

# The 9/11 Hijacking Myth Exposed

Examining the Official Story Against the History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts and the Content of the 9/11 Phone Calls



International Center for  
**9/11 JUSTICE**

# Why study the 9/11 hijacking story?

1. The first and most essential step in the official account, from which all else follows.
2. Refuting it tells us who the perpetrators were not.
3. It can be refuted by carefully scrutinizing the only evidence supporting it: the phone calls.

# Starting Hypothesis: Hijacking Story False

- Given plan to demolish WTC towers, 9/11 planners would not depend on highly unpredictable violent hijacking and piloting of four aircraft by inexperienced pilots.
- However, we will make the case independent of the controlled demolition assumption that the hijacking story is exceedingly improbable and based on false evidence.


# Scope of Study

**Research Question:** How probable and how supported by evidence is the violent takeover of each aircraft as reported by 9/11 Commission?

- Not investigating presence or lack thereof of alleged hijackers on the airplanes — only the reported hijacking events.
- Not investigating how the phone calls were made. Focus is on what was reported in the calls.


# Outline

- 1. Overview of Externally Observable Reported Hijacking Events**
- 2. 9/11 Commission Explanation for Success of Hijacking Attempts**
- 3. Historical Record of Suicide Hijacking Attempts**
- 4. Comparing the 9/11 Hijacking Story with the Historical Record**
- 5. The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin' of the 9/11 Hijacking Story**




# Part 1: Overview of Externally Observable Reported Hijacking Events

# Time and Location of Alleged Takeovers



## American Airlines Flight 11


Takeoff: 7:59 AM, Takeover: 8:13 AM



## United Airlines Flight 175


Takeoff: 8:14 AM, Takeover: 8:42 to 8:46 AM

# Time and Location of Alleged Takeovers



## American Airlines Flight 77

Takeoff: 8:20 AM, Takeover: 8:51 to 8:54 AM



## United Airlines Flight 93

Takeoff: 8:42 AM, Takeover: 9:28 AM



# External Indications of Takeover

For **AA11, UA175, and AA77**, no external indications, such as:

- Pilots squawking universal hijack code (7500).
- Verbal communication with air traffic control.
- Sudden, uncontrolled deviation from flight path.

# External Indications of Takeover

For **AA11**, just 16 seconds elapsed between crew's final radio transmission and subsequent ATC transmission that went unanswered.

8:13:29 46R	American eleven turn twenty degrees right. [BOS 1204-1233 Sector 46R]
8:13:31 AAL-11	twenty right American eleven. [BOS 1204-1233 Sector 46R]
8:13:47 46R	American eleven climb maintain flight level three five zero. [BOS 1204-1233 Sector 46R]
8:13:57 46R	American eleven climb maintain flight level three five zero. [BOS 1204-1233 Sector 46R]

# External Indications of Takeover


For **UA93** at 9:28 AM:

- A 600-foot descent, followed by return to cruising altitude within 2 minutes.
- 11 seconds after start of descent, two radio transmissions 32 seconds apart conveying sounds of violent cockpit struggle.

# External Indications of Takeover

## Reasons for skepticism:

- Brief 600-foot descent, without change of direction, not consistent with loss of control due to cockpit struggle, according to several pilots.
- Climb back to cruising altitude appears to start before end of cockpit struggle.



# External Indications of Takeover

## Reasons for skepticism:

- Transmission can come from anywhere.
- Very odd for pilot to use the term “may day,” especially in two transmissions, w/out giving more info.
- Second transmission: Exact same words and sounds repeat.



**At 9:28:16:**

“May day! May day!”



**At 9:28:48:**

“May day . . . Get out of here! . . . May day . . . Get out of here!”

# External Indications of Takeover

Keep in mind for later analysis of UA93 phone calls:

- External indications of UA93 takeover last from 9:28:05 to 9:28:54.
- Therefore, the official story has committed itself to a loud, violent cockpit struggle at 9:28 lasting about 1 minute or more.
- All passengers who made calls were originally seated in first class (5) or in rows 10 to 12 (6).



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A Boeing 757-200 cabin. Photo courtesy of Nicholas Young.

# External Indications of Takeover

Post-takeover radio transmissions on two flights:

- Three purportedly from **AA11** at 8:24:38, 8:24:56, and 8:33:59, respectively.
- Two purportedly from **UA93** at 9:31:57 and 9:39:12, respectively.

9/11 Commission explanation:

“The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel.... Jarrah, like Atta earlier, may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know how to operate the radio and the intercom.”

# External Indications of Takeover

## Reasons for skepticism:

Rudi Dekkers, director of Huffman Aviation, where Atta trained:

“I swear on my life, that’s not [Atta’s] voice. This is NOT ATTA SPEAKING. The guy that is on this tape . . . is in my opinion a black guy from the Bahamas speaking not with a monotone but flowing like.... Atta was ‘dead man walking.’ Atta had a voice that was MO-NO-TONE.”

Source: Interview on *Erskine Overnight*, 9/11/11



**At 8:24:38 and  
8:24:56:**

“We have some  
planes....”



**At 8:33:59:**

“Nobody move,  
please....”



# External Indications of Takeover

## Reasons for skepticism:

- Seems improbable that hijackers on two planes would accidentally use radio instead of intercom.
- Inconsistent with circumstances:
  - Dangerous aviation situation at 9:39 AM.
  - No passenger unrest at 9:39; hijackers in regular verbal contact with passengers.



**At 9:31:55:**

“Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.”



**At 9:39:11:**

“Ah! Here’s the captain. I would like you all to remain seated. We have a bomb aboard, and we are going back to the airport, and we have our demands. So, please remain quiet.”



# Part 2: 9/11 Commission Explanation for Success of Hijacking Attempts

# Four Teams of Hijackers

AA11




UA93



AA77



UA175



- Weapons used (based on reports from callers): knives, boxcutters, mace/pepper spray, threat of bomb.
- Speculated by 9/11 Commission: Hijacker pilot (at least Atta and Jarrah) typically not involved in taking over plane, and entered cockpit after pilots were incapacitated.
- This left only four/three “muscle” hijackers to take over cockpit and control cabin.

# How did the hijackers enter the cockpits?

Despite 28 real-time calls from the four flights, many from flight attendants and first-class passengers, the 9/11 Commission Report states:

**“We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit [of AA11].”**



# How did the hijackers enter the cockpits?

9/11 Commission's speculated methods:

- “Jamming” — based on speculation of Betty Ong.
- Forcing flight attendant to unlock door, or obtaining key from flight attendant.
- Luring pilots out of the cockpit by stabbing flight attendants.



# How did the hijackers enter the cockpits?

Explanation for the other flights:

- UA175: “Similar tactics” to AA11.
- AA77: None, despite both callers having been situated in first class.
- UA93: None, despite five first-class passengers and two flight attendants making phone calls.



