The Navy Command Center at the Pentagon is mostly destroyed when the building is hit at 9:37 a.m. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002] After the attack, the Navy’s leaders start arriving instead at the Navy’s Antiterrorist Alert Center (ATAC), which is located at the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) headquarters in southeast Washington, DC. [US Department of the Navy, 2/2002 
; CNN, 8/27/2002; US Naval Criminal Investigative Service, 8/22/2006] Those who arrive at the center include Admiral Vern Clark, the chief of naval operations; Admiral William Fallon, the vice chief of naval operations; Gordon England, the secretary of the Navy; and Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway of the US Coast Guard, who is currently in charge of Navy Anti-Terrorism Force Protection. According to Hathaway, the NCIS headquarters is “not the official backup,” but “There was not a plan in place that if somebody flew into the Pentagon where would we take folks.” From the center, these officials are able to hold secure video-teleconferences throughout the rest of the day, and also on the following day. Eventually the Naval Operations staff will relocate to the Navy Annex, which is about a mile away from the Pentagon. This will act as their temporary base in the following weeks (see (3:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). [US Coast Guard, 6/20/2002 ; GlobalSecurity (.org), 5/7/2011]
9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: Counterterrorism ‘Tsar’ Clarke Possibly Told to Pass on Shootdown Authorization, Earlier than Other Accounts Claim
According to one account, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is given the go-ahead to authorize Air Force jets to shoot down threatening aircraft around this time. In late 2003, Clarke will recall to ABC News that, minutes earlier, he’d picked up the phone in the White House Situation Room and called Vice President Dick Cheney, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House. He’d told him: “We have fighters aloft now. We need authority to shoot down hostile aircraft.” [ABC News, 11/29/2003] This call appears to be one Clarke also describes in his 2004 book Against all Enemies, though in that account he will describe having made his request to Army Major Mike Fenzel, who is also in the PEOC, rather than directly to Cheney. According to that account, the call occurred shortly before Clarke learns of the Pentagon attack, so roughly around 9:36 (see (Between 9:30 a.m. and 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 6-7] Clarke describes to ABC News, “I thought that would take forever to get that [shootdown] authority.” But, “The vice president got on the phone to the president, got back to me, I would say within two minutes, and said, ‘Do it.’” [ABC News, 11/29/2003] If correct, this would mean the president authorizes military fighters to shoot down threatening aircraft at around 9:37-9:38. However, around this time, the president and vice president are reportedly having difficulty communicating with each other, while Bush heads from the Booker Elementary School to the Sarasota airport (see (9:34 a.m.-9:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 6/18/2004; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 9/10/2006] Furthermore, this account contradicts several others. In his 2004 book, Clarke will describe being told to inform the Pentagon it has shootdown authorization slightly later, some time between 9:45 and 9:56 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 8] According to journalists Bob Woodward and Bill Sammon, Bush gives the shootdown authorization in a phone call with Cheney shortly after 9:56 (see (Shortly After 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Sammon, 2002, pp. 102; Woodward, 2002, pp. 17-18; Washington Post, 1/27/2002] The 9/11 Commission will say he gives it in a call at 10:18 (see 10:18 a.m.-10:20 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 41]
9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon Building Command Center Staff Confused as Attack Sets Off Over 300 Fire Alarms
Employees in the Pentagon’s Building Operations Command Center (BOCC) do not realize a plane has hit their building, and are confused when over 300 of the Pentagon’s fire alarms go off at once. [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 31; WHYY-FM, 5/27/2008] The BOCC, located on the first floor of the Pentagon’s innermost corridor, is usually staffed by two or three people who constantly monitor the building’s utility systems. [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 137; Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 31] In it, Steve Carter and Kathy Greenwell felt the building tremble and heard a dull explosion when the Pentagon was hit. Their computers then show that, in an instant, 335 fire alarms have gone off, including the alarm for the BOCC itself. As authors Patrick Creed and Rick Newman will describe: “That didn’t make sense. Normally, fire spreads slowly. If the computer was correct, 400,000 square feet of the Pentagon had erupted into flame all at once.” Creed and Newman describe the plane impact that has caused this: “As the mass [of the aircraft] traveled through the building, it began to resemble a shaped charge, a form of explosive that funnels its force into a small, directed area—like a beam of energy—in order to punch holes through armor or other strong material.” The entire event, from the moment of impact until the aircraft’s movement is arrested, has “taken place in eight-tenths of a second.” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 29-31] Furthermore, an unusual pattern of explosions occurred when the aircraft struck the Pentagon. The Defense Department’s book about the attack will describe: “The Jet A fuel atomized and quickly combusted, causing explosive bursts as the plane hurtled into the building. A detonation 150 feet inside the building resulted from a ‘fuel-air’ explosion after the Jet A tanks disintegrated on impact. Here, as elsewhere, there was no uniform pattern of death and destruction. The vagaries of the fuel-air explosions and freakish blast effects meant deaths occurred randomly inside the Pentagon, with the occupants of seemingly more secure interior offices sometimes suffering worse fates than those nearer the outside wall.” [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 37] In the BOCC, not realizing what has happened, Carter says aloud: “I think we have a truck bomb! Or some kind of explosion!” [Creed and Newman, 2008, pp. 31] It is not until later in the day that he learns a plane hit the Pentagon. [WHYY-FM, 5/27/2008]
Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Firefighter Is Told that a Suspicious Plane Approaching New York Has Crashed
Firefighter Timothy Brown, a supervisor at New York City’s Office of Emergency Management, is told that a suspicious plane that was reportedly flying toward New York has crashed. [Firehouse, 1/31/2003] After the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), Brown went to the lobby of the South Tower to help open a command post. [Project Rebirth, 6/30/2002 ; TEDx Talks, 10/7/2015] While there, he heard over his radio that another suspicious aircraft, in addition to the planes that hit the Twin Towers, was heading toward New York (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Since then, he has talked to the New York State Emergency Management Office about getting fighter jets to protect New York (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Firehouse, 1/31/2003] He then told people at the command post they should “be prepared to be hit again.” [Project Rebirth, 6/30/2002 ] However, he now hears over his radio that “the third plane was no longer inbound, that it had crashed.” This news “gave us a sigh of relief,” he will later comment. [Firehouse, 1/31/2003] The identity of this third suspicious plane is unclear. Brown will say it turned out to be “the one that crashed in Pennsylvania,” meaning Flight 93. [Project Rebirth, 6/30/2002 ] However, this is apparently impossible, since Brown will describe hearing it has crashed before 9:59 a.m., when the South Tower collapses (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001), but Flight 93 will reportedly crash later on, at 10:03 a.m. (see (10:03 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Firehouse, 1/31/2003; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 30]
After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Emergency Responders Experience Communications Problems at Pentagon
Emergency responders and others at the Pentagon experience serious problems with communications following the attack there. These difficulties last for several hours. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. 12-13 ; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 114] According to a federally funded report on the emergency response to the Pentagon attack, communications systems had been busy “even before American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon.” But when the crash occurs, “all area communications [seem] simultaneously overwhelmed.” [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A34 ] The Defense Department’s book about the Pentagon attack later describes, “Almost immediately radio traffic gridlocked, land lines were unavailable, and cellular telephone networks became so overloaded that for a time Pentagon officials and employees as well as some emergency responders could not call outside.” [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 114] This leads to significant problems: “Firefighters calling the [Arlington County Emergency Communications Center] couldn’t get through. Relatives of Pentagon workers found cellular and land lines jammed.” [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. A34 ] The DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic at the Pentagon and the Rader Clinic at nearby Fort Myer are unable to establish reliable communications. Reportedly, “Hospitals and clinics could not be informed about the flow of casualties, and perhaps more damaging, communication between the fire and rescue and the emergency medical elements on-site was severely impaired.” [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 114] Officer Aubrey Davis of the Pentagon