are you?” and again the man says nothing. Suddenly, the man opens his valise and pulls out a white, fluffy, stuffed toy rabbit and shoves it into Morley’s face. Another officer, David Norman, knocks the toy rabbit out of the man’s hand and onto the floor.
Officers Think the Man’s Phone May Be a Detonator Device – A few firefighters who are coming down the stairs see the man and ask the ESU officers: “What’d we got? A terrorist?” In response, the man says, menacingly: “You want to know who I am? Let me show you.” He then reaches for a cell phone that is hooked to his belt. Seeing the man’s fingers just an inch from the phone’s keypad, Morley shouts out, “You’re not pressin’ any buttons!” Concerned that the cell phone might be a detonator device, Morley, Norman, and another ESU officer, Clifford Allen, snatch it off the man and toss it onto the floor.
Senior Officer Wants the Man to Be Taken out of the Tower – By this time, more people have come down the stairs and are watching the commotion. Among them are two civilians who work on the 65th floor. Someone asks them if they recognize the suspicious man. They have a good look at him and say, “He’s not from that floor,” referring to the 21st floor. Deciding now that the man doesn’t belong in the building, ESU Lieutenant Venton Hollifield orders: “Get this guy outta here. We’ll find out what he is and who he is later.” A Port Authority Police Department sergeant who is on the stairs starts gathering up the man’s belongings, but when he goes to pick up the toy rabbit, Morley orders him to leave it where it is.
Man Goes into a Rage and Is Then Arrested – The ESU officers then start escorting the man down the stairs. But a couple of flights down, he goes into a rage and tries to get past them to run back upstairs. He starts swearing while flailing his arms, and punching and kicking at the officers. The officers are easily able to restrain him, but at this point Hollifield instructs Morley to arrest him. Morley does so and handcuffs the man behind his back. The man then quietens down and everyone is able to continue down the stairs. But occasionally the man makes an outrageous statement. For example, he says, “I was a soldier in my country” and when he is asked what his country is, he replies, “The Ukraine,” even though he doesn’t look Ukrainian.
Man Laughs When He Sees the Destruction outside the Tower – When the ESU officers reach the plaza level, they see the devastation caused by the collapse of the South Tower through the windows. But while everyone else is shocked at what they see, the suspicious man giggles and says: “Look at the fire. Nice, nice fire.” [Appel, 2009, pp. 125-129] Morley and Hollifield will escort the man away from their colleagues and eventually pass him on to the FBI. However, a man in a dark suit—apparently some kind of government agent—will subsequently instruct Morley to keep quiet about the strange man he’d arrested in the North Tower (see After 10:30 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Appel, 2009, pp. 131, 173-175] Curiously, considering that the suspicious man threatened the ESU officers with a toy stuffed rabbit, a week later, the New York State Police will be warned that terrorists might try to get bombs onto commercial planes by hiding them inside stuffed toys. But the man’s toy rabbit will never be recovered from the rubble of the North Tower and therefore is not examined to see if it contains explosives. [Appel, 2009, pp. 340]
10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Maryland Police Say They Cannot Send Helicopters to Pentagon, but Other Units Provide Helicopters
Sergeant Ronald Galey, the pilot of a US Park Police helicopter responding to the attack on the Pentagon, asks the Maryland State Police to send medical evacuation (medevac) helicopters to help out at the crash scene, but is told, “No, we can’t respond,” apparently because the airspace has been shut down. [Rotor and Wing, 11/2001; US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001] Galey is flying one of the two Park Police Aviation Unit helicopters that arrived at the Pentagon within minutes of the attack there (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). His helicopter has been circling overhead while the other Park Police helicopter landed to conduct medical evacuations. They are currently the only helicopters to have arrived on the scene.
Pilot Wants More Helicopters to Assist at the Pentagon – Realizing that his helicopter cannot provide its current command and control function and conduct medical evacuations at the same time, Galey requests assistance from other departments that have helicopters equipped to transport injured patients. The first department he calls is the Maryland State Police. [US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001; McDonnell, 2004, pp. 20-22 ] The Maryland State Police Aviation Command owns 12 helicopters and most of its work involves medical transport, with its helicopters carrying injured patients to hospital. [Maryland State Police, 2/16/2003; Baltimore Sun, 3/7/2006] According to Galey, the unit has “the most resources for aircraft, medevac aircraft, that we knew were manned and ready to go.” However, Galey will later recall, in response to his request, “they came back and said, ‘No, we can’t respond.’”
