According to a confession made later to Indian police, Pakistani militant leader Maulana Masood Azhar travels to Somalia to help al-Qaeda operatives train local forces the US is attacking. Azhar is assisted by other radicals linked to Osama bin Laden (see Late 1992-October 1993). The training will culminate in the Black Hawk Down incident in October 1993 (see October 3-4, 1993).
Trip – Azhar initially travels to Nairobi, Kenya, on the orders of Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, leader of the Pakistani militant organization Harkat ul-Ansar (later known as Harkat ul-Mujahedeen). In Nairobi, he meets with leaders of the Somali group Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, and gives them money and equipment, as well as making three journeys to Somalia itself. Azhar will also say that some of the militants helping the anti-American Somalis are the same people who fought as the mujaheddin in the Soviet-Afghan War, but were expelled from Pakistan after the war.
Alleged Yemen Connection – Indian authorities will also say that Azhar helped with the movement of mercenaries from Yemen to Somalia, and that he was assisted in this by a Yemeni militant leader named Tariq Nasr al-Fadhli. Tariq is said to have fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets and to have been involved in an anti-US bombing in Yemen in late 1992 (see December 29, 1992). [Los Angeles Times, 2/25/2002] Azhar is also associated with Pakistan’s ISI. He will be imprisoned briefly in Pakistan after 9/11 and then released (see December 14, 2002).
1993: Al-Zawahiri’s Brother Help Manage Mujaheddin in Bosnia Using Charity Cover
Ayman al-Zawahiri, head of Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, sends his brother Mohammed al-Zawahiri to the Balkans to help run the mujaheddin fighters in Bosnia. He is known as a logistics expert and is said to be the military commander of Islamic Jihad. Mohammed works in Bosnia, Croatia, and Albania under the cover of being an International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) official. He is said to make an extended stay in central Bosnia, where most of the mujaheddin are based, in 1993. He sets up an Islamic Jihad cell in Albania with over a dozen members to support the mujaheddin in Bosnia. [New Yorker, 9/9/2002; Schindler, 2007, pp. 123] Ayman also frequently visits Bosnia (see September 1992 and After) and by 1994 will move to Bulgaria to presumably work with Mohammed to manage operations in the Balkans region (see September 1994-1996).
1993: Ramzi Yousef and KSM Have High-Level Protection in Pakistan
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) and his nephew Ramzi Yousef have high-level protection in Pakistan around 1993, at least. This is according to Rehman Malik, who is head of Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) at the time. In July 1993, KSM and Yousef are unsuccessful in an attempt to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (see July 1993). Malik will later say, “It seemed to us [in the FIA] that the entire family were involved in this business [of terrorism]. Ramzi and Khalid were both out to make a name for themselves. They had close connections with the jihadis, but it was unclear who they were working for. They were both extremely dangerous men, and to us in the FIA, it always appeared that they had protection at a higher level. When we raided Ramzi’s house in Quetta, he had been warned. Likewise with Zahid [Shaikh Mohammed, KSM’s brother] in Peshawar.” [Fouda and Fielding, 2003, pp. 96] Also around this time, US investigators find KSM and his brother Zahid are linked to the ISI. They even find photographs of them with high-ranking Pakistani political leaders (see Spring 1993).
1993-1995: Croatian General Agim Ceku Responsible for Anti-Serb Atrocities
Croatian General Agim Ceku’s troops in Croatia are responsible for many atrocities against the Croatian Serbs, witnessed by Canadian peace-keeping forces. The Canadian testimony ultimately leads to a sealed indictment against Ceku being issued by the Hague Tribunal. [Taylor, 2002, pp. 164] Ceku will be elected prime minister of Kosovo in 2006 despite the still pending war crimes charges (see January 1999).
1993-1995: Mujaheddin Reach a Peak of Up to 4,000 in Bosnia
The number of Mujaheddin fighting in Bosnia plateau at around several thousand.
