A large number of government employees gather at the office of DaimlerChrysler in Washington, DC, after being evacuated from the White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, and continue their operations there. [Automotive News, 10/8/2001; Politico, 9/9/2011] The White House and the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next to it were evacuated at 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] After they left these buildings, many staffers went north to Lafayette Park, across from the White House, but were unsure what to do.
DaimlerChrysler Manager Wants Staffers to Come to His Building – Anita McBride, the acting director of White House personnel, calls her husband, Timothy McBride, who is vice president of Washington affairs for DaimlerChrysler and works at the company’s office a couple of blocks from the White House. “I knew he would know what to do even more than I,” Anita McBride will later comment, “and his immediate instinct was to bring everybody there” to the DaimlerChrysler building. Anita McBride tells her husband she is on the way to his office. She then gathers together the White House staffers who are around her and heads there. [Politico, 9/9/2011; National, 9/11/2011]
Equipment Set Up for Staffers to Use – Most of the DaimlerChrysler employees are leaving the building as the White House staffers are arriving. But before they go, they set up their computers, phones, televisions, and other resources for the White House staffers to use, and also order food for the staffers. Timothy McBride served as assistant to the president for management and administration during the administration of former President George H. W. Bush and, in that position, was responsible for many emergency procedures. “So I did have the benefit of being able to anticipate some of what the [White House] staff might need to carry on their functions,” he will comment.
Secret Service Secures the Building – After the first staffers arrive, other White House employees learn that their colleagues have assembled at the DaimlerChrysler building and go to join them. [National Journal, 8/31/2002] Soon, 72 members of the White House staff have made it to the building, the largest number of White House employees currently gathered in a single location. [Politico, 9/9/2011] They include speechwriters, photographers, and people from communications, the National Economic Council, Cabinet affairs, and legislative affairs. [National Journal, 8/31/2002] Members of the Secret Service lock down the building and ensure that only people with White House passes are able to gain access. Anita McBride calls the White House Situation Room and lets officials there know who is at the DaimlerChrysler building. Arrangements are then made for a few senior staffers to return to the White House (see (12:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001).
White House Employees Continue Their Work – The staffers who remain at the DaimlerChrysler building quickly set up operations and continue their work. The building becomes “a White House annex,” Anita McBride will comment. [Politico, 9/9/2011; National, 9/11/2011] Some of the staffers discuss how the government can continue to function, and put together checklists of the things various federal departments and agencies should do. [Bridgeland, 2012, pp. 5] Speechwriters David Frum, John McConnell, Matthew Rees, and Matthew Scully work on a speech for President Bush to deliver from the Oval Office this evening. They are assisted by another speechwriter, Michael Gerson, who is at his home in Alexandria, Virginia, but is able to communicate with them by phone. [Frum, 2003, pp. 117, 120; PBS Frontline, 7/7/2004; Draper, 2007, pp. 140]
Officials Consider How Previous Crises Were Managed – Ken Mehlman, the White House political director, instructs Brad Blakeman, the deputy assistant to the president for appointments and scheduling, and Barry Jackson, the director of the Office of Strategic Initiatives, to go on the Internet and research what, if any, significance the date of September 11 has in the Muslim world. Mehlman also instructs Blakeman and Jackson to research how former Presidents Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan responded to crises during their presidencies. And he directs Logan Walters, the president’s personal aide, and Ashley Estes, the president’s personal secretary, to come up with a schedule based on how crises were managed during past presidencies. [Draper, 2007, pp. 140-141]
Staffers Stay at Building until Late Afternoon – Secret Service agents periodically brief the White House staffers on what is happening in Washington and elsewhere. The staffers will remain at the DaimlerChrysler building until about 5:30 p.m., after word is received that the president is heading back to Washington. The speechwriters will then go to the White House while the other staffers will go home. [National Journal, 8/31/2002; Politico, 9/9/2011]
After 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Plane Carrying Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Shelton Spends Hours in a ‘Holding Pattern’ before Being Allowed into US Airspace
The plane that has been flying General Henry Shelton, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, over the Atlantic Ocean has to spend two hours in a “holding pattern” near Greenland and then more time in a holding pattern over Canada before it is cleared to fly back into the United States. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 
] Shelton was flying toward Europe for a NATO conference (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), but, after he learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center, ordered that his plane turn around and return to the US (see (8:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, air traffic controllers have denied the request to do so because US airspace has been shut down (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002, pp. G-1; Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 430-432]
Plane Has to Fly in a Holding Pattern near Greenland – Therefore, although Shelton’s plane, nicknamed “Speckled Trout,” does turn around, it doesn’t initially fly back to the United States. For a couple of hours, since its crew doesn’t have clearance to return to the US and it doesn’t have a destination, the plane goes into a “holding pattern” near Greenland. Captain Rob Pedersen, the flight navigator, comes up with a list of alternative landing sites, which include Thule Air Base in Greenland and Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland. Although the crew decides to head back to the US, Pedersen will later recall, it is still difficult to get a security clearance, even for such a high-profile passenger as Shelton.