police heads to the crash site with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld immediately after the Pentagon is hit. He receives frantic pleas over his radio, regarding Rumsfeld’s whereabouts. But, as Davis later recalls, “the system was overloaded, everyone on the frequency was talking, everything jumbled, so I couldn’t get through and they went on asking” (see (9:38 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Cockburn, 2007, pp. 1-2] Cellular and landline telephone communications remain “virtually unreliable or inaccessible during the first few hours of the response.” But later on, in the afternoon, Verizon technicians and Secret Service technical staff install portable cellular towers at the Pentagon, and this significantly increases cell phone access. [US Department of Health and Human Services, 7/2002, pp. C36 ] Communications problems are experienced not just around the Pentagon but also in the broader Washington area, with some senior government officials being affected (see (After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Verton, 2003, pp. 149]
Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Force Secretary Roche and Chief of Staff Jumper Head to Operations Center, but Are Unaware that a Plane Has Hit the Pentagon
General John Jumper, the Air Force chief of staff, and James Roche, the secretary of the Air Force, head to the Air Force Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon, where they will assist the Air Force’s response to the terrorist attacks. [CNN, 10/10/2001; Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003; Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] Roche learned about the attacks on the World Trade Center while he was holding a breakfast meeting with several members of Congress in his office on the fourth floor of the Pentagon. He then arranged for the members of Congress to return to their offices, but stayed in his own office (see (Shortly After 8:48 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] Jumper learned about the attacks during a staff meeting he was chairing, but initially continued the meeting (see (9:00 a.m.-9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 136] He adjourned it at 9:20 a.m., according to the Daytona Beach News-Journal. [Daytona Beach News-Journal, 9/7/2004 ] He then headed up to Roche’s office. [Airman, 9/15/2011]
Roche and Jumper Possibly Unaware of Plane Approaching Washington – In the office now with Roche and Jumper are Colonel Philip Breedlove, Roche’s senior military assistant, and Colonel Jack Egginton, executive officer to the Air Force chief of staff. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] It is unclear whether the men in Roche’s office realized a suspicious aircraft was approaching Washington, DC, before the Pentagon was hit, at 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). Lieutenant General Lance Lord, assistant vice chief of staff of the Air Force, will later say that those who attended Jumper’s staff meeting “heard there was another plane inbound to Washington” as they were heading to their offices after the meeting. [Air Force Space Command News Service, 9/5/2002] And Egginton will say that a few minutes before the Pentagon was hit, “We received word that another aircraft was headed toward Washington.” [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003] But according to the Midland Reporter-Telegram, Jumper’s staff had “no idea that they [i.e. the Pentagon] would be the next target for terrorists.” [Midland Reporter-Telegram, 4/2/2002]
Roche and Jumper Possibly Initially Unaware that the Pentagon Had Been Attacked – Breedlove will recall that shortly before the Pentagon was hit, while Roche and Jumper had their backs to the window, he and Egginton “saw an airplane go by really close to the building.” People who work at the Pentagon or visit it regularly are used to seeing planes flying by, near the building. “But that one seemed closer than any other,” Breedlove will comment. [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] However, it is unclear whether the men in Roche’s office immediately realized the Pentagon had been attacked when it was hit. The office is on the opposite side of the building to where the attack occurred and so, according to some accounts, Roche and Jumper did not feel the impact. They only realized something was wrong when they saw “people running down the halls and trying to evacuate the premises,” according to the Midland Reporter-Telegram. Roche will say that all he initially knew was that “the building was putting out the alert that something had gone wrong.” “It was amazing, from inside the building, how little we knew about what actually went on,” Tim Green, assistant executive to the Air Force chief of staff, who is with Jumper, will comment. “People outside of the building… probably knew more about what happened from the news than I did.” [CNN, 10/10/2001; Midland Reporter-Telegram, 4/2/2002] Egginton and Breedlove, however, will contradict these accounts. “I felt the building shake upon impact,” Egginton will say. Breedlove will recall, “We felt a tremor in the building and then alarms start flashing.”
