Personnel at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region II office at 26 Federal Plaza in New York are unable to communicate with the city’s emergency command center in World Trade Center Building 7 and so Richard Ohlsen, one of the office’s employees, is sent to the WTC site to liaise with officials there. Personnel in the FEMA office felt their building shake when the first hijacked plane crashed into the WTC, at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001), but were initially unclear about what had happened. They were able, however, to see the second crash, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), through the windows. Apparently after that crash occurs, “communications almost instantly became a problem and compromised the ability of the Regional Operations Center [i.e. the office at 26 Federal Plaza] to operate,” Ohlsen will later recall. In particular, personnel there are unable to communicate with the city’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which has its emergency command center on the 23rd floor of WTC 7. Mike Dabney, the senior FEMA manager in the office, therefore instructs Ohlsen to go to WTC 7, which is within walking distance, and act as an on-site liaison with the OEM there. However, Ohlsen’s departure is delayed because his colleagues are unable to find a working radio or a satellite phone he can take with him. He consequently only heads out at around 9:59 a.m., when the South Tower of the WTC collapses (see 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). He will change his plans following the collapse and, instead of heading to WTC 7, go to the command post at the headquarters of the New York Police Department (see After 9:59 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 3/16/2004 
; Graff, 2017, pp. 343-344]
After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Myers Learns of the Second Crash While Meeting Senator Cleland
General Richard Myers, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, learns that a second plane has crashed into the World Trade Center and realizes this is a terrorist attack while he is meeting Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) on Capitol Hill. Myers learned of the first crash at the WTC when he saw it reported on television as he was about to go into the meeting with Cleland, but didn’t realize it was a terrorist attack (see Shortly Before 9:00 a.m. September 11, 2001). He therefore proceeded with the meeting, which began at around 9:00 a.m. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 7-9]
Myers and Cleland Have Been Talking about Terrorism – After briefly discussing the incident in New York, Myers and Cleland had a “little conversation about national security,” Myers will later describe. [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006; Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8] Ironically, one of the subjects they talked about was terrorism. [Washington Post, 7/3/2003] They have been “discussing the need to boost our conventional forces, to look at the question of terrorism and attacks on the United States,” Cleland will recall. [US Congress, 9/13/2001] They were “discussing the future of American defenses, particularly against worldwide terrorism,” he will say on another occasion. [Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 6/16/2003]
Cleland and Myers Possibly See the Crash on TV – At some point, they learn of the second crash, which takes place at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), although accounts will conflict over exactly when and how this happens. According to Cleland, they learn of the crash when they see it on television. He will recall that while they are talking, his secretary, Elaine Iler, bursts into the room in an agitated state and says, “You’ve gotta see the TV.” Myers and Cleland follow her out to where the television is. “Almost as soon as we got into the room, we saw the second plane hit the tower at the World Trade Center,” Cleland will describe. “For a moment, I thought it was a replay of the first plane hitting the tower, but it quickly became apparent there were two planes involved and neither of them was little,” he will add. [Cleland and Raines, 2009, pp. 170]
Staffer Alerts Cleland and Myers to the Crash – Myers, though, will recall that, rather than seeing it on television, he and Cleland learn of the crash after it occurs, and, on most occasions, he will say they do so when someone tells them about it. On some occasions he will state that they learn of the crash shortly after their meeting began. “A couple of minutes into the meeting, one of the aides came in and said the second building had been hit,” he will say in an interview in 2011. [American Forces Press Service, 9/9/2011] He will give a similar account in his 2009 memoir, writing: “[Cleland] had started preparing a pot of tea, but we hadn’t taken a sip when a staff person came in from the outer office and informed us that the second tower had been hit. We both knew the interview was over and started out to the TV to see the South Tower erupting with smoke and flame.” [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 8]
Notification of the Crash Possibly Occurs Later On – In an interview in 2002, he will indicate that he and Cleland are alerted to the crash later on during their meeting. “Somewhere in the middle of that meeting, [someone] came in and said the second tower has been hit,” he will tell NBC News. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] On another occasion, he will be less specific, mentioning only that after the second crash occurred, “The meeting was over very quickly.” [Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006]
No One Alerts Cleland and Myers to the Crash, according to One Account – However, in an interview five weeks after 9/11, Myers will claim that no one interrupts the meeting to tell them about the crash and they only learn of it after the meeting ends. “Sometime during that office call the second tower was hit. Nobody informed us of that, but when we came out, that was obvious,” he will say. [Armed Forces Radio And Television Service, 10/17/2001; American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001]