Plane Goes into Another Holding Pattern over Canada – Speckled Trout eventually reaches Canada, but the plane is still refused entry into US airspace and so it goes into a holding pattern again. “In the beginning we had a few problems convincing [the air traffic controller] to allow us back into the country, [even though] we were ordered at a significantly high level to come back,” Pedersen will recall. “You can’t say over the radio who you are carrying because they don’t have secure communications at the FAA.… We had to tell them over an open line that we had a DV Code 2, which is a ranking that a lot of DVs [distinguished visitors] fall under.” Eventually, the crew receives permission to fly into the US, although the time when this occurs is unstated. “It took a little bit of time, and I’m sure there were a lot of phone calls made, before they let us back in,” Pedersen will say. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] Shelton, however, will contradict this account and claim his plane is cleared to enter US airspace significantly earlier. He will recall that those on the plane are told they have permission to enter US airspace 10 minutes after he talks on the phone with General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see (Shortly After 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001), which would mean they receive clearance possibly as early as around 10:15 a.m. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432-433]
Myers Takes Shelton’s Place as Chairman While Shelton Is outside the US – After flying over New York, Speckled Trout will land at Andrews Air Force Base, just outside Washington, DC, at 4:40 p.m. (see 4:40 p.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001 ; UNC-TV, 1/27/2013] While the plane is being denied permission to enter US airspace, Myers remains as the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Shelton’s place. This is “how the law reads whenever the chairman is out of the country,” Shelton will write. “Until I crossed back into United States airspace, all the decisions would be Dick’s to make, in conjunction with Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and the president.” [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432]
Shortly After 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Pilots Start Receiving Confused Radio Communications
The three pilots launched from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia start receiving confusing communications over their radios. Apparently, shortly after one of them first sees the Pentagon on fire (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the pilots’ radio frequencies become cluttered with orders and chatter. One of them will later describe: “It was like getting 10 hours of conversation in about 10 minutes. No one knew what was going on.” [New York Times, 11/15/2001] Journalist and author Jere Longman will refer to the pilots receiving a “jumble of radio communications.” [Longman, 2002, pp. 76] According to one of the pilots, Craig Borgstrom, he and the two others are on different frequencies but share a common intra-flight channel, and are “hearing a lot of chatter but nothing about airliners crashing into buildings.” He will later recall: “There was some confusion for us, this was very abnormal. We were all three on different frequencies… and were getting orders from a lot of different people.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 66]
After 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: White House Situation Room Requests Gas Masks, but Receives Too Few of Them
Personnel in the White House Situation Room request protective gear, in case there is a chemical or biological attack, but when someone arrives with gas masks for them, they find there are too few to go around. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8-9; McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011] While most people in the White House evacuate, beginning at around 9:45 a.m. (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001), those in the Situation Room stay where they are (see (Shortly After 9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke and about a dozen others remain at work there, keeping information flowing to key government officials. [Daily Telegraph, 9/10/2010; McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011] Beverley Roundtree, Clarke’s secretary, calls and tells Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, a member of Clarke’s counterterrorist staff, that she and the rest of Clarke’s staff in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next to the White House, will also be staying where they are instead of evacuating. Gordon-Hagerty, realizing she will not be able to persuade Roundtree to leave, says to the secretary, “Okay, okay,” and adds, “then bring over the chem-bio gear.” Responding to Gordon-Hagerty’s request, Roundtree subsequently comes to the Situation Room with gas masks, which she distributes to the people there. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8-9] However, Clarke and his colleagues face an “anxious moment” when they realize there are too few gas masks for the people in the Situation Room. “[S]ome questioned the apparent lottery, while others wondered what they didn’t know,” McClatchy Newspapers will later report. [McClatchy Newspapers, 8/29/2011]
