The Secret Service is concerned that President Bush might be the target of a terrorist attack while he is being driven to Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport and provides extensive security to protect him during the journey. [LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013; Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016] Bush and his entourage left the Emma E. Booker Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida, at around 9:35 a.m. to be driven to the airport, where Air Force One is waiting (see (9:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39] Bush’s Secret Service agents have arranged extensive security measures to protect the motorcade during the journey. Dave Wilkinson, assistant special agent in charge of the presidential protection division, will later describe: “We asked for double-motorcade blocks at the intersection. Double and triple blocks. Not just motorcycle officers standing there with their arms up, but vehicles actually blocking the road.” [Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016] Additionally, the vehicles in the motorcade are driven at around twice the normal speed, going at 80 to 85 miles per hour instead of the usual 40 to 45 miles per hour. [LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013] Furthermore, Secret Service agents in the motorcade “all had weapon barrels that were visible and they were pointing up at the ready position in case they needed to be used,” according to Officer Kevin Dowd of the Sarasota Police Department. [BBC, 9/1/2002] The Secret Service is specifically worried that a suicide bomber might be nearby and try to crash a truck bomb or a car bomb into Bush’s limousine. Edward Marinzel, the head of Bush’s Secret Service detail, has therefore arranged for the Sarasota Police Department to mobilize every available patrol car and, as it travels to the airport, the limousine is surrounded on all sides by these cars. The hope is that they will block any suicide attack on the vehicle, should one be attempted. [Rove, 2010, pp. 251; LBJ Presidential Library, 9/3/2013] The Secret Service is also “using the limos [in the motorcade] as a shell game, to keep the president safe” during the journey, Wilkinson will say. [Politico Magazine, 9/9/2016]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Attendant Warns United Airlines about Hijacking; Information Passed on to United’s Crisis Center
An unknown flight attendant on Flight 93, later determined to be Sandy Bradshaw, calls the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco, and reports that her plane has been hijacked. The San Francisco number is one that flight crews know to call if they need to report mechanical problems, obtain advice on troubleshooting, or request maintenance while in flight. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40; United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, Defendant., 4/11/2006 
] Bradshaw makes her call from the rear of Flight 93, using an Airfone. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ] A United Airlines maintenance employee initially answers the call. Shortly thereafter, it is taken over by a manager at the facility. Bradshaw reports that hijackers are in the cabin of her plane behind the first-class curtain, and also in the cockpit. They have pulled a knife, have killed a flight attendant, and have announced they have a bomb on board. The manager will later describe Bradshaw as being “shockingly calm” during the conversation. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40; United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, Defendant., 4/11/2006 ] Bradshaw’s call lasts just under six minutes. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006] The manager reports the emergency to his supervisor, who passes the information to the crisis center at United Airlines’ headquarters, outside Chicago. [USA Today, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40] After about 9:45-9:50, “everyone” in the crisis center will know “that a flight attendant on board” Flight 93 has “called the mechanics desk to report that one hijacker had a bomb strapped on and another was holding a knife on the crew.” [Wall Street Journal, 10/15/2001; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 43] The manager at the San Francisco maintenance facility instructs the Airfone operator to try and reestablish contact with the plane, but the effort is unsuccessful. [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 40] At 9:50, Bradshaw will make another call from Flight 93, this time to her husband (see 9:50 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006, pp. 12 ]
After 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001: Military Liaisons at FAA Command Center Said to Be Informed of Flight 93 Hijacking
Military officers at the FAA’s Command Center are informed of the hijacking of Flight 93, according to the FAA’s National Operations Manager Ben Sliney. If such notification is given, it is presumably shortly after the Command Center learns of the hijacking (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). Sliney will later tell the 9/11 Commission: “Available to us at the Command Center of course is the military cell, which was our liaison with the military services. They were present at all of the events that occurred on 9/11.” He will add, “The normal protocols for the events that were transpiring then—that is to say hijacked aircraft, which requires a notification to NORAD—those, at least I was given to understand, were made promptly—the notifications on each hijack.” The FAA’s acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger will add: “[T]here were military people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in what was going on.” [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] If the cell is notified, it is unclear what, if anything, the military liaison officers—Colonel John Czabaranek, Lieutenant Colonel Michael-Anne Cherry, and Major Kevin Bridges (see (Between 9:04 a.m. and 9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001)—at the Command Center do with the information about Flight 93’s hijacking. The 9/11 Commission will say that the first notification to the military about Flight 93 comes at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Contractors Evacuate Pentagon Just before It Is Hit