Cleland and Myers Realize This Is Terrorism – Myers and Cleland realize immediately that the US is under attack when they learn of the second crash. “It was pretty clear from the time that second tower was hit that we were under attack,” Myers will comment. “That’s when we figured out something: that America, or at least the World Trade Center, is under attack,” he will say. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002] The second crash was “no light aircraft accident, but certainly an act of unthinkable terrorist savagery,” he will write. [Myers and McConnell, 2009, pp. 9]
Myers Takes No Action in response to the Crash – However, Myers does nothing in response to the attacks at this time. He will tell the 9/11 Commission that he “did not recall making any decisions or taking any actions between the time the second tower was hit and the time the Pentagon was struck,” which is 9:37 a.m. (see 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2/17/2004 ] Furthermore, despite noting that the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon is “essentially my battle station when things are happening,” he will only head back to the Pentagon sometime after the Pentagon attack occurs (see Shortly After 9:37 a.m. September 11, 2001). [US Congress, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 6/29/2006] General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently out of the country, flying across the Atlantic Ocean for a NATO meeting in Europe (see 7:15 a.m. September 11, 2001), and so Myers is the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his place. [American Forces Press Service, 9/8/2006; George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 8/3/2012] Until Shelton returns to the US, therefore, he is the nation’s highest-ranking military officer. [Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, 2010, pp. 432; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11/7/2019]
Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Pentagon’s Executive Support Center Goes into Operation, But Rumsfeld Not Present
Just minutes after the second plane hits the World Trade Center, the Executive Support Center (ESC) within the Pentagon goes into operation. The ESC is located next door to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), and comprises several conference rooms that are secure against electronic eavesdropping. The Pentagon’s state-of-the-art communications hub, “Cables,” is establishing secure two-way video links with the White House and other key agencies. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Victoria Clarke arrives at the ESC soon after the second crash, accompanied by Larry Di Rita, who is Donald Rumsfeld’s personal chief of staff. They have just visited Rumsfeld and informed him of the second crash, but he has remained in his office to wait for his daily intelligence briefing (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Also at the ESC at this time is Rumsfeld’s closest aide, Stephen Cambone. According to Clarke, the ESC is “the place where the building’s top leadership goes to coordinate military operations during national emergencies.” Yet supposedly the Secretary of Defense does not join them there until about 10:15 A.M. (see (10:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Clarke, 2006, pp. 218-221; Cockburn, 2007, pp. 5-6]
Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FBI Bomb Technicians Are Away from New York for Training When the WTC Is Attacked
All but one of the bomb technicians from the FBI’s New York field office are away from New York and therefore avoid getting involved with the immediate response to the attacks on the World Trade Center. They are attending in-service training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, along with bomb technicians from other FBI offices. They learn what has happened in New York when Supervisory Special Agent James Clemente, who has been teaching a course in the room next to theirs, comes into their classroom after seeing the second crash on television and realizing it was a terrorist attack. “I ran in there and I told them that both World Trade Towers had been hit by jumbo jets, they were both in flames, this is a terrorist attack,” Clemente will later recall. The bomb technicians are initially skeptical, thinking Clemente’s announcement is a joke or some kind of class exercise. But their pagers start going off and they then realize that a major event is indeed taking place. The bomb technicians from New York will promptly leave the FBI Academy and head back to their city. They are apparently fortunate to be away from their field office this morning. One bomb technician from each office that is receiving the training in Quantico has stayed behind, in case an emergency should occur. [Graff, 2011, pp. 380; Rothco Press, 2015] The bomb technician who stayed behind in New York, Special Agent Leonard Hatton, heads into the WTC to help evacuate people sometime after the second crash and he will tragically be killed when the Twin Towers collapse. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/29/2001; Bergen Record, 8/15/2011] “It wasn’t lost on the bomb techs [from New York] that but for the serendipitous timing of the training, many of them would probably be dead along with Hatton,” journalist and author Garrett Graff will write. [Graff, 2011, pp. 380] “All the other bomb techs from the New York office would have likely died that day but for that training,” Clemente will comment. [Rothco Press, 2015]
Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: NORAD Training Exercise Canceled