Estimates of mujaheddin numbers in Bosnia vary from as few as a couple of hundred to as many as 4,000. However, most put the number somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000. The difficulty in pinning down an exact figure stems from fact that there are a variety of foreign mercenary groups in Bosnia and it is not entirely clear who is and who isn’t mujaheddin. Furthermore, these groups are not all present in Bosnia at the same time. According to Cees Wiebes, a professor at Amsterdam University, mujaheddin forces in Bosnia are not controlled by Bosnian authorities, but rather by their countries of origin, Islamic militant organizations, and criminal organizations. [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 207-208] While the mujaheddin’s presence in Bosnia is said to be of only limited military value, they are considered a valuable “political tool” for obtaining the support from Arab countries. According to a UN report, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic sees the fighters as “a conduit for funds from the Gulf and the Middle East.” [Wiebes, 2003, pp. 208, 215]
1993-1999: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Fight for Al-Qaeda
Of all the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have the longest records of involvement with al-Qaeda. CIA Director Tenet calls them al-Qaeda veterans. According to the CIA, Alhazmi first travels to Afghanistan in 1993 as a teenager, then fights in Bosnia with Alhazmi (see 1995). Almihdhar makes his first visit to Afghanistan training camps in 1996, and then fights in Chechnya in 1997. Both swear loyalty to bin Laden around 1998. Alhazmi fights in Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance with his brother, Salem Alhazmi. He fights in Chechnya, probably in 1998. [Observer, 9/23/2001; ABC News, 1/9/2002; US Congress, 6/18/2002; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 131 
] He then returns to Saudi Arabia in early 1999 where he shares information about the 1998 US embassy bombings. However it is not clear what information he disclosed to whom or where he obtained this information. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 131 ] It is possible that some or all of this information came from the NSA, which is intercepting some of Alhazmi’s phone calls at this time (see Early 1999).
1993-1994: Expert Panel Predicts Terrorists Will Use Planes as Weapons on Symbolic US Targets
An expert panel commissioned by the Pentagon in 1993 postulates that an airplane could be used as a missile to bomb national landmarks. Marvin Cetron, president of Forecasting International, a company which conducts studies for many companies and governments, writes the panel’s report. He will later recall telling the panel, “Coming down the Potomac, you could make a left turn at the Washington Monument and take out the White House, or you could make a right turn and take out the Pentagon.” [Reeve, 1999, pp. 259-260; Washington Post, 10/2/2001 ] However, State Department officials edit out the planes as weapons references in the final version of the panel’s Terror 2000 Report. [United Press International, 5/17/2002] Centron later says, “We were told by the Department of Defense not to put it in… and I said, ‘It’s unclassified, everything is available.’ In addition, they said, ‘We don’t want it released, because you can’t handle a crisis before it becomes a crisis. And no one is going to believe you.’” [ABC News, 2/20/2002] Air Force Col. Doug Menarchik, who organized the study for the Pentagon, will later recall, “It was considered radical thinking, a little too scary for the times. After I left, it met a quiet death.” [Washington Post, 10/2/2001 ] However, in 1994, Cetron will write in a Futurist magazine article about the report, “Targets such as the World Trade Center not only provide the requisite casualties but, because of their symbolic nature, provide more bang for the buck. In order to maximize their odds for success, terrorist groups will likely consider mounting multiple, simultaneous operations with the aim of overtaxing a government’s ability to respond, as well as demonstrating their professionalism and reach.” [Washington Post, 10/2/2001 ]
1993-1995: Al-Qaeda Operative Helps Militant Group Conduct Attacks in Philippines
An al-Qaeda operative helps the militant group Abu Sayyaf conduct attacks in the Philippines at least between the years 1993 to 1995, if not longer. Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, an ethnic Palestinian, went to college in the Philippines in the late 1980’s. Then he went to training camps in Afghanistan, joined al-Qaeda there, and became an explosives expert. [New York Times, 9/30/2001] Philippine intelligence agents photograph him in front of his house in the southern city of Davao at some point. [Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10/1/2001] He is a suspect in a 1993 bombing of a cathedral in Davao that kills seven. The attack is blamed on Abu Sayyaf. In 1995, Philippine authorities arrest him for possession of explosive devices and then let him go. He will later be captured and convicted for participating in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [New York Times, 12/27/1993; Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002] In late 1998, the Washington Post will report that he had recently confessed to taking part in “Operations in the Philippines that Odeh refused to describe in detail.” [Washington Post, 8/19/1998] Presumably these are Abu Sayyaf operations since they are the only Muslim militant group conducting attacks in the early 1990s. From at least 1991 to 1995, Abu Sayyaf is deeply penetrated by a Philippine government operative (see 1991-Early February 1995), but it unclear what the US government may have been told about Odeh and when. The US had been warned of Odeh through another source in 1993 (see Summer 1993). Odeh will also later admit to helping militias in Somalia kill US soldiers there in 1993 (see October 3-4, 1993).