A contract crew has been installing furniture in the southwest perimeter of the Pentagon. Construction workers are currently doing the final touching up, after more than three years of renovation work on this area of the building, and some Defense Department employees are already moving into their new office spaces. But the wife of one crew member phones her husband after seeing footage of the attacks in New York on CNN and says she feels he is in danger at the Pentagon. Hearing of the attacks, the crew leader instructs his 23 workers to abandon what they are doing and evacuate. Moments later, as they are crossing the parking lot, they see the airliner crash into the exact area of the Pentagon they had just left. [Government Executive, 5/1/2002; Freni, 2003, pp. 43-44] There is no evidence that anyone else in the Pentagon evacuates the building before it is struck (see Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Newsday, 9/23/2001] Another report, which appears to be describing the same incident, says the construction crew evacuates for a different reason: to discuss security with a customer in the parking lot. [Pentagram, 9/14/2001]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Continental Airlines Plane Signals It Is Hijacked Three Times, but Pilot Says It Is Not Hijacked
A Continental Airlines flight transmits a special transponder code three times, indicating to air traffic controllers that it has been hijacked, but the pilot then reports that the plane is fine. At 9:36 a.m., John White, a manager at the FAA’s Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, will report the suspicious incident over the phone to Doug Davis, the special assistant for technical operations in air traffic services at FAA headquarters. White says that Continental Airlines Flight 321, which is flying from Cleveland to Denver and is currently over South Bend, Indiana, has “squawked hijack three times.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 11/4/2003] (Pilots can set their plane’s transponder—a device that sends information about the aircraft to controllers’ radar screens—to squawk a code of “7500,” which is the universal code that signals a plane has been hijacked. [USA Today, 8/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 17] ) Yet, White says, “we have made contact with the pilot and the pilot has told us everything is okay.” White adds, “We are trying to determine why he squawked hijack.” At 9:48 a.m., asked if anything more is known about the aircraft, White will tell Davis, “I have no update on Continental 321.” An hour later, White will again be talking to Davis about Flight 321. He tells him that it is “on the ground at Peoria,” in Illinois, and that the FBI is “approaching the aircraft at this time.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11/2001; 9/11 Commission, 11/4/2003] Further details about Continental Airlines Flight 321, and why it wrongly signals it has been hijacked, are unknown.
Shortly Before 9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Personnel Monitoring Flight 93 before It Changes Course, according to Military Officials
Personnel at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) are following Flight 93 while it is still flying west and before it reverses course, according to the accounts of some NEADS and NORAD officials, but their claims will be disputed by the 9/11 Commission. [Filson, 2003, pp. 68, 71; 9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 100-101]
NEADS Watches Flight 93 Heading West – Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, will later recall that around this time, “his focus” is on Flight 93, which, he will say, is “circling over Chicago.” [9/11 Commission, 10/27/2003 ] Marr will tell author Leslie Filson that the flight is being monitored by NEADS personnel while it is still flying west. He will describe: “We don’t have fighters that way and we think [Flight 93 is] headed toward Detroit or Chicago. I’m thinking Chicago is the target.” Marr will say NEADS contacts an Air National Guard base in the area, “so they [can] head off 93 at the pass” (see (9:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 68]
NORAD Watching Flight 93 When It Changes Course – Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stuart, an intelligence officer who is in the NEADS battle cab with Marr, will give a similar account. He will say that when the Flight 93 “incident began to unfold,” it was his “professional judgment that the plane was going to strike the Sears Tower in Chicago, and he passed that judgment to Colonel Marr.” [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ] And Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region, will say that NORAD personnel are already following Flight 93 at 9:36 a.m., when it reverses course and heads back east (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). He will tell Filson, “[W]e watched the 93 track as it meandered around the Ohio-Pennsylvania area and started to turn south toward [Washington,] DC.” [National Transportation Safety Board, 2/19/2002 ; Filson, 2003, pp. 71; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 41] Marr will similarly say “that he distinctly remembers watching [Flight 93] come west and turn over Cleveland.” [9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004 ]
9/11 Commission Says No One at NORAD Watches Flight 93 – However, the 9/11 Commission will dispute these accounts. It will state: “The record demonstrates… that no one at any level in NORAD… ever ‘watched the 93 track’ start to turn south towards Washington, DC. In fact, the military never saw Flight 93 at all.” [9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 101] NEADS will first be alerted to Flight 93 significantly later, at 10:07 a.m., according to the 9/11 Commission (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001).
Officer May Have Confused Flight 93 with Delta 1989 – The 9/11 Commission will suggest to Marr that he was mistaking Flight 93 for Delta Air Lines Flight 1989, an aircraft that is incorrectly reported as having been hijacked around this time (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001). Marr will respond that he may have confused Flight 93 with Delta 1989, but say that “he believes the last point at which he saw Flight 93 was when it was over Ohio, before it turned off its transponder,” which happens at 9:41 a.m. (see (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 1/23/2004 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 27-30] Senior officials, including Marr and Arnold, will claim that the US military continues following Flight 93 after it reverses course and is heading toward Washington (see (9:36 a.m.-10:06 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 71, 73] Stuart will say that after Flight 93 changes course, he “and other NEADS people knew it was headed to DC.” [9/11 Commission, 10/30/2003 ]
9:35 a.m.-9:36 a.m. September 11, 2001: Several Witnesses See a Helicopter near the Pentagon
A number of witnesses see a helicopter flying near the Pentagon in the minutes before the attack there. 