Maryland Police Think They Cannot Launch Helicopters – When Galey is told that the unit cannot respond, he and the rest of his crew are “very shocked,” and, Galey will say, “[T]hat’s when we were starting to suspect there was something more to it.” According to later accounts, the unit cannot respond because the airspace has been shut down. [Rotor and Wing, 11/2001; US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001] (The FAA has issued a nationwide “ground stop” that prevents any aircraft from taking off (see (9:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001) and has also ordered that all airborne aircraft must land at the nearest airport (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Congress. House. Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure, 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 25, 29] Galey is currently unaware that the airspace has been shut down. However, the Maryland State Police helicopters should be able to respond all the same, because NORAD has told him, “The aircraft that you’re calling in, we’re going to allow to come in” (see (Shortly After 9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). According to Galey, the Maryland State Police “just didn’t know [that] if we requested them they could come.”
Other Departments Send Helicopters – Galey then contacts MedStar at the Washington Hospital Center and AirCare at Inova Fairfax Hospital in Virginia. Each of them dispatches helicopters to the Pentagon. Galey will recall that these two departments “hadn’t gotten the word that the airspace was shut down, and since I’m the one who requested the aircraft and informed NORAD, NORAD allowed them to come in.” [Rotor and Wing, 11/2001; US Naval Historical Center, 11/20/2001] It is unclear exactly when Galey contacts the different departments. But according to the Arlington County After-Action Report, the helicopter that MedStar launches arrives at the Pentagon at around 10:18 a.m. Inova Fairfax Hospital launches one helicopter at “approximately 10:00 a.m.” and then sends a second helicopter to the Pentagon at around 10:40 a.m. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A-45 ]
10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighters Possibly Scrambled from Florida Air Base toward Air Force One, but Apparently Do Not Reach It
Fighter jets belonging to a military unit in Jacksonville, Florida, launch to escort Air Force One after it takes off from Sarasota, Florida (see 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001), some accounts will later indicate. [New York Times, 9/16/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001] However, other accounts will indicate that these jets, if launched, never reach the president’s plane. [Code One Magazine, 1/2002; CBS News, 9/11/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 255]
Fighters Reportedly Launched – The New York Times will report that at 10:41 a.m., Air Force One is “headed toward Jacksonville to meet jets scrambled to give the presidential jet its own air cover.” [New York Times, 9/16/2001] And, according to a report in the Daily Telegraph, after Air Force One climbs to 40,000 feet, it is “joined by an escort of F-16 fighters from a base near Jacksonville.” [Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001] These reports are presumably referring to jets belonging to the 125th Fighter Wing, a unit of the Florida Air National Guard located at Jacksonville International Airport. The wing keeps two F-15s on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base, near Miami, ready for immediate takeoff, as part of NORAD’s air sovereignty mission. [Airman, 12/1999; GlobalSecurity (.org), 8/21/2005; Florida Air National Guard, 2009]
Fighters Likely Launched from Homestead – If 125th Fighter Wing jets are scrambled to accompany Air Force One, it appears they would be the unit’s F-15s on alert at Homestead, rather than its fighters at Jacksonville Airport. Major Charles Chambers, who is at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, will state within a week of the attacks, “Fighters had been scrambled from Homestead [Air Reserve Base] and were escorting Air Force One westward.” [US Department of Defense, 9/2001] In contrast, at Jacksonville International Airport, according to a 2007 report in the Florida Times-Union, “Within hours of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the wing’s aircraft were sitting on a JIA runway ready for the order to scramble.” [Florida Times-Union, 9/15/2007] And an account published by the Florida Air National Guard will only say, “On Sept. 11, 2001, several loaded F-15 aircraft lined Runway 13/31 [at Jacksonville Airport] for the first time in history.” [Eagle’s Eye, 2007 ]
Fighters Apparently Do Not Reach Air Force One – Most accounts will contradict Chambers’ claim that, if indeed 125th Fighter Wing jets are scrambled toward the president’s plane, they are subsequently “escorting Air Force One westward.” According to the 1st Air Force’s book about 9/11, it is in fact “[f]our F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing, Texas Air National Guard,” that accompany Air Force One “from the panhandle of Florida to Barksdale Air Force Base.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 87] CBS News will report that the first fighters to reach Air Force One are two F-16s from the 147th Fighter Wing (see (11:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CBS News, 9/11/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 255] And Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, will only say that 147th Fighter Wing F-16s “chased Air Force One and landed with the president at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana,” making no mention of any 125th Fighter Wing jets being scrambled. [Code One Magazine, 1/2002] At NORAD’s other alert site in Florida besides Homestead—a unit at Tyndall Air Force Base—the two alert fighters are put on “battle stations,” but apparently do not take off to escort Air Force One (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 87]
Between 10:00 a.m. and 10:27 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Wants Confirmation that the Airborne Operations Center Has Taken Off
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asks Colonel Matthew Klimow, his executive assistant, to check that the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) has been launched in response to the terrorist attacks. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153-154] Myers arrived at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon with Klimow at around 9:58 a.m. and then joined the air threat conference (see (9:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 9/11/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38] At 9:59 a.m., an Air Force officer at the White House stated over the air threat conference that Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley had requested the implementation of “Continuity of Government” (COG) measures (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). These measures are meant to be taken “only in the gravest of emergencies,” Myers will later note, “and most recently had been expected to meet the Cold War threat of nuclear attack.”