After 9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: Commerce Secretary Evans Is Not Evacuated in Line with the Continuity of Government Plan
Authorities fail to evacuate Secretary of Commerce Don Evans from his office at the Commerce Department in Washington, DC, in line with “Continuity of Government” (COG) plans and so Evans eventually decides to go home of his own accord. [Arkin, 2013, pp. 173-174] The COG plan was apparently activated by White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke shortly after 9:45 a.m. (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8] Whereas, earlier in the day, “executive agents and protective details all across the government had been operating in precautionary mode,” military expert and author William Arkin will later describe, “now everything was official, mandatory, and automatic.” And yet no one comes to move Evans to an alternate location, even though he is 10th in line for the presidency. The commerce secretary therefore stays in his office all morning, waiting for someone to contact him and tell him what to do. [Arkin, 2013, pp. 173-174; NBC News, 9/11/2016] Furthermore, while other government departments are evacuated, no one takes the initiative to evacuate the Commerce Department, where 5,000 people work (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Draper, 2007, pp. 143] Apparently, “those in charge had completely forgotten about [Evans] and his department,” Arkin will comment. Eventually, Evans arranges for an aide to drive him to his home in McLean, Virginia, where he spends the rest of the day watching television. Arkin will criticize authorities for their failure to move Evans to an alternate location, writing, “After almost 50 years of preparations and practice, after constructing an elaborate and foolproof edifice, the executive agents had overlooked a major branch of the executive office, or were too busy—or had their own plans.” [Arkin, 2013, pp. 174; NBC News, 9/11/2016]
9:47 a.m. September 11, 2001: Internal Collapse at WTC South Tower Reported
A man who is on the 105th floor of the South Tower calls emergency 9-1-1 to report that floors below his location, “in the 90-something floor,” have collapsed. The 9-1-1 operator types a record of this call into the Special Police Radio Inquiry Network (SPRINT) data link, which will be passed on to the New York fire department’s Emergency Medical Service (EMS). It isn’t known when the call is made exactly, but the EMS Dispatch computer apparently receives the call record at this time. However, because it is classified as a “supplement message,” it is not yet read by anyone. The police dispatcher dealing with the area around the WTC also receives the call record, but misinterprets it as meaning that the floor the person is on has collapsed. EMS dispatchers are dealing with an enormous volume of calls as well as performing many other tasks under extreme pressure during the crisis, so a report later concludes that the EMS operators didn’t have the time to review the information before the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), and the fire chiefs never received the information. [New York City Fire Department, 8/19/2002]
9:47 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Jeremy Glick Tells of Vote to Take Over Flight 93
On Flight 93, Jeremy Glick is still on the phone with his wife, Lyz. He tells her that the passengers are taking a vote if they should try to take over the plane or not. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] He later says that all the men on the plane have voted to attack the hijackers. [Toronto Sun, 9/16/2001] When asked about weapons, he says they don’t have guns, just knives. This appears to contradict an earlier mention of guns. His wife gets the impression from him that the hijacker standing nearby, claiming to hold the bomb, would be easy to overwhelm. [Longman, 2002, pp. 153-154]
9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001: Capitol Building Evacuated due to Reports of Approaching Plane, but Evacuation Is Chaotic
The Capitol building in Washington, DC is evacuated. [Associated Press, 8/21/2002] It is the first time in US history this has ever happened. [Chicago Tribune, 9/12/2001; New York Times, 9/12/2001] Both the Senate and the House are in session at the time. [CNN, 8/17/2002] Capitol Police officers go through the building and order people to leave at once. [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/11/2002]
Reports of Plane Approaching the Capitol – The evacuation appears to be in response to reports of a plane heading toward the Capitol. [Associated Press, 9/11/2001; CNN, 8/17/2002; Bamford, 2004, pp. 80-81] According to CNN congressional correspondent Dana Bash, “the Capitol Police were hearing, in their radio, that there was a plane—another plane in the air, likely headed for the Capitol.” [CNN, 9/11/2006] When a Capitol Police officer instructs Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) to leave the building, he says: “We have word that an airplane is heading this way and could hit the building anytime. You need to evacuate.”