Jeffrey Mark Parsons, an assistant chief patrol agent with the United States Border Patrol, sees a blue and white helicopter that appears as if it is coming in to land, from a window on the 17th floor of the hotel he is staying at, near the Pentagon. Parsons will later recall that two or three minutes before the Pentagon attack occurs: “I saw [the helicopter] circle… between the hotel and the Pentagon, going toward the landing pad [at the Pentagon] where that airliner ultimately hit. And I thought that he landed on the pad.” Parsons will say the helicopter flies in at “a weird angle,” and recall that he has been staying at the Marriott Residence Inn in Arlington for almost a month, but has “never seen a helicopter approach the Pentagon from that direction before.” He will recognize the helicopter as a Huey because he has flown Hueys and knows they make “a very distinct sound.” According to John Darrell Sherwood, a Navy historian who interviews Parsons about the incident, the helicopter belongs to the US Park Police and has been instructed to intercept the aircraft that subsequently hits the Pentagon (see Shortly Before 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Naval Historical Center, 12/13/2001; Goldberg et al., 2007, pp. 258] A senior Air Force officer who is somewhere outside the Pentagon also sees a helicopter circling the Pentagon around this time, although he believes it to be a US military helicopter. Shortly after the Pentagon attack, the unnamed officer will tell a CNN reporter that the helicopter “disappeared behind the building where the helicopter landing zone is… and he then saw [a] fireball go into the sky” when the Pentagon is hit. [CNN, 9/11/2001] Jennifer Reichert, who is stuck in traffic on Route 27 in front of the Pentagon, will describe that just before the attack, “A helicopter takes off from the heliport at the Pentagon.” She will add: “Minutes—maybe seconds—later, I hear it: American Airlines Flight 77 screams toward the Pentagon. The explosion [of the crash] shakes my car.” [Washington Post, 9/5/2002] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Denny Watson, his CIA briefer, who are in Rumsfeld’s office at the Pentagon, see a helicopter flying very close to the building, outside the window of the office, and then pulling away just before the building is attacked (see Shortly Before 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Priess, 2016, pp. 244-245]
Perhaps due to the presence of this helicopter in the area, some people will initially think the attack on the Pentagon involves a helicopter hitting the building. Captain William Durm, the commander of the Pentagon’s Triservice Dental Clinic, will head to the building’s center courtyard shortly after the Pentagon is hit. Someone there will tell him a helicopter has hit the other side of the building. [Marble and Milhiser, 9/2004, pp. 11] Some early news reports will suggest a helicopter crashed into the Pentagon. [Thomas Crosbie Media, 9/11/2001; Poynter Institute, 9/2/2002] One report will claim that “one aircraft and a helicopter have crashed into the Pentagon.” [Airline Industry Information, 9/11/2001] Vice President Dick Cheney will tell NBC’s Meet the Press that “the first reports on the Pentagon attack suggested a helicopter” hit the building. [Meet the Press, 9/16/2001] The Guardian will report that one witness claims the explosion that occurs when the Pentagon is hit blows up a helicopter circling overhead. [Guardian, 9/12/2001] New York Times columnist William Safire will report that, at approximately this time, Cheney is told that either another plane or “a helicopter loaded with explosives” is heading for the White House. [New York Times, 9/13/2001]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service, Concerned about Aircraft Approaching the White House, Orders Evacuation of Vice President Cheney
The Secret Service calls for the immediate evacuation of Vice President Dick Cheney from his office after learning that a suspicious aircraft is flying toward the White House. Air traffic controllers informed the Secret Service that an unidentified aircraft was heading toward the White House at around 9:33 a.m. (see (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and (9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but the aircraft then turned away from the White House and so, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, the Secret Service made no attempt to evacuate Cheney from his office at that time. Now, however, the Secret Service learns that the aircraft is “beginning to circle back.” This news prompts it to order “the immediate evacuation of the vice president.” [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39] Someone at the Secret Service Joint Operations Center at the White House passes on the details of the suspicious aircraft to Special Agent James Scott, the “on-duty shift whip” for Cheney’s Secret Service detail, and the shift agents with him in the West Wing of the White House, where Cheney’s office is located. The agents hear the “broadcast alert” over their radios, telling them, “Unidentified aircraft coming toward the White House.” [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001 ] Some or possibly all of the agents will immediately go into Cheney’s office, and hurry the vice president out of there and down toward the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, a bunker below the White House (see (9:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 11/17/2001 ; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 39-40; Gellman, 2008, pp. 114-116] However, a number of accounts will indicate that Cheney was evacuated from his office earlier on, at around 9:03 a.m., when the second plane crashed into the World Trade Center (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 9/13/2001; Daily Telegraph, 12/16/2001; ABC News, 9/14/2002]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Secret Service Agents Respond to Attacks in Crisis Center, but Are Hindered by Conflicting Information