Assistant Is Told to Verify that the NAOC Is Airborne – One aspect of the government’s COG plan is launching the NAOC. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 38; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 153] The NAOC is a militarized version of a Boeing 747 that is intended to provide the president, secretary of defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff with an airborne command center that could be used to execute war plans and coordinate government operations during a national emergency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for directing NAOC operations. [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Verton, 2003, pp. 143; United States Air Force, 8/2007] “Some in Washington considered it an expensive, unnecessary relic of the Cold War, but with the capital itself now under imminent threat, it was clear that NAOC was still a useful part of the inventory,” Myers will comment. In response to Hadley’s request, therefore, he asks Klimow to verify that the NAOC is airborne, according to his own recollection. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 154] Klimow, though, will give a slightly different account, recalling that Myers turns to him and says, “Call Strategic Command and have him scramble the NAOC.” [George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012]
NAOC Planes Were Involved in an Exercise – The US military in fact possesses four NAOC planes and three of them are already airborne. Two of them took off from Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, at 9:27 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. (see (9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and the third took off from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio minutes after the Pentagon attack, which occurred at 9:37 a.m. (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federation of American Scientists, 4/23/2000; Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 ; Dayton Daily News, 9/12/2001; 9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004] Furthermore, while Myers will imply that the NAOC was launched as part of COG measures, according to the Omaha World-Herald, the three aircraft took off because they were being used in a major training exercise called Global Guardian, which was being conducted by the US Strategic Command this morning (see Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Omaha World-Herald, 2/27/2002] The exact time when Myers talks about the NAOC with Klimow is unclear. However, he apparently does so before 10:28 a.m., since, in his 2009 memoir, he will place the conversation before he sees the North Tower of the World Trade Center collapsing on television, and the collapse occurs at 10:28 a.m. (see 10:28 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 154]
10:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Oklahoma City Prepares for Bombings in Wake of 9/11 Attacks
Twenty minutes after the 9/11 attacks in New York (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Washington (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001), a bomb truck is stationed in downtown Oklahoma City, in preparation for any potential bombing related to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (see 8:35 a.m. – 9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995). Additionally, an Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Department command post is activated where convicted bombing conspirator Terry Nichols (see September 5, 2001) is being held. [The Oklahoman, 4/2009]
Between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. September 11, 2001: Astronauts Record Devastation in New York from Space Station
The commander of the International Space Station, Frank Culbertson, is informed of the 9/11 attacks by NASA’s ground control. The station is orbiting the earth at a distance of about 300 miles. In addition to Culbertson, the station is manned by two Russian cosmonauts, Vladimir Dezhurov and Mikhail Tyurin. Culbertson quickly determines that the station will soon fly over New England. He positions himself with video and photographic equipment to record what he can see from space. One of his pictures, apparently taken after the collapse of both towers, shows a plume of smoke rising tens of miles into the sky. Vladimir Dezhurov will later take part in a televised debate during which he will apparently express skepticism about the US government’s version of the attacks (see September 12, 2008). [National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 9/12/2001; CNN, 10/15/2001; New York Times, 11/27/2001; Guardian, 9/11/2002]