Roche and Jumper Taken to Operations Center – Breedlove will say that, in response to the attack on the Pentagon, he promptly arranges for Jumper and Roche to be escorted to the Air Force Operations Center, in the basement of the Pentagon’s C Ring. He will recall that he hits the “duress button” and then security officers enter Roche’s office almost immediately. “We said, ‘We need to get to the bunker; we need to get down to our operations area,’” he will say. [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003; Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 ] Roche, though, will give a different account. He will say that his office had been “on the phone to our Operations Center” and then “we were called down,” presumably by whoever they were talking to in the Operations Center. [CNN, 10/10/2001] Roche and Jumper are escorted to the Operations Center through “smoke, alarms, and throngs of people heading for the exits,” Egginton will recall. [Air Force Print News, 9/11/2003]
Roche and Jumper Learn a Plane Hit the Pentagon – In the Operations Center, members of the Air Force Crisis Action Team have already begun to assemble so as to help provide assistance to civil authorities in New York (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 136] When Roche and Jumper reach the center, they will learn that the Pentagon has been hit by an aircraft (see After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 10/10/2001] Other Air Force officials, including Lord, also head to the Operations Center after the Pentagon is hit. [Lompoc Record, 9/11/2003]
9:38 a.m. September 11, 2001: Reagan Airport Controllers Alert Others to Pentagon Crash
After seeing the explosion from the attack on the Pentagon, air traffic controllers at Washington’s Reagan National Airport promptly alert others to the crash, with a supervisor reporting that the crashed aircraft was an American Airlines 757. [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/18/2001; Spencer, 2008, pp. 158-159] Reagan Airport is less than a mile from the Pentagon. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/19/2001] In its control tower, supervisor Chris Stephenson had looked out the window and seen Flight 77 approaching (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He watched it flying a full circle and disappearing behind a building in nearby Crystal City, before crashing into the Pentagon. Stephenson sees the resulting fireball and a mass of paper debris that fills the air. He calls the airport’s Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and reports: “It was an American 757! It hit the Pentagon. It was a 757 and it hit the Pentagon. American!” [USA Today, 8/11/2002; Spencer, 2008, pp. 158-159] Other controllers see the fireball from the crash. One of them, David Walsh, activates the crash phone, which instantly connects the control tower to airport operations, as well as fire and police departments. He yells down the line: “Aircraft down at the Pentagon! Aircraft down at the Pentagon!” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/18/2001; McDonnell, 2004, pp. 19-20 ; Spencer, 2008, pp. 158-159] Reagan Airport controllers contact controllers at Washington Dulles International Airport, who hear over the speakers in their room: “Dulles, hold all of our inbound traffic. The Pentagon’s been hit.” [ABC News, 10/24/2001]
Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Force Liaison Joins FAA Teleconference, Later than FAA Claims
The US Air Force liaison to the FAA joins a teleconference that has been established by the FAA shortly after the time of the Pentagon attack, according to her own later recollections, although an FAA statement will claim she joined it significantly earlier. [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003; 9/11 Commission, 3/26/2004; US Department of Transportation, 8/31/2006 ]
Watches Television, Does Not Join Teleconference – The Air Force liaison, Colonel Sheryl Atkins, will recall that she arrived at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, around five to 10 minutes after the first attack in New York (see (Between 8:51 a.m. and 8:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and went to her fourth-floor office there. She will describe: “Everybody was there around the TV. We watched the events unfold. At first, we were kind of hanging back and saying, you know, ‘there’s something awful going on with the air traffic system.‘… But at a certain point, not too long after that, it became obvious that, you know, something really strange is going on.”
