CBS later reports that on this day, Osama bin Laden is admitted to a military hospital in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, for kidney dialysis treatment. Pakistani military forces guard bin Laden. They also move out all the regular staff in the urology department and send in a secret team to replace them. It is not known how long he stays there. [CBS News, 1/28/2002]
September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Alshehhi Checks out of Boston Hotel
9/11 hijacker Marwan Alshehhi checks out of his hotel in Boston, Massachusetts. It is unclear where he spends the night before 9/11, but at 11:57 a.m. on this day he wires some money to a co-conspirator in the Middle East from the Greyhound bus station in Boston. [US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 
] One eyewitness will claim to see him at Dulles Airport in Washington later this evening (see (Between 8:00 p.m. and 8:45 p.m.) September 10, 2001), but apparently he is back in Boston by the next morning (see (6:20 a.m.-7:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Atta Allegedly Visits the WTC to Enter Coordinates Into GPS Device; One Report Claims Mistaken Identity
Credit card receipts later discovered by the FBI apparently show that alleged lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta is in Manhattan on this day. According to FBI agents, he visits the observation deck on the 107th floor of the south WTC tower. CNN will report, “Officials speculate Atta may have been in New York… to program the towers’ location into a global positioning system.” A global positioning system (GPS) uses satellite technology to pinpoint any location on Earth. According to the FBI, Atta bought himself such a device, costing about $500, by mail order. [ABC News, 5/22/2002; CNN, 5/22/2002] Investigators will reportedly consider this trip necessary, “because they believe the hijackers were too inexperienced to handle the jumbo jets without help.” [New York Daily News, 5/22/2002] BBC reporter Jane Corbin points out that Atta was also witnessed at Boston’s Logan Airport the previous morning (see September 9, 2001), where he could have entered start-point co-ordinates for his 9/11 flight into the GPS device. [Corbin, 2003, pp. 230] However, there is no mention of Atta’s New York visit in the 9/11 Commission Report. According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, Atta spent the previous night at the Milner Hotel in Boston, and then shortly after noon on this day is in Boston where he picks up Abdulaziz Alomari and drives to Portland, Maine. [US Congress, 9/26/2002] The 200-mile journey from Boston to New York takes approximately four hours by car. [MIT, 5/25/2006] So if Mueller’s account is correct, it seems difficult to comprehend Atta having time to travel to New York, go up the WTC, make purchases on his credit card, and then return to Boston, all in the space of one morning. An article in the New York Post will in fact claim that the person in Manhattan was “a distinguished renal and gene specialist at Johns Hopkins University Hospital” in Baltimore, Maryland. This man, who is also called Mohamed Atta, happened to have visited New York in the days before 9/11, “for a whirlwind weekend with his new bride.” The article claims that it had erroneously been reported that alleged hijacker Mohamed Atta “was casing the Twin Towers days before Sept. 11—even after the FBI concluded it was just the kidney doctor, who had planned to take his wife to Windows on the World for dinner in the North Tower.” [New York Post, 5/28/2002]
September 10, 2001: Pilot Assigns Himself to Flight 11, Replacing Original Co-Pilot
Thomas McGuinness, who will who be the co-pilot of American Airlines Flight 11—the first plane to hit the World Trade Center—on September 11, only arranges to be on that flight the afternoon before, pushing from it the original co-pilot, who assigned himself to the flight less than 30 minutes earlier. [Peter Scheibner, 8/30/2011; WYFF 4, 9/10/2011; KSAX, 1/20/2012] The original co-pilot of Flight 11 is Steve Scheibner, a Baptist pastor and a commander in the Naval Reserves, who also works part-time as an on-call pilot for American Airlines. [New York Times, 2/27/2000; Portland Press Herald, 3/1/2003; Fergus Falls Daily Journal, 1/20/2012]
Pilot Puts Name Down for Flight 11 – Scheibner will later describe how McGuinness comes to take his place on the flight. He will recall: “I was available to go flying on September 11. So at about three o’clock in the afternoon of September 10 I sat down at the computer and I logged in like I normally do, to check to see if there was any unassigned flying for the next day. And sure enough there was one trip that was available on September 11. It was American Airlines Flight 11 out of Boston’s Logan Airport to Los Angeles.… And I looked at it and there was no pilot assigned to it yet.” Scheibner checks to see if there are any reserve pilots available, but, he will say, “It just so happened [that] on September 11, 2001, there was only one guy available to go flying on that day and that was me.” He therefore puts his name down for Flight 11. Scheibner tells his wife he will be flying to Los Angeles the following day, packs his bags for the flight, and takes them out to the car ready.
Pilot Receives No Confirmation Call from Airline – However, shortly after Scheibner puts his name down for the flight, McGuinness takes the position from him. Scheibner will say how this comes about. According to Scheibner, the “final assignment” of a pilot to a flight involves a phone call from American Airlines, where someone from the airline will say, “Hey, we wanna let you know you’ve been assigned a trip.” Once this call has been made, even if another pilot wants to take your place, they cannot do so. There is therefore “a 30-minute window of opportunity” to replace a pilot who has already been assigned to a flight. After that, “Once that phone call gets made, it’s a done deal.” But after Scheibner signs up for Flight 11, the anticipated call from American Airlines never comes. Later on, during the evening, Scheibner thinks, “You know, they never assigned that trip to me.”