# How did the hijackers remove the pilots?

Despite 28 real-time calls (many from flight attendants and first-class passengers) and sounds of a loud, violent struggle on UA93 (which most of the calls came from):

- Only two calls mentioned anything about what happened to the pilots.
- 9/11 Commission Staff Statement 4 states: “There is scattered and conflicting evidence about what happened to the cockpit crew during the takeover.”



# How did the hijackers remove the pilots?

## Reports from the only two callers:

- Unidentified male flight attendant on UA175: Both pilots killed. (No description of how, and the two other callers don't mention the notable fact of the pilots being dead.)
- Todd Beamer on UA93: Pilots pulled out of cockpit, lying on floor.
- No info about AA11 and AA77 pilots (despite 3 flight attendants and 1<sup>st</sup> class passenger calling).





# No Training for ‘Suicide Hijackings’

9/11 Commission Report (p. 85):

“The final [security] layer, security on board commercial aircraft, was not designed to counter suicide hijackings. The FAA-approved ‘Common Strategy’ . . . taught flight crews that the best way to deal with hijackers was to accommodate their demands, get the plane to land safely, and then let law enforcement or the military handle the situation. . . . FAA training material provided no guidance for flight crews should violence occur.”

# No Training for ‘Suicide Hijackings’


## 9/11 Commission, Staff Statement 4:

“The point of the [Common Strategy] was to ‘optimize actions taken by a flight crew to resolve hijackings peacefully’ through systematic delay and, if necessary, accommodation of the hijackers. . . .

“Thus, on September 11, 2001, the Common Strategy, the last line of defense, offered no defense against the tactics employed by the hijackers of Flights 11, 77, 93, and 175.” [Emphasis added.]

# No Training for 'Suicide Hijackings'

**Wouldn't de-escalation training go out the window if hijackers were attempting to kill the pilots or remove them from the controls of the aircraft?**



# Part 3: Historical Record of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Study Definition/Criteria

Incidents where hijackers attempted to remove the pilots from the controls of the aircraft. This can include incidents where the hijacker did not attempt to fly the plane after the pilots were incapacitated but instead let it crash. It can also include incidents where suicidal intent was not clear.

Not included were incidents where the hijacker's intention may have been suicide but through the pilots flying the aircraft, or where the safe flight of the aircraft was sabotaged without attempting to remove the pilots.

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Early Examples, All of Which Involved Guns

1. Pacific Air Line Flight 773 (May 7, 1964)
2. Eastern Air Lines Shuttle Flight 1320 (March 17, 1970)
3. Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1771 (December 7, 1987)

## 90s Examples, All of Which Involved Weapons Other than Guns

4. Federal Express Flight 705 (April 7, 1994)
5. All Nippon Airways Flight 61 (July 23, 1999)

## Year 2000 Examples, All Unarmed

6. Alaska Airlines Flight 259 (March 17, 2000)
7. Germania Charter Flight (March 28, 2000)
8. British Airways Flight 2069 (December 29, 2000)

**(Skip to Slide 46 for Takeaways)**

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 1. Pacific Air Lines Flight 773, May 7, 1964, Stockton to San Francisco

- A depressed man shot both pilots before shooting himself, causing the plane to crash. All 44 people on board died.
- Flying at its assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, Flight 773 went into a steep dive of 2,100 feet per minute at an airspeed of nearly 400 mph. The wounded first officer made a last frantic transmission as he tried to pull the plane out of the dive.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 2. Eastern Air Lines Shuttle Flight 1320, March 17, 1970, Newark to Boston

- Passenger armed with a revolver confronted the captain, a former US Air Force pilot, and ordered him to fly east and alert him when the plane was going to run out of fuel.
- Something startled the hijacker, who shot the captain in the arms. The copilot was then shot. Despite being mortally wounded, the copilot was able to force the gun from the hijacker's hand and shoot the hijacker three times before lapsing into unconsciousness, and eventual death.





# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 2. Eastern Air Lines Shuttle Flight 1320, March 17, 1970 (continued)

- Despite his injuries, the passenger arose and began clawing at the captain, attempting to force a crash. The captain hit the hijacker over the head with the gun he had retrieved from the center console.
- Despite his injuries, the captain flew the aircraft safely to a landing Boston Logan International Airport while talking to air traffic control, telling them his copilot was shot and needed emergency services.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 3. Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1771, December 7, 1987, LA to SF

- Disgruntled former employee of USAir shot his former boss, both pilots, a flight attendant, and the chief pilot of Pacific Southwest Airlines before crashing the plane near Cayucos, CA.

**Observation:** In this case as well as with Pacific Air Lines Flight 773, the hijacker was able to gain control and crash the plane because of the use of a gun.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 4. Federal Express Flight 705, April 7, 1994, Memphis to San Jose

- Fed Ex employee facing possible dismissal at a hearing the next day attempted to kill three crew members and crash the plane to make it look like an accident so his family could collect insurance money. He was armed with hammers and spear gun concealed in a guitar case, and was an ex-Navy pilot and martial arts expert.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 4. Federal Express Flight 705, April 7, 1994, (continued)

- The three crew members (two of them also ex-US Navy) put up an all-out fight not to be killed.
- An extremely violent and bloody struggle ensued, also involving aggressive aviation maneuvers.
- After a prolonged struggle, the crew was able to subdue the hijacker.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 5. All Nippon Airways Flight 61, July 23, 1999, Tokyo to Sapporo

- About 25 minutes after takeoff from Tokyo Haneda Airport, a passenger got up from his seat, pulled an 8-inch knife on a flight attendant and forced her to unlock the cockpit door.
- He then forced the first officer out, remaining in the cockpit with the captain, who managed to notify Air Traffic Control about the hijacking. The hijacker ordered the captain to fly the plane to the US military air base at Yokota (near Tokyo).



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 5. All Nippon Airways Flight 61, July 23, 1999 (continued)

- While the captain flew the plane toward the alternative destination, the hijacker requested to take the controls of the aircraft. When the captain refused this request, the hijacker stabbed him multiple times in the neck and shoulder, severely injuring him.
- With the captain incapacitated, the plane entered a sharp dive, descending to an altitude of just 980 ft at one point.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 5. All Nippon Airways Flight 61, July 23, 1999 (continued)

- About 21 minutes after the takeover, upon hearing screams from the flight deck, the first officer and other crew members regained access to the cockpit and managed to overpower and subdue the hijacker. The first officer managed to arrest the aircraft's descent and subsequently flew back to the original airport.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 5. All Nippon Airways Flight 61, July 23, 1999 (continued)

### Observations:

- i. The pilots did not initially fight back because the hijacker was not trying to remove them from the controls.
- ii. During the commotion, the captain managed to notify air traffic control.
- iii. When the hijacker asked to take control of the aircraft, the captain refused.





# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 6. Alaska Airlines Flight 259, March 17, 2000, Puerto Vallarta to San Francisco

- An agitated and incoherent passenger attacked the pilot and co-pilot, apparently intending to crash the plane (at one point the passenger tried to charge the exit).
- The passenger broke through a locked cockpit door and was going for the throttle and fuel controls. The flight crew fought with the passenger but had to call for help from first-class passengers.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 6. Alaska Airlines Flight 259, March 17, 2000 (continued)

- Having been alerted of the impending attack, the co-pilot was armed with an axe.
- The captain used the intercom to ask first-class passengers for help. Crew members and 5 to 7 passengers wrestled the passenger to the floor (more than 6ft tall and weighing ~250 pounds).
- Prior to the passenger breaking through the cockpit door, the pilots notified air traffic control of the situation, requesting priority handling into SF.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 7. Germania Charter Flight, March 28, 2000, Tenerife to Berlin

- An airliner with 143 passengers on board dropped briefly from its flight path after the pilot was attacked and injured by a German man.
- The attacker, who appeared to be drunk, told the crew the plane was being taken over by “terrorists.” He assaulted and punched the pilot and grabbed at the flight instruments.
- The co-pilot appealed for help, and four passengers rushed forward to tackle the man.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 8. British Airways Flight 2069, December 29, 2000, London to Nairobi

- A mentally ill passenger stormed the cockpit and attempted to hijack the 747 aircraft.
- Attacking the first officer over the controls, the assailant grabbed the yoke and tried to execute a route change. This disconnected the autopilot and resulted in a struggle between himself and the first officer, causing the aircraft to climb sharply and stall from 42,000 feet and plunge towards the ground at 30,000 feet per minute.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 8. British Airways Flight 2069, December 29, 2000 (continued)

- The struggle was joined by the captain who had gone for a rest break just before the attack.
- The assailant bit one of the captain's fingers and his ear but, aided by his other first officer, the captain succeeded in removing the assailant from the controls, dragging him out of the cockpit and into the club class cabin.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## 8. British Airways Flight 2069, December 29, 2000 (continued)

- Two passengers sitting in the upper deck were able to get into the cockpit to assist, despite the extreme maneuvers, and helped to remove the passenger from the cockpit. Two flight attendants also ran into the cockpit to assist them.
- The first officer was able to regain control and return the aircraft to level flight. The captain said if the struggle had lasted 4 or 5 seconds longer, the co-pilot would not have been able to regain control because the jet was about to flip upside down.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Takeaways from historical examples:

1. In 2 out of 3 cases where guns were used, the hijacker managed to remove the pilots from the controls and keep them from regaining control. These are the only instances of a “successful” suicide hijacking attempt.

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Takeaways from historical examples (continued):

2. In contrast, in all cases involving other weapons or no weapons, when the hijacker attempted to remove the pilots from the controls, the pilots refused and a violent struggle ensued. In all cases, the pilots eventually regained control of the aircraft.



# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Takeaways from historical examples (continued):

Therefore, the idea that the pilots wouldn't have physically resisted violent attempts to remove them or would be unlikely to prevail in a physical struggle, simply on the basis that they were not trained to deal with such hijacking attempts, is contradicted by the historical record.

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Additional takeaways from historical examples:

3. In 4 out of 5 cases involving non-gun weapons or no weapons, the plane went off course.

Note: The one case when the plane didn't go off course (Alaska Airlines Flight 259) is when the pilots were warned by the cabin crew.

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Additional takeaways from historical examples:


4. In all non-gun cases on commercial flights, flight attendants and passengers quickly came to the cockpit to help. In 2 out of 4 examples, the pilots used the intercom system to ask for passengers to help.

# History of Suicide Hijacking Attempts

## Additional takeaways from historical examples:

5. In 2 out of 5 non-gun cases, the pilots were able to alert air traffic control while the hijacking was in progress.

Note: In one case (ANA Flight 61) this was because the hijacking was initially not violent. In another case (Alaska Airlines Flight 259) this was because the pilots were notified by the cabin crew in advance.



# Part 4: Comparing the 9/11 Hijacking Story with the Historical Record

# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record

## Typical features of a suicide hijacking:

1. **Failure (5 out of 5 historical examples).** While hijackers before 9/11 failed in every case where guns were not involved, the hijackers allegedly went 4 for 4 on 9/11.
2. **Deviations from flight path (4 out of 5 historical examples).** Only in one 9/11 case, UA93, was there any deviation, and the small degree of the deviation is suspect.
3. **Communication with air traffic control (2 out of 5 historical examples).** Only in one case, UA93, was there any purported communication, via radio. No pilot on any flight squawked the universal hijack code.

# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record

## Typical features of a suicide hijacking (continued):

- 4. A sustained violent struggle between hijackers and pilots (5 out of 5 historical examples).**  
There were 28 real-time calls and not one description of a struggle and only two vague mentions of what happened to the pilots.
- 5. The pilots call for passengers/crew to help them (2 out of 4 historical examples).** Not one mention of pilots asking passengers for help or otherwise communicating with the cabin.
- 6. Cabin crew and passengers quickly come to the cockpit (4 out of 4 historical examples).**  
Although there were reports of individuals being attacked in cabin, not one mention of multiple passengers coming to help in cockpit — especially odd for UA93 cockpit struggle.

# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record

**Would teams of 4 or 5 hijackers armed with knives or boxcutters really produce opposite outcomes and almost none of the typical features of suicide hijackings on all four flights?**



# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record

9/11 Commission counsel Dietrich Snell found this idea “remarkable”:

“Dieter finds it remarkable that they gained cockpit entry and controlled passengers even though none were physically imposing — the tallest was probably 5’8, and weight averaged 120-130lbs. There are conflicting stories as to how they entered the cockpit. There is indication that fake bombs were used, certainly force. Pilots don’t just abandon their cockpits.”

— Meeting of Team Ia: Dieter Snell with Chris Kojm and Vice-Chairman Hamilton, December 1, 2003



# Obstacles to Gaining Cockpit Access

## Pilots receiving advance warning:

- If hijackers substantially herded passengers/crew to the back of the plane before invading the cockpits, the cabin crew would have time to notify the pilots.
- At 9:24 AM, four minutes before alleged takeover, the UA93 pilots received message from a UA dispatcher: **“Beware any cockpit intrusion. Two aircraft in NY, hit Trade Center builds.”** Captain Jason Dahl responded at 9:26 AM: “Ed, confirm latest mssg plz—Jason.” They also received/overheard other indications.
- UA175 pilots overhead hijacker transmissions from AA11; overheard ATC discussion of AA11 being hijacked; and were asked to visually identify altitude of AA11, which they did.

# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

6 of 8 pilots (at least 1 on each flight) served in military:



AA11 Captain John Ogonowski, 50, Air Force fighter pilot in Vietnam




AA11 First Officer Tom McGuinness, 42, Navy fighter pilot



UA175 Captain Victor Saracini, 51, Navy fighter pilot in Vietnam

# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

**6 of 8 pilots (at least 1 on each flight) served in military:**



UA175 First Officer Michael Horrocks, 38, US Marine Corps aircraft commander



AA77 Captain Chip Burlingame, 51, Naval Academy graduate and Navy fighter pilot



UA93 First Officer Leroy Homer, 36, US Air Force Academy graduate and pilot

# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

## Statements about Chip Burlingame, captain of AA77:

- His sister, Debra Burlingame, said: “This was a guy that’s been through SERE [Survival Evasion Resistance Escape] school in the Navy and had very tough psychological and physical preparation.” (Source: Journal News (Westchester), 12/30/2003)
- Admiral Timothy Keating, who was a classmate of Burlingame’s from the Navy, said, “I was in a plebe summer boxing match with Chick, and he pounded me.... Chick was really tough, and the terrorists had to perform some inhumane act to get him out of that cockpit, I guarantee you.” (Source: CNN, 5/16/2006)



# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

**Many on UA93 were stout, trained, or known for bravery:**

Mark Bingham, 31, 6'5" tall, seated in first class (Seat 4D), was a former rugby star at Berkeley, once fought off two muggers armed with a gun, and saved an uncle from drowning.




Thomas Burnett, 38, 6'2", 200 lbs, seated in first class (Seat 4B), was QB of his high school and college football teams, and was briefly in the US Air Force Academy.



# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

**Many on UA93 were stout, trained, or known for bravery:**

Todd Beamer, 32, 6'0", 200 lbs, seated in 10D (aisle seat in first row of coach), played baseball and basketball in college (was captain of basketball team).



Bill Cashman, 60, had been a paratrooper in the US Army, studied martial arts, and was an iron worker of 40 years.



# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

**Many on UA93 were stout, trained, or known for bravery:**

Jeremy Glick, 31, 6'0", seated in 11A, was a collegiate national judo champion and rugby team captain. A friend said: "I was a 6-foot-tall, 255-pound football player and he could bring me to my knees in three seconds."



Linda Gronlund, 46, seated in first class (2A), was a karate brown belt (one level below black belt) and a certified medical technician. Her interests included sailing and scuba diving.





# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

**Many on UA93 were stout, trained, or known for bravery:**

Richard Guadagno, 38,  
as manager of a  
national wildlife Refuge,  
was a federal law  
enforcement officer  
trained in hand-to-hand  
combat and how to  
respond to a hijacking.  
Could bench press 350  
pounds, 2x own weight.



Flight attendant CeeCee  
Lyles, 33, was previously  
a police officer for six  
years, known for  
willingness to tackle  
fleeing criminals. Passed  
“Advanced Officer  
Survival” which included  
hand-to-hand combat  
and takedown moves.



# Obstacles to Gaining Control of Aircraft

**In contrast, the alleged hijackers were “slight” in build and not armed with particularly dominating weapons:**

- 9/11 Commission Report: “Despite the phrase widely used to describe them, the so-called muscle hijackers were not at all physically imposing; most were between 5’ 5” and 5’ 7” in height.”
- 9/11 Commission Report implies knives were under 4 inches in length.

# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record

**Would the 8 aforementioned people and 30 others on UA93 simply stand by with one 5'7" hijacker carrying a small knife holding them off while the pilots were engaged in a violent cockpit struggle and screaming for their lives — and with control of the aircraft hanging in the balance?**

# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record


**The official story claims four teams of four or three “muscle hijackers,” all under 5’7”, armed only with small knives or box cutters, were able to:**

- control dozens of passengers and cabin crew while gaining access to the cockpits and engaging in and decisively winning violent, deadly struggles with mostly military-trained pilots, some of whom were on extra alert;
- without any of the following things happening on a single flight: (i) The plane going *substantially* off course, (ii) the pilots alerting ATC (in a *clear* way), (iii) the pilots calling for the cabin crew and passengers to help, (iv) the cabin crew and passengers overcoming the one or two hijackers controlling them and coming to the aid of the pilots.

# 9/11 Hijackings vs. Historical Record

**Did the 28 real-time phone calls from the airplanes contain any information that would lead us to conclude this “remarkable” story is true?**

**To the contrary . . .**



# Part 5: The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’ of the 9/11 Hijacking Story

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## 28 calls total in which information was conveyed:

### AA11

- 1 from flight attendant Betty Ong lasting 27 minutes
- 2 from flight attendant Madeline Sweeney lasting 43 seconds and 13 minutes
- All 3 calls were to AA ground personnel

### UA175

- 1 unidentified flight attendant called a UA office in SF
- 2 passengers made 2 calls each to family
- Calls ranged from 27 seconds to 3 minutes

### AA77

- 1 from flight attendant Renee May to family
- 2 from Barbara Olson to husband Ted Olson, US Solicitor General
- Calls ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 minutes.

### UA93

- 2 flight attendants made 2 calls each, the first to the UA office in SF, all others to family.
- 10 passengers made a total of 13 calls to family
- Calls ranged from 28 seconds to ~20 minutes.

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

Types of evidence relating to the phone calls:

- Phone data provided by Claircom (American) and GTE (United)
- FBI reports on interviews with recipients and other info obtained
- 9/11 Commission reports on interviews with recipients
- News stories or books
- Recordings of a handful of calls/voice messages



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Category 1: Omissions and Contradictions

1. Not one caller described how the hijackers entered the cockpit.
2. Not one caller described how the hijackers overpowered the pilots, and only two mentioned what happened to the pilots.
3. Reports from several callers place the cockpit invasions later than the alleged takeover times, and reports from one flight attendant indicate no cockpit invasion at all.\*

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Category 1: Omissions and Contradictions (continued)

4. Callers provided contradictory reports of violence that are irreconcilable.\*
5. Callers provided minimal description of the hijackers and contradictory reports on the number of them.

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Category 2: Unrealistic Hijacking Situations and Behavior

1. Several callers described unrealistic hijacking situations.\*
2. Inexplicable behavior by flight attendants.
3. Majority of the callers were reported as strikingly calm.

# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

(front of plane)

	1A	1B - Ziad Jarrah		1C	1D	
	2A - Linda Gronlund	2B - Joseph DeLuca		2C	2D - Edward Felt	
	3A	3B		3C - Ahmed Alnani	3D - Saeed Alghamdi	
	4A	4B - Thomas Burnett		4C	4D - Mark Bingham	
	5A	5B - Mark Rothenberg		5C	5D	
	6A	6B - Ahmed Alhaznawi		6C	6D	
					8E	8D
9A	9B	9C		9D	9E	9F
10A - Nicole Miller	10B	10C		10D - Todd Beamer	10E	10F - Waleska Martinez
11A - Jeremy Glick	11B	11C		11D - Lauren Grandcolas	11E	11F - Honor Wainio
12A	12B - Marion Britton	12C - Extra Britton seat		12D - Georgine Corrigan	12E	12F - Louis Nacke, Jr.
13A - Colleen Fraser	13B	13C		13D	13E	13F
14A - Donald Peterson	14B	14C - Jean Peterson		14D	14E	14F
15A	15B	15C - Patrick Driscoll		15D - William Cashman	15E	15F
16A	16B	16C		16D - Donald Green	16E	16F
17A - Christine Snyder	17B	17C - Hildagard Marcin		17D - Christian Adams	17E	17F - Alan Beaven
18A - Toshiya Kuge	18B	18C		18D	18E	18F - John Taligani
19A - Richard Guadagno	19B - Jane Folger	19C - Linda Cushing		19D	19E	19F
20A	20B	20C - Andrew Garcia		20D	20E	20F - Deora Bodley
21A	21B	21C - Olga Kristin White		21 D	21E	21F
22A	22B	22C		22D	22E	22F
23A	23B	23C		23D	23E	23F
24A	24B	24C		24D	24E	24F
25A	25B	25C		25D	25E	25F
26A	26B	26C		26D	26E	26F
27A	27B	27C		27D	27E	27F
28A	28B	28C		28D	28E	28F
29A	29B	29C		29D	29E	29F
30A	30B	30C		30D	30E	30F
31A	31B	31C		31D	31E	31F
32A	32B	32C		32D	32E	32F
33A	33B	33C		33D	33E	33F
34A	34B	34C		34D	34E	34F

# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## Boeing 757-200 First Class Cabin



# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## Boeing 757-200 Coach Cabin



# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

	23ABC		23DEF	Grandcolas
Burnett (first call)	24ABC		24DEF	
Burnett (second and third calls)	25ABC		25DEF	Bingham
	26ABC		26DEF	Gronlund, DeLuca
	27ABC		27DEF	Glick
	28ABC		28DEF	
	29ABC		29DEF	
	30ABC		30DEF	
	31ABC		31DEF	
Lyles (first call)	32ABC		32DEF	Beamer
No ID Flight Attendant, Britton, Wainio	33ABC		33DEF	Bradshaw
No ID Flight Attendant (likely Bradshaw), Martinez	34ABC		34DEF	
Felt (cell phone)	Toilet			
Lyles (second call, cell phone)	Unknown			

**(back of plane)**

# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## First UA93 Call: Thomas Burnett at 9:30:32, 28 seconds

### **FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Deena Burnett:**

THOMAS BURNETT was talking quietly and told his wife that the flight he was on had been hijacked. He advised her he was on United Airlines flight 93 from Newark, New Jersey to San Francisco, California. THOMAS BURNETT instructed his wife to call the authorities and advise them that the plane had been hijacked. The hijackers claimed to have a bomb. He also told his wife that a passenger had been knifed.





# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## First UA93 Call: Thomas Burnett at 9:30:32, 28 seconds

### “Transcript” from Burnett Foundation website:

**Deena:** Hello.

**Tom:** Deena.

**Deena:** Tom, are you O.K.?

**Tom:** No, I'm not. I'm on an airplane that has been hijacked.

**Deena:** Hijacked?

**Tom:** Yes, they just knifed a guy.

**Deena:** A passenger?

**Tom:** Yes.

**Deena:** Where are you? Are you in the air?

**Tom:** Yes, yes, just listen. Our airplane has been hijacked. It's United Flight 93 from Newark to San Francisco. We are in the air. The hijackers have already knifed a guy, one of them has a gun, they are telling us there is a bomb on board, please call the authorities.



# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## First UA93 Call: Thomas Burnett at 9:30:32, 28 seconds long

From “Among the Heroes” by Jere Longman:

Later, she would wonder whether Tom called before the hijackers had taken control of the cockpit.

A guy had been knifed, he had said. . . . Deena assumed Tom meant a passenger. Surely he would have been more specific if the pilot or co-pilot had been stabbed. She had asked before he hung up, and he confirmed, yes, it was a passenger.



# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## Second UA93 Call: Sandra Bradshaw at 9:35:40, ~ 6 minutes long

### **FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Richard Belme:**

The female flight attendant said that two male hijackers who had knives were onboard, one of which was in the first class section of the plane and the other was possibly in the cockpit. The first class section was secured, no passengers were able to leave or gain entrance to the first class seating area.

### **Hand-written statement from Belme on 9/11/01:**

I took over the call and the flight attendant reported two men with knives are onboard. One man in the flight station and one man at first class. One man attacked a flight attendant but no passengers or crew were hurt.



# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## Second UA93 Call: Sandra Bradshaw at 9:35:40, ~ 6 minutes long

### **MFR of Belme's interview with 9/11 Commission on 11/21/03:**

Bradshaw told him that two hijackers were in first class at the curtain. They had attacked and killed a flight attendant. She said they did not harm any passengers. She said there were two more hijackers behind the curtain in first class. (His notes indicated that he reported a total of three male hijackers.) There was some dead air during the course of the call. Belme didn't ask about what weapons they used. . . . She did not describe the hijackers, nor did she mention anything about moving passengers to the back of the plane. She told Belme the hijackers announced they had a bomb on the plane. There was no indication there was a struggle; or that the plane was disrupted when they got into the cockpit.



# UA93 Cockpit Struggle: Highly Noticeable

## The Alleged Murder of a Flight Attendant in the Cockpit

### 9/11 Commission Report (p. 12):

“The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.”

- CVR transcript indicates commotion and struggle between hijacker and victim from 9:32 to 9:37, culminating in apparent murder of the victim. Would no one hear this? Would Sandra Bradshaw not report to UA (or to her husband at 9:50) that a flight attendant was in the cockpit or missing?

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Category 1: Omissions and Contradictions

1. Not one caller described how the hijackers entered the cockpit.
2. Not one caller described how the hijackers overpowered the pilots.
3. Reports from several callers place the cockpit invasions later than the alleged takeover times, and reports from one flight attendant indicate no cockpit invasion at all.\*
4. Callers provided contradictory reports of violence that are irreconcilable.\*
5. Callers provided minimal description of the hijackers and contradictory reports on the number of them.

# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Third UA93 Call: Mark Bingham at 9:37:03, ~ 3 minutes long

### **FBI 302 of 9/17/01 interview with Alice Hoglan:**

When ALICE HOGLAN got on the phone, her son said, “Mom, this is MARK BINGHAM” (he stated both his first and last names) followed by, “I want to let you know I love you. I love you all.” ALICE HOGLAN told her son that she loved him too.

BINGHAM then said, “I’m on a flight from Newark to San Francisco and there are three guys who have taken over the plane, and they say they have a bomb. I’m calling you from the air phone.”



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Third UA93 Call: Mark Bingham at 9:37:03 (continued)

**FBI 302 of 9/17/01 interview with Alice Hoglan:**

ALICE HOGLAN then asked, “Who are they Mark?” BINGHAM was distracted and did not answer. ALICE HOGLAN was not sure if her son had heard the question. There was an interruption for approximately five seconds. BINGHAM then stated to his mother, “You’ve got to believe me. It’s true.”





# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Third UA93 Call: Mark Bingham at 9:37:03 (continued)

### **FBI 302 of 9/17/01 interview with Alice Hoglan:**

ALICE HOGLAN responded, “I do believe you Mark. Who are they?” There was another approximate five-second pause, similar to the first, wherein ALICE HOGLAN heard activity and voices in the background. People were murmuring. There were no screams. ALICE HOGLAN got the impression that her son was distracted because someone was speaking to him. Then the phone went dead.



# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## UA93

- **Todd Beamer:** “He stated that three individuals, two wielding knives, the third with a bomb strapped to his waist with a red belt, were preparing to take control of the flight.”  
“[T]he guys went into the cockpit, took the pilot and co-pilot out and locked the door.”
- **Thomas Burnett:** “[T]hey just knifed a guy. . . . The hijackers have already knifed a guy.”  
“DEENA BURNETT advised that her husband, other than referring to the hijackers in the plural, never provided any descriptive data regarding the hijackers.”
- **Sandra Bradshaw (first call, to UA SAMC):** “Two men with knives are onboard.”  
“She did not describe the hijackers.”

# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## UA93

- **Marion Britton:** “BRITTON did not mention any identifying information about the hijackers, how many there were, how they were armed . . .”
- **Joseph DeLuca:** “[DeLuca’s sister] stated that DELUCA had called their father from the aircraft and had stated that terrorists were on the plane . . .”
- **Edward Felt:** “Hijacking in progress!” (Transcript)
- **Lauren Grandcolas:** “We’re having a little problem on the plane. ... I’m totally fine. ... I’m not uncomfortable and I’m OK, for now. ... It’s a little problem. ... It’s a little problem. . . .”
- **Linda Gronlund:** “I’m on United 93 and it’s been hijacked, uh, by terrorists . . .” (Transcript)

# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## UA93

- **CeeCee Lyles:** “I don’t know what to say. There’s three guys. They’ve hijacked the plane.”  
(Recording)



- **Honor Wainio:** “HONOR WAINIO . . . told [her mother] that the flight had been hijacked.... HONOR WAINIO did not provide any other pertinent information regarding the hijackers.”

# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## AA11

- **Betty Ong:** “I think the guys are up there. They might have gone, jammed their way up there or something. Nobody can call the cockpit. We can't even get inside.” (Recording)



# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## UA175

- **Peter Hanson:** “PETER HANSON gave no additional information as to the identity, nationality, physical description, accents, etc. of the highjacker(s).”
- **Brian Sweeney:** “Her conversation with her son was mostly personal. However, with regard to the hijackers, BRIAN SWEENEY told his mother that, ‘I don't know who they are.’”
- **Unidentified Flight Attendant:** “He informed me that the flight was in the process of being hijacked. He also stated that one flight attendant had been stabbed and both pilots had been killed.” (Hand-written statement from UA employee)

# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## AA77

- **Renee May:** “RENEE told her mother that the flight she was on had been hijacked by six 6 hijackers. RENEE further explained that the hijackers put ‘us’ in the back of the airplane.”

“RENEE did not provide any description of the hijackers.”

- **Barbara Olson:** “Barbara did not say anything to describe the hijackers, but did refer to them as ‘they’.”

# 16 of 19 callers didn't describe the hijackers

## The Three Callers Who Described the Hijackers

- **Jeremy Glick on UA93:** “Flight #93 had been hijacked by three ‘Iranian-looking’ males, with dark skin and bandanas (ethnic type as opposed to hippie type) on their heads.”
- **Sandra Bradshaw on UA93 (second call, to husband):** “She continued to state that the plane had been hijacked by three men with dark skin, and SANDRA stated ‘They almost looked Islamic’. . . . All three of the hijackers put red headbands on their heads as they were hijacking the plane. . . . SANDRA did not say anything about what the hijackers said nor the language spoken during the hijacking.”
- **Madeline Sweeney on AA11:** “SWEENEY described the hijackers as three Middle Eastern males. One of the males spoke good English and another spoke poor English.”



# No one gave correct number of hijackers

## UA93

- All five callers who gave number of hijackers stated three hijackers (Mark Bingham, Jeremy Glick, Todd Beamer, CeeCee Lyles, Sandra Bradshaw\*).
- 9/11 Commission explanation: “[S]everal passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four. . . . We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.”

# No one gave correct number of hijackers

## AA11

Both Ong and Sweeney mention no more than 3 hijackers on board:

- Betty Ong: “ONG also identified passengers seated in Seats 2A, 2B, and 10B as participating in the hijacking.”
- Madeline Sweeney: “The hijackers were sitting in seats 10B, 9C, and 9G or 9D and 9G. SWEENEY described the hijackers as three Middle Eastern males.”

## AA77

- Renee May: “RENEE told her mother that the plane she was on had been hijacked by six [6] hijackers.”

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Category 1: Omissions and Contradictions

1. Not one caller described how the hijackers entered the cockpit.
2. Not one caller described how the hijackers overpowered the pilots.
3. Reports from several callers place the cockpit invasions later than the alleged takeover times, and reports from one flight attendant indicate no cockpit invasion at all.\*
4. Callers provided contradictory reports of violence that are irreconcilable.\*
5. Callers provided minimal description of the hijackers and contradictory reports on the number of them.

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Fifth UA93 Call: Thomas Burnett at 9:37:53, 62 seconds long

### **FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Deena Burnett:**

Approximately ten minutes later DEENA BURNETT received another call from her husband, THOMAS BURNETT. THOMAS BURNETT was speaking in a quiet voice and asked his wife if she had heard about any other planes. DEENA BURNETT advised her husband that two planes had flown into the World Trade Center. . . . THOMAS BURNETT mentioned during this conversation that the hijackers were talking about flying the plane into the ground, location not specified.



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Fifth UA93 Call: Thomas Burnett at 9:37:53, 62 seconds long

### “Transcript” from Burnett Foundation website:

**Deena:** Hello.

**Tom:** They’re in the cockpit. The guy knifed is dead.

**Deena:** He’s dead?

**Tom:** Yes. I tried to help him, but I couldn’t get a pulse.

**Deena:** Tom, they are hijacking planes all up and down the east coast. They are taking them and hitting designated targets. They’ve already hit both towers of the World Trade Center.

**Tom:** They’re talking about crashing the plane. (a pause) Oh my God. It’s a suicide mission... [transcript continues]



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Thomas Burnett’s Third Call, at 9:44:23, 54 seconds long

### **FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Deena Burnett:**

Approximately five minutes later she received another cell phone call from her husband. . . . THOMAS BURNETT advised his wife in this call that the passenger that had been knifed had died. He told her “they” were in the cockpit.

“Later, she would wonder whether Tom called before the hijackers had taken control of the cockpit.” (Longman)



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Fourth UA93 Call: Jeremy Glick at 9:37:41, ~20 min (2 hrs, 6 min)

### **FBI 302 of 9/12/01 interview with Lyzbeth Glick:**

Jeremy first told Lyzbeth that he loved her and then said that Flight #93 had been hijacked by three "Iranian-looking" males. . . One of the males stated that he was in possession of a bomb in a red box and one was armed with a knife.