1993-1995: Former US Intelligence Agent and Arms Dealer Victor Bout Develop Town that Becomes Hub for Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 Plot
In the spring of 1993, Victor Bout moves to Sharjah, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and begins to use it as the central hub of expanding business empire. Bout is an ex-Russian military officer and is rapidly developing an international network to buy, sell, and transport illegal goods, mostly weapons. The UAE is centrally located for his needs, and it has no money laundering laws, low taxes, and very lax banking regulations. Sharjah International Airport has almost no air passenger traffic at the time, being overshadowed by the popular airport in Dubai a short distance away. So the airport establishes a niche as an air cargo hub by offering tax incentives for cargo companies. In 1993, Richard Chichakli becomes friends and business partners with Bout. In 1995, Sharjah airport hires Chichakli to be the commercial manager of a new free trade zone now being heavily used by Bout. Chichakli, a Syrian by birth, has an interesting background. He claims to have been friends with Osama bin Laden while studying in Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s. He will later claim that he used to “sit around and eat sandwiches and sing songs” with bin Laden and his siblings, back when “Osama was OK.” In 1986, he moved to Texas, became a US citizen, and served in the US army until 1993, specializing in aviation, interrogation, and intelligence. He will later claim that he not only served in the US military, but also spent about 18 years working in intelligence (which, if true, would mean he was an intelligence agent when he was friends with bin Laden). Chichakli’s free trade zone is wildly successful. [Center for Public Integrity, 11/20/2002; Farah and Braun, 2007, pp. 53-56] In 2000, US investigators will learn that Chichakli is living in Texas again and is still working closely with Bout. [Farah and Braun, 2007, pp. 53] However, no action will be taken against him until April 26, 2005, when US Treasury and FBI agents raid his home and business in Texas. They will seize his computer, documents, and over $1 million in assets as part of an investigation into Bout’s financial empire, but they will not arrest him. Chichakli will not be stopped when he leaves the US several days later. He will move to Syria, where it is later suspected that he and Bout supply Hezbollah with weapons (see July 2006). [Farah and Braun, 2007, pp. 247-248] Meanwhile, Sharjah and its airport will become a hub for al-Qaeda and the 9/11 plot. By 1996, there are daily flights between Afghanistan and Sharjah, and al-Qaeda uses Sharjah for drug and arms smuggling (see Mid-1996-October 2001). 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed will live in Sharjah in 1998 (see July 8, 1999), and 9/11 plot facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi will be based in Sharjah in the months before the 9/11 attacks. Some of the 9/11 hijackers will pass through there and visit him (see Early-Late June, 2001).
1993 and After: Milan Mosque Is ‘Main Al-Qaeda Station House in Europe’
The Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy, has numerous ties to terrorist activities during this period and after 9/11, and the Treasury Department will call the mosque “the main al-Qaeda station house in Europe.” It is initially headed by Anwar Shaaban (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995 and December 14, 1995), an opponent of the current Egyptian regime and a supporter of the Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya militant group, which is run by the ‘Blind Sheikh,’ Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see Late 1993-1994). 
It recruits fighters for militant Islamic causes and sends them to Afghanistan for training. One of the recruits, L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who will testify for the prosecution at the trial of men accused of bombing US embassies in Africa in 1998, will say that he knew Shaaban well, adding: “He was my guide. I went there every weekend to be with him.” After studying with Shaaban for some time, Shaaban arranges for Kherchtou and a group of other men to receive military training in Afghanistan. [Chicago Tribune, 10/22/2001] There is heavy telephone traffic between the Institute and the New York mosque run by Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, and Italian police say it is a logistical base for the WTC bombing (see Late 1993-1994). The Algerian militant group Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) gains influence in the mosque after Shaaban dies in the Bosnian Civil War (see After 1995). It creates a “cottage industry in supplying false passports and other bogus documents” according to European intelligence officials, and serves as a gateway to Europe for operatives from Afghanistan. [Boston Globe, 8/4/2002]