McGuinness Replaces Scheibner as Co-Pilot – Scheibner will explain what instead happens. He will say that McGuinness is one of American Airlines’ “line holding pilots” and is a “little bit senior” to him. At “about three o’clock in the afternoon,” Scheibner will say, McGuinness “went over to the computer and he logged in and he looked and he saw that [Flight 11] was open, but my name had been penciled in.” McGuinness knows he is “still in that 30-minute window of opportunity,” and so he calls American Airlines and asks: “Am I legal to take this trip? In other words, can I bump Scheibner off that trip?” According to Scheibner, American Airlines says, “Yep, you’re legal for that trip, but you gotta give us a call back in the next 20 minutes, or else we’re gonna finalize the assignment.” McGuinness does indeed call the airline again and tells it he will take the flight. “At that moment,” Scheibner will say, American Airlines “erased my name off the trip [and] they assigned it to Tom [McGuinness].” [Peter Scheibner, 8/30/2011] For a pilot to take another pilot’s place like this is a rare occurrence. In 2011, Scheibner will note, “I can count three times in 20 years at American Airlines that I’ve been bumped from a trip the night before.” [WYFF 4, 9/10/2011]
Scheibner Learns Flight’s Fate from Airline Website – On September 11, Scheibner will not initially realize that the flight he tried to be on was targeted in the terrorist attacks. It will only be in the evening that he will be wondering who was on the flight he signed up for, and so log into the American Airlines website to check. He will recall: “I logged in and when the screen came up in front of me, it looked exactly like it did the day before when it had that trip and it had my name penciled in. Except this time it had this trip sequence, my name wasn’t there, and it said these three words: ‘Sequence. Failed. Continuity.’” These words are the code the airline uses to say, “The trip never made it to its destination.” [Peter Scheibner, 8/30/2011] John Ogonowski, who will pilot Flight 11 on 9/11, is, like McGuinness, not originally supposed to be on that flight, but is scheduled to take it shortly before September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). [Georgetown Record, 9/18/2003; Georgetown Record, 9/7/2005] Pilots on two of the other aircraft hijacked on 9/11 are also not originally scheduled to fly that day, but are booked onto those planes shortly before September 11 (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001 and Shortly Before September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 9/13/2001; Denver Post, 12/16/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2006]
Before September 11, 2001: Terrorism Expert Tells FAA Intelligence Personnel that a Suicide Attack on Aviation Is Unlikely
The FAA’s intelligence division conducts a conference call to examine the idea of “suicide attackers” during which a leading authority on the subject says a suicide attack on aviation is unlikely. At an unspecified time before 9/11, James Padgett—the manager of the global issues division of the FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence at the time of the 9/11 attacks—arranges a conference call in which the analysts in his division get to talk to Ariel Merari, a professor of psychology at Tel Aviv University in Israel, about suicide terrorism. [9/11 Commission, 10/7/2003 ] Merari has spent years studying suicide attacks around the world and specializes in the profiles of suicide bombers. [Boston Globe, 9/23/2001; Washington Post, 10/16/2001] He has authored or coauthored numerous books, articles, monographs, and chapters on political terrorism and other forms of political violence, and has served as a consultant to various branches of several governments. [Merari, 10/2000 ] Merari says, during the conference call, that throughout his research he has yet to find a single instance of a suicide attack on aviation. He says he thinks such an attack would be unlikely for psychological reasons relating to the extended time between the “point of no return” and the execution of the attack. He “certainly did not raise the possibility of multiple hijackers willing to kill themselves,” Padgett will later comment. [9/11 Commission, 10/7/2003 ]
September 10, 2001: Review of Counterterrorism Legislation May Take Six Months, Says Cheney Aide
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who, with Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), has sent a copy of draft legislation on counterterrorism and national defense to Vice President Cheney’s office on July 20, is told by Cheney’s top aide Lewis “Scooter” Libby on this day “that it might be another six months before he would be able to review the material.” [Dianne Feinstein, 5/17/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002]
September 10, 2001: 9/11 Hijackers Atta and Alomari Make Mysterious Trip to Portland, Maine
9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari arrive in Portland, Maine, where they spend the night. In October 2001, the FBI will release detailed information and photographs of the two hijackers in the town in an apparent attempt to find out from the public more about what they were doing there. According to the FBI, the pair leave Boston in the afternoon in a blue Nissan Altima and drive to South Portland, where they check into a Comfort Inn around 5:45 p.m. They are caught on security cameras visiting a gas station, two ATMs, and shopping at a Wal-Mart. The next morning they fly back to Boston, where they board the airplane they will hijack. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/2001; Boston Herald, 10/5/2001; Portland Press Herald, 10/5/2001; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 11/12/2001] In September 2002, the New York Times speculates, “There have been many theories [for going to Portland]: that they made contact with a confederate in Portland who gave them the final go-ahead, or more likely, that by arriving on a connecting flight, they would avoid the security check in Boston. None of those explanations seems entirely satisfactory, given the risk….” [New York Times, 9/11/2002] The 9/11 Commission will later speculate that the most “plausible theory” is that the hijackers make the trip so as to help avoid suspicion that might be created from all ten hijackers departing on Boston flights arriving in the Boston airport at roughly the same time. [Washington Post, 2/13/2005]
September 10, 2001: Military ‘Infocon’ Alert Level Reduced because of Perceived Lower Threat of Computer Attacks
The US military reduces the Information Operations Condition (Infocon) to Normal—the lowest possible threat level—less than 12 hours before the 9/11 attacks commence, reportedly due to reduced fears of attacks on computer networks.