A NORAD training exercise that is taking place this morning, presumably Vigilant Guardian (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), is reportedly canceled shortly after 9:03, when the second World Trade Center tower is hit. [Airman, 3/2002] NORAD Commander Larry Arnold later says that after Flight 175 hits the South Tower, “I thought it might be prudent to pull out of the exercise, which we did.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 59] According to author Lynn Spencer: “The phone calls start flying between the various NORAD command centers. General Arnold calls Maj. Gen. Rick Findley” at NORAD’s operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, “to give him the latest information and have him withdraw all forces from the simulated exercise.” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 86] Arnold will recall, “As we pulled out of the exercise we were getting calls about United Flight 93 and we were worried about that.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 59] Some early accounts say the military receives notification of the possible hijacking of Flight 93 at around 9:16 a.m. (see 9:16 a.m. September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/17/2001; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) first receives a call about Flight 93 at 10:07 a.m. (see 10:05 a.m.-10:08 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 ] Arnold will add, “Then we had another call from Boston Center about a possible hijacking, but that turned out to be the airplane that had already hit the South Tower but we didn’t know that at the time.” [Filson, 2003, pp. 59]
9:04 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 175 Crash Leads to Confusion at NEADS; Some Think It Is a Simulation
NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, NY, has just received a phone call informing it of the hijacking of Flight 175 (see (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and several personnel have witnessed the plane crashing into the second World Trade Center tower live on CNN. There is considerable confusion on the operations floor over whether the plane seen on TV is the hijacking they have just been informed of. Tape recordings capture NEADS personnel in the background trying to make sense of things: “Is this explosion part of that that we’re lookin’ at now on TV?“… “And there’s a possible second hijack also—a United Airlines“… “Two planes?” Someone comments, “I think this is a damn input, to be honest.” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] Another person replies, “Then this is a damned messed-up input!” [Spencer, 2008, pp. 84] “Input” refers to a simulations input, as part of a training exercise. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] NORAD has the capacity to inject simulated material, including mass attacks, during exercises, “as though it was being sensed for the first time by a radar site.” [US Department of Defense, 1/15/1999] At least one military exercise this morning is reported to include simulated information injected onto radar screens (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Toronto Star, 12/9/2001] At the current time, despite the earlier crash of Flight 11, NORAD has yet to cancel a major exercise it is in the middle of (see (Shortly After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Filson, 2003, pp. 59]
After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Air Base Commanders Offer to Help NORAD; Timing of Acceptance Unclear
Shortly after the second World Trade Center crash, calls from fighter units begin “pouring into NORAD and sector operations centers, asking, ‘What can we do to help?’” From Syracuse, New York, a commander of the 174th Fighter Wing of the New York Air National Guard calls and tells Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS): “Give me 10 [minutes] and I can give you hot guns. Give me 30 [minutes] and I’ll have heat-seeker [missiles]. Give me an hour and I can give you slammers [Amraams].” Marr replies, “I want it all.” [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002; News 10 Now, 9/12/2006] Reportedly, Marr says: “Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack.” [Newhouse News Service, 1/25/2002] Canadian Major General Rick Findley, based in Colorado and in charge of NORAD on this day, reportedly has his staff immediately order as many fighters in the air as possible. [Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/2002] However, according to another account, NEADS does not accept the offers until about an hour later. The Toledo Blade will report, “By 10:01 a.m., the command center began calling several bases across the country for help.” [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001] The 9/11 Commission will conclude that an order for other bases to prepare fighters to scramble is not given until 9:49 a.m. In fact, it appears the first fighters from other bases to take off are those from Syracuse at 10:42 a.m. (see 10:42 a.m. September 11, 2001). This is over an hour and a half after Syracuse’s initial offer to help, and not long after a general ban on all flights, including military ones, is lifted at 10:31 a.m. (see 10:31 a.m. September 11, 2001). These are apparently the fourth set of fighters scrambled from the ground. Previously, three fighters from Langley Air Force Base, two from Otis Air National Guard Base, and two from Toledo, Ohio, were scrambled at 10:01 a.m. (see 10:01 a.m. September 11, 2001), but did not launch until 15 minutes later. [Toledo Blade, 12/9/2001]
9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m. September 11, 2001: House Speaker Hastert Has Problems Contacting Vice President Cheney; Receives Nuisance Call
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, who is third in line for the presidency, is in his office suite on the second floor of the US Capitol building when he sees the second plane hitting the World Trade Center live on television. [Hastert, 2004, pp. 5] He is told that Vice President Dick Cheney will soon be calling him on the secure telephone in his office. [Daily Herald (Arlington Heights), 9/11/2002] However, Cheney is currently having problems using secure phones, and Hastert is too. Hastert later recalls, “To use the secure phone, you have to push a button and turn a key. On that dreadful day I couldn’t make the thing work. No matter what I did, I couldn’t connect with the vice president. As the minutes passed, my frustrations grew.” [Hastert, 2004, pp. 6; Hayes, 2007, pp. 336] Several attempts to reach the vice president are unsuccessful. Hastert’s later explanation is that “Anyone who has used a secure phone can tell you they do