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Fourth UA93 Call: Jeremy Glick at 9:37:41 (continued)

**FBI 302 of 9/12/01 interview with Lyzbeth Glick:**

... Jeremy advised Lyzbeth that the hijackers had herded the passengers into the rear of the plane and told them that if they did not crash into the World Trade Center, that they were going to blow-up the plane.





# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Fourth UA93 Call: Jeremy Glick at 9:37:41 (continued)

### **FBI 302 of 9/12/01 interview with Lyzbeth Glick:**

One of the hijackers then told the passengers to call their loved ones. The three hijackers then entered the cockpit of the plane. Jeremy advised that he was unsure if the hijackers were going to crash or blow-up the plane. The entire call lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.




# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Fourth UA93 Call: Jeremy Glick at 9:37:41 (continued)

- Despite speaking with his wife for approximately 20 minutes, Glick did not mention any acts of violence against any pilots, flight attendants, or passengers.
- When speaking to his wife, Glick was sitting just two rows behind Thomas Burnett during Burnett's second/third calls reporting the death of stabbed man.

	23ABC		23DEF	Grandcolas
Burnett (first call)	24ABC		24DEF	
Burnett (second and third calls)	25ABC		25DEF	Bingham
	26ABC		26DEF	Gronlund, DeLuca
	27ABC		27DEF	Glick



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Todd Beamer's Call to GTE at 9:43:48, ~16 minutes (1 hr, 5 min)

### **FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Lisa Jefferson:**

JEFFERSON received a phone call at approximately 8:45 a.m. Central time. . . . BEAMER called to state that the airplane was about to be hijacked. He stated that three individuals, two wielding knives, the third with a bomb strapped to his waist with a red belt, were preparing to take control of the flight.



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Todd Beamer's Call to GTE at 9:43:48 (continued)

**FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Lisa Jefferson:**

JEFFERSON estimated that she spoke to BEAMER for seven minutes before the two hijackers armed with knives entered the cockpit, securing the door behind them. The third hijacker with the bomb remained in the main cabin with the passengers after closing the privacy curtain between First Class and Economy Class.



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Todd Beamer’s Call to GTE at 9:43:48: Subsequent Accounts

### **Lisa Jefferson 9/11/01 Synopsis of Call (shared 9/14):**

From what Todd could see two people were hurt, not sure if they were dead or alive. The hijackers went into the cockpit and locked the door.

### **Transcript of 9/15 call from Jefferson to Lisa Beamer:**

Jefferson did not mention Beamer saying anyone was hurt or lying on the floor, only: “the guys went into the cockpit, took the pilot and co-pilot out and locked the door.”



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Todd Beamer's Call to GTE at 9:43:48: Subsequent Accounts

### **MFR of Jefferson's 5/11/04 interview with the 9/11 Commission:**

Mr. Beamer told her that three people had taken over the flight. Two with knives had locked themselves in the cockpit. . . . Mr. Beamer then told Ms. Jefferson that two people were lying on the floor bleeding. Ms. Jefferson heard the flight attendant say to Mr. Beamer that the two on the ground were the pilot and co-pilot.

Ms. Jefferson believes that everything that Mr. Beamer had told her up to the part about the hijackers closing the curtain to First Class had already happened and that Mr. Beamer was bringing her up-to-date.



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Todd Beamer’s Call to GTE at 9:43:48: Subsequent Accounts

**Is that credible given what was recorded in the FBI 302 on 9/11?**

- “BEAMER called to state that the airplane was about to be hijacked.”
- “He stated that three individuals . . . were preparing to take control of the flight.”
- JEFFERSON estimated that she spoke to BEAMER for seven minutes before the two hijackers armed with knives entered the cockpit . . .”



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Todd Beamer's Call to GTE at 9:43:48: Subsequent Accounts

**According to Jefferson's 2006 book *Called*, Beamer said:**

There are two people lying on the floor in First Class. I think they're hurt [...] I can't tell if they're dead or alive. The flight attendant next to me says it's the pilot and co-pilot.

- Did Beamer see the pilots get pulled out of the cockpit or not?
- If he did, why doesn't he know whether or not these are the pilots?
- If he didn't, wouldn't their uniforms still make it obvious?
- And why do no other callers report any of this?






# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Marion Britton's Call to Fred Fiumano at 9:49:12, ~4 minutes

**FBI 302 of 9/17/01 interview with Fred Fiumano (boyfriend):**

BRITTON said the hijackers had cut two passengers throats. . . . BRITTON said they were turning and going to crash. FIUMANO then heard a lot of screaming and then the phone went dead.



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Sandra Bradshaw's Call to Phil Bradshaw at 9:50:04, ~8 minutes

FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Phil Bradshaw (husband):

Further, SANDRA did not say if the hijackers went into the cockpit of the plane or not. . . . At the end of the telephone call, SANDRA told BRADSHAW that everyone was running up to first class and she hung up the telephone.



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Sandra Bradshaw's Call to Phil Bradshaw at 9:50:04 (continued)

FBI 302 of 9/12/01 interview with Phil Bradshaw (husband):

SANDRA BRADSHAW informed her husband that three hijackers were on the airplane. All were sitting at the front of the plane and possessed knives. . . .

During her call, SANDRA assumed the airplane crew was still in the cockpit and in control, however, the three hijackers were also at the front of the plane.



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## Sandra Bradshaw’s Call to Phil Bradshaw at 9:50:04 (continued)

- How could Bradshaw assume the pilots were in control given the struggle at 9:28 — and with Burnett, Glick and Beamer all reporting the hijackers in the cockpit?
- Despite speaking with her husband (an airline pilot) for 8 minutes, Bradshaw did not mention any violence against any pilots, flight attendants, or passengers.

Lyles (first call)	32ABC		32DEF	Beamer
No ID Flight Attendant, Britton, Wainio	33ABC	←→	33DEF	Bradshaw
No ID Flight Attendant (likely Bradshaw), Martinez	34ABC		34DEF	

# Irreconcilable Reports of Violence, Death

**1. Cockpit Voice Recorder:** Woman (assumed to be a flight attendant) murdered in cockpit.




**2. Thomas Burnett:** One passenger knifed and dead.



**4. Todd Beamer:** Pilots removed from the cockpit and lying on the floor in first class.



**3. Sandra Bradshaw:** One flight attendant attacked, but no crew or passenger hurt. No violence or missing flight attendant reported to husband.



**5. Marion Britton:** Two passengers' throats slit.

(Beamer, Bradshaw, Britton across from each other or one row apart.)

# Irreconcilable Reports of Violence, Death

- **Jeremy Glick** described no violence despite 20-min call and sitting across from Burnett.
- **Mark Bingham** described no violence despite sitting directly across from Burnett.
- **Linda Gronlund and Joseph DeLuca** described no violence despite sitting across from Burnett.
- **CeeCee Lyles** described no violence despite sitting next to Beamer and Britton.
- **Honor Wainio** described no violence despite making 4.5-minute call to mother immediately after Britton called from the same bank of seats.
- **Edward Felt:** Described no violence, only “Hijacking in progress!” half hour into hijacking.