Heads to Situation Room – Shortly after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon is hit, Atkins hears CNN reporting a bomb may have gone off at the Pentagon. She will recall that she then heads up to the 10th floor of the headquarters building along with Sabra Kaulia, the program director for air traffic airspace management, and goes to the air traffic situation room, where David Canoles, the FAA’s manager of air traffic evaluations and investigations, is participating in a teleconference. [9/11 Commission, 3/26/2004; US Department of Transportation, 8/31/2006 ] According to a 2003 statement provided by the FAA, the FAA established this teleconference with several other agencies “[w]ithin minutes” of the first attack in New York (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] Atkins will say she is then “in and out” of the air traffic situation room throughout the morning. She does not speak with any of the military representatives at the White House, but does work directly with Steve Nolte, the airspace manager at NORAD, and also communicates with Lieutenant Colonel Michael-Anne Cherry, who is at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, to exchange information. [9/11 Commission, 3/26/2004]
FAA Claims Atkins Joined Teleconference Earlier – In a 2003 statement it provides to the 9/11 Commission the FAA will say Atkins joined the teleconference significantly earlier than she claims. According to the statement, the “US Air Force liaison to the FAA [i.e. Atkins] immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge” that was set up minutes after the first attack in New York, “and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.” [9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003]
Other Liaisons Arrive Later On – As well as Atkins, who represents the Air Force, liaisons representing the other three military services within the Department of Defense (the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps) work at FAA headquarters. However, Atkins is the only military liaison currently there. The Navy and Marine Corps liaisons will arrive at FAA headquarters at around 10:30 a.m. and join Atkins on the building’s 10th floor, from where they help establish and maintain critical communications channels between the Defense Department and the FAA. The Army liaison will not arrive at FAA headquarters until the following day. [Federal Aviation Administration, 3/21/2002; 9/11 Commission, 3/26/2004]
After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Implements a ‘Call-Up’ of All Personnel
Secret Service executives implement an “emergency call-up” of all their agency’s personnel at some time after 9:37 a.m., when the Pentagon was hit, according to US News and World Report. The reason why the Secret Service did not call up all its personnel earlier on is unstated, as is the reason it decides to do so now. [US News and World Report, 12/1/2002] The Secret Service is responsible for protecting the nation’s “most visible targets,” including the president, the vice president, and the White House complex. [US Department of the Treasury, 5/8/2001; Office of Management and Budget, 7/2001, pp. 82 ] Brian Stafford, the agency’s director, realized the US was under attack after the second plane hit the World Trade Center at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), and then activated the Director’s Crisis Center at Secret Service headquarters to manage the agency’s response (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; Peter Schnall, 10/24/2004] And since around 9:18 a.m., a meeting has been taking place in the office of Carl Truscott, the special agent in charge of the presidential protective division, during which Truscott and three other senior Secret Service agents have discussed security enhancements at the White House (see (9:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]
Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001: Solicitor General Olson Immediately Thinks His Wife’s Plane Has Crashed When He Learns of the Pentagon Attack
Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States, immediately thinks Flight 77, which his wife was a passenger on, has crashed when he sees reports on television about an explosion at the Pentagon. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001; Fox News, 9/14/2001; Daily Telegraph, 3/5/2002] Ted Olson was called by his wife, Barbara Olson, at his office at the Department of Justice in Washington, DC, sometime after the second hijacked plane crashed into the World Trade Center. She told him her plane had been hijacked and gave him details of the hijacking before the call got disconnected (see (Between 9:15 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001). She called again a short time later and gave him additional details of the hijacking, but that call also got cut off (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He then returned to watching the coverage of the crashes at the WTC on television and, after a short time, sees the reports indicating some kind of explosion has occurred at the Pentagon (see 9:39 a.m.-9:44 a.m. September 11, 2001). Ted Olson will later recall that, even though it is some time before reports suggest that the incident involved a plane crashing at the Pentagon (see 9:43 a.m.-9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001), he immediately knows Flight 77, his wife’s plane, has crashed. [CNN, 9/14/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 9] “I knew it was her,” he will comment. [Daily Telegraph, 3/5/2002] “I did and I didn’t want to, but I knew.” [CNN, 9/14/2001] “I knew in my heart that was that aircraft and I also knew in my heart that [Barbara Olson] could not possibly have survived that kind of an explosion with a full load of fuel on a recently taken-off airplane,” he will say. [Fox News, 9/14/2001] Ted Olson shares his thoughts with some of his colleagues. Helen Voss, his special assistant, watched television with him after the second call from his wife ended. She will recall that when the incident at the Pentagon starts being reported, he says, “That’s Barbara’s plane.” [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001] And Allen Ferber, a security officer from the Department of Justice command center, sat and watched television with the solicitor general for about 10 minutes after he received the second call from his wife (see (Between 9:17 a.m. and 9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Ferber then left Ted Olson’s office but he returns to it after the incident at the Pentagon is reported. He will recall that, apparently referring to Flight 77, Ted Olson says to him, “The plane is down.” Ferber says he is very sorry and then leaves the office again. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/11/2001] Ted Olson will stay in his office for the next few hours, phoning friends and family members to let them know his wife is dead. [CNN, 9/14/2001; Daily Telegraph, 3/5/2002]