Level Reduced Due to ‘Decreased Threat’ – The Infocon level is lowered to Normal, meaning there is no special threat, at 9:09 p.m. this evening. The reason for this, according to historical records for the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, is “a decreased threat from hacker and virus attacks on the computer networks across the US.” [Colorado Springs Gazette, 5/3/2001; 1st Fighter Wing History Office, 12/2001] Since October 1999, the commander of the US Space Command has been in charge of Defense Department computer network defense, and has had the authority to declare Infocon levels. [IAnewsletter, 12/2000 ] General Ralph Eberhart, the current commander of both the US Space Command and NORAD, is thus responsible for evaluating the threat to US military computers and issuing information conditions—“Infocons”—to the US military. He is presumably therefore responsible for lowering the Infocon level this evening.
Higher Infocon Level Requires More Precautions – It is unclear what difference the reduced Infocon level makes. But an e-mail sent earlier in the year from Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, where NORAD and the US Space Command are headquartered, revealed the steps to be taken when the Infocon level is raised one level from Normal, to Alpha. These steps include “changing passwords, updating keys used to create classified communication lines, minimizing cell phone use, backing up important documents on hard drive, updating virus protection on home computers, reporting suspicious activity, and reviewing checklists.” [Colorado Springs Gazette, 5/3/2001]
Level Increased Earlier in Year – It is also unclear what the Infocon level was prior to being reduced this evening and why it had been at that raised level. Pentagon networks were raised to Infocon Alpha for the first time at the end of April this year, as a precaution against attacks on US systems, after Chinese hackers warned of such attacks in Internet chat room postings. [United Press International, 4/30/2001; Colorado Springs Gazette, 5/3/2001; United Press International, 7/24/2001] The Infocon level was raised to Alpha a second time in late July, due to the threat posed by the Code Red computer virus. [United Press International, 7/24/2001; US Department of Defense, 7/24/2001] It will be raised again, from Normal to Alpha, during the morning of September 11, immediately after the second attack on the World Trade Center takes place (see 9:04 a.m. September 11, 2001). [1st Fighter Wing History Office, 12/2001]
System Intended to Protect Defense Department Computers – The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Infocon system in March 1999 in response to the growing and sophisticated threat to Defense Department information networks. The system is intended as a structured, coordinated approach to defend against and react to attacks on Defense Department systems and networks. Reportedly, it “provides a structured, operational approach to uniformly heighten or reduce defensive posture, defend against unauthorized activity, and mitigate sustained damage to the defense information infrastructure.” It is analogous to other Defense Department alert systems, such as Defense Condition (Defcon) and Threat Condition (Threatcon). The Infocon system comprises five levels of threat, each with its own procedures for protecting systems and networks. These levels go from Normal, through Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie, up to Delta, which, according to Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, is when “You’re currently under an absolutely massive hack attack, from a variety of means, from a variety of sources. You’re talking a very concerted, focused attack effort to get into [Defense Department] systems.” [IAnewsletter, 12/2000 ; General Accounting Office, 3/29/2001 ; US Department of Defense, 7/24/2001]
September 10, 2001: Alarm Bells Sound over Unusual Trading in US Stock Options Market
According to CBS News, in the afternoon before the attack, “alarm bells were sounding over unusual trading in the US stock options market.” It has been documented that the CIA, the Mossad, and many other intelligence agencies monitor stock trading in real time using highly advanced programs such as Promis. Both the FBI and the Justice Department have confirmed the use of such programs for US intelligence gathering through at least this summer. This would confirm that the CIA should have had additional advance warning of imminent attacks against American and United Airlines planes. [CBS News, 9/19/2001] There are even allegations that bin Laden was able to get a copy of Promis. [Fox News, 10/16/2001]
Before September 11, 2001: Al-Qaeda Hamburg Cell Member Zammar Is Placed on German Watch List
Al-Qaeda Hamburg cell member Mohammed Haydar Zammar is on a German watch list of suspected Muslim extremists before 9/11, the Washington Post will later report. However, more details, such as when he is placed on the watch list, are unknown. [Washington Post, 6/12/2002] Cell members Said Bahaji and Mounir El Motassadeq are also placed on a watch list, both of them in March 2000 (see March 2000).