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## AA77 callers also appear to have reported a late cockpit invasion

- **Time of alleged takeover:** 8:51 to 8:54 AM
- **FBI Information Control Form 0741, 9/11/01 (Renee May 9:12 AM call):** “RENEE MAY told her father that the hijackers were moving the crew and passengers to the rear of the airplane and attempting to gain access to the cockpit. At that point of the call, the telephone line went dead.”

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## AA77 callers also appear to have reported a late cockpit invasion

- **MFR of Patty Carson's 11/19/03 interview with 9/11 Commission (Renee May 9:12 AM call):** "Mrs. May told Carson that Renee had reported that she was in the back of the plane and that they didn't know anything about the state of the pilots at that time."
- **FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with AT&T operator Mercy Lorenzo (Barbara Olson 9:15 AM call):** "The hi-jackers, armed with guns and knives, were ordering the passengers to move to the back of the plane. The passenger wanted to know how to let the pilots know what was happening. It did not appear as if they were aware of the situation."



# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Category 2: Unrealistic Hijacking Situations and Behavior

1. Several callers described unrealistic hijacking situations.\*
2. Inexplicable behavior by flight attendants.
3. Majority of the callers were reported as strikingly calm.

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## The Situation on AA11 Described by Ong and Sweeney

- Two flight attendants stabbed and one business class passenger fatally stabbed in throat, and mace released in first class.
- All first class and business class passengers moved back to coach class.
- **And yet, coach class passengers are not aware there's a hijacking, only believe there's a medical emergency.**

“ONG also stated that she did not believe that the coach passengers were aware of the hijacking.” (FBI 302 of 9/12/01 interview with Winston Sadler)

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## The Situation on AA11 Described by Ong and Sweeney

- Meanwhile up front, no one is in first class and business class, and they can't to get into the cockpit.

Ong: "We can't get up to the cockpit. The door won't open."

- Apparently no hijackers are stopping them from reaching the cockpit, and there's no mention of the pilots on the floor.
- **Are all five hijackers and the two pilots in the cockpit???**



# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## The Situation on AA11 Described by Ong and Sweeney

“SWEENY described [to Michael Woodward] the atmosphere in the aircraft as calm while the hijacking was carried out.”



(FBI 302 of 9/11/01 interview with Jane Allen, VP of Flight Services)

# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## UA93 Passengers Were Free, Even Encouraged, to Make Calls

- **Jeremy Glick:** “One of the hijackers then told the passengers to call their loved ones.” (Lyzbeth Glick FBI 302 9/12/01)

Lyzbeth Glick to 9/11 Commission on 4/22/04: “Ms. Glick indicated that Mr. Glick did not tell her that the hijackers ‘urged’ the passengers to call loved ones. Mr. Glick indicated only that the hijackers did not seem to care that passengers were on the phone.”

# The Phone Calls: The ‘Nail in the Coffin’

## UA93 Passengers Were Free, Even Encouraged, to Make Calls

- **Todd Beamer:** “BEAMER stated the hijacker seemed to be aware of the fact that he was on the telephone, but that they did not seem to care.” (FBI 9/11/01 interview w/ Robert Combs, GTE)  
  
“Ms. Jefferson then told him that the authorities had been notified and not to endanger himself by talking on the phone. Mr. Beamer replied that he was free to talk.” (9/11 Commission MFR)
- **Sandra Bradshaw:** “SANDRA was permitted to use the phone and speak freely, therefore, BRADSHAW opined that the hijackers were not closely watching the passengers.” (FBI 302 of Phil Bradshaw’s 9/11/01 interview)

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

**Why didn't many more passengers on all four flights make phone calls?**

# Flight Attendants' Inexplicable Behavior

- **Ong:** 27 minutes on phone. **Sweeney:** 13 minutes on phone. **Bradshaw:** 8 minutes on phone — doing little to help the situation on the aircraft.

“MINTER stated that ONG kept repeating herself during the conversation. ONG said repeatedly that there were stabbings.” (FBI 302, Minter)

“There was some dead air during the course of the call [w/ Bradshaw].” (Belme, Commission MFR)

- Why didn't Sandra Bradshaw contact the cockpit if she thought pilots were there?
- Ong and Sweeney both initially stated they were on Flight 12.
- Ong: No doctor or nurse on onboard. Sweeney: Doctor & nurse onboard (wrong).



# The Calmness of the Callers

## UA93

- **Todd Beamer:** Beamer's voice "was so devoid of any stress. In fact, he sounded so tranquil it made me begin to doubt the authenticity and urgency of the call." (Lisa Jefferson, *Called*, 2006)
- **Mark Bingham:** "Throughout the entire call, her son sounded calm, controlled, matter-of-fact, and focused." (Alice Hoglan FBI 302, 9/17/01)
- **Sandra Bradshaw:** "She was 'shockingly calm.'" (Belme 9/11 Commission MFR, 11/21/03)

# The Calmness of the Callers

## UA93 (continued)

- **Thomas Burnett:** “It was as if he was at Thoratec, sitting at his desk, and we were having a regular conversation.” — Deena Burnett (Longman, *Among the Heroes*, 2003)
- **Jeremy Glick:** “Jeremy was extremely calm, but sounded very concerned and confused.” (Lyzbeth Glick FBI 302, 9/12/01)
- **Lauren Grandcolas:** “Her voice was very calm and there were no audible background noises.” (Jack Grandcolas FBI 302, 9/11/01)

# The Calmness of the Callers

## AA11

- **Madeline Sweeney:** “WOODWARD said that during the entire conversation he had with SWEENEY, her voice remained calm and even.” (M. Woodward FBI 302, 9/13/01)

## UA175

- **Brian Sweeney:** “His conversation was subdued.” (FBI Information Control Form, 0643, 9/11/01)
- **Unidentified Flight Attendant:** “Policastro was reluctant to believe him because the caller was calm and there was no background noise.” (Policastro 9/11 Commission MFR, 11/21/03)

# The Calmness of the Callers

## AA77

- **Renee May:** “NANCY MAY . . . further stated that her daughter sounded as though she was very calm during the conversation.” (Ron and Nancy May, FBI 302, 9/11/01)
- **Barbara Olson:** “She sounded very, very calm. . . . In retrospect, enormously, remarkably, incredibly calm.” — Ted Olson (Larry King Live, 9/14/01)

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Conclusion:

**The phone calls were false evidence produced and disseminated during the commission of the 9/11 crime.**

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Conclusion:

**Since the phone calls are false, there is no evidentiary basis for the already implausible story of violent hijackings.**

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

## Conclusion:

**The dissemination of false evidence meant to support the implausible hijacking story allows us to conclude it is also false.**

# The Phone Calls: The 'Nail in the Coffin'

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# Let Us Honor the Victims of 9/11 by Finding the Truth



*The 40 passengers and crew of United Airlines Flight 93. (Courtesy of the NPS)*