not work very well.” However, numerous other people in the Washington area, including senior government officials, are also experiencing serious communications problems throughout the day (see (After 8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Around the time the Pentagon is hit, the light on Hastert’s regular phone starts flashing, but instead of being Cheney it is apparently a nuisance caller, who complains, “I can’t get a hold of Jeb Bush, I can’t get a hold of the president, I can’t get a hold of Colin Powell. All this stuff is happening. What are you guys doing?” When Hastert asks the caller who they are, their reply is, “I’m just a citizen. Who is this?” [Chicago Sun-Times, 9/25/2001; Daily Herald (Arlington Heights), 9/11/2002; Associated Press, 6/16/2007] Shortly afterwards, the Capitol is evacuated (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001) and Hastert’s Secret Service agents hurry him out of the building. It is not until around 11 a.m. that Cheney finally speaks to him. [Hastert, 2004, pp. 8-9; Hayes, 2007, pp. 337 and 340-341]
Shortly After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: Atlantic City Fighters Recalled from Runway to be Armed, but Do Not Launch until after Pentagon Attack
Two fighter jets at a New Jersey military unit that are about to launch for training are recalled to respond to the attacks in New York, but will not be airborne until after the Pentagon is hit. The two F-16s belong to the 177th Fighter Wing, located at Atlantic City International Airport, and are only loaded with BDUs (practice bombs) for their routine training mission. [Code One Magazine, 10/2002] Colonel James Haye, the supervisor of flying (SOF) at the 177th FW, was informed of the first aircraft hitting the World Trade Center, and then went to a nearby television to see the footage of the burning North Tower. He’d alerted Lt. Col. Randall King, one of the base’s pilots, who was in the same room as him. King, who is an experienced commercial pilot, said: “Whoever was at the controls did that on purpose. That is no accidental crash! And that was no small airplane!” After watching the television coverage for several minutes, Haye sets about putting the scheduled training mission on hold. [Spencer, 2008, pp. 58-59 and 120] As they are taxiing to the runway, the two fighters preparing to launch are told to stop and return to the flight line (the parking and servicing area for aircraft). Personnel at the base then set about removing the training munitions and arming the planes with live missiles. Major Tom Cleary, one of the pilots, will later recall, “We launched almost immediately after the Pentagon was hit.” However, apparently his aircraft will not be properly armed. He recalls, “I was still carrying training munitions, but I had live guns.” Col. Mike Cosby, the commander of the 177th FW, indicates the jets may not launch until slightly later, saying, “We were airborne within the hour after the Pentagon attack.” Later on, four F-16s with live missiles will be launched from the unit, followed by another four, also with live missiles. According to Cosby, “We were the first non-alert unit to fly armed ordnance over the Northeast corridor anywhere the Northeast Sector of NORAD wanted us to fly, between New York City and Washington, DC.” [Code One Magazine, 10/2002] Two F-16s with the 177th FW have been airborne already this morning, practicing bombing runs near Atlantic City, and are called back to base following the attacks on the WTC to be re-fitted with live missiles and then re-launched (see 8:46 a.m.-9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Bergen Record, 12/5/2003]
After 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001: FEMA Establishes a Temporary Headquarters Away from New York, in New Jersey
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) establishes a temporary headquarters from which to operate at Camp Kilmer, an Army base near Edison, New Jersey, in place of its office in Lower Manhattan. [9/11 Commission, 3/15/2004 ; Graff, 2017, pp. 344] FEMA’s Region II office is at 26 Federal Plaza, several blocks north of the World Trade Center. After the second hijacked plane crashed into the WTC, at 9:03 a.m. (see 9:03 a.m. September 11, 2001), communications there “almost instantly” became a problem and “compromised the ability” of the office to operate, according to Richard Ohlsen, one of the office’s employees (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Urban Hazards Forum, 1/2002; 9/11 Commission, 3/16/2004 ] Perhaps due, at least partly, to this loss of communications, at some unspecified time a temporary Region II headquarters is subsequently set up away from the city. Arrangements to establish this temporary headquarters are made by Stephen DeBlasio, director of the Administration and Resource Planning Division for Region II. DeBlasio is currently away from New York, in the Virgin Islands for a conference. Immediately after being notified of the crashes at the WTC, he establishes communications from his location in the Virgin Islands. His “first order of business,” he will later recall, is then “to set up a site at Edison, New Jersey, as a temporary FEMA Region II headquarters.” This site is at Camp Kilmer, where FEMA has long maintained space. DeBlasio has 25 phone lines installed there, in addition to the four lines already in place at the site. He also initiates the setting up of a field disaster office at Camp Kilmer, which would be able to accommodate 1,000 people. [9/11 Commission, 3/15/2004 ; Graff, 2017, pp. 344] FEMA’s Region II subsequently deploys members of its emergency response team to various locations, but most of the members go to the site in New Jersey, according to Marianne Jackson, FEMA’s federal coordinating officer. [Urban Hazards Forum, 1/2002] The temporary headquarters at Camp Kilmer is apparently only in use for a relatively short time. After he leaves the Virgin Islands on the afternoon of September 12, DeBlasio will learn that FEMA’s operations for New York have been moved back to the Region II office at 26 Federal Plaza, even though communications there are still out. [9/11 Commission, 3/15/2004 ]