Danny Spriggs, the assistant director of the Secret Service’s Office of Protective Operations, arrives at the Director’s Crisis Center (DCC) at Secret Service headquarters and joins colleagues there in responding to the terrorist attacks, but the agents’ ability to take action is affected by the poor quality of the information they receive. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003] The DCC is used to direct operations in emergencies. It is located on the ninth floor of the Secret Service headquarters in Washington, DC, and maintained within the Secret Service’s intelligence division. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; Kessler, 2009, pp. 23-24] Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service, activated it after the two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, according to Spriggs (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Agent Joins Colleagues in Crisis Center – Spriggs will later recall that he arrives at the DCC at “approximately 9:35 a.m.,” and finds Stafford and Larry Cockell, the deputy director of the Secret Service, already there. At this time, Stafford is on the phone with the intelligence division. [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] (However, White House counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke will claim that Stafford is with him in the White House Situation Room around this time (see (9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2004, pp. 6-7] ) Shortly after entering the crisis center, Spriggs uses his “DCC designated telephone” to call Carl Truscott, the Secret Service special agent in charge of the presidential protective division. During the call, Spriggs alerts Truscott to a suspicious aircraft that is flying toward the White House (see (Shortly After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001; United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001]
Agents Receive ‘Conflicting’ and ‘Unconfirmed’ Information – Spriggs will say that his “area of concern” while he is at the DCC is “the location of our protective details and the safety of our protectees.” He will recall, however, that when he arrives at the DCC, “many of the telephones” there are “not operational.” [United States Secret Service, 10/1/2001] Furthermore, the amount of information that comes into the crisis center throughout the day is “enormous.” Spriggs will recall that, while he is at the DCC, the agents there receive “conflicting” information from the intelligence division, “unconfirmed data,” and “raw information,” which hinders their ability to make proper decisions. He will say that one of his colleagues at the DCC (whose name is unstated) is making decisions based on “inaccurate data that could have been quickly verified,” such as the misinformation that an aircraft crashed near Camp David (see (10:37 a.m.-11:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/28/2003]
9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001: Otis Pilot Says He Would Shoot Down a Hijacked Aircraft
In answer to a question from a weapons controller at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), one of the pilots that took off in response to Flight 11 confirms that he would be willing to shoot down a hijacked aircraft. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 153] Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, has already checked that his section heads and weapons technicians are prepared to order the shooting down of a civilian aircraft (see (9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001). At 9:32, after NEADS received a report of a hijacked plane approaching Washington (see 9:21 a.m. September 11, 2001), Major James Anderson asked Nasypany what would happen if they located that aircraft, saying, “Are we gonna shoot him down if they got passengers on board?” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]
Duffy Says He Would Shoot down a Plane – Nasypany wants to be sure that his pilots are willing to follow a shootdown order, should one be issued. He therefore directs his weapons controller who is dealing with the fighter jets launched from Otis Air National Guard Base (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) to check this. The weapons controller radios Otis pilot Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy and tells him, “If we get another hijack track, you’re going to be ordered to shoot it down.” He then asks, “Do you have a problem with that?” Somewhat startled by the question, Duffy replies, “No—no problem with that.” He reportedly thinks to himself, “If I have a problem with that order, I am in the wrong seat.” According to author Lynn Spencer, Duffy is “doing what he’s been trained to do.… [I]f he gets a legal, lawful order to take out an airliner, then that’s what he’s going to do. He knows every other fighter pilot would do the same.” Duffy and the other Otis pilot that launched with him, Major Daniel Nash, are “confident no plane will get past them: they’ll do what it takes, and follow any order, to protect New York.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 153] Duffy will later tell the Boston Globe: “[P]eople have said, ‘Would you have done it [i.e. shot down a hostile airliner]?’ Absolutely, that’s my job.” [Boston Globe, 9/11/2005]
No Shootdown Order Issued – However, according to the 9/11 Commission, NEADS personnel will only learn that NORAD has been cleared to shoot down threatening aircraft at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 42] And, according to most accounts, the two Otis pilots never receive an order from the military to shoot down an airliner (see (After 9:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/2002; Boston Globe, 9/11/2005] Duffy and Nash will also be contacted by a civilian air traffic controller regarding the possibility of shooting down a hijacked aircraft (see (9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [BBC, 9/1/2002]