‘Nothing Orderly’ about Evacuation – However, there are problems with the evacuation. According to Daschle, “The fire alarm system, which was working in the nearby Senate office buildings, was never activated in the Capitol, so there were people who weren’t aware that an evacuation was taking place.” Also, some individuals are reluctant to leave. [Daschle and D’Orso, 2003, pp. 109-110] Rep. Bob Stump (R-AZ) will recall: “They tried to throw me out three times, but they didn’t succeed. I figured I was safer in the building than out on the street.” [Associated Press, 9/11/2001] Daschle will recall that there is “nothing orderly” about the evacuation. Outside the building “No one knew what to do or where to go. People congregated on the grass and in the parking lot. Senators and staff were mixed in with tourists, all staring up at the sky, wondering what might be headed our way.” [Daschle and D’Orso, 2003, pp. 110] CNN will report, “[S]ome of the most high ranking officials in the United States government were just kind of scattered around this area without a gathering point.” [CNN, 9/11/2006]
Sergeant at Arms Concerned over Poor Security – Al Lenhardt, the Senate’s sergeant at arms, will later say how alarmed he was “to see members of Congress and their staffs mixed in with visitors and passersby wandering in the open around the Capitol grounds. One of the tactics that terrorists have been known to employ is to create a diversion to move their intended target to the area where the actual attack will take place. Al imagined a bomb or gunfire erupting right there on the lawn outside the Capitol.” [Daschle and D’Orso, 2003, pp. 111] Eventually, many of the members of Congress go to the Capitol Police headquarters, which then serves as their command center for the day (see (9:55 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001 and (10:00 a.m.-6:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/11/2002; Daschle and D’Orso, 2003, pp. 112]
9:49 a.m.-9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Marion Britton Says Two Other Flight 93 Passengers Had Their Throats Cut
Flight 93 passenger Marion Britton calls her longtime friend Fred Fiumano at his auto repair shop in New York City, and talks to him for just under four minutes. According to the Chicago Tribune, she is using a cell phone. [Chicago Tribune, 9/30/2001; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006] Journalist and author Jere Longman writes that, because her own cell phone is not working, Britton is using a borrowed phone (i.e. a cell phone). She gives Fiumano the phone number belonging to another passenger and tells him to write it down. [Longman, 2002, pp. 162 and 166] However, during the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, the prosecution claims that Britton, who had been assigned a seat in row 12 of the plane, makes her call from a phone in row 33, presumably meaning a seatback phone rather than a cell phone. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 12 ] Britton is crying. She tells Fiumano her plane has been hijacked and has made a U-turn. When he tells her that the World Trade Center is on fire, she replies, “I know, and we’re going to go down.” [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/28/2001] Britton says, “They’re gonna kill us, you know, we’re gonna die.” [MSNBC, 9/11/2006] Fiumano tries to reassure her, but she responds, “Two passengers have had their throats cut.” [New York Times, 4/13/2006] (In passenger Todd Beamer’s call from Flight 93 (see 9:45 a.m.-9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001), a flight attendant is reportedly heard in the background saying that two men lying on the floor in first class, possibly dead, are the plane’s pilot and co-pilot. It is unclear if these are the two people that Britton refers to as having had their throats cut, and she’d simply mistaken them for passengers. [Longman, 2002, pp. 199] ) Fiumano hears a lot of yelling and screaming, and then the line goes dead. He tries calling Britton back but is unable to get through. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/22/2001]
9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Command Center Suggests Launching Fighters in Response to Flight 93; FAA Headquarters Unable to Request Them
John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center, suggests to Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters, that fighter jets should be launched in response to Flight 93. However, FAA headquarters is apparently unable to act on this suggestion. [Federal Aviation Administration, 10/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] In the last few minutes, the Command Center has warned headquarters that Flight 93 is “29 minutes out of Washington” and approaching the city (see 9:41 a.m.-9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 44]
Command Center Asks about Launching Fighters – Davis now tells White, “They’re pulling Jeff [Griffith, the FAA’s deputy director of air traffic] away to go talk about United 93.” White asks, “Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?” Davis replies, “Oh, God, I don’t know.” White says, “Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to make probably in the next 10 minutes.” However, Davis only responds, “Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 10/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 29] This conversation takes place 13 minutes after the FAA’s Cleveland Center asked the Command Center whether anyone had asked the military to launch fighter jets to intercept Flight 93 (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40]
Person Who Could Request Fighters Is Unavailable – Apparently there is only one person at FAA headquarters who is authorized to request military assistance, and Ben Sliney, the Command Center’s national operations manager, is told that no one can find him. Sliney will later recount: “I said something like, ‘That’s incredible. There’s only one person. There must be someone designated or someone who will assume the responsibility of issuing an order, you know.’ We were becoming frustrated in our attempts to get some information. What was the military response?” [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] This lack of response to Flight 93 contrasts with the FAA’s earlier reaction to Flight 11, when Boston Center air traffic controllers contacted NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) themselves (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and even called military bases directly (see 8:34 a.m. September 11, 2001 and (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20]
